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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis examines literary and cultural influences upon descriptions of warfare in 
Byzantine historiography, focusing on events of the ninth to twelfth centuries.  Its 
main aim is twofold: to account for the appearance in historiography of more ‘heroic’ 
accounts of battle from the late tenth century, and to identify the sources Middle 
Byzantine historians employed for military events, particularly since this material 
appears to have had a significant role in the aforementioned development.  Study of 
Middle Byzantine historical works grants insight into general features of war writing.  
Moreover, it also reveals much about the working methods of historians and the 
written sources they employed for military episodes.  These sources, now lost to us, 
are determined to have primarily been campaign reports and biographical 
compositions.  Once an understanding of the nature of such texts is reached, one may 
demonstrate that they presented their military subject according to contemporary 
ideals of valour and generalship.  It is suggested that the appearance of promotional 
literature of the military aristocracy in the tenth century was instrumental in the 
development of a more ‘heroic’ form of war writing, with Homeric-style descriptions 
of battle, cunning military stratagems, and courageous displays more evident in 
historiography from this time. 
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INTRODUCTION 
With the appearance of the Histories of Herodotus ‘all history was military history’.1  
Arnaldo Momigliano decreed that from this time ‘wars remained the centre of 
historiography’.2  Charles Fornara speaks of Thucydides perfecting ‘the war 
monograph’ implicit in Herodotus,3 though Tim Rood determines that historians often 
‘did not distinguish between war monographs and other forms of contemporary 
history writing’.4  Lucian of Samosata, the famed sophist of the second century A.D., 
considered true the old saying of Ionian philosopher Heraclitus, that ‘“war is the 
father of all things”, since at one stroke it has begotten so many historians’.5  This 
sentiment is evident through Late Antiquity and persisted in much of the 
historiography of the Byzantine Empire.  Indeed, the eleventh-century writer Michael 
Psellos conceded to his reader that he did not have time ‘to tell of the armies and 
camps, the skirmishes and battles, and all the other minor points in which the careful 
historian is accustomed to indulge’.6  Psellos is seen to apologize for the lack of 
military detail in his work, such was the established presence of war in Greek 
historiography in the classical mould.  
This thesis explores the presentation of warfare in historiography of the tenth to early 
thirteenth centuries, the period generally classified as Middle Byzantine.  The study is 
limited by practical considerations, and extending the scope would perhaps be more 
                                                 
1 Kiesling (2003): 88-89. 
2 Momigliano (1960): 21-22. 
3 Fornara (1983): 32.  For discussion of war in Herodotus and Thucydides see Cobet (1986). 
4 Rood (2007): esp. 151. 
5 ἀληθὲς ἄρ’ ἦν ἐκεῖνο τό “Πόλεµος ἁπάντων πατήρ”, εἴ γε καὶ συγγραφέας τοσούτους ἀνέφυσεν ὑπὸ 
µιᾷ τῇ ὁρµῇ (Lucian: §2; trans. 5). 
6 Τὰ µὲν οὖν ἐφεξῆς πάντα διεξιέναι, ἕκαστόν τε ἐξακριβοῦσθαι ἀφ’ οἵων ἀρχῶν εἰς οἶα τέλη 
κατήντησε, συντάξεις τε καταλέγειν καὶ στρατοπεδείας, ἀκροβολισµούς τε καὶ ἁψιµαχίας καὶ τἄλλα 
ὁπόσα εἴθισται λέγειν τοῖς ἀκριβέσι τῶν συγγραφέων (Psellos, Chronographia: I, 152 [LXXIII]; trans. 
191). 
2 
foolhardy than ambitious.  A survey of historians writing after c.1220 is certainly 
warranted, but changes in warfare and culture call for a separate study.  By contrast, 
the great historians of Late Antiquity have been subject to many studies probing their 
autoptic ability, source material, coverage of wars, battle descriptions and general 
value as military historians.  This is particularly true of fourth-century Latin historian 
Ammianus Marcellinus, with Norman Austin and Gary Crump leading the field in this 
regard.7  In respect of military content, Procopius, the sixth-century historian of 
Justinian’s reign, is well served by the recent studies of Philip Rance and Conor 
Campbell Whately.8  Theophylact Simocatta, a historian of the first half of the seventh 
century, is the subject of comprehensive works by Michael Whitby and Therese 
Olajos, with both addressing the issue of Theophylact’s military sources.9   
Theophylact is generally regarded as the last great classicizing historian of Late 
Antiquity.  Thereafter, the traditional historical work dominated by military events all 
but disappears.  While this may be a matter of source survival, it is more likely to be a 
result of the sustained period of Arab dominance following Heraclius’ reign.  The 
general decline in military interest resulted in changes in literary attitudes.  Michael 
Whitby observed that ‘patrons were not interested in commissioning embarrassing 
narratives of defeats’, while audiences had little interest in reading such texts.10  The 
next known major historical works appear in the early ninth century - the 
Chronographia of Theophanes Confessor and the Breviarium of the Patriarch 
                                                 
7 Naudé (1959); Chalmers (1960); Alan Cameron (1964); Rowell (1964); N. J. Austin (1972a); idem 
(1972b); idem (1979); Crump (1975); Blockley (1977); idem (1988); Sabbah (1978): 572-588; 
Matthews (1989): 279-303; Barnes (1998); Den Hengst (1999); Trombley (1999); Kagan (2006); G. 
Kelly (2008). 
8 Hannestad (1960); Kaegi (1990); Rance (2005); Whately (2009). 
9 Olajos (1988); Michael Whitby (1988). 
10 Michael Whitby (1992): 72-73; Averil Cameron (1992): 84-85; Kazhdan (1995a): 5; Shepard 
(2003a): 102-103. 
3 
Nikephoros.  Theophanes employed many sources for the conflicts of the previous 
two centuries, material which James Howard-Johnston, Veselin Beševliev, Paul 
Speck, Ilse Rochow and Cyril Mango and Roger Scott have made convincing efforts 
to identify.11 
The principal reason for beginning with historical works of the mid-tenth century is 
the significant change in focus and style which may be observed from this time.  This 
development is best seen in the transition from historical works of the reign of the 
Emperor Constantine VII Porphyrogenitos and those which followed thereafter.  The 
Vita Basilii, a life of the Emperor Basil I written c.950, is very different to the History 
of Leo the Deacon, composed in the last decade of the tenth century.  Alexander 
Kazhdan, for example, observed ‘a clear contrast’ in the portrayals of the protagonists 
of both works.12  While greater emphasis is placed on Basil’s exhibition of traditional, 
pacifistic imperial virtues, Leo dwells on the military prowess of his subjects, the 
emperors Nikephoros II Phokas and John I Tzimiskes.  Furthermore, while the Vita 
Basilii presents a reasonably balanced appraisal of Basil’s life and deeds, Leo’s 
History is dominated by military events, marking a return to the war-dominated 
historiography of the sixth and early seventh century.  Of particular concern to this 
study is the manner in which descriptions of military encounters change in 
historiography.  Accounts of battles and sieges in the Vita Basilii do not typically 
form major narrative episodes.  The reader is afforded little tactical insight and 
particular feats tend to be ignored in favour of a brief overview of the engagement.  
Leo the Deacon, by contrast, provides detailed narratives of sieges during the reign of 
                                                 
11 Beševliev (1971a); Proudfoot (1974); Speck (1975); idem (1978): esp. 389-397; idem (1981); idem 
(1988); Conrad (1990); Rochow (1991): esp. 44-51; Howard-Johnston (1994); idem (2010), passim; 
Mango (1978); Mango & Scott (2007): lii-xcv. 
12 Kazhdan & Constable (1982): 110-111; Kazhdan (2006): 139. 
4 
Nikephoros Phokas and of battles during that of John Tzimiskes, often describing 
individual heroics and evoking a better sense of carnage.  The shift is arguably more 
pronounced in the Synopsis Historion of John Skylitzes, written in the late eleventh 
century, though chronicling the events of 811-1057.  Once he reaches the reign of 
John Tzimiskes, Skylitzes’ descriptions of battle suddenly echo those of Leo the 
Deacon, exhibiting a vivid style and detail hitherto unseen in the Synopsis Historion.  
While such complex and exciting accounts of battle remain infrequent in Skylitzes’ 
chronicle even after this section, they consistently feature in the historical works of 
the eleventh to thirteenth centuries.  Many of these texts can be categorized as what 
Kazhdan termed ‘chivalresque historiography’,13 though we shall prefer the term 
‘heroic historiography’, perhaps more apt given the obvious influence of Homer.14     
Kazhdan attributes the increased military interest in Middle Byzantine historiography 
to the accession of soldier emperor Nikephoros II Phokas in 963, with the new ruler 
bringing the ideals of the military aristocracy into the milieu of the imperial court and 
the wider elite.15  This is true in respect of audience interests and the anticipated 
virtues of the protagonists, yet it does not take into account the influences and 
inspirations behind the transformed battle descriptions of the period, nor the sources 
these historians employed.  Accounts of military actions in Middle Byzantine 
historiography, and the factors instrumental in their composition, constitute the central 
focus of this thesis. 
                                                 
13 Kazhdan (2006): 273-294. 
14 The term ‘heroic historiography’ was employed in a very different context by Boedeker (2001), 
though in this argument also Homeric epic is a key influence.  
15 See in general Kazhdan (1983a); idem (1984a). 
5 
It is only in the last decades of the twentieth century that Byzantine warfare has 
emerged as a specialist subject.16  John Haldon continues to be at the forefront of this 
movement.  His research spans the elite regiments of the sixth to tenth centuries,17 
military lands,18 equipment,19 attitudes towards war,20 army administration21 and 
logistics.22  Perhaps Haldon’s most notable contribution is his Warfare, State and 
Society in the Byzantine World 565-1204, an exhaustive study of all aspects of 
Byzantine warfare during the specified period.23  Warren Treadgold is the author of a 
number of studies on the administration, composition and organization of the Late 
Roman and Byzantine army, making extensive use of statistical data.24  The varied 
studies of Walter Kaegi include offerings on military unrest and the Byzantine notion 
of strategy.25  Edward Luttwak’s Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire is an 
ambitious examination of Byzantine strategy, tactics and diplomacy, though it is 
hampered by its derivative nature.26  Certain studies are period specific.  A number of 
articles on warfare of the Late Roman and Early Byzantine period may be found in the 
second volume of The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare.27  In 1995 
Eric McGeer published a study of the Byzantine expeditionary army of the tenth 
century, analyzing composition, tactics and campaign procedure.28  Hans-Joachim 
                                                 
16 This brief paragraph is by no means exhaustive.  For a more comprehensive overview of the history 
of scholarship on Byzantine warfare see the introductory section of Haldon (2007). 
17 Haldon (1984). 
18 Ibid (1989); idem (1993).  Cf. Magdalino (1997). 
19 Haldon (1975); idem (2002b). 
20 Idem (1992).  For further discussion on this controversial subject see Kolia-Dermitzake (1991); 
Laiou (1993); Oikonomides (1995); Kolbaba (1998); Dennis (2001a); Treadgold (2006); Stephenson 
(2007). 
21 Haldon (2000).   
22 Idem (1997a); idem (2006). 
23 Idem (1999). 
24 Treadgold (1980); idem (1992); idem (1995). 
25 Kaegi (1964a); idem (1981a); idem (1983). 
26 Luttwak (2009). 
27 Sabin, van Wees & Whitby (2007). 
28 McGeer (1995a). 
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Kühn’s work on the Byzantine army of the tenth century is particularly useful for its 
discussion of command structures and elite regiments.29  John Birkenmeier’s study on 
the army during the Komnenian period (c.1081-1180) fills an important gap, though 
its worth to specialists has been questioned.30  Mark Bartusis’ study of the Late 
Byzantine army (c.1204-1453), for some time the only work of its type, has now been 
challenged by the recent monograph of Savvas Kyriakidis.31  There are also important 
studies on particular aspects of Byzantine warfare and its military institutions, 
including equipment,32 the navy,33 fortifications,34 and administration.35 
Very few studies discuss issues relating to the presentation of warfare in 
historiography.  As John Haldon rightly endorses technology – specifically, computer 
modelling programs – as the best means of advancing our knowledge of military 
logistics,36 it is important still to clarify our understanding of historical texts, which 
remain the basis of any research into Byzantine military operations.  Perhaps most 
relevant to our study in this respect is the approach of examining Byzantine warfare in 
theory and practice; that is, comparing historical narratives of military operations with 
the guidance of military handbooks.  As Alphonse Dain has demonstrated, the 
tradition of Byzantine military theory owed much to the great Classical and 
                                                 
29 Kühn (1991). 
30 Birkenmeier (2002), subject to critical reviews from Bartusis (2004); Kaldellis (2005). 
31 Bartusis (1992); Kyriakidis (2011).  
32 Kolias (1988); Dawson (1998); idem (2002); idem (2007). 
33 Ahrweiler (1966); Pryor & Jeffreys (2006). 
34 Ahrweiler (1960a); Foss (1982); Foss & Winfield (1986). 
35 Ahrweiler (1960b); Hohlweg (1965); Oikonomides (1972); idem (1974); idem (1976); Cheynet 
(1991). 
36 The ‘Medieval Warfare on the Grid: The Case of Manzikert’ project at Birmingham and Princeton, 
co-ordinated by John Haldon and Vince Gaffney, seeks to use agent-based models, digital terrain 
mapping and simulation to investigate the logistics involved in the ill-fated march of the imperial army 
to Manzikert in 1071.  The fruits of the project will soon be realized – for its progress see Haldon, 
Gaffney, Theodoropoulos et al (2011, last accessed 7/2012).  For related discussion see the papers in 
Haldon (2005).  The application of computer simulation and gaming principles in a bid to reconstruct 
ancient battles is advocated by Sabin (2007).  
7 
Hellenistic Greek commentators on warfare, Aeneas Tacticus, Aelian and Onasander 
being perhaps the most influential.37  The first great treatise in the Byzantine 
tradition38 – the Strategikon of the Emperor Maurice – has been employed by Philip 
Rance, Michael Whitby and Walter Kaegi to elucidate the precepts and tactics 
described by Procopius, Theophylact Simocatta and Theophanes respectively.39  After 
a long period of apparent lack of interest,40 we observe a fresh concern for military 
science in the tenth century, as a number of new manuals appear, including the 
Taktika of Leo the Wise, the Praecepta Militaria of Nikephoros II Phokas and the 
Parangelmata Poliorketika of Heron of Byzantium.41  George Dennis, Eric McGeer 
and Denis Sullivan have shown that the procedures and tactics outlined by many such 
works correspond closely with those described in contemporary historiography, with 
the militaristic History of Leo the Deacon serving as a particular point of reference.42  
While such research confirms the relevance of the military manuals and the accuracy 
of descriptions in historical works, its worth in relation to our study becomes all the 
more significant when we consider an observation of Catherine Holmes.  Holmes 
proposes that protagonists in historical literature may have been consciously shown to 
adhere to the precepts of theoretical handbooks, in order to impress upon readers the 
                                                 
37 For discussion of Byzantine military manuals see Dain (1967); more recently, McGeer (2008); 
Sullivan (2010b). 
38 Three minor works of one Urbikios, drafted c.500 for the Emperor Anastasius, may be counted 
among ‘Byzantine’ military handbooks – see Förster (1877): esp. 467-471; Greatrex, Elton & Burgess 
(2005); Rance (2007b). 
39 Rance (1993); idem (2007a); Michael Whitby (1988), passim; Kaegi (2003): 115-118, 129-130, 161-
168.  For a more general study of Maurice’s tactical precepts which complements these works, see 
Mazzucchi (1981). 
40 This would depend on whether we place the compendium of military treatises attributed to Syrianos 
Magistros to the mid-sixth century or the mid-ninth, with scholars increasingly showing a preference 
for the latter.  See Baldwin (1988); Zuckerman (1990); Lee & Shepard (1991); Cosentino (2000); 
Rance (2007a). 
41 See below, 309-310 for discussion and references. 
42 Dennis (1997a); McGeer (1991); idem (1995a); idem (1995b); Sullivan (1997); idem (2003b); idem 
(2010a). 
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extent of the individual’s military ability and brilliance.43  The notion that Byzantine 
military theory may have influenced the writing of contemporary military accounts, 
and that in turn audience expectations were formed by such handbooks, is an 
important aspect of chapters four and five of this thesis. 
The approach to military accounts adopted in this thesis is one rarely applied to 
Byzantine historiography, primarily because it was only recently popularized in a 
study by Ted Lendon on Hellenistic and Roman literature.  Lendon is of the opinion 
that ‘ancient conventions of battle description are products as much of culture as of 
observation’.44  It is suggested that battle descriptions were driven by ‘conscious 
intellectual decisions’ – that is to say, cues taken from literary models and sources – 
and ‘unconscious cultural decisions’ – ‘deep-seated inherited convictions about what 
factors were decisive in battle, what details ought to be related, and how the narrative 
of events should be structured’.45  The only comparable study of Middle Byzantine 
battle description was conducted by Stamatina McGrath.  McGrath, comparing the 
accounts of a battle described by both Leo the Deacon and Skylitzes, suggests that any 
differences may be attributed to the contrasting values, level of understanding and 
editorial decisions of the two historians.46  A more comprehensive application of the 
‘cultural approach’ to a Byzantine text was carried out by Conor Campbell Whately in 
his thesis on the battle descriptions of Procopius.47  Whately reminds us that 
Procopius’ scenes of battle reflect the values and interests of his audience as well as 
those of the author.  Our study necessitates different considerations and is not 
                                                 
43 Holmes (2005): 278-289.  This is an argument reminiscent of that of Adrian Goldsworthy (1998) in 
relation to the depiction of Julius Caesar in his Commentarii.  For the literary cliché of the Roman 
general, see Rosenstein (1990): 114-152. 
44 Lendon (1999): 273-274. 
45 Ibid: 275. 
46 McGrath (1995). 
47 Whately (2009). 
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intended to be as meticulous in its dissection of battle accounts, favouring instead a 
comparative study of historiography to acquire a general sense of trends and 
developments in war writing in the Middle period.48  Nevertheless, my approach is 
fundamentally similar and concedes a debt to Whately’s excellent chapter on the 
theory of describing battle in Antiquity.49  Whately likewise stresses the importance of 
military theory in shaping battle descriptions, though for now I wish to consider a 
particular perceived influence on Byzantine accounts of battle: the Hellenistic 
rhetorical textbooks known as the progymnasmata. 
Rhetoric in Byzantium is the subject of a seminal study by George Kustas and a more 
recent collective volume of papers edited by Elizabeth Jeffreys.50  In addition to these, 
Herbert Hunger devotes considerable attention to rhetoric in his discussion of 
Byzantine literature.51  While little is known about the education of most authors 
discussed in this thesis, the many that pursued a higher education would have been 
taught rhetoric.52  A key part of the rhetorical curriculum was the progymnasmata, 
preliminary exercises in rhetoric which set the student on the path to composing a 
literary work.53  The progymnasmata credited to fourth-century sophist Libanius of 
Antioch offer a collection of exercises in prose composition for the benefit of 
students.54  Equally influential were the four Hellenistic treatises on progymnasmata 
                                                 
48 For the merits of comparative study of Byzantine literature, see most recently Magdalino (2002): esp. 
175. 
49 Whately (2009): 57-124. 
50 Kustas (1973); E. Jeffreys (2003b). 
51 Hunger (1978): I, 65-196.  
52 For useful discussion of the education and reading of the Middle Byzantine literati, see Browning 
(1962a); N. G. Wilson (1983): 136-208; Markopoulos (2008). 
53 Gibson (2004).  See Schissel (1934); Hunger (1978): I, 92-120; Schouler (1995) for Late Antique 
and Byzantine collections of progymnasmata, as well as epitomes, commentaries and scholia.  For 
recent affirmation that the Hellenistic treatises on progymnasmata, along with the handbook of 
Menander Rhetor, were the most influential works of rhetorical theory in Byzantium however, see E. 
Jeffreys (2008): 828-829.   
54 See Kennedy (1983): 150-163. 
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attributed to the sophists Aelius Theon, Hermogenes, Aphthonius, and Nicolaus.55  Of 
particular relevance are sections on ekphrasis, a mode of vivid description with the 
figurative intent of bringing the subject before the eyes of the reader or listener.56  The 
guidance of the progymnasmata is discussed in the third chapter of this thesis, though 
it should be noted that they recognized ekphrasis had a place in historiography, and 
that war, battle and equipment provided suitable candidates in this regard.57  The 
sophists encourage a number of literary models for budding writers to follow, with 
Homer and Thucydides chief among these paradigms. 
Homer was basic reading for any educated Byzantine, and Agne Vasilikopoulou-
Ioannidou and Robert Browning have demonstrated the great appreciation for ‘the 
Poet’ in Byzantium.58  This fondness is especially evident in the Middle period, where 
the heroic climate was conducive to an epic-Homeric revival.59  One observes the first 
signs of this in the second half of the tenth century,60 though renewed interest in 
Homer is most apparent under the Komnenian dynasty in the twelfth century.  
Relevant works include John Tzetzes’ Homeric Allegories, an introduction to the 
                                                 
55 Clark (1957): 177-212; Kennedy (1983: 52-73); Webb (2001); Heath (2002-2003) provide an 
overview of known rhetorical treatises from the late Hellenistic period.  In the view of George Kustas 
(1973: 22 n.1), ‘the influence of the progymnasmata is hard to overestimate.  Practically all the genres 
of Byzantine literature are affected by them: homilies, letters, histories, and so on’.  For the value and 
influence of the progymnasmata in Byzantium, Aphthonius in particular, see ibid: esp. 5-26; Hunger 
(1978): I, 74-132, 170-178; Kennedy (1983); Conley (1986); Hock & O’Neil (1986): esp. 212-216; 
Morgan (1998): 198-226; Russell (1998); Browning (2000): esp. 860-681; E. Jeffreys (2008); Schiffer 
(2010). 
56 For ekphrasis see most recently Webb (2009). 
57 See below, 213-218. 
58 Vasilikopoulou-Ioannidou (1971-1972); Browning (1975); idem (1992); Pontani (2005): 159-182. 
59 See Kaldellis (2007): 225-316; Bazzani (2007): esp. 222-225. 
60 Theodosios the Deacon’s Capture of Crete, a panegyric written to commemorate the capture of the 
island by Nikephoros Phokas in 961, and the History of Leo the Deacon frequently reference Homer 
and are clearly inspired by the Iliad with regard to their larger-than-life heroic warriors and 
descriptions of epic battles.  Further discussion and references may be found in chapters one and five of 
this thesis. 
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Iliad;61 the first extant Byzantine scholia on the Iliad by one Isaac Komnenos;62 a 
more comprehensive commentary on the Odyssey and the Iliad by Eustathios of 
Thessaloniki;63 and Constantine Manasses’ paraphrase of the Trojan War.64  Theodore 
Prodromos, court poet to the Emperor John II Komnenos, experimented with the 
hexameter verse of Homeric epic in several compositions hailing the martial prowess 
of his imperial subject.65  Homeric references and allusions also abound in 
historiography of the period, not least the Alexiad of Anna Komnene – a ‘prose Iliad’ 
for Alexios according to one scholar66 -, the Hyle Historias of Nikephoros Bryennios, 
and the Chronike Diegesis of Niketas Choniates.67  Indeed, Marina Bazzani has 
spoken of ‘the limit between history and epic [becoming] blurred, and historical 
narrations sometime[s resembling] a sort of fabulous epic account’.68  Anthony 
Kaldellis linked the reignited interest in Homer to the military aristocracy’s need for 
heroic models.69  He affirms that Homer ‘was in the air, fuelling a shift in values 
among rulers and writers’.70  It is the precise nature of this shift, which can be rooted 
to the mid-tenth century, which we must now consider.  
                                                 
61 See Morgan (1983); Budelmann (2002). 
62 Pontani (2008). 
63 See most recently Høgel (2009).  For general discussion of the Byzantine commentaries on Homer, 
see Hunger (1978): I, 34-35; II, 58-67; Browning (1992): 140-144; Budelmann (2002); Kaldellis 
(2009a): 29-36. 
64 Constantine Manasses, Chronike Synopsis: vv.1108-1470.  See also Nilsson (2004): 18-34. 
65 Theodore Prodromos: III, VI, VIII. 
66 Kaldellis (2009a): 21-22. 
67 For Anna, see Katicić (1957); Dyck (1986).  For Bryennios, see Carile (1968); idem (1969).  For 
Choniates, see Maisano (2000). 
68 Bazzani (2007): 223. 
69 This accords with the musings of Felix Budelmann, who proposed that the Byzantines were more 
engaged with ancient texts than we might suppose. ‘They knew that Homer had died a long time ago.  
But much more than we today, they felt that the gap could sometimes be bridged, and felt that the 
ancient material was still alive’ (Budelmann 2002: 164). 
70 Kaldellis (2009a): 21-22. 
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As Ted Lendon has demonstrated, Homer was a significant influence on Greco-
Roman military ideas and historiography.71  For soldiers throughout the ages, Homer 
presented models of courage and generalship styles.72  Moreover, Homer also offered 
models for how a historian might present commanders and how he might describe 
battle.  As has been shown by scholars such as Joachim Latacz, Hans van Wees and 
Oliver Hellmann, Homer frequently ‘zooms-in’ during his battle scenes, electing to 
follow the struggles of prominent individuals rather than describe the general scope of 
battle.73  Homeric battle is also replete with gore and violence, descriptions which, if 
not entirely realistic, provide stylistic flourish and, more significantly, underline the 
heroic ethos on display.74  This mode of battle description had been imitated by 
Procopius in the Gothic section of his Wars,75 and we see it frequently in Middle 
Byzantine historiography from the time of Leo the Deacon.  The heroic aspirations of 
the aristocracy were thus complemented by the epic inclinations of historians. 
The key exemplar of battle ekphrasis cited by the progymnasmata is Thucydides, 
particularly his accounts of the siege of Plataea and the naval battle at the Great 
Harbour of Syracuse.76  This recommendation raises the complex issue of mimesis in 
Byzantine literature; in our case, classicizing historians seeking to emulate the style of 
past authors or perhaps even lifting descriptive phrases and whole passages near-
                                                 
71 Lendon (2005).  Aelian (1.1) recognized Homer among the first writers on tactics, an observation 
which may have inspired Eustathios of Thessaloniki to comment similarly (Commentaries on the Iliad: 
II, 588.15-20; III, 449.2-5). 
72 See Edwards (1985).  This matter is discussed in chapters four and five of this thesis. 
73 For this tendency of Homer, and Homeric battle description in general, see Kirk (1968): esp. 111-
112; Latacz (1977): esp. 68-95; van Wees (1986): esp. 286; idem (1988): 3-7; idem (1994); idem 
(1995): esp. 166-167; Hellmann (2000): esp. 90-169; Albracht (2006): esp. 54-55. 
74 Salazar (2000); Neal (2006a). 
75 Whately (2009): 248-308. 
76 Aelius Theon: 68; trans. 11.  Thucydides: 3.21 (Siege of Plataea); 7.40-44, 7.70-71 (Battle at the 
Great Harbour of Syracuse). 
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verbatim.77  The tendency of Byzantine historians to use archaizing ethnic labels for 
foreign peoples (Turks are often called Persians, western Europeans Kelts, etc.)78 
becomes problematic when historians write of the tactics and general customs of 
foreign nations conforming with traditional stereotypes, and do not show particular 
awareness of the current military practices of these peoples.79  We must also be wary 
of anachronistic, non-technical military terminology.80  For now, however, I wish to 
discuss a more significant concern: that some battle descriptions in Middle Byzantine 
historiography may be modelled on, or perhaps even copied from, writers of 
Antiquity.  Is Cyril Mango correct to question the integrity of historical texts on the 
basis of such classical affectation?81   
The great historians of Antiquity served as a natural point of reference for Byzantine 
historians.  Much is lost of the Constantinian Excerpta, a tenth-century compilation of 
extracts from historians of Antiquity including Thucydides, Herodotus, Xenophon, 
Polybius, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Diodorus Siculus, Cassius Dio, Procopius and 
Agathias.  The compendium was divided into fifty-three sections, with roughly half of 
the titles known from surviving material.82  Headings of relevance include ‘Turning 
defeat into victory’ (Περὶ ἀνακλήσεως ἥττης); ‘Victory’ (Περὶ νίκης); ‘Defeat’ (Περὶ 
ἥττης); ‘Commanding armies’ (Περὶ στρατηγηµάτων); and ‘Battle’ (Περὶ συµβολῆς 
πολέµων).  While it is probable that the work served a practical function, Bernard 
Flusin believes that the passages filed under these sections were intended to provide 
                                                 
77 The classic article is Hunger (1969-1970); also idem (1981).  Diether Reinsch (2010) provides a 
good overview of the scholarly debate surrounding mimesis (and/or imitatio) in Byzantine literature.  
The terminology is discussed by Rhoby & Schiffer (2010). 
78 See most recently Durak (2009). 
79 See, for example, Bachrach (1970). 
80 For discussion of the problem of uncertain designations for troop types in general medieval military 
studies, see Morillo (2001). 
81 Mango (1975). 
82 Büttner-Wobst (1906). 
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models for current and future historians to imitate.83  It would be futile to comment on 
the ultimate success of the Excerpta; the content of the sections on war is unknown, 
and an attempt by Alphonse Dain to identify the fragments which made up ‘Περὶ 
στρατηγηµάτων’ is questionable.84  Nevertheless, the very existence of a convenient 
handbook providing historical models for writing about war reveals much about 
Byzantine attitudes towards literary mimesis.  Since the scholarly debate surrounding 
mimesis in historical accounts of warfare is particularly insightful in respect of 
historiography of Late Antiquity, we shall begin discussion there. 
Steven Runciman observed the ‘special admiration’ the Byzantine historian had for 
Thucydides.85  In the late nineteenth century, Hermann Braun noticed Thucydidean 
imitation in Procopius’ narrative of the plague which ravaged Constantinople in 542,86 
and also in Procopius’ accounts of the sieges of Amida, Edessa and Rome, which all 
bear the influence of Thucydides’ narrative of the siege of Plataea.87  Both Braun and 
Max Brückner suggested that Procopius’ imitation of Thucydides resulted in 
distortion and fabrication, a view which continues to influence certain scholars, 
evident in Brent Shaw’s remark that ‘most of Procopius’ accounts of sieges and set 
battles [are] dependent on rhetorical devices and images adopted from earlier 
historians’.88  Procopius is not considered to have been alone in this respect.89  Gyula 
                                                 
83 Flusin (2002): 553-558.  Cf. Lemerle (1986): 323-332, esp. 331-332. 
84 Dain (1967): 364. 
85 Runciman (1995): 59.  Diether Reinsch, who charts the general interest in Thucydides at Byzantium, 
concurs: ‘(Thucydides) was the linguistic and conceptual model for Byzantine historical writers from 
the beginning to the end of the Byzantine Empire, albeit with varying intensity’ (Reinsch 2006: 756). 
86 Such imitation also accorded with the recommendations for models of ekphrasis by Aelius Theon 
(68). 
87 Braun (1886): 191-195, 207-211. See Averil Cameron (1964) for the particular significance of 
Thucydides’ accounts of the plague and the siege of Plataea in Byzantine historiography. 
88 Brückner (1896): 7-16; Shaw (1999): 133. 
89 Hermann Peter (1897: 296, 307) classified battle descriptions among the adornments of classicizing 
historiography, where truth is sacrificed for adherence to rhetorical conventions.  
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Moravcsik, however, has argued that Procopius and his contemporaries’ use of 
classical models need not impair their credibility as historians, showing that military 
accounts reminiscent of episodes related by Thucydides and Herodotus are consistent 
with contemporary practice.90  Katherine Adshead demonstrates that Procopius’ 
account of the siege of Rome, while similar to Thucydides’ record of the siege of 
Syracuse, employs more sophisticated and contemporary terminology in an attempt to 
highlight Procopius’ own craft and perhaps best his ancient counterpart in narration 
and content.91  This is symptomatic of Procopius’ general approach.  Averil Cameron 
considers the Wars to be ‘self-consciously Thucydidean’, though observes significant 
departures from this model.92  Roger Blockley and Barry Baldwin similarly insist that 
while the historians Dexippus and Priscus imitate the style of Thucydides’ account of 
the siege of Plataea, borrowing constructions and even phrases, their records are 
nevertheless compatible with siege warfare of their own day.93  Blockley’s 
admonition is crucial: ‘Verbal imitation by itself is no proof of historical 
unreliability’.94  This is true of historiography of all periods.95 
                                                 
90 Moravcsik (1966).  Averil Cameron (1985: 40) also demonstrates this for Procopius’ description of 
Berber camel tactics, a passage verbally reminiscent of Herodotus’ Histories.  See also Reinsch (2006): 
769-772; Aerts (2003): 93-96, who show that Procopius’ account of the Constantinople plague, while 
borrowing linguistically from Thucydides, remains independent and adapts the story to his own 
situation.   
91 Adshead (1990): 95-104.  In another article Adshead (1983) adopts a similar line with Agathias’ use 
of Thucydides, suggesting he used Thucydides as a historical framework but worked independently 
within this.  
92 Averil Cameron (1985): 37-46. 
93 Blockley (1972): esp. 22; Baldwin (1980): esp. 53-55.  Also idem (1981b). 
94 Blockley (1972): 26. 
95 Fourteenth-century emperor John VI Kantakouzenos is seen to draw upon Thucydides for his 
description of pestilence, though these verbal loans do not diminish his credibility nor restrict the 
presence of his own observations.  See Hunger (1976); T. Miller (1976).  Even after the fall of 
Constantinople in 1453, the historian Cristoboulos of Imbros employed Thucydides’ narrative of the 
siege of Plataea in writing his account of the fall of the Byzantine capital, though he was careful to 
ensure all references to fortifications and technology were up-to-date and accurate.  See Reinsch 
(2006): 764-767.  
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Be the model Thucydides or another writer, Paul Magdalino was correct to note that 
‘the imitation of ancient models and the use of clichés were not proof that an author 
had nothing to say’.96  C. B. Hase, editor of Leo the Deacon, observed that the tenth-
century historian invariably imitated his sixth-century counterpart, Agathias.97  Such 
mimesis does not necessarily render Leo’s testimony inaccurate, for he adapts 
Agathias’ account to reflect present circumstances.98  While there is still need to 
assess mimesis in battle description on a case-by-case basis, we may conclude in 
principle that the incorporation of descriptive elements from texts of Antiquity is no 
obstacle to historical credibility.  
Mimesis had long been a part of Greco-Roman historiographical tradition.99  Indeed, 
imitation in literature was prominent in almost all cultures until the late eighteenth 
century.100  Particularly relevant to our study is a recent debate about Anglo-Saxon 
warfare.  Richard Abels has shown that the eleventh-century writer John of Worcester 
lifted his account of a particular engagement almost word-for-word from Roman 
historian Sallust.101  Abels and Stephen Morillo view such literary practice with 
suspicion, decreeing that any parts bearing an obviously classical influence should be 
discarded: ‘The legacy of Antiquity on the study of medieval military history is that of 
a distorting lens that imposes apparent continuity on changed reality’.102  For 
‘distorting lens’, see Mango’s ‘distorting mirror’ in relation to Byzantium;103 the 
concern over classicizing in historiography is remarkably similar.  Bernard Bachrach 
                                                 
96 Magdalino (1983): 328. 
97 Hase (1828): 397; Hunger (1978): I, 370. 
98 Sullivan (1997); idem (2000): esp. 18.  See also McGeer (1995b). 
99 Russell (1999); Clark (1957): 144-176. 
100 See Nilsson (2010). 
101 Abels (1991). 
102 Abels and Morillo (2005): quote at 13. 
103 Mango (1975). 
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argues that it was not ‘misleading’ to contemporary audiences if a famous commander 
was presented ‘undertaking military operations within a framework that betrays the 
influence of Roman behaviour upon these leaders’.104  The notion of the subject being 
presented through the model of a classical episode relates to an important argument of 
Anthony Kaldellis’ in regard to the classicizing tendencies of Procopius. 
There are various reasons as to why a Byzantine historian borrowed from an ancient 
author – to embellish their text, show their learning, highlight the splendour of their 
own account.105  Averil Cameron suggests that in doing this Procopius was not 
plagiarising, but rather taking advantage of continuity in certain aspects of warfare, in 
order to give his work ‘the required classical tinge’; it would have been impossible to 
describe something like a great siege in classicizing language without acknowledging 
similar instances in ancient historiography.106  Kaldellis goes further than Cameron.  
He suggests that classical culture fuelled Procopius’ ‘objectives, outlook and modes 
of expression’.  Procopius’ use of Thucydidean narrative strategies is shown to be 
particularly evident in his accounts of battle.  As Jacqueline De Romilly has shown 
that the corresponding pre-battle speeches of opposing commanders in Thucydides 
indicate how each perceived the situation and essentially won or lost the encounter,107 
Kaldellis demonstrates that Procopius’ technique of describing battle using speakers 
as ‘literary vehicles of military analysis’ is ‘entirely Thucydidean’.108  We should not 
discount the possibility of another historian employing Thucydides or another 
                                                 
104 Bachrach (2007), esp. 175-184, quote at 191.  For a similar view see Lavelle (2010): 269-273. 
105 See Bartusis (1995). 
106 Averil Cameron (1985): 39.  This is particularly true of siege warfare, where certain motifs recur in 
Greek historiography – in addition to the accounts based on Thucydides’ siege of Plataea, discussed 
above, see Paul (1982). 
107 De Romilly (1956): esp. 138-150. 
108 Kaldellis (2004): esp. 24-37.  Whately’s analysis of Procopius’ pre-battle speeches (2009: 137-142, 
208-213) has lent further credence to this suggestion. 
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historian similarly.  Leo the Deacon, for example, appears to craft an episode around a 
narrative model offered by Agathias.109  We must also consider the many studies 
proposing that Procopius’ use of Thucydides and also Herodotus enabled him to make 
subtle critiques of the Emperor Justinian through classical allusions.110  The utilization 
of such a literary technique is unlikely to have been limited to Procopius.  Indeed, it is 
suggested here that Procopius himself was employed as part of John Kinnamos’ 
efforts to rework his material and denigrate the commander John Doukas.111  It should 
therefore be stressed that mimesis in Byzantine historiography, and in accounts of war 
in particular, could be expressed in more intricate ways than mere copying, and it is in 
our interest to recognize these classical frameworks when they appear in order to 
comprehend the greater significance underlying the historian’s presentation.   
As Byzantine historians took models and descriptive phrases from older historians, it 
is probable that they culled information from more recent texts.  This is something 
Whately did not consider for Procopius, who wrote within close proximity to many of 
the events he describes, and was an observer of many battles.  Yet most authors of the 
Middle period were writing about wars and campaigns which occurred many decades 
earlier and did not witness their participation.  This gap has led to suggestions that a 
number of historians employed lost written sources closer to the events in question.  
For the earlier period Michael Whitby has hypothesized the existence of a military 
narrative employed by Theophylact Simocatta.112  James Howard-Johnston makes the 
case that Theophanes’ account of Heraclius’ campaign of 627-628 against the 
                                                 
109 See below, 57-60. 
110 Bormann (1974); Aristotelous (1980); Cresci (1986); idem (1986-1987); Pazdernik (2000); idem 
(2006). 
111 See below, 129-138.  For the influence of Procopius in the later period in general, see Kalli (2004): 
3-4, 149-168. 
112 Michael Whitby (1988): 94-105. 
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Persians was drawn from an official narrative written by court poet George of Pisidia 
within months of the event.113  Skylitzes is the subject of much speculation on his lost 
written sources.  Chief among these are a number of pieces of what we may 
collectively term ‘aristocratic promotional literature’ – that is, eulogistic biographical 
texts concerned with the military actions of famous soldiers.  This area is led by 
Jonathan Shepard, who argues for Skylitzes’ use of lost sources dedicated to two 
generals of the mid-eleventh century, Katakalon Kekaumenos and George 
Maniakes.114  Following this, Catherine Holmes has proposed that Skylitzes also 
employed a source favourable to the tenth-century warlord, Bardas Skleros.115  
Related to these texts from the aristocratic milieu are the cluster of apparent works 
chronicling the deeds of the Emperor Nikephoros II Phokas and his family, material 
thought to have been used by Skylitzes and Leo the Deacon in particular.116  The 
similarities between these two writers has also led Anthony Kaldellis to conclude that 
there existed a lost commemorative narrative of one of John Tzimiskes’ campaigns, a 
work which both historians consulted and rendered slightly differently.117  Another 
recent hypothesis which may relate to the sources employed by Leo the Deacon is that 
of Marc Lauxtermann, pertaining to Theodosios the Deacon’s apparent use of 
dispatches in order to write his poem commemorating Nikephoros II Phokas’ capture 
of Crete, an event covered by Leo.118  Progressing to historiography of the twelfth 
century, we encounter a number of similar arguments.  In line with the scholarship of 
Shepard and Holmes, Leonora Neville suggests that historian Nikephoros Bryennios 
                                                 
113 Howard-Johnston (1994). 
114 Shepard (1975-1976); idem (1977-1979); idem (1992b). 
115 Holmes (2005). 
116 Hirsch (1876): 50-51; Tinnefeld (1971): 108-110; Morris (1988); idem (1994); Ljubarskij (1993a); 
Markopoulos (1983): esp. 284; idem (1988); idem (2003a): 187-189; idem (2003b): 187-188, 195-196; 
idem (2004b): 89-90; idem (2004c): 4-6; idem (2009a): 703-705; Kazhdan (2006): 167, 273-274. 
117 Kaldellis (forthcoming). 
118 Lauxtermann (forthcoming). 
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employed a memoir of the influential general John Doukas.119  Bryennios is also 
credited as the shadow author of the Alexiad of Anna Komnene in a highly 
controversial study by James Howard-Johnston.  Therein, it is suggested that 
Bryennios compiled a large dossier of material prior to his death, which Anna edited 
into a history of her father’s reign.120  Finally, the convergence between historians 
John Kinnamos and Niketas Choniates, and also the encomiasts of the emperors John 
II and Manuel I Komnenos, has led Paul Magdalino and Michael Jeffreys to suggest 
that the historians and encomiasts made use of common sources, probably official 
bulletins issued following campaigns.121 
The attempt to determine the sources of a historical narrative – Quellenforschung – 
has long been a contentious exercise.122  Jakov Ljubarskij was a particularly staunch 
critic of efforts to identify the material employed by Theophanes, a task which, in his 
eyes, effectively reduced Theophanes to little more than a compiler of material from a 
dossier.  Ljubarskij refers to a form of ‘extreme source criticism’ which compelled 
Paul Speck and James Howard-Johnston to invent ‘phantom sources’ and even reject 
the authorship of certain writers.  Ljubarskij is concerned that we risk neglecting the 
author’s individuality by ‘striving at all costs to disintegrate the works of Byzantine 
writers and deprive them of authors’.123  Still, this view did not stop Ljubarskij from 
himself indulging in speculation about lost sources.124  It is not about denying the 
individuality and contribution of the author, but acknowledging that historians 
                                                 
119 Neville (2008). 
120 Howard-Johnston (1996). 
121 Magdalino (1993a): 434-488; M. Jeffreys (2011). 
122 For salient comments see Morley (1999): 49-91.  For Quellenforschung in relation to Byzantine 
texts see Moravcsik (1958): I, 185-200. 
123 Ljubarskij (1998): esp. 9-10. 
124 See Ljubarskij (1993a), where he makes the case for numerous sources employing biographical 
material pertaining to the Emperor Nikephoros II Phokas. 
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removed from the military events they describe would seek detailed information from 
authoritative sources – dispatches, official accounts, and memoir-like literature.   
Plagiarism, to impose the modern concept, was rife in historiography.  Albert Brian 
Bosworth demonstrates that historians of Antiquity followed their sources ‘with 
commendable fidelity’.125  Roger Scott suggests that the Byzantines attached great 
significance to adhering to their original material; for chroniclers in particular, 
‘plagiarism was a virtue’, and lent credence to their histories.126  To this end any 
alteration had to be subtle,127 but adaptation was a significant part of the process.  
Bosworth observed that ancient historians, while keeping to the facts of their sources, 
nevertheless gave the material ‘a new spin’, emphasizing aspects hitherto less 
prominent and imparting their own brand of rhetoric.  We may extend such a principle 
to Byzantine historiography, wherein Ingela Nilsson similarly regards ‘plagiarism’ as 
a process whereby the writer reworks the historical material, ‘[leaving] room for a 
certain adaptation of sources, creation of personal bias, and (to varying degrees) 
personal interpretation of history’.128  
With this in mind, the first chapter of this thesis examines a number of historians of 
the Middle Byzantine period and the sources they may have employed for military 
events.  Our notion of what sources these historians used is formed by their own 
statements as well as hypotheses formulated by modern scholars.  The works and 
personalities discussed include the Vita Basilii, Leo the Deacon, Michael Attaleiates, 
                                                 
125 Bosworth (2003). 
126 Scott (2006a): esp. 30; idem (2006b): 52-55. 
127 See Maisano (1987): 227-248. 
128 Nilsson (2006a): 51.  Theophanes represents a good case in point, as Ljubarskij (1995) and Scott 
(2006b) have shown. This is true also of western chroniclers: ‘Using an eclectic approach and selecting 
their sources and themes through prisms of interest, ideology, or just prejudice, medieval chroniclers 
left for the critical modern historian the challenge to discern those agendas and selection codes’. 
(Menache 2006: 345). 
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Skylitzes, Anna Komnene, John Kinnamos and Niketas Choniates.129  The insight and 
understanding provided by these studies enables us to determine the manner in which 
Middle Byzantine historians appear to have reworked their military material in order 
to fulfil the demands of their historical programme. 
Having examined select techniques of historians, we may explore the types of written 
material which would have been available to them.  Chapters two and three are 
concerned primarily with reports and bulletins sent to inform Constantinople of the 
progress of an expedition.  The only specific study on bulletins is an outdated but still 
useful article by Veselin Beševliev, though relevant discussion is provided by Michael 
McCormick and James Howard-Johnston.130  Private written correspondence and 
letters sent to foreign courts reporting military successes are also surveyed, since they 
align closely with official bulletins and may have provided another means for 
historians to learn of military events.  To test the practicalities of such assertions, the 
final part of the chapter discusses documentation and archival practices in Byzantium, 
questioning if military reports would have been maintained and thus if they were 
accessible to historians.  Chapter three demonstrates the probable use of bulletins by 
expanding on the argument that such documents served as common sources for the 
encomiasts and historians of the reigns of John II and Manuel I Komnenos.  The 
evidence may not point to the direct use of dispatches by John Kinnamos and Niketas 
Choniates – or at least not the same as those used by contemporary encomiasts – but 
there is certainly much to suggest an official tradition preserving common details 
about campaigns, which can only have stemmed from bulletins. 
                                                 
129 Discussion of the extensive scholarship on these authors appears in the appropriate place; here it is 
only necessary to cite the general studies of Byzantine literature and historiography undertaken by Karl 
Krumbacher (1897) and Herbert Hunger (1978), along with the more period-specific publications of 
Apostolos Karpozilos (2002) and Alexander Kazhdan (1999, 2006), which are of considerable value. 
130 Beševliev (1974); Howard-Johnston (1994); idem (2010), passim; Lee (2007): 38-40. 
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Chapter four explores aristocratic promotional literature, a lost body of memoir-like 
works which appear to have been a favourable source for historians describing wars 
and campaigns.  The evidence and aforementioned arguments for these works is 
discussed.  The literary tradition behind the appearance of biographical compositions 
and ‘the autobiographical impulse’ in Byzantium are investigated.131  Finally, 
potential features of aristocratic promotional literature are suggested, a delicate 
exercise based on the purported fragments preserved in extant historiography, wider 
literary developments, and cultural trends.  It is proposed that such works presented 
the subject as a brave combatant as well as a skilled commander, principally through 
his use of innovative stratagems and his textbook application of military theory.  This 
mode of presentation, coupled with an anecdotal style of storytelling which drew 
influence from popular Hellenistic collections of stratagems, are deemed defining 
features of aristocratic promotional literature and regarded as their possible 
contribution to Byzantine historiography. 
The fifth and final chapter of this thesis addresses the appearance of ‘heroic 
historiography’ in the latter half of the tenth century.  The features which defined this 
type of history – chivalrous conduct, appreciation of military virtues, single combat, 
heroic last stands, endurance, displays of personal heroics – are discussed.  Such 
ideals were inspired by the reading of Homer; this was true also of the new style of 
describing battle, with an emphasis on individual heroics and gory bloodshed.  We 
note the oral tales popular along the eastern borderlands since the early tenth century, 
the most famous example being the epic poem Digenes Akrites.  It is suggested that 
these tales, which espoused aristocratic heroic values and almost certainly celebrated 
great generals, were key to the development of aristocratic promotional literature.  
                                                 
131 Angold (1998); idem (1999). 
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The appearance of such works alongside ‘heroic historiography’ in the mid-tenth 
century cannot be considered coincidental.  It was the literary expression of 
aristocratic values which precipitated the aforementioned developments in 
descriptions of war and battle in Middle Byzantine historiography. 
This thesis has two primary functions: to discuss and account for the appearance of 
‘heroic’ battle narratives and values in historiography from the late tenth century; and, 
since they appear to have had a significant role in this development, to identify and 
partially reconstruct the sources Middle Byzantine historians may have employed for 
military events.  Such an investigation also yields observations about eyewitnessing 
and the transmission of news about campaigns, areas hitherto overlooked in the field 
of Byzantine studies.  The thesis is above all an examination of how the Byzantines 
wrote about warfare.132  To this end it is both necessary and important to reach 
beyond our designated period, not only for examples which contribute to our 
discussion, but also to demonstrate consistency and change in Byzantine war writing.  
Aside from Adolf Stender-Peterson’s thesis arguing that the medieval Scandinavian 
sagas derived a preference for tales of military trickery from Byzantine anecdotal 
tradition, there have been no real attempts to define a ‘Byzantine style’ of writing 
about warfare.133  This thesis, along with the aforementioned study of Conor 
Campbell Whately on Procopius’ battle descriptions, begins the process of developing 
a cultural understanding of accounts of war in Byzantine literature. 
                                                 
132 It is for this reason that non-Greek sources of the period, while useful in corroborating or 
contradicting accounts at various points, are not discussed at length in this thesis.  
133 Stender-Peterson (1934): 77-90; also R. Cook (1986). 
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CHAPTER I. MIDDLE BYZANTINE HISTORIANS AND THEIR SOURCES 
FOR MILITARY EVENTS 
Transparency with regard to sources employed was not a trait frequently exhibited by 
Ancient Greek historians, and their Byzantine counterparts followed suit in this 
respect.  A preference for autopsy and questioning of eyewitnesses is generally stated 
by authors, though this professed line of inquiry is often questionable.  It is a literary 
device, one which enables the writer to position themselves in the tradition of 
Thucydides and assure their audience that only the most trustworthy forms of research 
were employed.  Ancient writers generally did not disclose a reliance on written 
material, a reticence also evident in Byzantine historical writing but one unlikely to 
have extended to actual research methods; indeed, there are instances where we can 
identify the use of another extant historical work which the historian does not 
acknowledge.  Consequently, scholars have postulated the use of other written sources 
now lost to us, arguments which will be discussed.  Investigation of the working 
methods and content of select historical works of the Middle period permits us to not 
only consider what sources historians and chroniclers may have consulted, but how 
these authors shaped this material to their own style and purposes.  Seven major 
works of the period are examined here – the Vita Basilii, the History of Leo the 
Deacon, the History of Michael Attaleiates, the Synopsis Historion of John Skylitzes, 
the Alexiad of Anna Komnene, the Epitome of John Kinnamos, and the Chronike 
Diegesis of Niketas Choniates.  Subsequent chapters complement this section with 
further study of the probable underlying sources and their use by historians. 
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I. Historical Method and Authorial Concerns 
It is instructive to begin with a look at the research methods of ancient historians.  As 
Middle Byzantine historians worked within this tradition, it is unsurprising to find 
echoes of Thucydides and Polybius in their approach.  Yet the method statements of 
Polybius at least appear suspect, and as the centuries progress significant changes in 
research practices further undermine the logic on display.  By the Middle Byzantine 
period, there can be little question that historians were merely paying ‘lip service’ to 
the methods advocated by ancient writers, raising real questions about how much trust 
we should place in their stated research methods. 
Source Citation and Research Ideals in Classical and Hellenistic Historiography 
While Herodotus attributes particular information to sources, there is some debate as 
to whether these citations are accurate or merely sources invented to elicit 
credibility.134  Regardless, Herodotus is not especially precise, citing only two 
individual informants.135  Thucydides is more vague still, a reticence which has been 
seen as a result of his desire to inspire confidence through narrative homogeneity, 
with source identification otherwise undermining the sense of objectivity.136  Simon 
Goldhill considered that ‘the most persuasive rhetorical device in Thucydides’ 
armoury…is the direct expression of uncontested and enumerated fact’.137  While 
                                                 
134 For the suggestion that Herodotus’ citations are fictitious, see Fehling (1989).  This controversial 
view has been rejected by Schepens (1980): 33-93; Hornblower (1987): 13-25; Gould (1989): 136-137, 
151-152; Shrimpton (1997); Griffiths (2006): 136-140. 
135 Archias of Sparta (Herodotus: 3.55); Thersander of Orchomenus (ibid: 9.16). 
136 Parry (1972); Marincola (1997): 9; Gribble (1998): 45 n.34. 
137 Goldhill (2002): 43. 
27 
Latin historians were at times more inclined to name specific sources,138 the Greek 
historiographical tradition generally favoured Thucydides’ approach. 
Discussion of sources in classical historiography was typically confined to prooimia 
or passages devoted to research methods and practices.  In these statements we 
observe a particular preference for autopsy and investigation of oral accounts 
stemming from eyewitnesses.139  Herodotus famously asserts that ‘ears are less 
trustworthy than eyes’, believing oral reports to be suitable only when autopsy was 
unavailable.140  Thucydides discloses that he based his account on his own 
observations as well as what others had seen.141  Polybius continued to champion 
autopsy and personal inquiry, stressing that dependence on the former minimized the 
exaggeration and distortion endemic in the accounts of others.142  While written 
material was merely overlooked by Thucydides, its use is roundly condemned by 
Polybius.  He considers the reading of books to be the weakest form of research, that 
requiring the least amount of industry and time.143  Such vehement views led Charles 
Fornara to conclude that ‘the investigation of oral tradition remained the essential 
method of the historian from Herodotus through Polybius to Ammianus 
Marcellinus’.144 
                                                 
138 Marincola (1997): 78-79. 
139 See Schepens (1980); Hartog (2005). 
140 ὦτα γὰρ τυγχάνει ἀνθρώποισι ἐόντα ἀπιστότερα ὀφθαλµῶν (Herodotus: 1.8.2).  For Herodotus’ 
historical method see Lateiner (1989), with his reliance on oral tradition discussed by Evans (1991): 
89-146; Murray (2001). 
141 τὰ δ᾽ ἔργα τῶν πραχθέντων ἐν τῷ πολέµῳ οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ παρατυχόντος πυνθανόµενος ἠξίωσα γράφειν, 
οὐδ᾽ ὡς ἐµοὶ ἐδόκει, ἀλλ᾽ οἷς τε αὐτὸς παρῆν καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσον δυνατὸν ἀκριβείᾳ περὶ 
ἑκάστου ἐπεξελθών.  ἐπιπόνως δὲ ηὑρίσκετο, διότι οἱ παρόντες τοῖς ἔργοις ἑκάστοις οὐ ταὐτὰ περὶ τῶν 
αὐτῶν ἔλεγον, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἑκατέρων τις εὐνοίας ἢ µνήµης ἔχοι (Thucydides: 1.22.2-3). 
142 Polybius: XII.25e.1-25h.4.  Also XX.12.8 for the preeminence of the eyewitness over hearsay. 
143 Ibid: XII.26d.3-27.6.  See in general Pédech (1964); Sacks (1981) for discussion of Polybius’ 
thoughts on historical method. 
144 Fornara (1983): 30.  See also Lacroix (1951): 224-227. 
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Greek historians of Antiquity did utilize some documentary material, which may be 
defined as ‘something written, inscribed, engraved, etc., which provides information 
or serves as a record’.145  Herodotus explicitly refers to a written source only once,146 
though various financial and administrative documents are alluded to, while official 
campaign records from the Persian archives, written itineraries and inscriptions also 
appear to have been consulted.147  Thucydides does not mention written documents in 
his methodological statements, but nevertheless includes two treaties,148 and may have 
employed other written material besides.149  Even Polybius, the staunchest critic of the 
use of written accounts, concedes that a historian must compare their facts with 
written documents,150 and reveals that he took his figures for the forces of Hannibal 
from a stele erected by the Carthaginian near Cape Licinium.151   
Still, the balance is heavily tipped in favour of oral testimony.  Arnaldo Momigliano 
traced the ‘paramouncy of oral evidence’ to Herodotus, though Simon Hornblower 
contests this view, observing that Herodotus never explicitly affords primacy to oral 
accounts.152  Thucydides displays a similar apathy in respect of documentary sources.  
It is generally considered that the two historians rarely quote documents or reference 
written material on account of a lack of relevant documentation and poor archival 
                                                 
145 New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary: I, 719b, definition 3. 
146 Herodotus: 6.137.1. 
147 How & Wells (1964): 51-152; Lateiner (1989): 92-108; O’Toole (1991-1992); Rhodes (2007): 58. 
148 Thucydides: V.23-24, 47.  See Gomme (1973): 606-607, 680-682; Hornblower (1987): 87-90; 
Shrimpton (1997): 101; Smarczyk (2006); Rhodes (2007): 58-60. 
149 For summary of the arguments and for bibliography, see Marincola (2001): 63-65. 
150 Polybius: XII.25e.1, XII.27.5, XII.28a.3-7. 
151 Ibid: III.33.5-18, 56.2-4.  Elsewhere, Polybius claims to have examined inscribed treaties between 
Rome and Carthage (III.21.9-26.7) as well as an admiral’s dispatch preserved at the prytaneum at 
Rhodes (16.15). 
152 Momigliano (1966a): 135; Hornblower (2002): 374. 
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practices.153  In respect of campaigns, for example, P. J. Rhodes determines that 
documents might record statistics, but not particular events of an expedition.154  It is 
telling that most documents apparently consulted by Herodotus were of Egyptian or 
Persian origin, cultures with a strong archival tradition.155  Records and record-
keeping were products of largely literate societies, not one like Classical Greece, 
chiefly reliant on oral tradition.156   
The situation changed during the Hellenistic period, as improvements in archives and 
libraries allowed for more convenient consultation of written material.157  Rosalind 
Thomas notes an ‘increasing respect’ for written documents from the early fourth 
century B.C., with developments of interest to historians – foreign treaties, military 
actions – more frequently committed to writing and preserved.158  Fornara draws 
special attention to the Romans’ ability to access written information, including 
military dispatches and senatorial decrees.159  Latin and Greek historians, particularly 
those writing about events already described by their predecessors, gradually came to 
favour written material.160  Livy claimed greater confidence in his account from Book 
VI onward as he could now draw upon written records, ‘the only trustworthy place for 
the preservation of the memory of events’.161  Similarly, Diodorus Siculus commends 
                                                 
153 Momigliano (1966b): 213-216; Finley (1985): 15-16; Grant (1995): 34-36; Marincola (1997): esp. 
99-107.  For the difficulties of speaking of an organized archive of written documents in the city states 
of Ancient Greece, see R. Thomas (1992): 34-94. 
154 Rhodes (2007): 56-57.  Cf. Hornblower (1987): 39-40, who argues for Thucydides’ potential use of 
written reports filed by commanders. 
155 Burn (1984): 597-598; Finley (1985): 33-35. 
156 On this point see R. Thomas (1992). 
157 Jacob (1996). 
158 R. Thomas (1992): 83-93; Rhodes (2007): 64. 
159 Fornara (1983): 56-57. 
160 Schepens (2007). 
161 …litterae…una custodia fidelis memoriae rerum gestarum… (Livy: VI.1.2-3). 
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Rome for its ability to supply him with written material.162  Seemingly at odds with 
this sentiment is Polybius, who disparaged fellow historian Timaeus for his use of 
written sources.163  F. W. Walbank proposes that Polybius had little access to 
documents, and made sparing use of them.164  Marie Laffranque, however, considers 
Polybius’ protests to not be in keeping with the preference for written information in 
the Hellenistic period, contesting that Polybius drew more from written sources than 
he would have the reader believe.165  As a writer of contemporary history, Polybius 
may have felt obligated to follow publicly the research methods outlined by his 
model, Thucydides.166  Study of Byzantine historians shows that Polybius was 
certainly not the only historian to place himself in this literary tradition and profess a 
questionable obedience to the Thucydidean mode of inquiry.  
The Use of Written Sources in Byzantine Historiography: Adherence and Change 
The appearance of Eusebius’ Vita Constantinii in the fourth century A.D. was 
instrumental in the development of a new branch of historical writing, known as 
ecclesiastical historiography.167  The work is also notable for its unabashed inclusion 
of entire documents and excerpts from earlier sources.168  The form of the Vita 
Constantinii is unique, though one suspects that the obvious influence here is 
                                                 
162 ἀφορµῇ δὲ πρὸς τὴν ἐπιβολὴν ταύτην ἐχρησάµεθα µάλιστα µὲν τῇ πρὸς τὴν πραγµατείαν ἐπιθυµίᾳ, 
δι᾽ ἣν πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις τὸ δοκοῦν ἄπορον εἶναι τυγχάνει συντελείας, ἔπειτα καὶ τῇ ἐν Ῥώµῃ χορηγίᾳ 
τῶν πρὸς τὴν ὑποκειµένην ὑπόθεσιν ἀνηκόντων. ἡ γὰρ ταύτης τῆς πόλεως ὑπεροχή, διατείνουσα τῇ 
δυνάµει πρὸς τὰ πέρατα τῆς οἰκουµένης, ἑτοιµοτάτας καὶ πλείστας ἡµῖν ἀφορµὰς παρέσχετο 
παρεπιδηµήσασιν ἐν αὐτῇ πλείω χρόνον (Diodorus Siculus: I.4.2-5). 
163 The polemic in Polybius’ criticism should be taken into account – see Sacks (1981): 32-99; 
Schepens (1990). 
164 Walbank (1972): 82-84. 
165 Laffranque (1968). 
166 For the possible belief of Thucydides that written material was largely irrelevant to contemporary 
history-writing, see Marincola (1997): 105-107; Rood (2006): 236-237. 
167 See Averil Cameron (1997); idem (2000).  Cf. Barnes (1989). 
168 See Barnes (1981); Jones & Skeat (1954): 194-200. 
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biography, authors of which, striving to display impartiality, emphasized their use of 
documents to gain credibility.169  In any case, subsequent church historians Sozomen 
and Socrates followed Eusebius in his preference for erudite research and source 
citation.170  The Byzantine chronicle tradition, thought to have been influenced by 
ecclesiastical historiography, adopted the practice of including official documents 
verbatim and borrowing liberally from earlier compositions.171  Classicizing 
Byzantine historians continued to follow Thucydides in stressing that they relied on 
autopsy and eyewitness informants, with specific citations rare.  Yet these 
programmatic statements seem formulaic, representative of an historical ideal rather 
than the practical reality.   
James Howard-Johnston is critical of those who maintain that Byzantine historians did 
not make extensive use of official documents.  Such a consensus, he decrees, ‘flies in 
the face of common sense’.172  The administration of the state yielded many 
documents of historical interest, stored, albeit imperfectly, in departmental 
archives.173  The notion that these depositories were regularly consulted by historians 
is affirmed by a tendency to employ or even quote documents and written material in 
classicizing Byzantine historiography.  From the earlier period, we may cite the 
apparent use of documentary sources and the inclusion of whole letters,174 treaties175 
                                                 
169 Cox (1983): 60-63.  
170 Momigliano (1966b): 216-217; Rohrbacher (2002): 154-155, 161. 
171 Roger Scott (1992) suggests that John Malalas made frequent use of diplomatic dispatches and 
documents for his detailed discussions of foreign affairs during the 520s and early 530s.  See also E. 
Jeffreys (1990): 200-216.  For documents contained within the seventh-century Chronicon Paschale, 
see M. & M. Whitby (1989): xx-xxi; Howard-Johnston (2010): 37-58. 
172 Howard-Johnston (1983): 242-243; idem (2001): 319 n.55. 
173 See below, 190-207 for discussion of archives and document storage. 
174 See, in general, Lee (1993): 37. 
175 Chrysos (1976). 
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and diplomatic reports176 in the historical works of Priscus,177 Malchus,178 Menander 
Protector,179 Procopius,180 Agathias,181 and Theophylact Simocatta.182  Potential use of 
written material among historians of the Middle period will be discussed, though it 
will suffice here to note two examples.  Niketas Choniates discloses that he will cover 
the reign of John II Komnenos briefly as he was not an eyewitness to events, and 
assures the reader that he related only what he had heard from contemporaries.183  The 
indication is that Choniates relied on autopsy and oral accounts for the subsequent 
portions of his history, but this is not the case.  He refers to the account of the fall of 
Thessaloniki in 1185 written by the Archbishop Eustathios, and it is evident that he 
based his own narrative of this episode on said composition.184  Furthermore, Niketas 
is shown to have drawn upon the writings of his brother Michael, and was probably 
also familiar with the Epitome of John Kinnamos.185  This dependency on written 
accounts contradicts the preliminary statement of Niketas, which is little more than an 
attempt to present himself as an inquiry-based historian in the tradition of 
                                                 
176 Diplomatic reports preserved in sixth-century historical works are discussed in Treadgold (2007): 
256-258, 264-269. 
177 Blockley (1985): 68-69. 
178 Heather (1991): 236.   
179 Baldwin (1978a): 104, 109; Blockley (1985): 18-20; and, most recently, Angold & Whitby (2008): 
839.  
180 It is thought that Procopius employed documents from the archives, even though he quotes none 
verbatim – see Averil Cameron (1985): 156; Greatrex (1998): 63-64; Treadgold (2007): 218. 
181 Averil Cameron (1970: 39-40) notes that Agathias ‘tends to state documented information where he 
had it’. 
182 Michael Whitby (1988: 95-97, 316-321) is not altogether convinced that Theophylact Simocatta 
made extensive use of documents for his historical work, suggesting that any which may feature were 
probably copied directly from his base sources.  More recently, however, James Howard-Johnston 
(2010: 143-145), despite citing Whitby, is convinced that Theophylact reproduced documents verbatim, 
including some letters.  
183 Niketas Choniates, Chronike Diegesis: 4.76-80. 
184 Ibid: 296-308.  For Choniates’ use of Eustathios’ work see most recently Simpson (2004): 209-212. 
185 For Niketas’ reliance on his brother Michael Choniates, see Rhoby (2002); Simpson (2004): 215-
218.  For Niketas’ reliance on Kinnamos, see Grecu (1949). 
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Thucydides.186  Similar is Anna Komnene, whose Alexiad appears to include four 
official documents in their entirety, despite the historian not drawing explicit attention 
to such texts in her ‘method chapter’.187  It is suggested that Anna was strongly 
influenced in her decision to include documents by ecclesiastical historians such as 
Eusebius.188  Anna follows Thucydides in stressing a dependence on oral 
correspondence, though Roger Scott suggests that such indicators of continuity were 
merely superficial, with biographer-historians such as Plutarch more instrumental 
models for the Alexiad.189  Byzantine historians were inspired by their ancient 
counterparts, but we have noted their capacity to stray from tradition.  A discreet 
willingness to take advantage of written material was one such departure.  
Conclusion 
Momigliano considered the study of written records ‘an exceptional occupation for 
Greek and Roman historians’.190  He refers only to those of Antiquity, but even this 
view is contentious given the proposals that certain writers from the time of the third 
century B.C. suppress a reliance on written sources.  The shadow of Thucydides, and 
his preference for autopsy and oral testimony from eyewitnesses, loomed large, his 
impact profoundly felt among subsequent writers of contemporary history.  Historians 
of the Middle Byzantine period generally present themselves as disciples of 
                                                 
186 Maisano (1994a: 402-403) argues that Choniates relied upon written sources for the first eight books 
of his Chronike Diegesis.  For a similar view see Simpson (2004): 203-204. 
187 Anna Komnene: III.4.4-8 (chrysobull for Anna Dalassene); III.10.3-8 (letter to Henry IV of 
Germany); VI.5.10 (chrysobull for the Venetians); XIII.12 (Treaty of Devol).  For further discussion, 
see Howard-Johnston (1996): 278-279; Buckler (1929): 234-239. 
188 Lieberich (1900): esp. 20; Grigoriadis (1998): 38-39. 
189 Scott (1981).  It should also be noted that Agathias and possibly Leo the Deacon employed 
Diodorus Siculus as a model, and thus may have felt more encouraged to consult written material (see 
Averil Cameron 1970: 57-58). 
190 Momigliano (1966a): 135. 
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Thucydides in respect of their research methods,191 similarly neglecting to cite sources 
for specific events, perhaps in order to inspire trustworthiness through a uniform 
narrative.  The reality however was very different, with clear evidence for the use of 
written material by Anna Komnene and Niketas Choniates.  Having read Polybius, 
Byzantine classicizing historians would have been mindful that a reliance on written 
sources was not considered ‘proper’, and thus the general secrecy surrounding the use 
of written material in historiography persisted.  This reticence, combined with the lack 
of source citations, makes it difficult to identify the sources historians employed.  
Conversely, it also permits scholars to hypothesize the use of written material even by 
historians who do not list texts and documents among their sources.  These 
methodological issues are paramount as we progress to discussion of the potential 
sources Middle Byzantine historians employed for military events. 
                                                 
191 See Grigoriadis (1998): 41; Aerts (2003): 93. 
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II. The Vita Basilii 
The Vita Basilii is a eulogistic biography of the Emperor Basil I, commissioned and 
perhaps even written by his grandson, the Emperor Constantine VII Porphyrogenitos, 
in the mid-tenth century.192  The work is often thought of as the fifth book of six in the 
Theophanes Continuatus, a volume of separate histories compiled c.963 and covering 
the period 813-960.  Around the time the Vita was published, the Basileiai of the 
courtier Genesios appeared.  Genesios’ work chronicles the period 814-886, and, 
since it too was part of Constantine VII’s historical programme, one observes many 
similarities in the accounts of the reign of Basil, presumably indicative of a common 
source.193 
The Vita Basilii has been the subject of much study relating to its genre and the 
presentation of both Basil and his ousted predecessor Michael III.194  The Vita has 
also been mined by J. G. C. Anderson and Norman Tobias for its information on 
campaigns conducted by Basil and his subordinates, though Tobias gives little thought 
to the provenance of this military content, persisting only with the reconstruction of 
events.195  Romily Jenkins considered that ‘much painstaking, and comparatively 
speaking, honest work’ went into the Vita Basilii’s accounts of Basil’s campaigns,196 
                                                 
192 Ševčenko (1998).  As the production and form of the Vita is discussed in chapter four (285-286) we 
will not concern ourselves with such matters here.   
193 First observed by Hirsch (1876): 229-230.  For the relationship between the two texts see Kaldellis 
(1998): ix-xiv, where it is suggested that the similarities may have been a consequence of Genesios’ 
dependency on the Vita Basilii.  This contradicts the views of Franjo Barišić (1958) and Athanasios 
Markopoulos (2009b), who persuasively argue that Genesios wrote first.  For detailed discussion on the 
ties between Book IV of the Theophanes Continuatus and the Vita Basilii, see Varona (2009). 
194 See, for example, Adontz (1933a; 1934); Jenkins (1948); Moravcsik (1961); Maguire (1983): 91-93; 
Dagron (1984): 74-97; Markopoulos (1994): 160-164; Kazhdan (2006): 137-144. 
195 Tobias’ work (2007) fills an obvious void - Basil’s foreign policy did not generally concern Albert 
Vogt (1908) in his influential monograph on Basil’s reign.  The articles by Anderson (1896; 1897) 
remain useful for reconstructing Basil’s campaigns. 
196 Jenkins (1954): 29. 
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and on this point Arnold Toynbee was in general agreement.197  Further investigation 
is necessary to test the validity of these claims.  
Historical Method 
Indication of the research undertaken by the author of the Vita Basilii is found in the 
narrative.  The preface to the Theophanes Continuatus notes: ‘You have gathered 
together material partly from works written down here and there by some authors, and 
partly from oral tradition’.198  To what extent this statement applies to the historical 
method of the Vita Basilii is unclear; scholarship is increasingly moving towards 
distinguishing the first four books of the Theophanes Continuatus from the Vita 
Basilii.199  We may, in any case, postulate a similar research programme behind the 
latter text, which interrupts its coverage of Basil’s eastern campaigns to discuss 
narrative approach and source material:  
Let no one wonder or cavil if we have reported such momentous events succinctly 
or in barest outline, as if in a rapid survey.  On the one hand, our narrative has 
imitated, as it were, the speed of those actions and has been for that very reason so 
simple and cursory – for, indeed, those <strongholds> were then conquered, and 
those missions accomplished, in less time than it takes now to tell the tale.  On the 
other hand, because the long years that have already elapsed here, so to speak, 
blurred the details of these deeds, silencing <what happened> in between, and 
                                                 
197 Toynbee (1973): 594. 
198 τὰ µὲν ἐκ τῶν γεγραµµένων σποράδην τισί, τὰ δὲ ἐκ τῶν ἀκοῇ παραδεδοµένων συνηθροικὼς 
(Theophanes Continuatus: 4.21-5.2.  Greek text taken from the revised prooimion found in Ševčenko 
1998: 82.37-39, trans. 85). 
199 Ševčenko (1998: 87-89) determined that the preface only applied to the four-book Theophanes 
Continuatus.  The forthcoming CFHB critical editions, which offer separate publications of the Vita 
Basilii and Theophanes Continuatus (Books I-IV and VI), suggest that we should move away from the 
traditional six-book idea popularized by the CSHB edition of Immanuel Bekker. 
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because we lack the knowledge needed both to given an account of the various 
orders of battle, methods of attack, extension or contraction of phalanx 
formations, and to tell what opportune uses were made of military stratagems, it 
has been impossible for us to devote much time to single points, or, so to speak, 
lovingly linger over them, all of which are devices used to draw out the story.  As 
for the things whose credibility does not rest on evidence, even if they perchance 
are passed on by word of mouth, we do not want to accept them merely on faith, 
to avoid the appearance of offering the emperor a fictitious narrative of deeds that 
never happened; all the more so, because in his lifetime he himself plainly 
frowned upon fawning flattery uttered for the sake of currying favour.  We who 
have neither the ability nor the leisure to commit to writing what is a matter of 
universal agreement can hardly be expected to indulge in long disquisitions about 
what is controversial.200 
The Vita Basilii generally summarizes campaigns, even those involving Basil.  The 
above admission suggests there were two reasons for this.  The first argues that the 
campaigns were as described - swift and often consisting of little more than the 
capture of fortresses.  It seems that the author had no desire to write dramatic accounts 
of siege warfare, and his audience little interest in reading them.  The siege 
                                                 
200 Εἰ δὲ συντόµως τε καὶ ψιλῶς τὰ οὕτω µεγάλα οἱονεὶ κατ’ ἐπιδροµὴν ἀπαγγέλλοµεν, µηδεὶς 
θαυµαζέτω, ἀλλὰ µηδὲ ἐγκαλείτω.  ἅµα γὰρ τὴν ταχύτητα τῶν πράξεων ἐκείνων µιµεῖσθαι ἡ διήγησις 
ἔοικεν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὕτως ἐστὶν ἁπλῆ τε καὶ ἐπιτρέχουσα· θᾶττον γὰρ ᾑρέθη τότε ἐκεῖνα καὶ <τὰ> 
τῶν πράξεων ἔλαβε τὴν συντέλειαν, ἢ νῦν ἀπήγγελται. ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐπεὶ ὁ χρόνος ἤδη ῥεύσας διὰ 
µέσου πολὺς τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστα τῶν ἔργων διὰ τῆς µεταξὺ σιγῆς οἷον ἡµαύρωσεν, καὶ οὔτε παρατάξεων 
τρόπους οὔτε προσβολῶν ἐφόδους οὔτε φαλάγγων ἐκτάσεις καὶ συστολὰς οὔτε στρατηγηµάτων 
ἐπικαίρους χρήσεις εἰδέναι καὶ ἀπαγγέλλειν ἔχοµεν, οὐκ ἔστι περὶ τὰ κατὰ µέρος ἐγχρονίζειν καὶ οἷον 
ἐµφιλοχωρεῖν, ἐξ ὧν πλατύνεται τὸ διήγηµα.  τὰ δὲ ἀµάρτυρον ἔχοντα τὴν πίστιν, εἰ καὶ λέγεται 
πολλάκις, ἀλλ’ ἡµεῖς ἀβασανίστως προσδέχεσθαι οὐ βουλόµεθα διὰ τὸ µὴ δόξαι πεπλασµένην µὴ 
γεγονότων πραγµάτων διήγησιν ἀνατιθέναι τῷ βασιλεῖ, µάλιστα ὅτι οὐδ’ ἐκεῖνος ἔτι ζῶν τὰ πρὸς χάριν 
θωπευτικῶς ὑποτρέχοντα ῥήµατα ἐφαίνετο προσιέµενος. οἱ δὲ µηδὲ τὰ παρὰ πάντων ὁµολογούµενα 
δυνάµενοι ἢ σχολάζοντες παραδοῦναι γραφῇ, σχολῇ γ’ ἂν περὶ τὰ ἀµφίβολα τὸν λόγον ἀποµηκύνοιµεν 
(Vita Basilii: §47.1-20; trans. 167-169). 
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descriptions of Leo the Deacon indicate that this state of affairs would soon change 
dramatically, though this development is discussed in its proper place.201  The author 
of the Vita also insists that detailed knowledge about campaigns was lacking, as many 
years had elapsed since the reign of Basil.  There is also a suggestion that certain 
information, perhaps overly favourable to Basil, was considered suspect, and 
subsequently omitted.  Prima facie, it would appear that the author of the Vita Basilii 
did not have access to extensive written material on the military ventures of Basil’s 
reign.  It is however possible that the author is excusing a lack of interest in military 
exposition; he might also be addressing concerns that he indiscriminately included all 
eulogistic stories about his subject, a defence later made by Anna Komnene when 
writing her Alexiad.202   
The military content of the Vita Basilii is at least unlikely to derive entirely from oral 
sources.  In the passage quoted above, the author indicates that he was wary of 
accepting oral evidence ‘without examination’ (ἀβασανίστως).  While the passage 
recalls the famous admonition of Thucydides, the author of the Vita Basilii may 
actually be alluding to the greater authority of written sources.  Joseph Genesios, 
writing around the same time, insists that he relied exclusively upon oral accounts: ‘I 
have now undertaken the complex task of writing…by listening both to men who 
lived then and who have some limited knowledge of what transpired and to oral 
traditions that have come down from that time’.203  How literally one should take this 
                                                 
201 See below, 51-57. 
202 For further discussion on the ambiguity in this passage of the Vita Basilii, see van Hoof (2002): 165-
166.  Anna Komnene’s tendency to interrupt her account and assure the reader of her impartiality and 
the veracity of her text is discussed below, 103-109. 
203 ὅθεν κἀγὼ νῦν τὴν περὶ τούτων γραφικὴν σπουδὴν πολυτρόπως ἀνῃρηµένος, ἔκ τε τῶν τότε 
βεβιωκότων καὶ ἀµωσγέπως εἰδότων ἔκ τε φήµης δῆθεν δραµούσης ἠκουτισµένος (Genesios: pr.10-12; 
trans. 3). 
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statement is contestable,204 though in any case the extensive time passed since 
Genesios came to write about these events raises serious doubts.  Therefore, while at 
least one historian of the court of Constantine VII presented his historical 
investigation in the Thucydidean tradition of interviewing eyewitnesses and acquiring 
information orally, the reality, as the prooimion to Theophanes Continuatus and the 
method passage of the Vita Basilii suggest, was almost certainly very different. 
Sources for Military Narratives 
If Romily Jenkins accepted the Vita’s claims that information on Basil’s campaigns 
was lacking, we must conclude that he merely gained the impression that extensive 
research was undertaken from the actual accounts of military operations conducted by 
Basil and his subordinates.  Suggestions as to the written sources behind these 
accounts are not lacking.  Cyril Mango postulates the existence of a lost encomium of 
Basil I, the hypothesized common source used also by Genesios.205  Yet a lost 
encomium of Basil I would not account for all episodes described by the Vita Basilii, 
not least those expeditions involving only Basil’s subordinates.  Mango further 
discerned a ‘selective use’ of archival material, namely inventories and diplomatic 
reports, though was less certain about the origin of the Vita’s accounts of Basil’s wars.  
The frequent lists of minor forts captured,206 Mango considers, ‘points to a factually 
circumstantial source rather than a rhetorical encomium’;207 that Constantine VII was 
able to locate at least one detailed report of a triumph held by Basil I in 878 may 
                                                 
204 Kaldellis (1998: 3 n.1) notes that ‘ἀκούειν’ might mean ‘reading’ rather than ‘listening’, and thus 
Genesios could here be referring to textual research, and not, as Ljubarskij (1997) determines, purely 
oral sources. 
205 Mango (2011): 10-11.  See also Alexander (1939), where it is suggested that the funeral encomium 
for Basil delivered by his son Leo VI was consulted by the author of the Vita Basilii. 
206 For example, Vita Basilii: §40.19-21, 43-45; §46.35-38. 
207 Mango (2011): 11-13. 
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suggest that records of imperial campaigns were also available.208  This idea tallies 
with that of Mark Whittow, who suggests - without elaboration - dispatch origins for 
the Vita’s accounts of Basil’s campaigns.209  Whittow’s proposal, however, is 
inconsistent with the claims of the author of the Vita to be lacking military details and 
accurate dates: ‘…because the exact date of each deed was not known, [the wars of 
Basil] have been recounted in one sequence in the present account’.210  The problem is 
underlined by Paul Lemerle, who has shown the chronology of the Vita Basilii to be 
particularly suspect in regard to Basil’s wars against the Paulicians.211   
Nevertheless, when we consider the detail provided for certain episodes, and the 
unlikelihood of oral sources, Mango and Whittow are surely correct to suggest that 
the author had written accounts at his disposal.  The independent actions of the 
admirals Niketas Ooryphas and Nasar against the Arabs of Sicily and Crete, related 
with command perspective and extensive detail, are suggestive of post-campaign 
reports filed by these generals.212  Another commander subject to a lengthy narrative 
is Andrew the Scythian, domestikos ton scholon under Basil and victor over an Arab 
army at Podandos near Tarsos.  Upon his return to Constantinople, Andrew was not 
rewarded but slandered to the emperor by jealous men who accused him of cowardice 
                                                 
208 Constantine VII, Text C: ll.724-807 describes a triumph held by Basil I upon his return from 
Tephrike and Germanikeia.  John Haldon (1990: 54-55, 58) suggests that information offered by 
Constantine in his treatises on imperial expeditions may have derived from official records of Basil’s 
campaigns: ‘These may have been official accounts preserved in the palatine archive, perhaps intended 
originally for the glorification of the emperor; or accounts extracted from some now-lost encomiastic 
compositions’. 
209 Whittow (1996a): 356. 
210 εἰ δὲ µὴ συνηµµέναι τοῖς χρόνοις ἀλλήλαις αἱ πράξεις ἐτύγχανον, ὥσπερ οὖν ἡ διήγησις, ἀλλ’ ὅµως 
ἐπεὶ ὁ ἑκάστης πράξεως ἀκριβὴς ἠγνοεῖτο χρόνος, διὰ τοῦτο µίαν κατὰ τὴν ἀπαγγελίαν τάξιν ἐδέξατο 
ἅπαντα (Vita Basilii: §71.29-33; trans. 247). 
211 Lemerle (1973): 96-108. 
212 Vita Basilii: §§52-55, §§60-61 (Ooryphas); §§62-65 (Nasar).  For these actions, and discussion of 
Basil’s western policy in general, see Tobias (2007): 124-128, 153-201.  The author omits a number of 
actions performed by independent generals – including Andrew the Scythian and Nikephoros Phokas – 
known from other sources.  See again ibid: 130-133, 140-141.  
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for not pressing on to capture Tarsos.  Having been dismissed from command, 
Andrew was replaced by Stypeiotes, who is shown to be a foolish and inexperienced 
general in the subsequent account of his own attempt to take Tarsos, suffering a 
disastrous defeat through his negligence.213  Alexander Kazhdan proposed that the 
author of the Vita Basilii drew upon an oral or written hagiographical source, which 
apparently related Andrew’s success, showed him to be the victim of an injustice, and 
presented his replacement as inept in the field.214  Cyril Mango recently dismissed 
Kazhdan’s hypothesis without further consideration,215 though the intense piety 
displayed by Andrew, which sees him weep upon receiving a letter from the emir of 
Tarsos blaspheming against the Virgin Mary, and consequently invoking her 
assistance, is difficult to otherwise explain if it did not originate in a semi-
hagiographical source.  Invective against Stypeiotes alongside this praise is extremely 
consistent with ‘historical hagiography’ of the late ninth and early tenth century.216 
A strong candidate for an informed written source is the lengthy narrative of the 
defeat of the Paulician heretic Chrysocheir and his subsequent death, which, Mango 
opines, ‘reads as if it were due to an eyewitness’.217  Genesios’ account of the same 
events, which is remarkably similar, is thought by Lemerle to have been drawn from 
the testimony of a witness, ‘peut-être au rapport d’un officier, qu’il [Genesios] aurait 
pu consulter dans les archives du Palais’.218  Only a participating officer could have 
                                                 
213 Vita Basilii: §§50-51.  According to another source, Symeon the Logothete (132.25; 133.3, 6-10), 
Andrew was removed because Theodore Santaberenos, a court favourite of Basil, accused him of 
siding with Basil’s son, Leo, in a dispute against his father.  It is subsequently revealed that he was 
reinstated following Stypeiotes’ defeat. 
214 Kazhdan (1993). 
215 Mango (2011): 13. 
216 See below, 280-285. 
217 Mango (2011): 13; Vita Basilii: §§41-43.  For discussion of this campaign see Kaegi (1981a): 281-
282; Tobias (2007): 111-114. 
218 Lemerle (1973): 98.  Genesios: IV.35-36. 
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furnished details on the dispute between the soldiers of the Charsian and Armeniakon 
themes, the tactical dispositions which brought victory in the battle, and the pursuit 
and slaying of Chrysocheir by one Poulades, complete, in both accounts, with speech 
elements.  Genesios and the author of the Vita Basilii clearly consulted a common 
source, though the Vita extends the account to relate Basil’s reaction to receiving the 
head of Chrysocheir.  He shot three arrows into it, fulfilling an earlier promise he had 
made to God prior to the expedition, and disclosed at the beginning of the Vita’s 
account of this campaign.  The bookending of the expedition with a tale confirming 
God’s support for Basil, a theme consistent with the propaganda of his reign,219 
indicates that the original source was a commemorative written account of the 
expedition, perhaps based on dispatches and eyewitness testimony but crucially not 
neglecting Basil and the divine cause of victory over a heretical enemy.  Even if the 
elements concerning Basil, not present in Genesios’ account, were invented by the 
author of the Vita Basilii, then Lemerle’s suggestion of an official report written by an 
officer serving in the expedition is the only plausible alternative. 
The Campaigns of Basil I: Panegyric and Distortion 
There can be few doubts that the author of the Vita Basilii drew upon encomiastic 
material from Basil’s lifetime or possibly more detailed dispatches, as Cyril Mango 
suggests.  If the Vita Basilii derived from an encomium of Basil, praise of the emperor 
and the glossing over of his failures is to be expected.220  Basil is the focalizer for 
many of his campaigns, and there are numerous episodes attesting to his commitment 
and heroism.  In the narrative of Basil’s eastern campaigns of 871-873, it is reported 
                                                 
219 See Moravcsik (1961). 
220 For such recommendations, see Menander Rhetor, Peri Epideiktikon: 368.3-8.  The potential 
influence of Menander’s treatise on imperial orations on the format of the Vita Basilii is discussed by 
van Hoof (2002). 
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that the emperor ordered the construction of a bridge over the swollen Euphrates, 
joining his soldiers in the endeavour, lifting with ease what it otherwise took three 
soldiers to carry.221  A very similar tale features in the Taktika of Leo VI, confirming 
that the story predated the Vita Basilii, and strengthening the notion that it was 
propagated nearer to Basil’s lifetime.  Leo’s additional note that Basil saved many 
soldiers from great danger during the crossing indicates that the original episode may 
have been even more generous in its praise of the emperor.222  A comparable sense of 
commitment is observed in the Vita Basilii’s report of Basil’s campaign in northern 
Syria in 877-878.  While traversing rough terrain around Kallipolis and Padasia, Basil 
led by example, dismounting and proceeding on foot through the narrow passes.223  
References to Basil’s military prowess are surprisingly few, though an abstract one is 
observed in the account of the attack on Melitene in 873: 
[Basil] made a show of bravery, so that not only those under him, but also the 
enemy were astounded by his courage and fortitude.  For he engaged the enemy 
with prudence and vigour, revealed high spirit in deeds, and distinguished himself 
in acts of daring, showed courage and imperturbability in the very midst of 
danger, and amidst much slaughter was the first to turn back the enemy.224   
                                                 
221 Vita Basilii: §40.1-15. 
222 ‘We recall that our ever-memorable father and emperor Basil did this when he was on campaign 
against Germanikeia in Syria.  He arrived at the river called Paradeisos and stationed himself in the 
middle of it with lamps, and in his presence and in safety the entire army under his command made the 
crossing easily and securely.  He frequently gave a hand and, by himself, saved several soldiers from 
great danger’ (Leo VI, Taktika: §9.14; trans. 159). 
223 Vita Basilii: §48.5-8. 
224 τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν ἐπεδείξατο, ὡς µὴ µόνον τοὺς ὑπ’ αὐτόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς πολεµίους περιφανῶς 
ἐκπλαγῆναι τὴν ἀνδρείαν αὐτοῦ καὶ εὐχέρειαν. ἐµφρόνως γὰρ ἅµα καὶ νεανικῶς προσµίξας τοῖς 
πολεµίοις καὶ κατὰ χεῖρα γενναῖος φανεὶς καὶ τόλµῃ διαφέρων καὶ παρὰ <τὰ> δεινὰ ὁρώµενος 
εὐθαρσής τε καὶ ἀκατάπληκτος, πρῶτος τοὺς ἀντιτεταγµένους ἐτρέψατο φόνῳ πολλῷ (ibid: §40.21-30; 
trans. 145). 
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The deeds attributed to Basil here are non-specific, and the praise rather standard for a 
soldier emperor, rather suggestive of encomia.225   
Another element of this pro-Basil slant is that setbacks suffered by the emperor appear 
to be played down.  According to the Vita Basilii, Basil abandoned a siege of the 
Paulician capital of Tephrike in 871 because the defences of the city were too 
strong.226  However, the hostile Chronicle of Symeon the Logothete alleges that Basil 
was defeated in many battles outside the city, and would have been captured had he 
not been saved by one Theophylact Abastakos.227  This historicity of this report is just 
as questionable, for this rendition of Symeon’s chronicle was favourable to the 
Emperor Romanos I Lekapenos, and Abastakos happened to be Romanos’ father.228  
Paul Lemerle prefers the account of Symeon, though Tobias employs evidence from 
Arabic sources which suggests that Basil at least conducted a disciplined 
withdrawal.229  More intriguing is the decision of Genesios to include reports of 
Chrysocheir’s damaging counter-raids the following year and Basil’s failed 
negotiations, a set of events viewed by Mango as ‘inglorious’ to Basil and perhaps for 
this reason omitted from the Vita Basilii.230  When Basil besieged Melitene in 873, he 
was again frustrated in his efforts, with the Vita Basilii asserting that the imperial 
army forced the defenders to retreat within the city before Basil, observing the 
                                                 
225 Jenkins (1954) proposes that the Vita Basilii drew upon a number of ancient texts, many now lost, 
so it may be the case that there are classical models for some of Basil’s purported feats.  Certainly, later 
individuals were written about in similar fashion by authors seeking to lavish praise upon their subjects.  
Basil partaking in heavy labour to encourage his troops is reminiscent of the conduct of Nikephoros II 
Phokas at Antioch in 968 (Leo the Deacon: 74.12-15), which, translators Talbot & Sullivan note, is in 
itself similar to an episode in the Vita of St. Nikon (§35.24-25), where the saint carries stones to the site 
of a proposed new church to encourage the people of Sparta to supply building materials.  Imperial 
panegyrics boasted that Manuel I Komnenos had physically contributed to the construction of new 
fortifications at Dorylaion and Soublaion – see in general Stone (2003). 
226 Vita Basilii: §37. 
227 Symeon the Logothete: 132.7. 
228 See Kazhdan (2006): 162-170. 
229 Lemerle (1973): 103; Tobias (2007): 108-111; Byzance et les Arabes: II.1, 33-34. 
230 Genesios: IV.35-36.  Mango (2011): 12-13; Tobias (2007): 111-112. 
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strength of the defences, again elected to withdraw.231  According to Arab sources, 
however, Basil was defeated in battle and lost an important commander.232  These 
accounts are difficult to reconcile; one suspects the Vita Basilii of reporting a version 
of events distorted in favour of the emperor.  Lemerle argues that the Vita’s account 
of the siege of Tephrike originates from a source close to the emperor, which knew he 
had in fact retreated to Constantinople in defeat.233  Possibly the ultimate source of 
this information were dispatches sent to the capital, intended to cover up the 
emperor’s failure.  That the reason given for Basil abandoning the sieges of Tephrike 
and Melitene is the same, and that the Vita proceeds to list minor fortresses taken by 
Basil upon his return march in both instances, as though to ease the sense of failure,234 
perhaps suggests a deliberate strategy on the part of Basil and his publicists.  The 
tendency to exaggerate victories and play down defeats was practised in all imperial 
propaganda; Basil was no different in this respect. 
Conclusion - The Hand of Constantine VII Porphyrogenitos 
While the author of the Vita Basilii undoubtedly made use of written material for 
relating military campaigns, we should note that he did not simply follow his sources, 
and clearly shaped parts to exploit the mid-tenth century context and benefit 
Constantine VII Porphyrogenitos.235  This is most evident in the account of Basil’s 
                                                 
231 Vita Basilii: §40.  See Tobias (2007): 121-123, where the Vita’s account of the siege is described as 
‘garbled’. 
232 Byzance et les Arabes: II.1, 6. 
233 Lemerle (1973): 103.  Lemerle was less convinced of the Vita’s narratives of Basil’s later campaigns 
in the east, observing a confusing list of names and places, and opining that Constantine VII and his 
researchers had been unable to secure official documents and first-hand testimony (ibid: 107). 
234 See Anderson (1896). 
235 The work was intended in part to bolster the legitimacy of Constantine VII by highlighting the 
greatness and noble lineage of his grandfather Basil, the founder of the Macedonian dynasty (see 
Markopoulos 1994: 160-164).  For example, Kazhdan (2006: 143) observes the topicality of the 
agrarian issues discussed in the Vita Basilii, with similar concerns prevalent during the reign of 
Constantine VII.   
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eastern campaign of 877-878.236  The emperor, struggling to capture Hadat, inquired 
as to why the city was so confident in its defence.  He was told that one of the city’s 
holy men had decreed that Hadat would fall only to ‘another man of your kin, 
Constantine’.  When Basil pointed out that he had a son with that name, the informant 
explained that the Constantine in question would be a later descendant of Basil.  The 
prophecy apparently came to pass, as ‘in our own day’ Constantine brought about ‘the 
utter destruction of the inhabitants of Hadat’.237  This statement may refer to Leo 
Phokas’ capture of the city in 947/948, though it is more likely to hint at the 
destruction of Hadat by Leo’s brother Nikephoros in 957.238  In any case, it is 
undoubtedly apocryphal, a prophecy inserted by the author with the insinuation that 
the deeds of Constantine VII surpassed even those of his grandfather.  While such an 
insertion does not render invalid our observations about sources consulted by the 
author, it is our first encounter with Ljubarskij’s ‘individuality of the historian’, 
establishing an important theme for the remainder of the chapter.
                                                 
236 For this campaign see Tobias (2007): 130-138. 
237 “οὐχ ὑπὸ σοῦ” τοῦ νῦν πολιορκοῦντος αὐτούς, ἀλλ’ ὑφ’ ἑτέρου τινὸς “τῶν κατὰ γένος σοι 
προσηκόντων, Κωνσταντίνου καλουµένου,” πεπρωµένον εἶναι τὴν τοιαύτην ἁλῶναι πόλιν...καὶ γὰρ 
ἐκείνου µὴ δυνηθέντος τότε τὴν πόλιν ἑλεῖν, νῦν ἐπὶ τῶν ἡµετέρων χρόνων Κωνσταντῖνος ὁ τῆς 
πορφύρας βλαστός, ὁ Λέοντος µὲν τοῦ σοφωτάτου υἱὸς ἐκείνου δὲ υἱωνός, τὸ τοιοῦτο προτέρηµα 
ἀπηνέγκατο καὶ ἐπεγράφη τῷ κατορθώµατι τῆς παντελοῦς ἀπωλείας τῶν οἰκούντων τὴν Ἄδατα (Vita 
Basilii: §48; trans. 171-175).  In his critical apparatus, Ihor Ševčenko notes similarities to a prophecy 
given in the Vita of St. Luke of Steiris (60.3-9), where the saint predicts that Crete would be taken by an 
emperor named Romanos, though he was apparently referring to the future Romanos II rather than the 
current ruler, Romanos I Lekapenos.  It is possible the author of the Vita Basilii was inspired by such 
predictions.  
238 Mango (2011): 8-9.  For the destruction of Hadat in 957, see Byzance et les Arabes: II.2, 361-362. 
47 
III. The History of Leo The Deacon 
Born c.950 in Asia Minor, Leo was educated in Constantinople and rose to the 
position of deacon in the palace under the Emperor Basil II.  Aside from his 
participation in a disastrous campaign led by Basil, little is known of Leo’s career, 
though he is believed to have drafted his history around 995.239  The History covers 
the period 959-989, though events after 976 are related in telescoped fashion, with the 
reigns of Nikephoros II Phokas and John I Tzimiskes of primary interest.   
Perhaps our lack of information on Leo has contributed to a relative dearth in studies, 
at least outside of Russia.240  In 1965 a biography of Leo was attempted by Nicholas 
Panagiotakes.241  General insight is provided by Herbert Hunger and especially 
Apostolos Karpozilos in their encyclopaedic volumes on Byzantine literature.242  
Alice-Mary Talbot and Denis Sullivan offer salient discussion of Leo and his work in 
their English translation of the History.243  In recent decades, study has tended to 
focus on Leo’s role as a military historian.  Denis Sullivan and Eric McGeer have 
established the technical authenticity of Leo’s military accounts through comparison 
with military handbooks of the tenth century.244  Alexander Kazhdan classified Leo’s 
work as ‘chivalresque historiography’ and drew attention to the primacy of military 
virtues and the heroic presentation of great warriors.245  Athanasios Markopoulos 
                                                 
239 For fuller attempts at a biography see Panagiotakes (1965); Kazhdan (2006): 278-282. 
240 I refer here to the scholarship of Mikhail Sjuzjumov (1916), Alexander Kazhdan (1961) and Jakov 
Ljubarskij (1991).  Not being familiar with Russian I am dependent on other works summarizing the 
main arguments of these scholars. 
241 Panagiotakes (1965). 
242 Hunger (1978): I, 367-371; Karpozilos (2002): 476-508. 
243 Talbot & Sullivan (2005): 9-50. 
244 McGeer (1995a); idem (1995b); Sullivan (1997); idem (2010a). 
245 Kazhdan (2006): 273-287. 
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followed a similar line in his study of gender in the History,246 while Lars Hoffmann 
has explored the various ‘command speeches’ (the logos parakletikos) related by Leo, 
asking to what extent they were influenced by rhetoric.247  Our primary concern here 
is with scholarship of the sources which may have been employed by Leo.  
λέγεται and φασί(ν): Determining Leo’s Use of Oral Sources 
While most classicizing historians rarely cite their sources, among those of the Middle 
period Leo is perhaps the most reticent in providing details of his historical method 
and source material.  In his opening section, Leo, referencing Herodotus, remarks that 
he will write about events ‘that I saw with my own eyes…and those that I verified 
from the evidence of eyewitnesses’.248  The claim to have relied on autopsy and 
eyewitness testimony recalls the research methods of Thucydides; Leo acknowledged 
this tradition to gain credibility for his work, but in truth was reliant largely on the 
testimony of others, not having attended any campaigns conducted by Nikephoros II 
Phokas or John I Tzimiskes.   
Leo’s use of oral information provided by eyewitnesses is perhaps attested by his 
consistent use of λέγεται (‘it is said’) and φασί(ν) (‘they say’) when presenting 
information.  There are fifty-two such instances in total, as Talbot and Sullivan have 
observed.249  Many appear in relation to military episodes, such as when Leo 
describes heroic individual prowess250 and lists figures of those wounded, captured or 
                                                 
246 Markopoulos (2004a). 
247 Hoffmann (2007). 
248 τὰ δὲ τούτων ἐχόµενα, καὶ ὅσα ὀφθαλµοῖς καὶ αὐτὸς τεθέαµαι (εἴπερ ὀφθαλµοὶ ὤτων πιστότεροι, 
καθ’ ‘Ηρόδοτον), τὰ δὲ καὶ πρὸς τῶν ἰδόντων ἠκρίβωσα, ταῦτα καὶ δώσω γραφῇ (Leo the Deacon: 
5.19-22; trans. 58). 
249 Talbot & Sullivan (2005): 14. 
250 Leo the Deacon: 10.23 (Nikephoros II Phokas); 81.17 (the taking of Antioch); 97.6 (John 
Tzimiskes); 107.19 (the stratopedarches Peter); 109.21 (Bardas Skleros); 123.18 (Leo Phokas). 
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killed in battle.251  Others recur in digressions and snippets about enemy customs;252 
amidst prophecies foretelling the murder of Nikephoros II Phokas;253 as Leo is 
describing historical events predating his scope;254 and when he relates the deaths of 
certain rulers and commanders.255   
Talbot & Sullivan view Leo’s use of λέγεται and φασί(ν) when relating controversial 
accounts of how emperors died as an attempt to distance himself from the accuracy of 
such reports.  Other usage is thought to reflect what Leo considered to be dubious 
information, or testimony he derived via oral transmission.  This is consistent with the 
views of D. A. Pauw, who proposed three reasons for the use of λέγεται by historians 
of Antiquity: because specific sources were lacking; a feeling of uncertainty; or to 
subtly denigrate an individual.256  Such a modern way of thinking, however, may fail 
to understand why classical historians employed λέγεται.  Brad Cook has argued that 
Plutarch’s use of λέγεται was not to signal his doubt about a particular part of the text, 
but, conversely, to assure his readers that he was using information from an 
established tradition.  Thus, when Plutarch uses λέγεται in describing how Alexander 
was the first man to charge the Thebans at Chaeronea, he does so to emphasize the 
accuracy of the report, not to indicate scepticism on his part.257   
                                                 
251 Ibid: 105.4; 111.2; 134.7; 155.8. 
252 Ibid: 24.21 (on Cretan beliefs); 27.12 (on Cretan wealth); 103.18 (on the Mysians, or Bulgarians); 
129.21 (on the Istros, or Danube); 130.9 (on the Danube); 149.24, 150.23, 151.22, 152.2 (on the 
customs of the Rus’). 
253 Ibid: 64.13; 83.2; 85.23. 
254 Ibid: 63.2 (of past defeats suffered by the Byzantines in Bulgaria); 104.18 (of past victories over the 
Bulgarians). 
255 Ibid: 30.2, 31.2 (the suspicious circumstances surrounding the death of the Emperor Romanos II); 
46.13 (the death of Marianos Argyros); 78.10 (the death of the Bulgarian ruler Peter); 177.4, 177.8 
(John Tzimiskes potentially poisoned). 
256 Pauw (1980): esp. 84. 
257 B. Cook (2001).  Similarly, Henry Westlake (1977) suggests that λέγεται does not always indicate 
doubt on Thucydides’ part, but can simply mark his repetition of a tradition or even his use of a written 
source. 
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Perhaps we should view Leo’s use of λέγεται and φασί(ν) similarly.  Thus, rather than 
interpreting Leo’s use of λέγεται and φασί(ν) for events surrounding the divine 
intervention of Saint Theodore at the Battle of Dorostolon as expressions of 
uncertainty, it is surely more apt to suggest that Leo was actually reinforcing the 
historicity of these miraculous events.258  The same may be said for Leo’s use of ‘it is 
said’ and ‘they say’ in relation to the miraculous keramion (‘holy brick’) and the 
bleeding icon of Beirut.259  Possibly Leo precedes mention of numbers and heroic 
feats with λέγεται and φασί(ν) in anticipation that these are the very sort of elements 
which people tend to doubt.  Unlike Plutarch, Leo does not cite his sources at all, so 
there is no cause to suggest that use of λέγεται and φασί(ν) refers to information 
derived orally rather than from written accounts.260  Indeed, that λέγεται and φασί(ν) 
represent the norm rather than the exception makes it all the more plausible that Leo 
was calling upon these terms to reinforce the veracity of the text, and allay the 
suspicions of his readers.  Use of λέγεται and φασί(ν) therefore does not automatically 
denote oral information, least of all that which Leo considered suspect.  We cannot 
discount the possibility that he was drawing upon written material in such instances. 
Leo’s Sources for Military Operations 
Much scholarship has concerned Leo’s alleged use of lost written sources.  Mikhail 
Sjuzjumov, followed by Alexander Kazhdan, proposed that Leo’s fondness for 
Nikephoros II Phokas compelled him to use a source favourable to the emperor and 
his family.  This pro-Phokas material is discussed later in the thesis, though it may be 
                                                 
258 Leo the Deacon: 153.22 (Theodore’s appearance); 154.2 (the soldiers in the camp claiming never to 
have seen this soldier prior to the battle); 154.9 (the vision experienced by a nun in Constantinople, 
wherein she saw the Virgin instructing Theodore to go to the aid of John Tzimiskes). 
259 Ibid: 70.18 (how the imprint on the keramion came to be); 166.23 (miracle attributed to the icon of 
Beirut); 166.24 (the icon again). 
260 Lateiner (1989): 93 notes that Herodotus’ vague use of λέγεται may refer to written sources. 
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noted that Athanasios Markopoulos, Jakov Ljubarskij and Rosemary Morris have 
been among the subsequent proponents of the hypothesis.261  Similar is Jean-Claude 
Cheynet’s suggestion that the Parsakoutenoi, relatives of the Phokas family, may have 
supplied Leo with first-hand information, since they, like Leo, were probably from the 
Thrakesian theme in Asia Minor.262  Herbert Hunger’s suggestion that Leo employed 
official documents is pertinent in relation to military dispatches, but difficult to 
substantiate in respect of articles such as letters and speeches, given the hazards of 
attributing such rhetorical devices to anything other than Leo’s hand.263 
Any argument for Leo’s sources for the campaigns of Nikephoros II Phokas must take 
into account Marc Lauxtermann’s suggestion that Theodosios the Deacon, who 
drafted a commemorative poem celebrating Nikephoros’ capture of Crete from the 
Arabs in 961, drew, in part, on military dispatches.264  Lauxtermann, noting two 
references to the Emperor Romanos II receiving progress letters from Nikephoros,265 
proposes that Theodosios made use of such dispatches.  It is suggested that 
Theodosios drafted a canto upon the arrival of each bulletin to Constantinople.266  
Therefore, while the Capture of Crete’s descriptions of battle remain rather 
                                                 
261 Sjuzjumov (1916); Kazhdan (1961); idem (2006): 273-274; Ljubarskij (1991); idem (1993a); 
Markopoulos (1988); idem (2003a); idem (2009a); Morris (1988); idem (1994). 
262 Cheynet (1986): 303 n.43. 
263 Hunger (1978): I, 367; cf. Hoffmann (2007).  There is a suggestion that Leo may have located at 
least one of his pre-battle speeches in another source - see Talbot & Sullivan (2005: 16 n.49). 
264 Lauxtermann (forthcoming): chapter 10.  The Capture of Crete was a historical epic comparable 
only to the works of seventh-century poet George of Pisidia in Byzantine literature, and both authors 
may have shared techniques in the type of military material they consulted – see Howard-Johnston 
(1994).  Intriguingly, Theodosios was clearly familiar with George’s works. On this point, see Pertusi 
(1959): 17; Panagiotakes (1960): 19-23. 
265 Theodosios the Deacon: ll.273-305 (ἐπιστολὴν...εἶχεν ἐσφραγισµένην); ll.588-609 (τὸ γράµµα). 
266 This practice accords with the tendency of Michael Italikos to practice something similar with 
dispatches from the army of John II Komnenos.  See below, 219-220. 
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abstract,267 beneath Theodosios’ fancy the outline of historical events may follow the 
dispatches of Nikephoros Phokas. 
Modern analyses of the conquest of Crete have struggled to reconcile the Byzantine 
sources chronicling the event.268  Book VI of Theophanes Continuatus, while 
surviving incomplete, offers enough to suggest the author was not merely following 
the dispatches of Nikephoros.  While Theodosios the Deacon notes the shortages 
which plagued Nikephoros’ army over the winter of 960-961,269 only Theophanes 
Continuatus and the short chronicle of the Vaticanus gr. 163 mention the good 
counsel of the parakoimomenos Joseph Bringas, a powerful eunuch at court who 
persuaded the Emperor Romanos to immediately send provisions.270  Since 
Theophanes Continuatus precedes its account of the expedition with Bringas giving 
an impassioned speech to the senate advocating the need for such a campaign, it is 
thought that the chronicler adopted a pro-Bringas slant.271  Leo the Deacon, however, 
does not mention shortages and suffering among Nikephoros’ army.  Furthermore, in 
contrast to Theophanes Continuatus,272 Leo omits the convening of the imperial fleet 
near Ephesos and Nikephoros’ reconnaissance efforts, beginning his narrative with 
Nikephoros’ arrival on Crete.  Theophanes Continuatus and Theodosios assert that 
Phokas met no resistance,273 though Leo relates that Nikephoros was greeted by a 
large enemy force which he routed.274  As surprise seems to have been key to 
                                                 
267 See Criscuolo (1979); Kazhdan (2006): 274-277. 
268 Panagiotakes (1960): 33-88; Christides (1984): 172-191; Tsougarakis (1988): 58-74. 
269 Theodosios the Deacon: ll.779-790. 
270 Theophanes Continuatus: 478-480; Vaticanus gr. 163: 98. 
271 Theophanes Continuatus: 474-475.  For discussion see Markopoulos (2004c): 1-6. 
272 Theophanes Continuatus: 475-477. 
273 Theophanes Continuatus: 476; Theodosios the Deacon: ll.59-107. 
274 Leo the Deacon: 8. 
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Nikephoros’ expedition, Leo’s report of a battle on shore is rather improbable.275  
Furthermore, it is unlikely that Theodosios would neglect to describe this battle had 
he known of it.  The evidence points towards the source of Leo the Deacon inventing 
or at least embellishing an engagement and glossing over difficulties which afflicted 
the expeditionary army.  This is suggestive of a source which exaggerated the success 
of Nikephoros and played down any sense of failure. 
Perhaps the most striking point of divergence between Theodosios and Leo the 
Deacon is the fate of the veteran Nikephoros Pastilas, commander of the forces of the 
Thrakesian theme in western Asia Minor.  According to Theodosios, Pastilas died 
valiantly when his scouting force was ambushed, inspiring his troops to rally and 
drive the Arabs into the mountains.276  According to Leo the Deacon’s more critical 
account of the incident, Pastilas neglected orders from Phokas to be vigilant as he and 
his band began consuming the fruits of the island, falling prey to indulgence.  When 
ambushed, Pastilas resisted bravely, but, due to being bloated and intoxicated, he and 
his men were butchered and dispersed.277  Lauxtermann thinks the portrayals a 
consequence of Leo using Pastilas to cast Phokas in a positive light, and of 
Theodosios’ concern to offer a more ‘patriotic’ account.  One might add that the 
version of events reported by Theodosios was more suited to a dispatch which sought 
to reassure the emperor, and not worry him with incidents of indiscipline.  Possibly 
Leo the Deacon had access to ‘unofficial’ testimony, though given that he appears to 
employ an episode related by his model Agathias as a template, as shown below, it 
would seem that this presentation of Pastilas’ conduct owed much to Leo’s own 
                                                 
275 Tsougarakis (1988): 64-65.  Cf. Panagiotakes (1960): 48-49, where the possibility of a small 
encounter is not ruled out. 
276 Theodosios the Deacon: ll.867-914. 
277 Leo the Deacon: 9-10. 
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design.  In any case, Dimitris Tsougarakis questions the accuracy of Leo’s account, 
while Lauxtermann considered Theodosios more reliable since he apparently drew 
from official material.278  Basic similarities between the narratives of Leo and 
Theodosios suggests the slight possibility that Leo culled selectively from the same 
source, though the use of a pro-Phokas composition is more probable, with Leo 
inserting his own discourse, taking descriptive passages from sixth-century historian 
Agathias, and adjusting parts to suit his historical design. 
The next major campaign described by Leo is Nikephoros’ conquest of the Arab 
strongholds of Cilicia over the course of 964 and 965.279  Nikephoros was forced to 
abandon an initial siege of Tarsos due to its impressive defences and, according to 
Leo, the failure vexed Nikephoros all winter:  ‘He considered the matter a 
disgrace…for when he had previously been a general and was later proclaimed 
domestikos ton scholon, he had destroyed untold numbers of cities, plundered them 
and reduced them to ashes’.280  Lars Hoffmann proposes that Leo believed 
Nikephoros to have softened since becoming emperor, with the failure at Tarsos 
evidence that his generalship skills were no longer as potent.281  This argument fails to 
convince, as Hoffmann overlooks that Nikephoros’ initial assault on the Cretan capital 
Chandax also failed, and, as at Tarsos, he was forced to wait until the following spring 
for better fortune.282  Since Leo draws attention to the discipline, perceptiveness and 
strategic nous of Nikephoros in his accounts of both the Crete and Tarsos campaigns, 
                                                 
278 Tsougarakis (1988): 60. 
279 Leo the Deacon: 51-61.  For discussion see Canard (1951): 820-823; Apostolopoulou (1982); 
Garrood (2008): 136-138. 
280 καὶ τὸ πρᾶγµα προπηλακισµὸν καὶ ὕβριν ἄντικρυς ἐλογίζετο, καὶ ὄνειδον ἀνεξάλειπτον, εἰ 
Νικηφόρος ὢν ὁ Φωκᾶς, καὶ πρώην ἐν στρατηγοῖς τελῶν, καὶ αὖθις ἀναῤῥηθεὶς ∆οµέστικος τῶν 
σχολῶν, τοτὲ µὲν µυριάδας πόλεις κατέσκαψε καὶ δῃώσας ᾐθάλωσε (Leo the Deacon: 55.7-56.3; trans. 
104). 
281 Hoffmann (2007): 125-126. 
282 Leo the Deacon: 16, 24. 
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it cannot be sustained that he adjusted his presentation of the emperor.  The 
consistency strengthens the logic for Leo’s continued use of a source favourable to 
Phokas.  
There are problems however in arguing for Leo’s consistent use of a comprehensive 
biographical source for Nikephoros’ campaigns.  Perhaps the biggest obstacle is the 
glaring omission of the sack of Aleppo, capital of the empire’s chief enemy, the 
Hamdanid emir Sayf al-Dawla.283  Surprisingly little is reported of this important 
expedition of 962 in Byzantine sources,284 though, given that Theodosios the Deacon 
proposed commemorating the campaign in a similar fashion to the Capture of Crete, it 
is probable that there existed material for consultation, at least for contemporary 
writers.285  William Garrood suggests that Leo would have been well-informed about 
this campaign on account of his proposed pro-Phokas source, but chose to overlook it 
so as not to diminish the accomplishment of conquering Crete.286  One may counter 
this argument by asking why Leo would pass over the opportunity to ascribe another 
spectacular success to his beloved Nikephoros.  Furthermore, Leo appears to have had 
considerable difficulty locating knowledgeable sources on some of Nikephoros’ later 
campaigns.  Two eastern expeditions of 966 and 968 have been conflated, with a 
narrative of the emperor’s acquisition of the keramion clumsily inserted.287  On a 
related note, while it is suggested below that Leo was well-informed about John 
Tzimiskes’ Bulgarian campaign of 971, his record of Tzimiskes’ eastern expeditions 
                                                 
283 See in general Canard (1934); idem (1951). 
284 Skylitzes (252-253) briefly mentions the sack of Aleppo, though the most detailed Greek narrative is 
offered by Vaticanus gr. 163: 22. 
285 Theodosios the Deacon: pr.7-10.  For general discussion of the Aleppo campaign, see Canard 
(1951): 805-817; Bikhazi (1981): 848-868. 
286 Garrood (2008): 132-135, where the general importance of the sack of Aleppo is stressed. 
287 See Schlumberger (1890): 704-706; Talbot & Sullivan (2005): 119-125. 
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between 972 and 975 is blighted by conflation, inaccuracies and chronological 
errors.288   
Problems extend to Leo’s coverage of subordinate generals performing independent 
military operations.  Thus we learn very little of the efforts of the eunuch Nicholas at 
the Battle of Alexandretta in 971,289 while John Tzimiskes’ bloody triumph at Adana 
in 964,290 the conquest of Cyprus by Niketas Chalkoutzes in 965291 and the actions of 
Nikephoros’ nephew Bardas Phokas in Arab Armenia in 967 are omitted entirely.292  
Only two campaigns conducted by subordinates of Phokas and Tzimiskes are related 
in extensive detail: Manuel Phokas’ failed expedition to Sicily in 964293 and Bardas 
Skleros’ victory over an army of Rus’ and Pechenegs in Thrace in 971.294  Gustave 
Schlumberger observed that Leo was not particularly conversant with Manuel’s 
expedition, especially given that Leo implies a date of 966 rather than the established 
date of 964.295  The negative appraisal of Manuel for indiscipline recalls the 
presentation of Pastilas, and, coupled with the recurrent theme of fickle fortune,296 
indicates that Leo again shaped the original account to his own interests.  John 
Skylitzes’ account of Bardas Skleros’ victory at Arcadiopolis is believed to have been 
culled from a source favourable to Skleros, and, while there are minor differences 
                                                 
288 See Dölger (1932); Canard (1950); Grégoire (1966): 164-172; Walker (1977). 
289 Leo the Deacon: 103.  See Walker (1972) for the significance of Nicholas’ actions. 
290 Skylitzes: 267-268.  The battle is also described in Arabic and Syriac sources, though in more 
subdued terms - Bar Hebraeus: 169-170; Ibn Miskawayh: 216-217; Yahya Ibn Said: 793-794.  For 
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(1984): 170-172. 
292 Recorded solely by Armenian historian Stephen of Taron: 132. 
293 Leo the Deacon: 65-67; Skylitzes: 267.  For discussion of this expedition see Gay (1904): II, 290-
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294 Leo the Deacon: 107-111; Skylitzes: 288-291. 
295 Schlumberger (1890): 461 n.1; Dölger (1932): 290 n.1.  For Manuel’s relationship with the emperor 
see Cheynet (1986): 306 & n.53. 
296 For fortune and fate in Leo see Talbot & Sullivan (2005): 16-19; Hinterberger (2010). 
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between the two accounts, that provided by Leo the Deacon derived from a source not 
dissimilar, perhaps the initial dispatches of Skleros or even the proposed official 
narrative of Tzimiskes’ campaign, discussed below.297 
Leo’s ignorance of campaigns which occurred within three decades of him writing his 
History casts doubt on his claims to have conversed with eyewitnesses, and supports 
the suggestion that mention of λέγεται does not always signify oral testimony.  Leo 
does not disclose his material, though it is probable that he did make use of 
compositions favourable to Nikephoros Phokas, which embellished the emperor’s 
successes and suppressed events that might cast a poor reflection upon him.  Gaps and 
errors in Leo’s knowledge of certain major campaigns indicate however that he had 
only a limited amount of detailed and accurate material at his disposal.  In sum, Leo’s 
sources must remain an area of supposition and uncertainty.   
Mimesis in Leo’s Accounts of Battle 
One can be reasonably sure that Leo subjected whatever sources he did employ to 
substantial edits and alterations in accordance with his own historical programme.  
Leo’s long-recognized imitation of sixth-century historian Agathias is particularly 
evident in his descriptions of battle.298  His sketch of the undermining of the walls of 
the Cretan capital Chandax is modelled in part on Agathias’ account of a similar 
                                                 
297 Catherine Holmes (2005: 272-276) observes slight differences in the presentation of Skleros and 
also in numbers, with the pro-Skleros source of Skylitzes seemingly exaggerating the success of the 
commander.  Leo’s account strikes us as more realistic, attributing the victory to tactical manoeuvres 
rather than the individual heroics of Bardas Skleros and his brother Constantine.  It is also shorter, 
omitting Skleros’ initial actions within Arcadiopolis and John Alakasseus’ preliminary skirmish with a 
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Arcadiopolis in his narrative; in the account of Skylitzes, the name of the town is stated only once, but 
it is in the opening sections otherwise glossed over by Leo.   
298 Hase (1838): 397; Hunger (1978): I, 370; Karpozilos (2002): 492-501. 
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procedure,299 while the record of Nikephoros Phokas’ preparations for a proposed 
campaign against Tarsos and the emirate of Aleppo in 963 draws upon Agathias’ 
description of Narses’ training exercises.300  Yet, as Denis Sullivan has shown, the 
prop-and-burn technique was regularly utilized in tenth-century warfare, and Leo 
recognizes the need to adapt Agathias’ account to reflect the present circumstances.301  
Borrowing from past works in this instance served to highlight the reading of the 
author and add stylistic flourish to the text.  Leo opts for weather metaphors when 
describing bombardments of arrows and stones, mirroring the technique of Agathias 
and Homer.302  Thus we find imagery such as ‘arrows poured down like hail’303 and 
‘arrows fell like snowflakes in winter’,304 a metaphor taken from Homer.305  At two 
points Leo lifts the phrase ‘lost much blood and was stricken by many arrows’ from 
Dionysius of Halicarnassus; once to describe the fate of Nikephoros Pastilas on Crete, 
and again to render the plight of Sviatoslav on the plain of Dorostolon.306  The 
statement simply conveys that these warriors had toiled in battle and were afflicted by 
many wounds.  Recognition of such mimesis in Leo’s descriptions of battle reveals 
                                                 
299 Leo the Deacon: 25.19-26.8; Agathias: I.10.  See Hase (1838): 417. 
300 Leo the Deacon: 36.2-9; Agathias: II.1.1-2.  See Talbot & Sullivan (2005): 87 n.5.  For discussion of 
the exercises mentioned, see McGeer (1995a): 197-198, 217-222. 
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(1999b: 229 n.51) decrees Leo to have ‘christianized’ the preface of Agathias in the process of adapting 
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302 καὶ ἄλλα ἐπὶ τούτοις· ἅπαντά τε τὸν µεταξὺ ἀέρα ἐπεκάλυπτον τῇ συνεχείᾳ, ὥσπερ ἀλλήλοις 
ξυµπεφυκότα. εἴκασεν ἄν τις τὸ χρῆµα νιφετῷ µεγάλῳ ἢ χαλάζῃ πολλῇ ξὺν βιαίῳ πνεύµατι 
καταρραγείσῃ (Agathias: III.25.1); νιφάδες δ’ ὡς πῖπτον ἔραζε, ἅς τ' ἄνεµος ζαὴς νέφεα σκιόεντα 
δονήσας ταρφειὰς κατέχευεν ἐπὶ χθονὶ πουλυβοτείρῃ (Homer, Iliad: 12.156-158). 
303 δεινῆς δὲ µάχης ἀναῤῥαγείσης, καὶ δίκην χαλάζης τῶν βελῶν καταφεροµένων (Leo the Deacon: 8.7-
8; trans. 61-62). 
304 καὶ δῆτα τῆς µάχης ἀναῤῥαγείσης ἦν ὁρᾷν ἔργα χειρῶν καὶ τόλµης γιγνόµενα ἔµπλεα, πολλαχῇ τῶν 
δοράτων ἀκοντιζοµένων, καὶ τῶν βελῶν δίκην χειµερίων νιφάδων ἐκπεµποµένων, καὶ θαµινὰ τῶν 
λίθων τῶν πετροβόλων ὀργάνων ἀφιεµένων, καὶ ταῖς ἐπάλξεσι προσαρασσοµένων (Leo the Deacon: 
15.19-23; trans. 68). 
305 ὥς τε νιφάδες χιόνος πίπτωσι θαµειαὶ ἤµατι χειµερίῳ (Homer, Iliad: 12.278-279). 
306 Ἔξαιµος…καὶ καταβελὴς (Dionysius of Halicarnassus: II.42.5, in relation to Mettius Curtius); 
ἔξαιµός τε καὶ καταβελὴς ἐγεγόνει (Leo the Deacon: 10.6-8, trans. 63, for Pastilas); ἔξαιµος γεγονὼς 
καὶ καταβελὴς (ibid: 155.6-8; trans. 198, for Sviatoslav). 
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relatively little about Leo’s general construction of military episodes and possible 
influences in this respect.  However, since Leo was obviously familiar with Agathias, 
it is reasonable to posit that the sixth-century historian was among these models.307 
The chief protagonist of Agathias’ history, Narses, appears to have served as a model 
for the presentation of Nikephoros II Phokas’ generalship.  Where Agathias relates the 
aforementioned undermining method employed by the Byzantines at the siege of 
Cumae, he also describes the general Narses carefully examining the fortress, 
identifying strengths and weaknesses, and deciding on the best course of action;308 
Leo affords a similarly measured approach to Nikephoros II Phokas at the sieges of 
Chandax and Mopsuestia.309  The antithesis of Narses is the Heruli Fulcaris, whom 
Narses acknowledges as a brave but foolish general, impetuously charging the enemy 
and fighting in the front line.  Such a custom resulted in Fulcaris being surrounded by 
the Franks and making a courageous yet foolhardy last stand.310  Agathias asserts that 
Fulcaris should have first sent scouts to ascertain the plans of the enemy,311 a 
convention followed by Leo the Deacon, who occasionally remarks what a 
commander should have done to avoid disaster.312  When the news was brought to 
Narses, he bemoaned the death of Fulcaris, and that his admonition towards caution 
had been disregarded.  He then gave a speech to his men, in which he acknowledged 
the setback and asserted that Fulcaris would not have perished if he had followed his 
advice.313  This episode is extremely reminiscent of Leo the Deacon’s account of the 
death of Nikephoros Pastilas on Crete.  Like Fulcaris, Pastilas ignored the guidance of 
                                                 
307 For discussion of Agathias’ descriptions of battle, see Whately (2009): 108-114. 
308 Agathias: I.10. 
309 Leo the Deacon: 10-12, 16 (Chandax); 52-53 (Mopsuestia). 
310 Agathias: I.14.3-15.5; IV.16.8-10. 
311 Ibid: I.14.4. 
312 Leo the Deacon: 9.13-18 (of Nikephoros Pastilas); 66.19-67.2 (of Manuel Phokas in Sicily). 
313 Agathias: I.15.10-16.10. 
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his commander, and, upon learning of his death, Nikephoros Phokas criticized the 
negligence of Pastilas in a speech to his officers.314 
Conclusion 
Leo’s claims concerning autopsy and eyewitnesses appear to have little substance.  
Though we cannot draw any firm conclusions about his sources, it is probable that he 
had access to some written reports of campaigns, in particular material favourable to 
Nikephoros II Phokas.  Leo adapted this material to suit his main themes, employing 
complex mimesis in the style of Procopius’ use of Thucydides to this effect.  As we 
come now to examine John Skylitzes and a mooted source he may have shared with 
Leo the Deacon – an official narrative of John Tzimiskes’ Balkan campaign of 971 – 
we discern yet more about Leo’s handling of his material.
                                                 
314 Leo the Deacon: 12-13. 
61 
IV. John Skylitzes, the Synopsis Historion and the Lost Source for John 
Tzimiskes’ Balkan Campaign of 971 
John Skylitzes, a high-ranking official from western Asia Minor, is thought to have 
drafted his Synopsis Historion towards the end of the eleventh century.315  The 
chronicle covers the years 811-1057, continuing where Theophanes left off.  In recent 
times, our general understanding of Skylitzes’ approach and working methods has 
been elucidated by the studies of Catherine Holmes and Eirini-Sophia Kiapidou.316  At 
the heart of their discussion is the issue of Skylitzes’ source material, which has been 
the subject of much debate among scholars over the past century.317   
Skylitzes’ Sources 
The prooimion of Skylitzes’ Synopsis Historion offers some details about his material 
and approach.  Skylitzes immediately professes a preference for the method of George 
Synkellos and Theophanes, ‘men [who] carefully read through the history books, 
making a summary of them in simple, unaffected language’.318  To this end Skylitzes 
claims to have read numerous historical works, the identity of which we will consider 
shortly.  He also added anything he learned ‘from the mouths of sage old men’,319 
though it was clearly written material which made the greatest contribution to the 
Synopsis Historion. 
                                                 
315 For biographical studies see Holmes (2005): 80-91; Cheynet (2010). 
316 Holmes (2005); Kiapidou (2010).  See also Flusin (2010). 
317 See Holmes (2005): 91-119 for an overview of the arguments for Skylitzes’ sources. 
318 ἐπιστατικώτερον τὰς ἱστορικὰς ἐπιδραµόντες βίβλους καὶ συνοψίσαντες λόγῳ µὲν ἀφελεῖ καὶ 
ἀπεριέργῳ (Skylitzes: 3.9-10; trans. 1). 
319 προσθέντες δὲ καὶ ὁπόσα ἀγράφως ἐκ παλαιῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐδιδάχθηµεν (ibid: 4.49; trans. 3). 
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Skylitzes lists a number of historians, some whose works are known to us, a number 
whose compositions are lost.320  Skylitzes employed Genesios and Theophanes 
Continuatus for the period 811-948,321 though his sources after this time are no longer 
extant.  Catherine Holmes’ analysis of Skylitzes’ use of Theophanes Continuatus for 
the reign of Romanos I Lekapenos shows that Skylitzes adhered closely to his original 
source, suggesting that other written texts he utilized were copied without any great 
changes, and thus precipitating the reconstruction of lost compositions underlying 
Skylitzes’ digest of historical texts.322  It has been suggested that Skylitzes consulted 
the pro-Phokas source (‘Source B’) of Leo the Deacon, together with a source hostile 
to Nikephoros Phokas and favourable to John Tzimiskes (‘Source A’), possibly 
emanating from ecclesiastical circles.323  Skylitzes’ source for the reign of Basil II 
may have been a biographical work composed by one Theodore of Sebasteia.324  
Angeliki Laiou proposed that Skylitzes employed an ecclesiastical source for his 
narrative of the reigns of Romanos III and Michael IV.325  In particular, scholars have 
advocated Skylitzes’ use of aristocratic promotional literature; that is, eulogistic 
biographical compositions concerned with important generals.326  We have discussed 
the pro-Phokas material and will examine Skylitzes’ use of aristocratic promotional 
literature in chapter four.  Dissecting Skylitzes’ coverage of the reign of Basil II is 
                                                 
320 The authors are Theodore Daphnopates; Niketas the Paphlagonian; Joseph Genesios; Manuel; 
Nikephoros the Deacon from Phrygia; Leo of Asia; Theodore, bishop of Side; Theodore, bishop of 
Sebasteia; Demetrius, bishop of Kyzikos and the monk John the Lydian.  For attempts at identification 
see Hirsch (1876): 356-375; Panagiotakes (1996): 238-240; Tsamakda (2002): 23-24, 37-41; 
Markopoulos (2003a): 193-194; Flusin (2010): xv-xxiii. 
321 These were not the only historical works Skylitzes consulted for the earlier period – see Hirsch 
(1876): 362-364. 
322 Holmes (2005): 125-152. 
323 The standard arguments are Sjuzjumov (1916); Kazhdan (1961).  See also Morris (1988). 
324 Panagiotakes (1996).  Cf. Holmes (2005): 96-99, who argues that Theodore may have been the 
author of another text entirely. 
325 Laiou (1992a): esp. 172. 
326 Shepard (1975-1976); idem (1977-1979); idem (1992); Holmes (2005): 120-298. 
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unnecessary, given the peerless work of Catherine Holmes in this area.327  
Consequently, we will focus here on the most recent argument pertaining to Skylitzes’ 
source material, a study which clarifies the methods of Skylitzes and Leo the Deacon 
and also explores religious overtones in historical accounts of warfare. 
The Lost Source for John Tzimiskes’ Balkan Campaign of 971 
The record of John Tzimiskes’ reign in the historical works of Leo the Deacon and 
Skylitzes is dominated by his campaign against the Russian prince Sviatoslav of Kiev 
in 971.328  John Haldon determined that Leo offers a personal eyewitness account, 
though there is no indication that he participated in the expedition.329  More 
persuasive is the suggestion of Gyula Moravcsik, who proposed that a war diary 
(‘Kriegstagebuch’) may have been consulted by Leo.330  A similar idea was put 
forward by James Howard-Johnston, who suggests that Leo used a set of campaign 
dispatches.331  Paul Stephenson supposed that orators may have produced poems 
based on ‘official victory bulletins’ which recorded the major events of the 
campaign.332  Most recently, Anthony Kaldellis, observing considerable similarities 
between the accounts of Leo and Skylitzes, argues that the original source was a lost 
literary narrative of the campaign, written upon the emperor’s return.333  Kaldellis’ 
principal hypothesis is difficult to argue against.  Though Skylitzes possibly cites Leo 
                                                 
327 Holmes (2005). 
328 Almost a third of Skylitzes’ coverage of Tzimiskes’ reign is concerned with this event - ibid (2005): 
110-111.  For discussion of the campaign see Stokes (1961); idem (1962).  
329 Haldon (2001): 100. 
330 Moravcsik (1958): I, 336, 399.  See also Dölger (1932): 288. 
331 Howard-Johnston (2001): 302-303. 
332 Stephenson (2000): 52-53. 
333 Kaldellis (forthcoming).  Terras (1965: 396) linked the common source of Leo and Skylitzes to this 
campaign, but did not build on this observation. 
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the Deacon among his sources,334 it is generally thought that he did not draw upon 
Leo for his record of the period c.960-c.989.335  So while their narratives of 
Tzimiskes’ campaign of 971 converge on many points, it is unlikely that Skylitzes 
employed Leo’s History; rather, the pair must have utilized the same original source. 
Working from the probability that Skylitzes and Leo the Deacon used a common 
source for their narratives of Tzimiskes’ campaign of 971, certain differences in 
presentation must be addressed.  Kaldellis notes that Leo was prone to inserting 
archetypal features of classical historiography, such as speeches and digressions, and 
so may have embellished the original source with rhetorical elements which do not 
appear in Skylitzes’ account.336  Kaldellis however overlooks two episodes which are 
difficult to attribute to authorial preference.  The first of these, which features only in 
Skylitzes, relates how a group of Byzantine foragers were surprised and defeated by a 
Russian force scouring for supplies along the Danube.  An infuriated Tzimiskes 
blamed the leaders of the fleet, and threatened them with death if they showed such 
negligence again.337  The second event – the death of Tzimiskes’ cousin John 
Kourkouas338 during the siege of Dorostolon – is related by both Leo and Skylitzes, 
though very differently.  Leo reports that Kourkouas had overindulged at lunch, and 
rode out foolishly against a Russian sally only to be thrown from his horse and 
                                                 
334 Among his sources Skylitzes (3.28) lists a ‘Leo of Asia’, who many believe to be Leo the Deacon – 
see Panagiotakes (1996): 238-240; Markopoulos (2003a): 193-194; Flusin (2010): xvi. 
335 For comparison and discussion of the accounts of Leo and Skylitzes, see Morris (1988); idem 
(1994); Ljubarskij (1993a); McGrath (1995); Holmes (2005): esp. 224-228, 272-276. 
336 List of speeches: Leo the Deacon: 105.9-15 (Sviatoslav’s ultimatum to Sviatoslav); 105.17-106.16 
(Tzimiskes’ response to Sviatoslav); 106.18-107.6 (Sviatoslav’s response to Tzimiskes); 130.19-
131.12, 131.19-132.14 (Tzimiskes’ two-pronged address to his troops); 151.12-21 (Sviatoslav’s advice 
at the Rus’ war council).  For Leo’s speeches in general, see Hoffmann (2007): 130-134.  For 
Skylitzes’ tendency to omit such rhetorical elements, see in general Holmes (2005): 120-170. 
337 Skylitzes: 302. 
338 For this individual see McGrath (1996): 169-170. 
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brutally killed.339  Skylitzes, by contrast, records the valiant end of a brave officer, 
whose death helped save Byzantine siege engines.340  Perhaps Kaldellis is satisfied 
with the earlier conclusions of Stamatina McGrath.  McGrath does not doubt the 
historicity of the naval incident, but nevertheless cannot account for its ‘surprising’ 
omission from Leo’s narrative.  McGrath supposes that Skylitzes’ presentation of this 
episode offers insight into the purpose of his work, which may have sought to 
illustrate the consequences of carelessness in war.341  The problem with this theory is 
that Leo the Deacon was also concerned with offering models of military behaviour 
for readers to avoid, as the fate of Nikephoros Pastilas demonstrates. 
Reasons of censorship and ‘patriotism’, also put forward by McGrath, cannot be 
responsible; if this were the case, Leo would surely not have reported such an 
embarrassing end for Tzimiskes’ cousin, John Kourkouas.  The account of a bloated 
Kourkouas being hewn to pieces is very much at odds with Skylitzes’ heroic tale of a 
man who died valiantly defending siege machines.  McGrath attributed the difference 
to Skylitzes’ habit of superimposing standardized heroic behaviour, eliminating 
examples of improper behaviour by Byzantine officers.342  Yet if Skylitzes’ distortion 
of Kourkouas’ death was part of a process to eliminate all instances of foolish 
generalship from his chronicle, then why are such mishaps reported elsewhere in the 
Synopsis Historion?343  Catherine Holmes, following McGrath’s conclusions, 
                                                 
339 Leo the Deacon: 147-148. 
340 Skylitzes: 304. 
341 McGrath (1995): 157-158. 
342 Ibid: 158-159. 
343 I will cite merely two examples here.  Skylitzes (203-204) records Leo Phokas’ humiliation at the 
river Acheloos in 917, where the domestikos’ decision to refresh himself backfired after his horse 
bolted off without its rider.  The Roman troops, seeing the horse and thinking their general dead, 
retreated, leading to a spectacular reverse and Bulgarian victory.  Another instance can be seen in 
Skylitzes’ record of Manuel Phokas’ Sicilian expedition in 964.  Manuel is said to have been young and 
rash, better suited to the ranks rather than command.  His ignorance and impetuousness, Skylitzes 
continues, led to Manuel getting his entire force destroyed (ibid: 267).  It is surely no coincidence that 
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considered Kourkouas’ heroic representation to be indicative of Skylitzes’ wish to 
provide models of aristocratic valour in the Balkans, reflecting concerns of the 1090s.  
By this hypothesis, Skylitzes emended this section because one Gregory Kourkouas 
was doux of Philippoupolis at the time he was writing, and it was thus considered 
imprudent to discuss an inept ancestor meeting with disaster in the Balkans.344  The 
suggestion is compelling, but whenever Skylitzes seeks to uphold military reputations, 
omission, rather than alteration, is typically his preferred approach.345 
The situation recalls the contrasting portrayals of the demise of Nikephoros Pastilas 
given by Theodosios and Leo the Deacon.  We argued in that instance that Leo 
deviated from the official line, and in John Kourkouas’ case it is implausible that 
Tzimiskes would permit the public disclosure of the humiliating death of an imperial 
relation.  The general tendency of Skylitzes not to stray too far from his sources 
supports this idea.346  Leo may have drawn upon eyewitness testimony to supplement 
his primary source.  Such informants would explain how Leo was aware of the 
misconduct and incompetence of Kourkouas throughout this campaign.  For Leo 
alone asserts that Kourkouas had suffered for his drunken plundering of churches in 
Bulgaria, a revelation which has no place in Skylitzes’ narrative.347  Earlier in his 
history, Leo describes how Tzimiskes sent Bardas Skleros to Thrace, since the 
                                                                                                                                            
these disasters involved the Phokades, a family often criticized by Skylitzes.  Rather than Skylitzes 
wanting to trim all instances of poor conduct by Roman commanders in his work, it appears he was 
merely selective in which episodes he chose to maintain and which to omit. 
344 Holmes (2005): 223-224. 
345 Marianos Argyros is perhaps the most obvious example of this. With the Argyroi still influential 
during Alexios’ reign (Alexios’ one-time fiancée was an Argyros – see Cheynet 1990: 269), Marianos’ 
entire role in the rebellion of Nikephoros II is omitted.  That Argyros is said to have sided with a 
scheming eunuch like Joseph Bringas (see Markopoulos 2004c), who Skylitzes portrays in a very 
negative light, and was apparently killed by a plant pot or tile thrown by a woman, is hardly something 
the family would have been pleased about (Leo the Deacon: 45-46).  Leo’s account of Argyros’ 
embarrassing demise is corroborated by the contemporary Theophanes Continuatus (438.13-14). 
346 Holmes (2005): 120-170. 
347 Leo the Deacon: 147-148. 
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previous commander there, John Kourkouas, had ‘turned to immoderate indolence 
and drink, and handled the situation in an inexperienced and stupid manner’.348  One 
might argue that Leo deliberately flipped the heroic perception of subordinates who 
died in battle in order to suit a historical programme which generally endorsed a more 
responsible mode of generalship.349  Working against this hypothesis, however, is 
Leo’s praise of the imperial guardsman Anemas, who was slain in battle after a heroic 
last stand.350  This inconsistency indicates that Leo had reason to condemn the 
conduct of Pastilas and Kourkouas, rather than merely subvert their actions for literary 
purposes. 
While we may speculate that Skylitzes was more faithful to Kaldellis’ proposed 
common source, he also was not averse to slight adjustments and minor additions.  At 
one point in the narrative of the campaign, Skylitzes remarks that the Byzantines were 
confident for a coming battle, ‘knowing that they had God on their side, He who has 
no wish to come to the aid of princes with unclean hands, but always helps the victims 
of injustice’.351  This statement must refer to Tzimiskes’ role in the murder of 
Nikephoros II Phokas;352 such an admission of guilt had no place in a narrative 
propagated by the imperial court and can only have been added by a later hand.  This 
statement and the inconsistencies noted above are problematic to say the least, but 
Kaldellis’ argument for an official campaign narrative is nevertheless persuasive, 
given the broad similarities across both accounts, and, more significantly, the divine 
                                                 
348 Ἰωάννου Μαγίστρου, ᾧ Κουρκούας ἐπώνυµον, ἐς ῥᾳστώνην καὶ πότους, παρὰ τὸ εἰκὸς, 
ἀποκλίναντος, ἀπείρως τε καὶ ἀµαθῶς κεχρηµένου τοῖς πράγµασι (ibid: 126.10-20; trans. 173-174). 
349 See below, 361-365. 
350 Leo the Deacon: 152-153; Skylitzes: 308.  On Anemas, see Miles (1970): 83-84; McGrath (1996): 
101.   
351 εἰδότες δ’, ὅτι καὶ θεὸν συλλήπτορα ἕξουσιν, οὐ τοῖς ἀδίκων χειρῶν ἄρχουσι φιλοῦντα, ἀλλὰ τοῖς 
ἀδικουµένοις διὰ παντὸς ἐπαρήγειν (Skylitzes: 299.36-40; trans. 285). 
352 See in general Ljubarskij (1993a); Morris (1994). 
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assistance which allegedly swung the final battle at Dorostolon in favour of the 
Byzantines. 
Divine Assistance in the Record of Tzimiskes’ Campaign 
One reason for suspecting an official source is the religious overtones evident in both 
accounts of the campaign.  Before departing from Constantinople, Tzimiskes visited 
the city’s most venerated ecclesiastical sites and offered prayers to Christ and the 
Virgin353 which were seemingly answered at the second Battle of Dorostolon.  With 
the struggle undecided, a sudden wind and rainstorm blew dust in the faces of the 
Russians, just as a figure astride a white horse, thought to be the military martyr, 
Theodore Stratelates, broke the enemy lines, leading the Byzantines to victory.354  
Upon his return to the capital, Tzimiskes refused to mount the golden chariot prepared 
for his triumph, and instead placed upon it an icon of the Virgin.355 
This presentation was intended to emphasize Tzimiskes’ piety and that the campaign 
enjoyed divine favour.356  Both accounts reveal that Tzimiskes requested the aid of 
Theodore Stratelates prior to battle, and used icons of the saint for protection.357  
Theodore, however, does not act of his own accord.  On the night prior to the battle, a 
Constantinopolitan woman (Leo suggests she was a nun) is reported to have 
experienced a vision, wherein she saw the Virgin summoning Theodore, and urging 
                                                 
353 This is standard practice.  Constantine VII’s record of imperial expeditions (Text B: ll.86-90) reveals 
that an emperor’s last duty prior to leaving the capital was to visit the churches to pray.  Alexios I, like 
Tzimiskes, prayed at the church of the Mother of God at Blacharnae before departing the city for 
Thessaloniki in 1107 (Anna Komnene: XIII.I.2). 
354 Leo the Deacon: 153-154; Skylitzes: 308-309. 
355 Leo the Deacon: 158-159; Skylitzes: 310.  For triumphs in this period see McCormick (1986): 155-
176. 
356 McCormick (1986): 170-171; Stephenson (2000): 52-53.  For Tzimiskes’ piety see Patlagean 
(1989): 355-357; Pentcheva (2006): 34-35. 
357 Leo the Deacon: 154.6-9; Skylitzes: 308.15-17. 
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him to assist John in battle.358  By acting as intercessor, the Virgin confirms the 
legitimacy of the expedition.359  Recognition of the Virgin’s role is evident in the 
celebratory triumph, as Tzimiskes gives pride of place to the captured icon of the 
Theotokos, placing it atop of the insignia of the Bulgarian ruler.360 
There are several innovations here, not least the appearance of Theodore Stratelates.  
Nature mysteriously conspiring in favour of the Byzantines during war was not 
new.361  Dorostolon, however, marks the first instance of a saint physically 
participating in battle in Byzantine historiography.362  A closer reading suggests that 
bold tactical manoeuvres were instrumental to Byzantine success,363 and Kaldellis is 
correct to deem the account a ‘literary elaboration of the belief that the battle was won 
                                                 
358 ὁ σὸς παρὰ τὸ ∆ορύστολον Ἰωάννης, κύριε Θεόδωρε, Σκύθαις µαχόµενος, ἄρτι περιστατεῖται 
δεινῶς. ἀλλ’ εἰς τὴν ἐκείνου σπεῦσον βοήθειαν. εἰ γὰρ µὴ προφθάσῃς, ἐς κίνδυνον αὐτῷ τελευτήσει τὰ 
πράγµατα (Leo the Deacon: 154.9-22; trans. 198). Τhe phrasing of Skylitzes (308.19-309.25; trans. 
292) is slightly different: ‘Theodore, sir; John, my [friend] and yours, is in distress; go quickly to his 
assistance’. 
359 The image of Mary surrounded by military saints was extremely prominent in contemporary Roman 
art, an example being the ivory diptych at Palazzo Venezia, which may have provided inspiration for 
those composing the report of the Dorostolon campaign (see Pentcheva 2006: 82-97).  Niketas 
Choniates (Chronike Diegesis: 190.92-191.8) describes the dream of a man named Mauropoulos, 
wherein an icon of the Virgin Kyriotissa urged, in vain, the military saints to go forth and aid the 
Emperor Manuel I.  That Manuel lost the Battle of Myriokephalon the following day suggested that 
divine favour had deserted him.  For discussion of this incident, see also Pentcheva (2006): 68-69. 
360 For innovations in the ceremony, see McCormick (1986): 171-174.  Praise of the Theotokos during 
a triumph was not new.  Constantine VII (Text C: ll.726-736, 779-794) records vigils to churches and 
thanksgiving to the Virgin in a triumph of Basil I.  Skylitzes (364.80-83) also states that Basil II 
celebrated a triumph in Athens in 1018, where he offered thanks for his victory to the Virgin and 
adorned her church with splendid offerings before returning to Constantinople.  For further discussion 
of this occasion, see Kaldellis (2009b): 81-91, esp. 89-91. 
361 For references to divine storms aiding the Byzantines during Heraclius’ battles with the Persians, 
see Howard-Johnston (1994): 81-82. 
362 Walter (2003): 292.   
363 McGrath (1995: 160-163) and Haldon (2001: 103-104) suggest that the Romans’ feigned retreat to a 
wider plan gave them a tactical advantage, whilst Tzimiskes’ cavalry charge, recorded by Leo the 
Deacon, was decisive.  That Tzimiskes, like Theodore, rode a white horse (albeit at his triumph) may 
be significant.  For the general symbolic importance of the rider astride a white mount, see Kintzinger 
(2003): esp. 323-325.  Hoffmann (2007: 135 n.136), discussing the appearance of the Stratelates, 
observed possible origins in the Book of Revelations, where the rider of a white horse is synonymous 
with conquest and victory (Rev.: 6.2, 19.11-16). 
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(partly) through saintly intervention’.364  Tzimiskes’ publicists, composing an official 
account of the campaign, exaggerated the perceived intervention of Theodore to better 
serve Tzimiskes and his claim to divine favour.365   
The choice of saint was deliberate.  Theodore Stratelates was a relatively new entrant 
into the fraternity of military saints, having emerged as a distinct figure from 
Theodore Tiron by the late ninth century.366  It is suggested that the creation of the 
Stratelates cult was fuelled by the military aristocracy, who demanded a patron similar 
in social status and rank, rather than the lowly Tiron, generally associated with foot 
soldiers.367  By having a popular saint strongly linked with the elite class intervene on 
horseback, the source reflected contemporary ideals.368  It also offered Tzimiskes the 
opportunity to popularize Theodore’s cult, and his success may be measured by the 
development of Euchaneia, the burial place of Stratelates.369 
Kaldellis suggests a classical model behind the literary development.  He notes that 
the episode echoes the intervention of the Dioskouroi at the early fifth-century B.C. 
                                                 
364 Kaldellis (forthcoming) 
365 Stephenson (2000): 52-53; also McGrath (1995): 161-163. Failure could have been disastrous for 
Tzimiskes: as Treadgold (2006: 227-228) notes, defeat by a foreign army often implied that God no 
longer approved of the emperor in question. 
366 For the cult of the two military saints, Theodore Tiron and Theodore Stratelates, see Cheynet 
(2003b); Walter (2003): 44-66.  Walter alternatively proposes that the model for the Stratelates was not 
Tiron, but rather a third saint Theodore – Theodore Orientalis. 
367 Grotowski (2010): 119.  For Theodore Tiron’s links with poorer foot soldiers in this period, see 
Kazhdan (1983b): 544-545. 
368 Further evidence of this may be seen in the potential shame of the Byzantines in not being able to 
defeat a people who had yet to master fighting on horseback (Leo the Deacon: 140-141).  Even if Leo 
the Deacon added this element of his own accord, it demonstrates the social values of the late tenth-
century military aristocracy.  For while the contribution of the infantry was greatly valued at most 
times, and especially during this period (see in general McGeer 1995a: 202-211, 272-280; Haldon 
1999: 193-200, 217-225), the aristocracy were not expected to fight among them given their social 
standing. 
369 Oikonomides (1986: 331) proposes that the subsequent creation of a bishopric at Euchaneia may 
have been influenced by the events of 971.  It is known that the tomb of Theodore Stratelates was a 
popular place of pilgrimage in the eleventh century – see Malamut (1993): 42. 
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Battle of Lake Regillus, as recorded by Dionysius of Halicarnassus.370  The sequence 
of events is unquestionably similar.  Dionysius relates that after the battle a fruitless 
search was made for the two men, leading people to conclude that the helpers were in 
fact the gods Castor and Pollux.  An almost identical process of realization is reported 
in Leo the Deacon with regard to the involvement of the Stratelates.371  And just as the 
Romans erected the Temple of Castor and Pollux in gratitude, Tzimiskes ordered 
Theodore’s church at Euchaneia be rebuilt, and the town be renamed 
Theodoroupolis.372  The renaming was quite exceptional; such an honour was usually 
reserved for emperors.373  Skylitzes further notes that the second Battle of Dorostolon 
occurred on Theodore’s feast day, echoing Dionysius’ revelation that the anniversary 
of the battle would also mark the annual commemoration of the Dioskouroi.  Kaldellis 
concludes that ‘the original source formatted its account to the aetiological, 
monumental, and festal aspects of Lake Regillus, adapting them to the changed 
religious circumstances of the tenth century’.374 
                                                 
370 Dionysius of Halicarnassus: 6.13.  For further instances of the Dioskouroi intervening in Greco-
Roman historiography, see Pritchett (1979): 11-46; Hornblower (2001): 140-147. 
371 Leo the Deacon: 154.1-9.   
372 Skylitzes: 309.29-33, contra Leo the Deacon (158.1-2), who asserts that Tzimiskes changed the 
name of Dorostolon to Theodoroupolis.  It is generally considered that Leo was mistaken, and Skylitzes 
correct – see Oikonomides (1986): 330 n.10.  For a different view, see Hutter (1998) and Stephenson 
(2003a: 65), who both note the finding of a seal of a strategos of Theodoroupolis at Preslav, seemingly 
supporting the testimony of Leo the Deacon.  On Theodore’s association with Euchaneia, see Walter 
(2003): 55-57. 
373 See McCormick (1986): 171.  Earlier in the campaign, the conquered Preslav was renamed 
Ioannoupolis after the emperor (Leo the Deacon: 138.16-19; Skylitzes: 298.9-11).  Stephenson (2000: 
53) asserts that by renaming towns, Tzimiskes was clearly determined to exploit his victory to 
maximum political advantage.  The long-term resonance of his actions however is questionable.  When 
Preslav was lost and recaptured by the Byzantines in 1000, the name Ioannoupolis was forgotten; 
sources merely refer to it as Preslav once more - see Oikonomides (1983): 4-5. 
374 Kaldellis (forthcoming).  I am unconvinced by Kaldellis’ suggestion that Skylitzes’ double use of 
the term ἐπικουρία to characterize the intervention of Theodore alluded to the very name of the 
Dioskouroi; at 300.56, Skylitzes also uses ἐπικουριαν in relation to the emperor’s dispatch of elite 
reinforcements to aid his troops at the first Battle of Dorostolon.   
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Tzimiskes’ publicists may also have drawn upon more contemporary models.  There 
was a Christian precedent for this sort of saintly intervention, as Kaldellis 
recognizes.375  The fourth miracle of the eighth-century source celebrating Theodore 
Tiron includes the tale of a nun who envisioned a mounted Theodore actively 
defending his burial place of Euchaita from an Arab attack.376  As the work continued 
to be read in tenth-century Byzantium,377 the image of a Theodore battling on 
horseback would have been embedded in the Byzantine consciousness long before 
971.  Even the divine intervention of the Stratelates in some capacity was not entirely 
novel.  Henri Grégoire drew attention to a similar tale in the Vita of Saint Basil the 
Younger, wherein it is reported that the holy general Theodore Spongarios - who 
Grégoire believes to be Theodore Stratelates - led the Byzantines against those Rus’ 
who invaded Paphlagonia in 941.378  Closer yet to Tzimiskes’ time, there is a 
fourteenth-century reference to Stratelates joining with fellow military saints George 
and Demetrios along with the archangel Michael to aid Nikephoros Phokas in his 
capture of Crete.379  The actions of the Dioskouroi at Lake Regillus may have 
                                                 
375 Kaldellis cites the example of the Battle of the Frigidus in 394, where, according to the testimony of 
fifth-century author Theodoretos of Kyrrhos, the saints Philip the Apostle and John the Evangelist 
appeared before Theodosios I on white horses and renewed his spirits, with Theodosios eventually 
triumphing after a wind blew dust in the faces of the enemy (Theodoretos of Kyrrhos: 5.24). 
376 Delehaye (1909): 196-198.  Zuckerman (1988) has convincingly argued for a date of 753 for the 
attack.  For further discussion see Walter (2003): 46-48. 
377 The Theodore Tiron text was revised by the military commander Nikephoros Ouranos during the 
reign of Basil II – see F. Halkin (1962). 
378 Grégoire (1938): 292-300.  For discussion, see Walter (1999): 176 n.56.  Grégoire suggests that this 
account inspired the twelfth-century Russian Primary Chronicle (72), which lists a ‘Theodore 
Stratelates of Thrace’ among the Byzantine commanders.  These references to Theodore are noted by 
Shepard (1974: 16), who suggests that there may have been a literary source which mentioned 
Theodore’s help in 941. Grégoire proposes that behind Theodore is one of Romanos Lekapenos’ 
commanders, Theophanes, who was banished and replaced in legend by the Stratelates.  The reference 
to Theodore’s apparent Thracian origins is puzzling, though Grotowski (2010: 101-102) links this with 
the later translation of Stratelates’ relics to Serres from Euchaneia.  A further possibility is that the Rus’ 
associated this Theodore with Thrace because of his perceived involvement in the 971 expedition.  See 
Shepard (1974): 16, for discussion of Russian awareness of Byzantine supernatural aid. 
379 See Walter (2003): 133 & n.157.  A tenth-century provenance for the story is probable when one 
considers the personal piety of Nikephoros Phokas (Morris 1988: 102-105; Sullivan 2011), and also the 
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provided a suitable literary template, but Kaldellis overlooks more current 
developments.  There was a growing propensity to attribute military success to saintly 
intervention in mid tenth-century Byzantium, which manifested itself most explicitly 
in the official account of Tzimiskes’ campaign in Bulgaria. 
The motif of the military saint intervening in battle astride a white steed persisted in 
Byzantine literature.380  According to the Synopsis Historion, the Bulgarians, having 
besieged Thessaloniki in 1040, were driven off when the defenders sallied forth, with 
many Bulgarians witnessing the martyr Saint Demetrios leading the charge on 
horseback.381  Another source asserts that the enemy commander Alousianos 
neglected to construct a proper siege camp, ensuring his tired army was quickly 
overcome.382  Official origins for Skylitzes’ version of events are all the more likely 
when we consider that Thessaloniki was then under the command of Constantine, 
nephew of the reigning emperor, Michael IV the Paphlagonian.383  Moreover, Michael 
spent time at Thessaloniki in the final years of his life, frequently visiting the tomb of 
Demetrios in the hope of being relieved of his pains.384  Demetrios had famously 
                                                                                                                                            
various legends and accounts of the conquest of Crete, ranging from the novel late-eleventh century 
testimony of Attaleiates (163-166) to tales from Venetian Crete (Maltezou 1998: 234-235, 239-240).  It 
is also consistent with Phokas’ decision to found a church in honour of Theodore Stratelates at 
Constantinople - see Oikonomides (1986). 
380 Walter (1999): 176-177 & n.58; idem (2003): 64; Grotowski (2010): 103 n.154 for examples.  A 
similar tradition also existed in western Europe, and became particularly popular from the time of the 
First Crusade – see Holdsworth (1996): 117-118; MacGregor (2003). 
381 Skylitzes: 413-414. 
382 Kekaumenos: 160-162.  Paul Lemerle (1960: 67) rightly considers the account of Kekaumenos to be 
the more realistic of the two. 
383 Fine (1983: 205-206) has suggested that Alousianos may have been a Byzantine agent who 
intentionally lost the battle; if so, an official account would be all the more creative in its efforts to 
disguise the fiasco.  
384 Skylitzes: 408.51-53.  We might also cite in this context the opening of a mint at Thessaloniki under 
Michael IV, which Hendy viewed in the context of the Bulgarian revolt.  However, the histamenon 
thought to have been produced there bears the image of the archangel Michael rather than Saint 
Demetrios (Hendy 1970; Grierson 1993: II, 720-723). 
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intervened to save Thessaloniki before, during the Avar siege of 586,385 but the events 
of 1040 mark the first instance of the saint physically assisting his beloved city, a 
development linked with the description of Theodore Stratelates riding to the aid of 
Tzimiskes.386  Like Tzimiskes, Michael IV had been involved in the death of his 
predecessor and faced challenges to his rule.387  The report of Saint Demetrios’ 
appearance helped demonstrate the divine approval of the reigning emperor. 
The Marian Icon and Public Ceremony in the Account of Tzimiskes’ Campaign388 
The use of a further classical allusion in the proposed source served to underscore 
another of its primary themes.  Michael McCormick observed hints of Plutarch’s 
Camillus in accounts of Tzimiskes’ triumph.  Like Camillus, Tzimiskes is offered a 
chariot drawn by four white horses; yet while the Roman statesman became 
vainglorious with victory, Tzimiskes refused to mount the chariot, instead affording 
precedence to the icon of the Virgin by placing it within.  This literary construction 
likens Tzimiskes to a great hero of Antiquity, while illustrating his superior 
character.389   
                                                 
385 See Lemerle (1979b) for the miracle and commentary.   
386 It is intriguing that Skylitzes (413.20-21) describes Demetrios ‘making safe the path’ (τὴν πορείαν 
προοµαλίζοντος) for the Romans, a quotation from Isa. 40:3 which also appears in Leo the Deacon’s 
narrative of the Bulgarian campaign of John Tzimiskes - Leo the Deacon (129.7), quoting Ps. 5:8, Isa. 
40:3, and/or 1 Thess. 3:11: τὴν ὁδὸν κατευθύνοντα (per Talbot & Sullivan 2005: 175 n.8).  The second 
of Constantine VII’s military orations likewise implores God to dispatch an angel to protect the army 
along its route (Constantine VII, Address of the Emperor Constantine VII to the Strategoi of the East: 
8.53-56). 
387 For Skylitzes’ account of the reign of Michael IV, see Laiou (1992a); Sklavos (2006): 115-118. 
388 The Virgin was always an important figure for Byzantine soldiers, but her importance intensified in 
the tenth century.  On the development of the cult of the Theotokos in Byzantium, see Pentcheva 
(2006): 11-35; and for Mary’s association with war in Byzantium, ibid: 61-103.  For Mariolatry among 
the tenth-century Byzantine military, see also Weyl Carr (1997): 90. 
389 McCormick (1986): 173-174.  Leo the Deacon: 158.6-7; Skylitzes: 310.55-57; Plutarch, Camillus: 
VII.1. 
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The occasion marked the first use of a Marian icon in a public ceremony, another 
innovation intended to emphasize Tzimiskes’ gratitude to the Theotokos.390  The 
display may have inaugurated renewed use of Marian icons by campaigning 
emperors.391  According to Michael Psellos, Basil II stood against the pretender 
Bardas Phokas at Abydos in 989 grasping the icon of the Virgin as the rebel charged, 
only to suddenly fall from his horse and die.  Against the probable scenario that 
Bardas was poisoned by his cupbearer,392 Psellos credited the victory to the 
Theotokos,393 and it may be that this was the official line of Basil II.394  The worth 
Tzimiskes placed in the acquisition of holy artefacts is attested by accounts of his 
subsequent campaigns in the east.  Leo the Deacon describes Tzimiskes’ discovery of 
the sandals of Christ and the hair of John the Baptist, along with an icon of the 
crucifixion of Christ.395  In his correspondence with Armenian ruler Ashot III, 
Tzimiskes draws particular attention to these relics.396  Matthew of Edessa’s chronicle 
also contains a letter the emperor sent to the Armenian vardapet Leon, inviting him to 
come and witness ‘a splendid celebration in honour of the sandals of Christ and holy 
                                                 
390 Angelidi & Papamastorakis (2005): 212-213; Pentcheva (2002): 29-31; idem (2006): 34-35, 53-54, 
190-191.  The icon is usually identified as the Hodegetria, though there is some speculation that it may 
have been another type of Marian icon (Weyl Carr 2000: 332).  For discussion of the Hodegetria, see 
Wortley (2005): 172-174. 
391 Despite Psellos’ protestation that emperors habitually carried the icon of the Theometer with them 
on campaigns, his description of Romanos III Argyros bringing the object to war represents the first 
time a specific Marian icon is carried into battle (Psellos, Chronographia: I, 38-40 [X-XI]; Pentcheva 
2002: 32-33).  Pentcheva (2001: 204-208) charts the frequent use of Marian icons by soldier emperors 
from the mid-eleventh century onwards. 
392 Skylitzes: 336-338.  Leo the Deacon (174-175), writing under the watch of Basil, states that Bardas 
fell suddenly from his horse and was decapitated.  For discussion, see Kaldellis (1999a): 64 n.144. 
393 ‘For my own part, I prefer to express no opinion on the subject and ascribe all the glory to the 
Mother of the Word’ (Psellos, Chronographia: I, 11 [XVI]; trans. 36).  For discussion see Kaldellis 
(1999a): 62-66. 
394 In support of this one might cite a special issue of a silver miliaresion to commemorate the victory, 
with the bust of the Virgin Nikopoios on the obverse, once dated to the reign of Basil II (Grierson 1963; 
idem 1993: II, 600, 611).  More recently, however, a revised dating to the end of Basil’s reign has 
seemingly invalidated this potential evidence (Pitarakis & Morrisson 2001; Pentcheva 2006: 75). 
395 Leo the Deacon: 165-166. 
396 Matthew of Edessa: 32-33.  For the relics mentioned in the letter see also Adontz (1965): 141-147. 
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hair of John the Baptist’.397  Furthermore, Leo the Deacon reveals that the sandals 
were placed in the church of the Virgin of the Pharos, the typical depository for 
Passion relics,398 while the hair strand and icon were kept in the church of the Saviour 
at the Chalke Gate.399  Tzimiskes enjoyed a strong connection with this particular 
place of worship;400 by placing relics in a church he renovated, he created an implicit 
link between military success and his personal piety.  The parading of the Marian icon 
upon his triumphant return from Bulgaria should be viewed similarly. 
In these activities Tzimiskes followed the tenth-century trend of imperial relic 
hunting.401  Tzimiskes’ immediate predecessor, Nikephoros II Phokas, is reported to 
have recovered part of the apparel of John the Baptist402 and the keramion from 
Syria.403  The acquisition of relics provided visible evidence of divine favour for the 
regime.404  While this concept extends to the physical showcasing of the Marian icon 
of Tzimiskes, the object was not a holy relic.  Certainly, there is no evidence of a 
Tzimiskean equivalent of the Narratio de imagine Edessena which celebrated the 
passage of the Mandylion from Edessa to Byzantium in 944,405 or the sermon on the 
                                                 
397 Matthew of Edessa: 33-34. On the various relics of John the Baptist and their value, see Kalavrezou 
(2004): 67-79; Wortley (2004): 145-153, esp. 152, where the inconsistencies in Tzimiskes’ claims and 
the reports of Leo the Deacon and Skylitzes are discussed.  On account of the dual testimony of Leo the 
Deacon and the Ashot letter, Denis Sullivan (2011: 399-400) believes that Tzimiskes acquired the hair 
of John the Baptist, against Skylitzes’ assertion that it was Nikephoros Phokas (Skylitzes: 271.62-63). 
398 On the church of the Virgin of the Pharos, see Kalavrezou (2004): 55-57; Pentcheva (2006): 30.  For 
Constantine VII’s record of the relics of the Passion stored in the Pharos, see Constantine VII, Address 
of Constantine VII to the Strategoi of the East: 8.23-31. 
399 Engberg (2004) suggests, albeit without much foundation, that Tzimiskes may also have installed 
the Mandylion in the Church at the Chalke Gate. 
400 Mango (1959): 149-152. 
401 On the capture of Christian relics in Byzantium, see Barker (1993): 48-49; James (2001).  For the 
growing relic cult from the tenth century, see Morris (2003): 249-253; Klein (2006): 91-94. 
402 Skylitzes: 254.50-52. 
403 Leo the Deacon: 70-71. 
404 James (2001): 128; Mergiali-Sahas (2001); Morris (2003): 249-250; Kalavrezou (2004): 54. 
405 Narratio de imagine Edessena.  For further discussion see Guckin (2009): esp. 154-181. 
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translation of the keramion by Nikephoros II Phokas.406  Neither text relates 
significant details about the military events leading up to the capture of the relics, but 
they were, nevertheless, officially commissioned pieces, intended to commemorate 
occasions of symbolic importance and underline the legitimacy of Constantine VII 
Porphyrogenitos and Nikephoros II Phokas respectively.407  Rosemary Morris 
encapsulates the process:  
The very recording of a ceremonial often indicates not only that there was 
something special about it, but that the author of the record had some important 
points that he wanted to make about its instigator.  The record of the ceremonial 
could be just as pregnant with political messages as the celebration itself.408  
The concluding account of Tzimiskes’ triumphant return, with pride of place given to 
the icon of the Virgin, should be seen in such terms.  
Conclusion 
Official commemorative narratives of campaigns were not unknown in Byzantium.  
Victories won under Anastasius were commemorated in panegyrics and epic poems, 
now largely lost.409  Prose accounts of particular campaigns do not seem to have been 
among these celebratory literary works, though it is possible that such texts are also 
                                                 
406 Homily on the Translation of the Holy Blood and the Keramion.  For discussion see F. Halkin 
(1963); Sullivan (2011). 
407 Sullivan (2011): 405-408. 
408 Morris (2003): 253. 
409 For the notion of a lost panegyrical work celebrating Anastasius’ victory over the Blemmyes in 
southern Egypt, see Vasiliev (1950): 285-286, 286 n.49.  For the Persica of the Egyptian poet 
Colluthus of Lycopolis, commemorating Anastasius’ triumph over the Persians, see Alan Cameron 
(1969): 108; McCormick (1986): 64 n.100.  Another poet, Christodorus of Coptus, drafted the Isaurica, 
a six-book composition on the Isaurian War – see Dihle (1994): 601-602.  Anastasius’ court 
panegyrists, Procopius and Priscus, similarly praised their subjects’ military accomplishments.  For 
these individuals and literary works of Anastasius’ reign in general, see Nicks (2000): esp. 185-186, 
190-194; E. Jeffreys (2006): 131; Haarer (2006). 
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lost.410  The first known ‘official history’ of a war may have appeared a generation 
later.  John Lydus, by order of the Emperor Justinian, penned a brief work chronicling 
the 529-533 war against Persia.411  James Howard-Johnston hypothesized that 
dispatches formed the basis of a lost ‘official history’ of Heraclius’ campaign against 
the Persians of 627-628, composed by George of Pisidia, traces of which may be 
observed in the Chronographia of Theophanes Confessor.412   
In spite of problems, Kaldellis’ argument for a lost narrative of John Tzimiskes’ 
Balkan campaign of 971 in the tradition of these works is attractive.  The role 
afforded to the Virgin and Saint Theodore is indicative of an official tradition, and 
bulletins cannot have recorded Tzimiskes’ triumph.  Kaldellis has speculated that the 
work may have been intended as a ‘Tzimiskean response’ to Theodosios the Deacon’s 
Capture of Crete.  As Lauxtermann thought Theodosios to emulate the poetry of 
George of Pisidia, we might ponder if the campaign narrative of Tzimiskes similarly 
found a literary model in George’s probable history of Heraclius’ final Persian 
offensive.413  Stylistic differences aside (George’s narrative was probably a verse-
                                                 
410 Greatrex (1998: 75-76) suggests that the historians of Justinian’s reign deliberately played down 
Anastasius’ successes against the Persians so as to make those of Justinian seem more impressive.  It 
may have been that the suppression or even eradication of works commemorating Anastasius’ 
achievements was part of this process.  Howard-Johnston (1995c: 166 & n.13) argues that Joshua the 
Stylite used an official documentary source for his account of Anastasius’ counteroffensive of 503-504, 
a document which may have been later used by Theophanes. The lost history of Eustathios of 
Epiphania chronicled Anastasius’ Persian wars up to the Persian siege of Amida in 503, at which point 
it ends abruptly; the work however begins with events from Adam and the fall of Troy, and was thus 
not a monograph of a particular campaign or war. 
411 ‘[Justinian] also bade me to write the history of the war which he had successfully conducted against 
the Persians’ (John Lydus: III.28; trans. 177).  See also Maas (1992): 33; Treadgold (2007): 258-264.  
Averil Cameron (1985: 156 n.35) postulates the existence of a detailed ‘official’ historical account.  
Michael McCormick (1986: 64 & n.100), however, considers that John Lydus’ work may have been 
panegyric. 
412 Howard-Johnston (1994). 
413 Evidence suggests that George’s work was widely distributed in the Near East and continued to 
circulate for some time, being also employed by the Armenian historians Sebeos and Movses 
Daskhurantsi - see Howard-Johnston (1994): 77-78; idem (2002); idem (2010): 83-84, 95-96, 124-125, 
288-295.  The fragments preserved in the tenth-century encyclopaedic Suda, different to those in 
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prose hybrid), the basic concept of a commemorative dispatch-based history may have 
resonated with a soldier emperor who sought a fitting testament to his deeds and a 
valuable propaganda tool.414 
It is maintained here that the report of the divine intervention of Theodore and 
Tzimiskes’ subsequent triumph originated in an official account of the campaign.  
While not the first historical account of warfare to incorporate religious elements,415 it 
does represent the first extant example in Byzantine historiography of a saint 
physically intervening to assist an emperor-led army in pitched battle.  As such scenes 
are more common in the following centuries, it would appear that this apparent 
innovation of Tzimiskes and his publicists served as inspiration to later rulers and 
writers, and marked a significant development in the Byzantine approach to 
composing accounts of battle.  
                                                                                                                                            
Theophanes, suggest an independent witness to George of Pisidia’s work.  For these fragments see 
Pertusi (1959): 276-307. 
414 In measuring the enduring influence of George we must also recall the lavish praise of Psellos, who 
likened George’s poems to those of Euripides – see Colonna (1953). 
415 Michael Whitby (1998: 194-195) cites the example of Theophylact Simocatta, but notes that the 
portrayal of Heraclius’ campaigns against Persia were ‘the most spectacular example of the 
mobilisation of Christian fervour’ to date.  See Mary Whitby (1998): 253-225; Bergamo (2008); Sarris 
(2011): 245-258; Stoyanov (2011): 25-44. 
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V. The History of Michael Attaleiates 
Born in the early 1020s in southern Asia Minor, Michael Attaleiates was an influential 
judge in Constantinople before being promoted to patrikios and military judge (krites 
tou stratopedou) under Romanos IV Diogenes in 1068.  Attaleiates accompanied the 
imperial army on expeditions against the Turks in this capacity, and was present at the 
infamous defeat at Manzikert in 1071.  Attaleiates continued to enjoy favour under 
Romanos’ successor Michael VII Doukas, during which time he began writing his 
History, a work documenting events from the mid-1030s - when Attaleiates first 
arrived in Constantinople – to shortly before his death in 1080.416 
Attaleiates did not command extensive attention in modern scholarship until the 
1960s, when Eudoxos Tsolakis published a number of articles on Attaleiates and his 
work.417  In 1981, revisions to the biography formulated by Tsolakis were offered by 
Paul Gautier in an article on a monastic document drafted by Attaleiates.418  Shortly 
after Alexander Kazhdan explored the social and political views of Attaleiates,419 and 
it would be almost two decades before Athanasios Markopoulos followed up on a 
similar theme with his look at the portrayal of man in the History.420  In between, 
Italian scholars Carlota Amande and Lia Raffaela Cresci examined the literary 
composition of the History, focusing on its mix of history and encomium.421  
Inmacolada Pérez Martín contributed a new edition of the History in 2002, along with 
a commentary and an introductory study on Attaleiates and his work.422  Since then, 
                                                 
416 For fuller biographies of Attaleiates see Pérez Martín (2002): xxv-xxxiii; Krallis (2006): 34-92. 
417 Tsolakis (1965); idem (1969); idem (1970). 
418 Gautier (1981). 
419 Kazhdan (1984c): 23-86. 
420 Markopoulos (2003b). 
421 Amande (1989); Cresci (1991); idem (1993). 
422 Pérez Martín (2002). 
81 
the research of Dimitris Krallis has transformed the way in which we understand 
Attaleiates.  By reading Attaleiates’ History through the lens of ‘history as politics’, 
Krallis has shown how Attaleiates constructed his work in view of contemporary 
concerns, seeking to present his own ideas of how the empire might improve its dire 
situation while promoting his suitability as an advisor.423 
Krallis’ reappraisal of the History calls for a fresh look at Attaleiates’ record of the 
campaigns of Romanos Diogenes.  Attaleiates has often been mined for this rich 
material, above all for his account of the Battle of Manzikert.424  In this section we 
consider to what extent Attaleiates’ record of his time on campaign can be considered 
an eyewitness account, in light of Krallis’ research and in view of the practical 
restrictions imposed by sole reliance on autopsy. 
The Limits of Autopsy in War: Attaleiates’ at Hierapolis 
In the tradition of Thucydides, Attaleiates stresses in his prooimion that he relied on 
what he had seen and experienced.425  What distinguishes Attaleiates from the 
majority of historians of the Middle period is that he was involved in a number of the 
campaigns he describes, namely those conducted by Romanos IV Diogenes along the 
eastern frontier.  Prior to recounting his experiences on an expedition of 1068, 
                                                 
423 Krallis (2006), where one may find a fuller bibliographic review. Krallis’ book, adapted from his 
doctoral thesis, appeared too late for consultation. 
424 Cahen (1934); Janssens (1968-1972); Vryonis (1971): 96-103; idem (1992); idem (1998); idem 
(2001); idem (2003b); idem (2005); Cheynet (1980); De Vries - van der Velden (1997); Vratimos-
Chatzopoulos (2005). 
425 περὶ ὧν οὐκ ἀκοῇ καὶ µύθοις ἑτέρων παρέλαβον, ἀλλ’ ὧν αὐτὸς αὐτόπτης καὶ θεατὴς ἐχρηµάτισα 
(Attaleiates: 6.1-3).  Even when recounting the events of his early years Attaleiates places great 
significance on his historical role as an eyewitness - see Krallis (2006): 53-55. 
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Attaleiates asserts that what follows is written entirely from autopsy, not hearsay.426  
Is Attaleiates merely giving the impression of being an eyewitness, in order to boost 
his own credentials, or can we observe substance in his claims? 
We begin with an episode from Attaleiates’ record of operations in northern Syria in 
1068.  During his account of fighting at Hierapolis, Attaleiates centres his 
observations on an engagement outside the camp, in which the Arabs battled the elite 
tagma of the scholae, a brief struggle which resulted in many Byzantine losses.  In a 
rare instance of personal reflection, Attaleiates remarks:  
At that time I did not fear for my life so much as I acknowledged the full extent 
of the cowardice, of the stupidity, and of the debasement of the Romans.  For 
while the Romans underwent such destruction in front of their military camp, 
none of the other detachments and none of the officers moved to help them, as 
they all remained motionless tending to their daily affairs as though they were 
encamped on friendly soil.427   
Attaleiates was able to observe this engagement at close quarters because it occurred 
near the main camp, where a non-participant such as he would have been stationed.  
For Speros Vryonis to state that ‘much of what [Attaleiates] writes is the product of 
his rich personal experience as a direct participant in these battles’ takes Attaleiates’ 
                                                 
426 Εἰ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ταῦτα συγγράφων τῶν ἐκ προκρίσεως αὐτῷ συνεποµένων ἐτύγχανεν καὶ τὰς τοῦ 
στρατοῦ διευθετῶν ὑποθέσεις ἐν κρίσεσι, πάντως ἂν οὐκ ἐξ ἀκοῆς ἀλλ’ ἐξ αὐτοπτίας τὰ καθεξῆς 
παραδώσει διὰ γραφῆς τοῖς µετέπειτα (Attaleiates: 78.7-10).  
427 Τότε τοίνυν κἀγὼ οὐ τοσοῦτον ἀπέγνων τὴν ἐµαυτοῦ σωτηρίαν ὅσον τὴν τῶν Ῥωµαίων κατέγνων 
δειλίαν ἢ ἀπειροκαλίαν ἢ ταπεινότητα, τοσαύτης γὰρ γενοµένης καταφορᾶς καὶ ἥττης τῶν Ῥωµαίων 
πρὸ τῆς παρεµβολῆς, οὐδεὶς τῶν λοιπῶν λόχων καὶ λοχαγῶν εἰς ἄµυναν διηρέθιστο, ἀλλὰ πάντες ἔνδον 
καθήµενοι ἕκαστος τὸ οἰκεῖον ἔργον, ὡς διὰ φιλίας γῆς ἐνσκηνούµενος (Attaleiates: 85.20-25).  For 
further discussion of these events, see Vratimos-Chatzopoulos (2005): 163-164. 
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credibility as an eyewitness to an improbable degree.428  His role was that of a judge 
and advisor, not a soldier,429 and there is nothing to suggest that Attaleiates ever 
enjoyed an appreciable view of battle unless it encroached upon the marching column 
or, more often, the main camp. 
The limits imposed upon Attaleiates’ autopsy in this instance highlight a key facet of 
eyewitness testimony of battle.  John Keegan’s influential ‘face of battle’ approach, 
which sought to establish the experience of the individual combatant, speaks of ‘the 
personal angle of vision’, noting the physical obstacles which might impair one’s 
perception in battle.430  This hindrance to providing a balanced and informed account 
of one’s experience was recognized even by the Ancients.  Thucydides questioned 
how someone could truly know what happened in a night battle, conceding that even 
in daylight one ‘knew little of what went on beyond his own immediate 
surroundings’.431  Similarly, in Euripides’ Suppliant Women, the Athenian king 
Theseus questioned Adrastos, king of Argos, about one’s capacity to observe in battle: 
The enemy they encountered in the battle, the spear from which each received his 
wound - these are useless tales for listeners and speakers, [the notion] that any 
man standing in battle, when spears are hurtling before his eyes, should declare for 
certain who each champion is.  I could not…trust those who dared speak of such 
                                                 
428 Vryonis (2003a): 18-19. 
429 Contra Ljubarskij (1996: 443-444), who believes that Attaleiates depicts himself as a ‘bold warrior’.  
How one would reach this conclusion is unclear. 
430 Keegan (1976): 128-133. 
431 ἐν µὲν γὰρ ἡµέρᾳ σαφέστερα µέν, ὅµως δὲ οὐδὲ ταῦτα οἱ παραγενόµενοι πάντα πλὴν τὸ καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸν 
ἕκαστος µόλις οἶδεν· ἐν δὲ νυκτοµαχίᾳ, ἣ µόνη δὴ στρατοπέδων µεγάλων ἔν γε τῷδε τῷ πολέµῳ 
ἐγένετο, πῶς ἄν τις σαφῶς τι ᾔδει; (Thucydides: VII.44.1).  The problem of persons having differing 
viewpoints of the same incident, depending on what they elected to observe, is noted at ibid: VII.71.3. 
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things; for when a man is face to face with the enemy, he could hardly see what he 
is supposed to.432 
At Hierapolis, Attaleiates was a mere observer, but his field of vision could not have 
been much clearer than that of a soldier.  Catherine Hanley’s thoughts on the 
eyewitness to medieval battle are applicable to this context also: ‘Anyone observing a 
battle would see, firstly, a confused mass of struggling men, fighting with very little 
sense of order or discipline; if he continued to watch, his eye would be caught by one 
or more individuals, and he would begin to focus on them’.433  Was the defeat of the 
tagmata outside Hierapolis truly ‘the most important event’ of the 1068 campaign, as 
Antonios Vratimos-Chatzopoulos maintains,434 or does the incident merely seem such 
because it was one of the few events Attaleiates could clearly recount having seen it 
first-hand?   
Attaleiates’ Experience at the Battle of Manzikert 
One discerns similar restrictions in Attaleiates’ perspective of the defeat at Manzikert 
in 1071.  Attaleiates was among many in camp confused as to why a small force under 
Nikephoros Bryennios had been attacked by a large number of Turks.435  He was only 
able to ascertain what became of the supporting force led by Nikephoros Basilakes 
                                                 
432 ὅτῳ ξυνέστη τῶν δ᾽ ἕκαστος ἐν µάχῃ  
  ἢ τραῦµα λόγχης πολεµίων ἐδέξατο.  
  κενοὶ γὰρ οὗτοι τῶν τ᾽ ἀκουόντων λόγοι  
  καὶ τοῦ λέγοντος, ὅστις ἐν µάχῃ βεβὼς  
  λόγχης ἰούσης πρόσθεν ὀµµάτων πυκνῆς  
  σαφῶς ἀπήγγειλ᾽ ὅστις ἐστὶν ἁγαθός.  
  οὐκ ἂν δυναίµην οὔτ᾽ ἐρωτῆσαι τάδε  
  οὔτ᾽ αὖ πιθέσθαι τοῖσι τολµῶσιν λέγειν·  
  µόλις γὰρ ἄν τις αὐτὰ τἀναγκαῖ᾽ ὁρᾶν  
  δύναιτ᾽ ἂν ἑστὼς πολεµίοις ἐναντίος (Euripides, Suppliant Women: ll.847-856). 
433 Hanley (2003): 117-118. 
434 Vratimos-Chatzopoulos (2005): 184. 
435 Attaleiates: 114-115. 
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when a report reached the camp, along with wounded troops.436  We learn that the 
emperor left the camp to investigate these developments, but since Attaleiates merely 
documents that the army returned at sunset, we may surmise that he did not 
accompany the party.437  Attaleiates’ description of the Turkish attack on the camp 
that evening illustrates other facets of the eyewitness account of battle: psychological 
insight and evocation of the senses.438  Attaleiates vividly describes the sleepless night 
the camp endured as a result of the harassment of the Turks: ‘There was an 
extraordinary fear and ill-omened utterances and a mixed cry and unintelligible sound 
and everything was filled with noise and danger.  And everyone wished to die rather 
than experience such times.  Not to behold this was considered a blessing’.439   
With regard to how the eventual battle unfolded and progressed, we may apply the 
label of eyewitness to Attaleiates only sparingly.  For events beyond the camp, 
Attaleiates was clearly reliant on the testimony of others.  Citing the treachery of 
Diogenes’ rival Andronikos Doukas as a key factor in the collapse, Attaleiates notes 
that this version of events was that provided by ‘most people’ (οἱ πολλοὶ 
πληροφοροῦσιν ὅτι...).440  As the army poured back into the camp, Attaleiates 
bemoaned the lack of an ‘informed statement’ (λόγος οὐδεὶς ἀπηγγέλλετο καίριος).441  
In the absence of official word, Attaleiates heard only conflicting rumours from those 
fleeing from the battle: ‘some’ said that the emperor had stood firm and routed the 
                                                 
436 Ibid: 115-116. 
437 Ibid: 116. 
438 See in general Keegan (1976); Kagan (2006): esp. 61-62; Harari (2008).  Emily Albu (2005) draws 
particular attention to the strong emotional and psychological aspects of the ‘eyewitness’ testimony of 
the Gesta Francorum. 
439 Τότε δὴ τότε καὶ φόβος ἐξαίσιος καὶ λόγος ἀπαίσιος καὶ βοὴ συµµιγὴς καὶ ἄσηµος κρότος καὶ πάντα 
µετὰ θορύβων καὶ κινδύνων ἐδείκνυτο καὶ πᾶς τις θανεῖν ἐπεθύµει µᾶλλον ἢ τοιοῦτον ἰδεῖν καιρὸν καὶ 
τὸ µὴ κατιδεῖν ὡς εὐτυχὲς ἐνοµίζετο καὶ τοὺς µὴ τοιοῦτον ἱδόντας ὡς εὐτυχεῖς ἐµακάριζεν (Attaleiates: 
116.25-117.3; trans. 232). 
440 Ibid: 120.6-13. 
441 Ibid: 120.21-23. 
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barbarians, ‘others’ that he had been killed or captured, while ‘yet others made other 
assertions’, suggesting that victory changed hands until many of the Cappadocians 
standing with the emperor began to flee.442  Attaleiates is attempting to convey the 
chaos of these desperate moments; Patrick Walsh identified the narrative device 
employed – reports of different but simultaneous actions by a number of groups – as 
the ‘division of crowds’, observing that the technique was ‘especially frequent in 
scenes of disorder and confusion’.443  Presumably seeking more reliable testimony, 
Attaleiates waited until the imperial horsemen returned, but they had not seen the 
emperor.444  He encouraged the retreating soldiers to turn back, but once the Turks 
drew near the encampment Attaleiates thought of little other than salvation and fled 
back to Constantinople by way of Trebizond, offering little detail about his journey.445   
Attaleiates’ view at Manzikert was again that of a camp-follower, able to observe 
events in and around camp, but forced to rely on hearsay and reports for actions 
further afield.  Though present, he struggled for accurate information as to the fate of 
the Byzantine army, and probably only pieced together the course of the battle once 
he returned to Constantinople.  Indeed, being only a few kilometres away from the 
action afforded Attaleiates no clearer consensus than Michael Psellos, who writes of 
survivors and messengers trickling into the capital in the days after the battle, each 
                                                 
442 τῶν µὲν λεγόντων ἰσχυρῶς ἀντιπαρατάξασθαι τὸν βασιλέα µετὰ τῶν ὑπολελειµµένων αὐτῷ καὶ τοὺς 
βαρβάρους τρέψασθαι, τῶν δὲ σφαγὴν ἢ ἅλωσιν καταγγελλόντων αὐτοῦ καὶ ἄλλων ἄλλα συναιρόντων 
καὶ παλίντροπον ἑκατέρου µέρους τὴν νίκην καταλεγόντων ἕως ἤρξαντο καὶ τῶν σὺν αὐτῷ 
Καππαδοκῶν πολλοὶ κατὰ µοίρας τινὰς ἐκεῖσε ἀποφοιτᾶν (ibid: 120.23-121.1; trans. 235). 
443 Walsh (1961): 185-186.  Walsh was discussing the use of this literary technique in relation to 
Roman historian Livy but Andreola Rossi (2004: 143-145) notes its presence in other narratives of war, 
including Greek texts. 
444 Τὸ δὲ µετὰ τοῦτο καὶ τῶν βασιλικῶν ἱππέων πολλοὶ µετὰ τῶν ἵππων ἐπαναστρέφοντες µὴ ἰδεῖν τὸν 
βασιλέα τί γέγονεν ἐρωτώµενοι ἀπεκρίναντο (Attaleiates: 121.3-5).  See Cheynet (1980: 428-429) for 
possible identification of these ‘imperial’ troops. 
445 Attaleiates: 119-121, 124.  John Keegan (1976: 45-52) notes that the view of the soldier (i.e. active 
participant) will always focus on his personal survival in dangerous situations. 
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offering a different report on the fate of the emperor.446  In this respect, Attaleiates’ 
account perfectly conveys the sense of panic and confusion among the imperial army 
as the battle unfolded.  When compared with the later account of Nikephoros 
Bryennios, who seems far more interested in upholding the reputation of his 
homonymous grandfather, one can appreciate all the more the unique experience 
provided by Attaleiates’ civilian observer.447  The value attached to his record is 
summed up by Carole Hillenbrand, who judged Attaleiates to be ‘the most precious 
account of all’ sources on the Battle of Manzikert.448 
Attaleiates’ Sources and Access to Privileged Information 
While Attaleiates relied to a considerable degree on his own autopsy, he was not quite 
the ‘Autopsiefanatiker’ that Athanasios Markopoulos considers him to be.449  
Attaleiates had little choice but to rely on oral and written sources for information on 
events he did not personally witness.  In the case of the Battle of Manzikert, 
Attaleiates was dependent on informants for events he had not directly observed.  His 
knowledge of Romanos’ heroic actions in the field and subsequent time in captivity, 
                                                 
446 Psellos, Chronographia: II, 162-163 (XXIII). 
447 Bryennios: 104-120.  Bryennios must have drawn upon first-hand testimony, either a written 
account or a story passed down though his family.  Speros Vryonis (1992: 131) concluded that 
Bryennios was writing ‘a family and political pamphlet on the battle’.  Jonathan Shepard (1975: 221-
222) describes Bryennios the Elder as ‘a first-hand, if biased, informant’, critical of Romanos 
Diogenes, but seems to prefer him over Attaleiates nonetheless. 
448 Hillenbrand (2007: 17).  It had not always been thus.  Claude Cahen (1934) observed apparent 
inaccuracies which led him to favour Arabic sources for reconstructing the events of 26th August 1071.  
Antonio Carile (1968; idem 1969) inclined towards the account of Bryennios, asserting that Attaleiates’ 
partiality towards his patron Nikephoros III Botaneiates led the historian to taint his battle narrative 
with unfounded accusations against Bryennios.  Yet Vryonis has disproved the arguments of Cahen and 
Carile and championed the pre-eminence of Attaleiates in a series of works (1971: 96-103, esp. 100-
101 n.109; idem 1992; idem 1998; idem 2001; idem 2003b; idem 2005).  Modern scholarship tends to 
follow Vryonis (Janssens 1968-1972; Cheynet 1980; Vratimos-Chatzopoulos: 48-51), though not all 
are convinced: Jonathan Shepard (1975: 222-223) viewed Attaleiates as a fierce apologist of Romanos 
IV, deeming the historian to be ‘far from objective’, and, like Carile, finding Bryennios’ narrative 
‘more precise and plausible’ in terms of its exposition of tactical manoeuvres. 
449 Markopoulos (1988): 229.  Ruth Macrides (1996: 209-210) dismisses Markopoulos’ claim. 
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for example, is thought to have been taken from a letter the emperor sent his wife 
Eudokia, recounting his troubles.450  Throughout Attaleiates’ record of Romanos’ 
campaigns, there are frequent mentions of confidential plans, the activities of distant 
forces, and the movements of the enemy, demonstrating the extent of his wider 
knowledge.  His position as krites tou stratopedou would have afforded him insight 
into the workings of military command.451  During the campaign of 1069, for 
example, Attaleiates was apparently among a council Romanos Diogenes convened in 
order to discuss his plans.452  Admittedly we cannot be certain that this participation 
was indicative of regular practice.453  Though Romanos may have valued Attaleiates’ 
opinion,454 there is evidence to suggest that Attaleiates was not always privy to 
Romanos’ decision-making.455  Yet even if he was at times shut out of planning 
sessions, there can be little question that Attaleiates was well-equipped to write about 
                                                 
450 Attaleiates: 120, 121-124.  Use of the letter is suggested by Vryonis (2001); idem (2003b).  Receipt 
of such a letter in Constantinople is confirmed by Michael Psellos: καὶ ὥσπερ αὐτάγγελος τοῦ µετὰ τὸ 
ἀτύχηµα εὐτυχήµατος τῇ βασιλίδι καθίσταται γράµµασι τῆς ἰδίας χειρὸς ἃ συµβεβήκοι τούτῳ 
σηµειωσάµενος (Chronographia: II, 164 [XXVI]). 
451 For Attaleiates’ status in the army, see Haldon (2002a).  His presence in the camp alone would have 
been a useful conduit to important information from command – see in general on this point Harari 
(2007b). 
452 Attaleiates: 96-99. 
453 While Speros Vryonis Jr. (1992: 130) asserts that Attaleiates participated in all Romanos’ war 
councils throughout the campaign of 1071, Antonios Vratimos-Chatzopoulos (2005: 201, 219-230) is 
unconvinced that the council of 1069 was anything other than a one-off.  The author later appears to 
contradict himself however, opining that after 1068 Romanos no longer consulted his generals, only his 
judges (ibid: 237).   
454 Romanos is said to have personally persuaded a reluctant Attaleiates to accompany him on his 1069 
campaign, offering him the title of patrikios as incentive (Attaleiates: 93-94).  We should likewise note 
however that Romanos impelled Michael Psellos to join him for the same campaign (Psellos, 
Chronographia: II, 159-160 [XV-XVI]).  Vratimos-Chatzopoulos (2005: 200-201) proposes that 
Romanos realized the strategic and tactical failures of his last campaign, and therefore was seeking 
reliable advisers to avoid making similar errors on his new expedition.  It is also suggested that 
Attaleiates’ hesitancy may be attributable to his desire to monitor his property and estates, or, more 
likely, because he was irked at not having been consulted at any time on the previous campaign. 
455 Vratimos-Chatzopoulos (2005: 223-224) astutely observes that Attaleiates’ obvious ignorance as to 
why Romanos later reneged on his acceptance of the historian’s advice at the aforementioned meeting 
may be attributed to Attaleiates being part of a different section of the army at the time the emperor 
made his final decision.  As Attaleiates (99-100) is unsure as to why this decision was made, he credits 
the change to misfortune (ἀκληρία), a rather rare occurrence in a work which generally strives for 
causation.  On this point, see Krallis (2006): 191-192. 
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imperial campaigns.  He consistently makes reference to reports and messages as a 
source of information for distant events,456 and his judicial position probably afforded 
him access to administrative documents such as muster rolls, inventory lists and post-
action reports.457  Not since Ammianus Marcellinus and Procopius had a Roman 
historian enjoyed such close proximity with central command.458   
Influences on Attaleiates’ Record of the Campaigns of Romanos IV Diogenes 
One cannot isolate Attaleiates’ experiences on campaign from the rest of his History.  
In respect of the eyewitness chronicles of the First Crusade, Yuval Noah Harari and 
Elizabeth Lapina have demonstrated that the records might be strongly influenced by 
the ideals of the author and his subsequent experiences, and adapted to a more 
conventional historical narrative model.459  This is true also of Attaleiates.  Modern 
                                                 
456 Attaleiates: 80.3-7, for word (λόγος) reaching the emperor of the Turkish attack on Neokaisarea in 
1068; 92.4-9 for rumour (φήµη) reaching the emperor at Typsarium that the syntagmatarch left to 
guard Melitene had allowed the enemy to pass through to Amorion unscathed; 95.4-6 for word (φήµη) 
reaching the emperor at Larissa that a group of Turks was pillaging land nearby; 100.13-18 for rumour 
(φήµη) reaching the emperor that the force he left under Philaretos Brachamios at Melitene had 
suffered a great defeat, later confirmed by the appearance of survivors in Romanos’ camp; 105.12 for 
word (φήµης) reaching the emperor of the defeat and capture of Manuel Komnenos in 1070; 114.22-24 
for mention of word (φήµη) reaching the camp at Manzikert that a Turkish force was attacking 
foragers; 116.7 for news (ἀγγελίας) reaching the camp of Basilakes’ capture; 124.5-8 for Attaleiates 
hearing (αὐτήκοοι) a report (φήµης) whilst at Trebizond that Romanos had been set free and was 
mustering troops along the eastern frontier. 
457 See Pérez Martín (2002): xlii n.127, for the suggestion that Attaleiates may have accessed 
documentary sources through his office.  Warren Treadgold (2007: 218) speculates that Procopius, as 
one involved in military administration, may have had access to statistical documents and used them in 
the composition of his Wars.  For military rolls (stratiotikoi katalogoi), see Lemerle (1979a): 144. 
458 For both historians see in general Austin (1983).  For Procopius’ sources of knowledge, see Averil 
Cameron (1985); Kaegi (1990): esp. 56.  For Ammianus Marcellinus’ informed view of operations, see 
Austin (1979): esp. 92-116; Matthews (1986).  Kimberly Kagan (2006: 43) notes Ammianus ‘being 
part of the senior decision-making process (or seeing events from that perspective) provides a much 
more useful framework for understanding combat than simply being an eyewitness’.  This may apply to 
any eyewitness historian recounting campaigns. 
459 Harari (2004b); Lapina (2007).  Relevant studies on eyewitnessing in western medieval and Early 
Modern literature include Guenée (1980): 77-78; Beer (1981); Morse (1991); Adorno (1992); Damian-
Grint (1999); Frisch (2004). 
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scholarship generally affirms that Manzikert was not a military disaster,460 but one 
would be forgiven for thinking this reading Attaleiates’ account.  ‘For what could be 
more piteous...than for the whole Roman state to be seen as ruined, and the empire as 
all but collapsing?’461  This sentiment is understandable given that Attaleiates was 
imperilled462 and lost close friends in the struggle.463  But more than this, the failure 
was compounded by subsequent events: civil war, the death of Romanos, the 
catastrophic reign of Michael VII Doukas, and the collapse of the eastern defences 
against the Turks.464  Thus when Attaleiates writes of the empire’s ruin at Manzikert, 
he does so with the torrid aftermath in mind.  
Other factors may be at work in Attaleiates’ reflections on Manzikert.  With 
Nikephoros Botaneiates his patron, it has been suggested that Attaleiates deliberately 
portrayed Nikephoros Bryennios the Elder, a rival of Botaneiates, as cowardly; 
however, a closer reading of the text reveals that Attaleiates actually defends 
Bryennios from such criticism.465  Another potential influence is Attaleiates’ 
                                                 
460 Cheynet (1980). 
461 τί γὰρ ἐλεεινότερον...ἅπαν ἀνάστατον τὸ Ῥωµαϊκὸν καθορᾶσθαι καὶ βασιλείαν ἐν ἀκαρεὶ κατανοεῖν 
συµπεσοῦσαν; (Attaleiates: 121.10-15; trans. 235). 
462 In a monastic document of c.1077, Attaleiates attests to his lasting relief of being saved ‘from 
accursed hands during wars against the Persians’ (Rule of Michael Attaleiates for his Almshouse in 
Rhaidestos and for the Monastery of Christ Panoiktirmon in Constantinople: 85.1123-1127; trans. 355).  
Evidently, the traumatic experience remained with him for the rest of his days.  See also Alexander 
(1962): 356-357; Krallis (2006): 84. 
463 Attaleiates: 167.  See Cheynet (1980): 430, 436-437; Kazhdan (1984c): 48-49, 50; Krallis (2006): 
84-91, 138-151 for discussion of these individuals and Attaleiates’ social circle in general.  Skylitzes 
Continuatus (167), perhaps mindful of the rather personal nature of this account, removes this section 
when paraphrasing Attaleiates’ account of the campaign. 
464 For an overview of events in the decade following Manzikert see Angold (1997): 115-135. 
465 Carile (1969); Shepard (1985): 220-223.  Kazhdan (1984c: 65) likewise believes that Attaleiates is 
directly criticizing Bryennios here.  For the rebuttal of these arguments, see Vryonis (1992): 128-131.  
This is not to say that Nikephoros Bryennios the Elder is not viewed negatively in subsequent passages 
of the History - see Cresci (1993): 82-83.  A detailed comparison of Attaleiates’ views on Botaneiates 
and Bryennios may be found in idem (1991): 200-218.  A number of scholars have argued that 
Attaleiates deliberately constructed his account of Michael VII’s reign in order to glorify Botaneiates, 
adopting the Vita Basilii and its contrasting portrayals of Michael III and Basil I as a model – see 
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attachment to Romanos Diogenes.466  Jonathan Shepard is of the opinion that 
Attaleiates writes as a ‘passionate apologist’ for Romanos, seeking to justify his 
questionable decisions at Manzikert ‘to vindicate the fallen emperor’s memory’.467  
Vratimos-Chatzopoulos concurs, observing that Attaleiates rarely criticizes Romanos 
for military errors.468  Krallis traces the root of Attaleiates’ portrayal of Romanos to 
current arguments at court.  According to this view, Attaleiates’ History is 
conceivable only as a response to the Chronographia of Michael Psellos, a work 
which portrayed Romanos as an ineffective ruler and commander, practically 
justifying his overthrow by Psellos’ benefactor, Michael VII Doukas.469  So, while 
Psellos conveniently ignores the treachery of Michael’s cousin Andronikos Doukas, 
instead attributing the defeat to Romanos,470 Attaleiates emphasizes the betrayal as a 
key reason for the collapse.  Psellos bemoans the futility of Romanos’ campaigns, but 
Attaleiates shows that they were moderately successful in reconstituting the army and 
making some valuable defensive gains.471  I am less convinced by Krallis’ argument 
that Attaleiates sought to counter Psellos’ claims that Romanos was impervious to 
advice,472 but the idea of a dialogue between the two works is attractive.  Attaleiates’ 
                                                                                                                                            
Amande (1989): 268-271; Markopoulos (2003b): 226-227.  Attaleiates’ apparent fondness for 
Botaneiates has recently been called into question however by Krallis (2006: 227-240). 
466 Krallis (2006): 219-220. 
467 Shepard (1985): 220-223. 
468 Vratimos-Chatzopoulos (2005): esp. 32-40. 
469 Krallis (2006): 127-203, esp. 157-173. 
470 Psellos, Chronographia: II, 161-162 (XIX-XXII). 
471 See in general Vratimos-Chatzopoulos (2005). 
472 Krallis (2006: 137, 167-169) suggests that Psellos was present and ‘likely defeated’ by Attaleiates’ 
argument during a council on the 1069 campaign, and that Psellos’ frustration may be seen in his 
account of the Manzikert campaign, where Romanos is depicted as arrogant and impervious to advice.  
Krallis argues that Attaleiates’ account of the council may have been meant to show that this was not 
the case, and also serve as a painful reminder to Psellos of his failure at the meeting.  Yet I would argue 
against Psellos’ presence at this meeting, since Attaleiates states that only military judges were present.  
Furthermore, it seems that Romanos forced Psellos to accompany him not because he valued his 
advice, but rather because he did not trust him.  Psellos professes in a letter only to assisting in the 
construction of siege machines, and his decision to leave the campaign early at Caesarea after a 
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conscious effort to vindicate Romanos’ decisions and consistently highlight his 
bravery and generalship at Manzikert is perhaps best understood when viewed as a 
response to Psellos’ criticism of the emperor.   
We must also consider Krallis’ suggestion that Attaleiates endeavoured to display his 
wisdom to show prospective emperors that he could be of great use as an advisor. 
According to Krallis, the History ‘was ultimately a billboard on which the author 
advertised his skills as a political analyst’.473  Attaleiates’ experience in the service of 
Romanos Diogenes was critical in this respect.  Attaleiates may only insert himself 
into the narrative to indicate that he had witnessed, heard about, or participated in an 
event, or that he had advised the emperor,474 but each incident assumes added 
significance when viewed in light of Krallis’ proposal.  Let us consider Attaleiates’ 
most notable role in the text, at the war council convened by Romanos in 1069.  
While most judges concur with Romanos’ idea that the army should march 
homeward, Attaleiates is the sole dissenting voice, contending instead that the army 
should press on and take a number of border fortresses.475  Unlike his fellow judges, 
Attaleiates is no mere ‘yes man’ who puts his own interests first.  He appears, in short, 
perfect advisor material.476  Romanos might reject Attaleiates’ plan, but the historian’s 
foresight is seen in the campaign of 1071, where Chliat and Manzikert, two key 
border fortresses, were the principal objectives.  By Attaleiates’ account, the 
                                                                                                                                            
thoroughly unpleasant experience seems to confirm his dispensable role.  For these events see Snipes 
(1981). 
473 Krallis (2006): 339. 
474 Vryonis (1992): 129. 
475 Attaleiates: 96-99.  For discussion see Vratimos-Chatzopoulos (2005): 247-248. 
476 Attaleiates’ decision to portray himself as a wise advisor is observed by Ljubarskij (1996): 443-444. 
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expedition failed due to disloyalty and misfortune; the strategy was always a sound 
one.477 
Conclusion 
Attaleiates’ narrative of the campaigns of Romanos IV Diogenes, while built on a 
foundation of personal experience, is shaped by various factors: a desire to vindicate 
Romanos against the criticism of Psellos, frustration at subsequent events in the years 
following Manzikert, and a professional need to give evidence of his ability to provide 
sound guidance.  Averil Cameron similarly observed that another historian involved 
in the events of his history – Procopius – often distorted reality for reasons of political 
or personal bias: 
The value of Procopius as an eyewitness…is the most deceptive aspect of all; it 
depends totally on his subjective impressions, the quality of his observation, what 
he thought important and the purpose to which he put the information he 
collected.  There is no such thing as completely objective reporting and we 
certainly shall not find anything like it in the work of Procopius.478 
Attaleiates’ descriptions of battle can read like those of an eyewitness participant.  He 
conveys the chaos of defeat and the restricted ‘personal angle of vision’ in his 
narrative of the Battle of Manzikert, while recollection of emotions and sensory 
aspects heightens the personal nature of the account.  Yet recollection is itself a 
problem.  Unless he maintained a journal of his time on campaign,479 Attaleiates, like 
                                                 
477 On this point, see Krallis (2006): 325-328. 
478 Averil Cameron (1985): 12-13. 
479 Attaleiates’ statement (5-6) that he began writing his history whilst involved in military operations 
might suggest that he made notes of his experiences on campaign with Romanos – see Krallis (2006): 
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most recalling an experience in war, was suspect to failing memory and the 
subconscious distortion of events. 480  Yuval Noah Harari’s conclusions on 
eyewitnesses to battle writing of their experiences are pertinent: 
The field of vision is always narrow, hence an eyewitness can never see (or hear, 
or smell) all the facts.  Because the emotional turmoil of combat plays havoc with 
one’s sensory input, an eyewitness can never see the facts objectively.  The 
passage of time between witnessing the event and giving an account of it ensures 
that an eyewitness will never remember the facts correctly.481 
Attaleiates was, first and foremost, a historian.  Parts drawn from first-hand 
observation must be understood in the wider context of the History, taking into 
account the historical setting as well as the personality and intent of the author.482  
These sections, guided by personal bias and subsequent knowledge, cannot be isolated 
purely as accounts of Attaleiates’ personal experiences on campaign.483   
                                                                                                                                            
23-24.  For the notion that Procopius maintained a journal during his time on campaign with Belisarius, 
which he later consulted when writing the Wars, see Averil Cameron (1985): 12-13, 136, 148, 236. 
480 Carl von Clausewitz (1832: 109-110) noted such deficiencies in the testimony of a military 
memoirist:  ‘We also admit that a good memory can be a great help; but are we then to think of 
memory as a separate gift of the mind, or does imagination, after all, imprint those pictures in the 
memory more clearly?  The question must be left unanswered, especially since it seems difficult even 
to conceive of these two forces as operating separately’.  See Fussell (1975); Harari (2008) for the 
problems associated with recollections of war in military memoirs of modern times.  Woodman (1988: 
15-23) employs such eyewitness accounts of war to highlight the difficulties facing Thucydides in his 
attempts to reconstruct military engagements.  For general studies on the problems associated with 
remembrance of an event, see Felman & Laub (1992); Schacter (1996); Eakin (2000). 
481 Harari (2009): 215.  The italics are Harari’s. 
482 This seems to be true of most reflective eyewitness works in medieval literature.  Studying 
eyewitness accounts of three sieges – Acre, Constantinople (1453), and Granada – Cyril Aslanov 
(2009) concludes that while each retain a nucleus of eyewitness testimony, it is often mingled with or 
even replaced by rhetorical or poetic amplification, and laden with classical allusions. 
483 The comments of Harari (2007a: 303) made in relation to medieval and Renaissance military 
memoirs, similar in that they too represent eyewitness accounts of war composed at a later stage, are 
insightful: ‘Since they are conscious retrospective attempts to shape the narrative of war, and since they 
suffer not only from the pitfalls of memory but also from the benefits of hindsight, they tend to be 
factually less reliable than diaries, letters, and administrative documents created in the midst of war’.  
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Faithful autoptic testimony was probably not required of Attaleiates.  Polybius, 
Attaleiates’ historical model,484 judged fellow chronicler Timaeus to be ill-equipped 
for the task of history writing because he lacked political and military experience:   
It is impossible for a man with no experience of warlike operations to write well 
about what happens in war…as nothing written by mere bookworms is blessed 
with experience or vividness, their works also are of no practical value.485 
Polybius suggests that a historian need not have seen every engagement that he wrote 
about, but required experience of warfare in order to write about military operations 
convincingly.486  Greek historiography may have ruled that if a writer had been 
involved in war at any time, his word was deemed more believable, more 
trustworthy.487  If so, Attaleiates gained leverage from having been on campaign, with 
readers perhaps more inclined to consider him a certified authority in military matters 
as a result.  The tenth-century encyclopaedic work, the Suda, describes Procopius ‘as 
Belisarius’ secretary and attendant during all the events, wars, and deeds he 
                                                 
484 Krallis (2006): 102-126. 
485 Ὅτι οὔτε περὶ τῶν κατὰ πόλεµον συµβαινόντων δυνατόν ἐστι γράψαι καλῶς τὸν µηδεµίαν 
ἐµπειρίαν ἔχοντα τῶν πολεµικῶν ἔργων οὔτε περὶ τῶν ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις τὸν µὴ πεπειραµένον τῶν 
τοιούτων πράξεων καὶ περιστάσεων.  λοιπὸν οὔτ᾽ ἐµπείρως ὑπὸ τῶν βυβλιακῶν οὔτ᾽ ἐµφαντικῶς 
οὐδενὸς γραφοµένου συµβαίνει τὴν πραγµατείαν ἄπρακτον γίνεσθαι τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσιν· εἰ γὰρ ἐκ τῆς 
ἱστορίας ἐξέλοι τις τὸ δυνάµενον ὠφελεῖν ἡµᾶς, τὸ λοιπὸν αὐτῆς ἄζηλον καὶ ἀνωφελὲς γίνεται 
παντελῶς (Polybius: XII.25g; trans. IV, 381, with amendments).  For discussion, see Walbank (1972): 
72-74. 
486 ‘It is difficult, perhaps, to have taken a personal role…in every kind of event, but it is necessary to 
have had experience of the most important and those of regular occurrence’ (Polybius: XII.25h.6; trans. 
IV, 383).  Lucian (§§29, 37) concurred with Polybius in this respect, asserting that the ideal historian 
should have experience as a soldier. 
487 Yuval Noah Harari (2004a: 32-33) observes this phenomenon also in relation to Renaissance 
military memoirs: ‘Manipulations of authority characterize most Renaissance memoirists for whom the 
eyewitnessing-truthfulness connection is important.  They very often emphasize their status as 
eyewitnesses of certain events to gain authority, which they then utilize to speak authoritatively on 
completely different matters’. 
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recorded’.488  It is generally acknowledged however that Procopius only accompanied 
Belisarius until 540;489 his continued status as an eyewitness must have been assumed 
on the basis of his previous experiences.490  A measure of first-hand experience thus 
helped convince audiences of the credence and expertise of the historian.  Even today, 
scholars are influenced by the very presence of Attaleiates on Romanos’ campaigns.  
Krallis asserts that ‘Attaleiates had witnessed Doukas’ treachery on the field of 
battle’,491 but nowhere does he claim to have personally seen the incident.  Though 
the distinction between participation and autopsy may be vague, the benefit of 
personal experience to the perceived authority of a historian is clear. 
                                                 
488 γέγονεν ἐπὶ τῶν χρόνων ᾿Ιουστινιανοῦ τοῦ βασιλέως, ὑπογραφεὺς χρηµατίσας βελισαρίου καὶ 
ἀκόλουθος κατὰ πάντας τοὺς συµβάντας πολέµους τε καὶ πράξεις τὰς ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ συγγραφείσας (Suda: 
Pi, 2479). 
489 Averil Cameron (1985): 13-15; 135-136, 193-198, 202-203; Rance (2005); Treadgold (2007): 184-
185, 215-216. 
490 It is possible that these observers were also influenced by Procopius’ opening statements, where he 
claims to have been ‘especially competent to write the history of these events…because it fell to his lot, 
when appointed advisor to the general Belisarius, to be an eyewitness of practically all the events to be 
described’ (Procopius, Wars: I.1.3; trans. 5). 
491 Krallis (2006): 77-78. 
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VI. Anna Komnene and the Alexiad 
Anna Komnene, born in 1083 to parents Alexios I Komnenos and Eirene Doukaina, is 
perhaps most notable in the political sphere for a failed attempt to install her husband, 
Nikephoros Bryennios, as emperor in place of sibling John II Komnenos in 1119.492  
It was probably upon the death of Bryennios in 1137 that Anna retired to the 
Kecharitomene monastery in Constantinople, and there she finished the project her 
husband had begun: a history of the reign of her father entitled the Alexiad.  As Anna 
appears to have been writing with awareness of the Second Crusade, it is probable she 
finished not long before her death c.1153/1154.493 
Anna has long intrigued modern scholars, and our understanding of her historical 
method and the purpose of the Alexiad has advanced considerably since Georgina 
Buckler’s seminal monograph of 1929.494  One prominent branch of study is 
concerned with Anna’s depiction of the First Crusade,495 and related to this are several 
articles which interpret Anna’s account of said enterprise as a response to Manuel 
Komnenos’ handling of the Second Crusade.496  Barbara Hill and Thalma Gouma-
Peterson have investigated Anna’s social status and gender issues in the Alexiad.497  
Peter Frankopan has analyzed the accuracy of the Alexiad and endeavoured to explain 
Anna’s presentation of particular individuals and events.498  Diether Reinsch has 
contributed studies on various aspects of the text, including its literary qualities.499  
Finally, there is James-Howard Johnston’s controversial thesis on the composition of 
                                                 
492 For these events see Hill (2000). 
493 For Anna’s death see Browning (1962b). 
494 Buckler (1929). 
495 France (1984); Shepard (1988); idem (1997); Frankopan (2002a); idem (2012). 
496 R. D. Thomas (1991); Magdalino (2000b); Stephenson (2003c). 
497 Hill (1996a); idem (1996b); Gouma-Peterson (1996); idem (2000); Smythe (2006). 
498 Frankopan (1996); idem (1998); idem (2004); idem (2005); idem (2006); idem (2007). 
499 Reinsch (1989); idem (1996); idem (1998). 
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the Alexiad, which inspired responses from Ruth Macrides and Jakov Ljubarskij 
contesting his arguments and making the case for Anna’s originality.500 
Our discussion of Anna draws upon this scholarship and contributes to the debate over 
her sources, which demand further clarification.  Anna is by far the most revealing of 
the Middle Byzantine historians in respect of sources employed, digressing into a 
broad discussion of her material in Book XIV of the Alexiad.  The purpose and 
substance of this extraordinary ‘method chapter’ have perhaps yet to be realized.  
Only by unravelling the layers of rhetoric may we attempt to determine the sources 
which were employed by Anna Komnene. 
Anna’s Discussion of her Sources 
We begin with what Anna herself says about her sources.  She explains that some of 
her material was ‘gathered in a number of ways from the emperor’s comrades-in-
arms, who transmitted to us information about the progress of the wars through 
certain carriers’.501  While E. R. A. Sewter and Peter Frankopan translate διά τινων 
πορθµέων as ‘beyond the straits’, I have favoured the interpretation of Ruth 
Macrides,502 which seems more accurate given the use of διά τινων.  Similar is the 
German translation of Diether Reinsch, who renders the phrase as ‘auch auf 
verschiedene Weise’.503  The difference is not hugely significant; Anna is 
                                                 
500 Howard-Johnston (1996); Macrides (2000); Ljubarskij (1998): 16-19; idem (2000b); Reinsch 
(2000). 
501 τὰ δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ξυστρατευσαµένων τῷ αὐτοκράτορι, ποικίλως περὶ τούτων µανθάνουσα καὶ διά 
τινων πορθµέων εἰς ἡµᾶς διαβιβαζόντων τὰ τοῖς πολέµοις ξυµβεβηκότα (Anna Komnene: XIV.7.5.43-
45; trans. 421, with amendments). 
502 Macrides (2000): 70. 
503 ‘Einen Teil der Fakten also kenne ich, wie gesagt, aus eigener Anschaung, anderes wieder habe ich 
von denjenigen erfahren, die den Autokrator auf seinen Feldzügen begleitet haben, wobei ich mich 
darüber auch auf verschiedene Weise durch Gewährsmänner informiert habe, welche uns die 
Kriegsereignisse übermittelten’ (Anna Komnene: German trans. 502). 
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undoubtedly referring to written material coming into her possession.  James Howard-
Johnston considered that Anna’s use of ποικίλως and διά τινων πορθµέων in this 
passage might be discreet references to the purported dossier of material compiled by 
her husband Nikephoros Bryennios, discussed below.504  The documents in question 
are likely to have derived from Alexios’ reign.  Anna earlier recounts the bravery of 
one Aspietes in battle ‘according to a report distributed at that time’, which appears to 
confirm that she was not consulting current material.505  Athanasios Kambylis thought 
the aforementioned passage about Anna’s sources to refer to ‘Boten, von kaiserlichen 
Offizieren vom Schlachtfeld nach Constantinople gesandt’.506  Frankopan writes of 
Anna drawing upon, and adding to, ‘campaign records’ for coverage of Alexios’ wars 
with the Normans.507  Howard-Johnston reached a similar conclusion: ‘Written 
materials, produced by commanders in the field or senior officials in Constantinople, 
with the aid of their subordinate staffs, were the most useful sources from which to 
form the military and diplomatic core of [Anna’s] history’.508   
Anna then appears to elaborate upon this written material as well as divulging other 
sources of information: 
My material...has been gathered from insignificant writings, absolutely devoid of 
literary pretension, and from old soldiers who were serving in the army at the 
time that my father seized the Roman sceptre, who fell on hard times and 
exchanged the turmoil of the outer world for the peaceful life of monks.  The 
writings that came into my possession were written in simple language without 
                                                 
504 Howard-Johnston (1996): 280 n.47. 
505 ὡς ἡ φήµη τὸ τηνικαῦτα ἐκήρυττε (Anna Komnene: XII.2.1.92-95). 
506 Kambylis (1975): 143. 
507 Frankopan (2006): 166-167. 
508 Howard-Johnston (1996): 290. 
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embellishment; they adhered closely to the truth, were distinguished by no 
elegance whatever and were composed in a manner lacking style and free from 
rhetorical flourish.  The accounts given by the old veterans were, in language and 
thought, similar to the writings, and I based the truth of my history on them, 
checking and comparing what I had written against what they had said, and what 
they told me with what I had often heard, from my father in particular and from 
my uncles both on my father’s and on my mother’s side.509 
The ‘writings’ (ξυγγραµµάτων), while similar to the accounts of retired veterans, 
clearly represent a distinct body of material.  Anna may be referring to the field 
dispatches alluded to in the preceding section, or perhaps memoirs, as suggested by 
Frankopan.510  That Anna had bulletins and dispatches in mind is supported by a 
reference to this sort of material within close proximity of this section.  Anna’s 
digression on her sources interrupts discussion of the exploits of Eustathios Kamytzes, 
charged by Alexios to deliver a bulletin to the people of Constantinople.  While it is 
not stated that Kamytzes read from a written document, Anna notes that Kamytzes 
‘gave an account of what had happened, as we have described it’,511 indicating that 
she may have consulted a record of his speech for her account of Alexios and 
                                                 
509 ἃ δὲ συνειλόχειν τῆς ἱστορίας, ἴστω Θεός, ἴστω ἡ ὑπερκόσµιος µήτηρ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐµὴ δεσπότις, ἀπό 
τινων συνελεξάµην ξυγγραµµάτων ἀχρείων καὶ ἀσπουδῶν παντάπασι καὶ γερόντων ἀνθρώπων 
στρατευσαµένων κατ’ ἐκεῖνο καιροῦ, καθ’ ὃν οὐµὸς πατὴρ τῶν σκήπτρων Ῥωµαίων ἐπείληπτο, 
χρησαµένων δὲ συµφοραῖς καὶ µετασχηµατισθέντων ἀπὸ τῆς κοσµικῆς τύρβης εἰς τὴν τῶν µοναχῶν 
γαληνιαίαν κατάστασιν. τὰ γὰρ εἰς χεῖρας ἐµὰς ἐµπεσόντα συγγράµµατα ἁπλᾶ µὲν ἦσαν τὴν φράσιν 
καὶ ἀπερίεργα καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας ἐχόµενα καὶ οὐδέν τι κοµψὸν ἐπιδεδειγµένα οὐδὲ ῥητορικὸν ὄγκον 
ἐπισυρόµενα, τὰ δὲ παρὰ τῶν γεραιτέρων ἐκδιηγούµενα τῆς αὐτῆς ἦσαν καὶ λέξεως καὶ διανοίας τῶν 
συγγραµµάτων ἐχόµενα· καὶ ἐτεκµηράµην ἐξ αὐτῶν τὴν τῆς ἱστορίας ἀλήθειαν, συµβάλλουσα καὶ 
παρεξετάζουσα τὰ παρ’ ἐµαυτῆς ἱστορούµενα πρὸς τὰ παρ’ ἐκείνων λεγόµενα καὶ τὰ παρ’ ἐκείνων 
πρὸς τὰ παρ’ ἐµαυτῆς, ἅπερ αὐτὴ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τὲ τοὐµοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τῶν πρὸς πατρὸς καὶ µητρὸς ἐµοὶ 
θείων ἠκηκόειν πολλάκις.  ἀφ’ ὧν ἁπάντων τὸ τῆς ἀληθείας ἅπαν σῶµα συνεξυφαίνεται (Anna 
Komnene: XIV.7.7.64-78; trans. 422 with alterations). 
510 Frankopan (1998): 13 n.31. 
511 ὁ µὲν γὰρ διηγήσατο τὰ συµπεπτωκότα, καθάπερ εἴποµεν (Anna Komnene: XIV.7.8.81-82; trans. 
422). 
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Kamytzes’ actions against the Turks.512  The comment about the ‘ξυγγραµµάτων’ 
adhering to the truth is puzzling, since we might ask how Anna would have otherwise 
learned of ‘the truth’ beyond her sources.  Anna says similar of the accounts of 
veterans, explaining how she checked them against what she had already written and 
heard about from other sources.  As Kambylis and Julian Chrysostomides have 
recognized, this is reminiscent of the working method of Thucydides, unwilling to 
accept his first source for an event, ‘the accuracy of each being checked by the most 
severe and detailed methods possible’.513  We should thus view such statements as 
rhetorical, a reflection of Anna’s general concerns vis-à-vis historical accuracy.  
The accounts of old veterans who entered the monastic sphere require clarification.  
Kambylis proposes that Bernard Leib’s French translation of the Alexiad – and by 
extension the English translations of Sewter and Frankopan – is incorrect to link 
‘ἀχρείων καὶ ἀσπουδῶν παντάπασι’ with ‘ξυγγραµµάτων’.  Kambylis instead 
connects the adjectives to the veterans, so that we are to understand them as 
‘insignificant and completely uneducated’.514  While this reading might be more 
accurate, it also creates problems: a cursory reading of the Alexiad shows that the 
individuals who provided Anna with information must have been relatives of her 
father and his leading generals – hardly ‘insignificant’ therefore, and likely to have 
been literate.  Anna may claim low status for her informants to lend credibility to her 
narrative, with the sense also that her simplistic written material ensured greater 
                                                 
512 Ibid: XIV.5-6. 
513 παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσον δυνατὸν ἀκριβείᾳ περὶ ἑκάστου ἐπεξελθών (Thucydides: I.22).  Kambylis 
(1975): esp. 144-145; Chrysostomides (1982: 33-34). 
514 Kambylis (1975): 144 n.5. 
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veracity.  Frankopan observes that the admission ‘does little to enhance their 
reliability’,515 though it may have proved more persuasive with contemporary readers. 
Kambylis’ interpretation of this passage is more consistent with Anna’s often 
misconstrued general message regarding her sources.  Howard-Johnston determined 
that the accounts of veterans to which Anna refers were in fact memoirs, with 
Frankopan similarly describing them as written ‘recollections and musings’.516  
Ferdinand Chalandon even suggested that the retired soldiers documented their 
experiences at Anna’s behest.517  There is no reason to think that the tendency of 
soldiers to author or commission (auto)biographical works was unusual and 
performed only at Anna’s insistence.518  More importantly, it may be doubted that 
Anna is referring to written testimony at all in this section.  Returning to our earlier 
point, it is improbable that soldiers without any education could have drafted 
memoirs.  Furthermore, Anna only asserts ‘I gathered [my information] from…’ (ἀπό 
τινων συνελεξάµην…) old soldiers who served under Alexios – one cannot 
automatically draw a link with ξυγγραµµάτων, which is obviously referring to a 
different source of information.  Indeed, in translating the text into German, Reinsch 
interpolated ‘[aus Erzählungen]’ before ‘von alten Soldaten’, confirming our inability 
to draw anything conclusive from Anna’s text.  Reinsch’s insistence that the two 
modes of information were separate results in an intriguing reading of another part of 
the same passage.  What Sewter and Frankopan render as ‘the accounts 
(τὰ…ἐκδιηγούµενα) given by the old veterans were, in language and thought, similar 
to the writings (τῶν συγγραµµάτων)’, Reinsch translates thus: ‘Die mündlichen 
                                                 
515 Frankopan (1998): 13. 
516 Howard-Johnston (1996): 275; Frankopan (1998): 13. 
517 Chalandon (1900): xii. 
518 See chapter four of this thesis. 
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Erzählungen der alten Soldaten waren in Sprache und Gedanken von derselben 
Qualität wie die schriftlichen Berichte’.519  Evidently, Reinsch considered 
‘τὰ…ἐκδιηγούµενα’ to refer explicitly to oral accounts.  Perhaps this is too great an 
assumption, but one must wonder why Anna says nothing of the testimony provided 
by veteran soldiers taking written form.  Mention of these accounts being similar in 
‘λέξεως καὶ διανοίας’ to the aforementioned writings does not necessarily identify 
them as written texts, for, as shall be discussed, the συγγραµµάτων were probably 
written in the vernacular.  The notion that Anna is describing oral accounts is lent 
further credence by her declaration that she compared her own history with what the 
veterans ‘had said’ (τὰ λεγόµενα).   
Autopsy, Eyewitnessing and Veracity 
Anna supports her claim to have spoken to survivors of Alexios’ reign by stressing at 
several junctures that there were many eyewitnesses to the events she describes.   Her 
portrait of Robert Guiscard concludes: ‘…as I have often heard many say’.520  The 
description of Guiscard’s siege of Dyrrachion in 1081 is interrupted by the statement 
‘according to the person who told me’, indicating an oral eyewitness informant.521  
Similar may be said for the rebel Rhapsomates, with Anna’s judgments based on 
‘what I heard about him’.522  At one point, Anna explains that ‘there are men still 
alive today who knew my father and tell me of his deeds’.  Their contribution to the 
substance of the Alexiad was ‘not inconsiderable’: ‘for one reported or recalled to the 
best of his ability one fact, while another told me something else – but there was no 
                                                 
519 Anna Komnene: German trans. 503. 
520 ὡς πολλῶν λεγόντων πολλάκις ἀκήκοα (Anna Komnene: I.10.4.50). 
521 ὡς ὁ ταῦτα διηγησάµενος ἔλεγεν (ibid: IV.5.1.78; trans. 117). 
522 ὡς ἔγωγε περὶ τούτου ἤκουον (ibid: IX.2.2.52-53).  For further discussion see Beaton (1986b). 
104 
discrepancy in their accounts’.523  The validity of this statement is suspect, not least 
since Anna admits to encountering contrasting evidence.524  Accounting for the 
Empress Maria’s continued presence in the palace after the abdication of her husband 
Nikephoros III Botaneiates, Anna opines:  
For my own part, I am in any case naturally averse to making things up or to 
inventing stories about history, although I know the custom is widespread, 
especially among the jealous and spiteful…I have heard many others speak of 
these things with differing accounts, as some interpreted the events of that time in 
one way, and others in another; each followed their own inclination, influenced by 
sympathy or hatred, and I saw that they did not all share the same opinion.525 
It is realistic to assume that Anna received conflicting accounts for other parts of the 
Alexiad also.  Her bold claim to the contrary is presumably an attempt to follow 
Thucydides and convince readers of the veracity of her content through a 
homogeneous narrative.   
References to eyewitnesses appear rather sporadically, and it is improbable that these 
represent the only such instances where Anna derived information from an 
eyewitness.  Anna’s frequent reminders that her account could be corroborated by 
                                                 
523 εἰσίν οἵτινες εἰς τὴν τήµερον περιόντες καὶ τὸν πατέρα τὸν ἐµὸν ἐγνωκότες καὶ τὰ κατ’ αὐτὸν 
ἀφηγούµενοι, ἀφ’ ὧν καὶ οὐκ ὀλίγα τῆς ἱστορίας ἐνταυθοῖ συνηράνιστο, ἄλλων ἄλλό τι διηγουµένων 
καὶ µεµνηµένων ὧν ἕκαστος ἔτυχε καὶ πάντων ὁµοφωνούντων (Anna Komnene: XIV.7.4.20-24; trans. 
420-421). 
524 So Anna offers two reports of how the monk Raiktor claimed to be the deposed emperor Michael 
VII Doukas, deeming one version of events to be more convincing than the other (ibid: I.12.6-11). 
525 ἐγὼ γὰρ καὶ ἄλλως φύσει τὸ λογοποιεῖν καὶ καινά τινα ἀναπλάττειν ἀποστρέφοµαι εἰδυῖα τοῦτο 
σύνηθες εἶναι τοῖς πολλοῖς, καὶ µᾶλλον ὁπηνίκα ὑπὸ φθόνου καὶ χαιρεκακίας ἁλίσκοιντο...καὶ πολλῶν 
µὲν καὶ ἄλλων περὶ τούτων λεγόντων ἀκήκοα καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους διαφεροµένων, τῶν µὲν οὕτως, τῶν 
δὲ οὕτως ἐκλαµβανοµένων τὰ τότε πραχθέντα, ἑκάστου πρὸς τὴν ἰδίαν τῆς ψυχῆς κατάστασιν καὶ ὡς 
πρὸς αὐτὴν εὐνοίας ἢ µίσους εἶχε, καὶ οὐ πάντας τῆς αὐτῆς ἑώρων γνώµης  (ibid: III.1.4.42-53; trans. 
80). 
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eyewitnesses can be attributed to a concern that some might doubt her credibility, 
most obviously because of the glowing portrayal of her father.  This fear is explicitly 
acknowledged in the opening to her work: ‘Someone might conclude that in 
composing the history of my father I am glorifying myself; the history, wherever I 
express admiration for any act of his, may seem wholly false and mere panegyric’.526  
Anna inevitably dispels these accusations, noting, in a passage taken straight from 
Polybius, her role as an impartial historian who is able to praise her enemies and 
censure kin where necessary.527  A crucial part of ensuring accuracy, Anna continues, 
was consulting ‘the evidence of the actual events and of eyewitnesses’.528  This 
establishes an immediate link between eyewitness testimony and veracity.  
Subsequent mentions of Anna being informed by individuals involved in the events 
related should be viewed in this context.   
Anna’s self-doubt about her portrayal of Alexios is evident throughout the Alexiad.529  
Edward Gibbon observed ‘the perpetual strain of panegyric and apology’ which leads 
us ‘to question the veracity of the author’.530  Having described her father’s heroic 
escape from the Battle of Dyrrachion, Anna recognizes a concern that the whole 
episode may seem too fantastic to some:  
Often, in my desire not to incur suspicion, in the composition of my history I 
hurry over affairs that concern [Alexios], neither exaggerating nor adding my 
                                                 
526 ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς ἐκείνου πράξεις προελοµένη συγγράφειν δέδοικα τὸ ὑφορµοῦν τὲ καὶ ὑποτρέχον, µή 
ποτε λογίσαιτό τις τὰ τοῦ ἐµοῦ πατρὸς συγγράφουσαν τὰ ἑαυτῆς ἐπαινεῖν, καὶ ψεῦδος ἅπαν δόξῃ τὸ 
τῆς ἱστορίας πρᾶγµα καὶ ἐγκώµιον ἄντικρυς, εἴ τι τῶν ἐκείνου θαυµάζοιµι (ibid: pr.2.2.28-32; trans. 4). 
527 Ibid: pr.2.3.37-42; Polybius: I.14.  For recognition of the link, see Chrysostomides (1982): 37-39, 
43-44 n.20. 
528 τῶν ἑωρακότων τὰ πράγµατα αὐτοὺς τὲ καὶ τὰ πράγµατα µαρτυραµένη (Anna Komnene: pr.2.3.44-
45; trans. 4). 
529 For another such instance not quoted here, see ibid: I.16.9.  Anna is similarly concerned about 
appearing to overstate the greatness of her grandmother, Anna Dalassene – see ibid: III.8. 
530 Gibbon (1776-1788): III, 69. 
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personal observations.  I wish I were detached and free from this feeling that I 
have for him, so that seizing on this vast material I might demonstrate how much 
my tongue, when released from all restraint, could delight in noble deeds.  But the 
natural love I have for him overshadows my personal wishes: I would not like the 
public to imagine that I am inventing marvels in my eagerness to speak about my 
own family.531 
These concerns over acceptance are repeated near the close of the work:532 ‘I chose to 
write the truth about a good man, and if that man happens to be the historian’s father, 
then let his name be included…If this [work] proves that I love my father as well as 
truth, I do not fear criticism that I have suppressed the facts’.533  Anna earlier 
concluded her account of Alexios’ actions against heretics upon a similarly defensive 
note: ‘Let no one find fault with the history, as though it were corrupt.  There are 
plenty of people living today who are witnesses to what I have described, and I could 
not be accused of lying’.534  Again Anna stresses the link between truth and 
                                                 
531 µὴδὲ γὰρ βουλοµένη τὴν ἱστορίαν ὕποπτον θεῖναι πολλάκις παρατρέχω τὰ τοῦ πατρὸς µήτε 
αὐξάνουσα µήτε πάθος περιτιθεῖσα. εἴθε γὰρ ἐλευθέρα ἦν τοῦ πάθους τούτου τοῦ πατρικοῦ καὶ 
ἀπόλυτος, ἵνα καθάπερ ὕλης ἀµφιλαφοῦς δραξαµένη τὴν σοβάδα γλῶσσαν ἐνεδειξάµην, ὁπόσην ἔχοι 
περὶ τὰ καλὰ τὴν οἰκείωσιν. ἐπηλυγάζει δέ µου τὸ πρόθυµον ἡ φυσικὴ στοργή, µή πως δόξαιµι τοῖς 
πολλοῖς ὑπὸ προθυµίας τοῦ λέγειν περὶ τῶν κατ’ ἐµαυτὴν τερατολογίας παρέχειν ὑπόληψιν.  καὶ γὰρ ἂν 
πολλαχοῦ τῶν κατορθωµάτων τῶν πατρικῶν µεµνηµένη καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτὴν ἀπεστάλαξα 
ξυγγράφουσα τὲ καὶ διηγουµένη, ἐν ὁπόσοις κακοῖς περιπέπτωκε, καὶ οὐδ’ ἄνευ µονῳδίας καὶ θρήνου 
τὸν τόπον παρῆλθον (Anna Komnene: IV.8.1.74-84; trans. 125-126). 
532 Also, in Book XII (ibid: XII.3.4.9-10; trans. 338), Anna states: ‘Let no one suspect that I lie about 
the emperor - for I am speaking the truth’ (µὴδ’ ὡς καταψευδοµένην τοῦ αὐτοκράτορος ὑφοράσθω· τὰ 
γὰρ ἀληθῆ λέγω). 
533 ἐγὼ µὲν γὰρ τἀληθῆ προειλόµην ξυγγράφειν καὶ περὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ· εἰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν ξυµβέβηκεν 
εἶναι καὶ πατέρα τοῦ ξυγγραφέως, τὸ µὲν τοῦ πατρὸς ὄνοµα προσερρίφθω ἐνταῦθα καὶ κείσθω ἐκ τοῦ 
παρέλκοντος...εἴ δ’, ὅπερ εἶπον, καὶ φιλοπάτορας ἡµᾶς συναποδείκνυσιν ὁ καιρὸς οὗτος, οὐ παρὰ 
τοῦτο τὰ τῆς ἀληθείας ἐπηλυγάσαι τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων µεµψίµοιρον (ibid: XV.3.4.40-56; trans. 438, 
with amendments). 
534 καὶ µή τις ἐπιµεµφέσθω τὴν ἱστορίαν ὡς δῆθεν δωροδοκοῦσαν τὴν συγγραφήν· τῶν γὰρ νῦν ὄντων 
µάρτυρες εἰσὶ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀφηγουµένων, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ψευδηγορίας ἁλοίηµεν (ibid: XIV.9.5.10-12; trans. 
429). 
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eyewitnessing.  Such statements are designed to convince the reader of the veracity of 
the account, rather than provide an earnest reflection of Anna’s sources. 
So obsessed is Anna with the primacy of autopsy that she offers the following to 
reassure her audience: ‘Most of the time, we were ourselves present, for we 
accompanied our father and mother’.535  Since Anna was born in 1083, it is unlikely 
that her father dragged her along on expeditions prior to 1099, during which time he 
was most active as a soldier.536  Family members are said to have joined Alexios 
during his campaign against Bolkan of Dalmatia in 1094; however, only the Empress 
Eirene is mentioned.537  This is true also of Alexios’ expedition to the Balkans in 
1105, with Anna praising her mother for accompanying Alexios.538  When news of 
Bohemond’s invasion reached Constantinople in 1107, Alexios set off, seemingly 
taking only Eirene with him.539  The only evidence for Anna venturing outside the 
capital alongside her father is her comment on the great structures of Philippopolis, in 
the context of Alexios’ campaign of 1114 against the Cumans: ‘I myself saw traces of 
them when I stayed there with the emperor for some reason or other’.540  The fact that 
Anna is rather cryptic as to when and why she visited the town instills doubt as to 
whether we should link the occasion with this particular campaign, though 
intriguingly the historian John Zonaras mentions that Eirene and the women of the 
                                                 
535 τὰ µὲν γὰρ πλείω καὶ ἡµεῖς συνῆµεν τῷ πατρὶ καὶ τῇ µητρὶ συνειπόµεθα· οὐ γὰρ ἦν τὸ ἡµέτερον 
τοιοῦτον οἷον οἰκουρικὸν καὶ ὑπὸ σκιὰν καὶ τρυφὴν στρεφόµενον (ibid: XIV.7.4.24-26; trans. 421). 
536 That said, the young daughters of Manuel Komnenos joined their father on campaign for short 
periods of time - see Anderson & Jeffreys (1994): 187-188. 
537 Anna Komnene: IX.5.1-3. 
538 Ibid: XII.3. 
539 Ibid: XIII.1.4-7.  Eirene’s presence on these campaigns was quite extraordinary – see Hill (1997): 
91-92.   
540 ὧν ἴχνη κατέλαβον καὶ αὐτὴ µετὰ τοῦ αὐτοκράτορος ἐπιδεδηµηκυῖα <εἰς> τὴν πόλιν κατὰ χρείαν 
τινά (Anna Komnene: XIV.8.2.37-39; trans. 424). 
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court accompanied Alexios to Thrace in 1113, and stayed by his side until he 
progressed to Philippopolis the following spring.541   
Even if the women in Alexios’ life did join him on campaign, the likelihood of them 
witnessing military actions is remote.  Alexios only permitted the pregnant Eirene to 
join him in 1105 ‘because there was as yet no danger and the moment for battle had 
not arrived’.542  In the spring of 1108, Eirene was sent back to Constantinople as 
Alexios marched to the western Balkans to meet Bohemond.543  In 1113, Eirene 
returned to Constantinople once Alexios set out to relieve Nicaea.544  Upon word of 
the imminent arrival of Turkish forces near the emperor’s camp in 1116, Alexios 
quickly sent Eirene back to Constantinople.545  Once he reached Nikomedia, Alexios 
sent for the empress once more, but only ‘until he heard of barbarian incursions and 
decided to leave’.546  Anna’s field of direct vision would thus have been limited to 
Constantinople.  Her most notable appearances in the text - during accounts of the 
pending execution of Michael Anemas and the death of Alexios - occur within this 
space.547  And though she would have been present when the First Crusade passed 
through the city, there are serious questions as to what a girl of fourteen years might 
have seen, and, furthermore, what she would have recalled of the incident some fifty 
                                                 
541 Zonaras: III, 18.26.9-10. 
542 τὸ δέ τι καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀκινδύνῳ τῶν πραγµάτων ἔτι καθεστηκότων καὶ µήπω καιροῦ πολέµων 
ἐπιδεδηµηκότος (Anna Komnene: XII.3.9.65-67; trans. 340). 
543 Ibid: XIII.4.1. 
544 Ibid: XIV.5.2. 
545 Ibid: XV.2.1-2. 
546 µέχρις ἂν τὰς τῶν βαρβάρων ἐφόδους ἐνωτισθεὶς ἐκεῖθεν ἀπᾶραι βουληθείη (ibid: XV.3.1.90-91; 
trans. 436). 
547 See James Howard-Johnston (1996): 264-269: ‘There is nothing to indicate that [Anna] ventured 
much, if at all, outside the natural settings of her life, the Komnenian family and its affinity, the court 
and Constantinople, during Alexios’ lifetime, when she was a free agent.  It may therefore be inferred 
that her first-hand knowledge of the events of the period was largely, if not entirely, confined to those 
that occurred within these metropolitan milieu’ (quote at 264-265). 
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years later.  Therefore, while Anna bills herself as an important eyewitness to lend 
greater credence to her narrative, the reality was very different.548 
Anna’s Alleged Conversations with Veteran Soldiers: Some Problems 
Anna’s claim to have derived much of her information from oral correspondence with 
veteran soldiers of Alexios’ reign is undermined by practical considerations.  The 
conditions of her apparent exile after an abortive coup against her brother John II 
Komnenos549 would seem to contravene any notion that she conversed with such 
individuals:  
Not even the least important people are allowed to visit us, neither those from 
whom we could have learnt news they had heard from others, nor my father’s 
most intimate friends.  For thirty years now, I swear it by the souls of the most 
blessed emperors, I have not seen, I have not spoken to a friend of my father; 
many of them of course have passed away, but many too are prevented by fear 
because of the change in our fortunes.  For the powers-that-be have condemned us 
to this ridiculous position so that we might not be visible, and also so as to be a 
pitiful spectacle for the masses.550 
The question that arises from this lamentation is how Anna could have conducted 
interviews with those who participated in Alexios’ wars.  We might speculate that 
                                                 
548 Frankopan (2002a: 64) comments that Anna’s claim to have been an eyewitness ‘can only apply to a 
handful of the episodes which appear in the text’. 
549 For these events, see Hill (2000). 
550 καὶ οὐδὲ τοῖς ἀφανεστέροις ἐξέσται τῶν ἀνθρώπων παρ’ ἡµᾶς φοιτᾶν, µὴ ὅτι γε δι’ ὧν µανθάνειν 
εἴχοµεν, ἅπερ παρ’ ἄλλων διακηκοότες ἐτύγχανον, καὶ τοῖς τοῦ πατρὸς οἰκειοτάτοις.  εἰς τριακοστὸν 
γὰρ τοῦτο ἔτος, µὰ τὰς τῶν µακαριωτάτων αὐτοκρατόρων ψυχάς, οὐκ ἐθεασάµην, οὐκ εἶδον, οὐχ’ 
ὡµιλήκειν ἀνθρώπῳ πατρῴῳ, τοῦτο µὲν τῶν πολλῶν ἀπερρυηκότων, τοῦτο δὲ τῶν πολλῶν 
ἀπειργοµένων τῷ φόβῳ. καὶ τούτοις γὰρ ἡµᾶς κατεδίκασαν οἱ κρατοῦντες τοῖς ἀτοπήµασι µὴδὲ 
θεατοὺς εἶναι, ἀλλ’ ἐστυγηµένους τοῖς πλείοσιν (Anna Komnene: XIV.7.6.56-64; trans. 422). 
110 
monks were excluded from this purported ban, with Buckler otherwise finding Anna’s 
alleged capacity to communicate with former soldiers ‘not easy to explain’.551  Yet the 
truth is perhaps more straightforward.  One suspects that Anna, wallowing in self-
pity,552 exaggerates the conditions of her ‘exile’ at the Kecharitomene monastery, 
which does not appear to have been as restrictive as she maintains.553  It is probable 
therefore that she had greater freedom to meet survivors of her father’s reign than she 
would have the reader believe. 
There is another significant obstacle to accepting Anna’s claims to have derived 
information from the oral testimony of eyewitnesses.  It is generally thought that 
Anna began working on her history c.1143,554 as she notes that she collected the bulk 
of her evidence during the reign of Manuel.555  By this time, however, most of the 
men who served Alexios, and feature prominently in the Alexiad, had died.556  Anna 
claims that she heard much from her uncles on both sides.557  Yet we know that 
George Palaiologos, Nikephoros Melissenos, and John and Michael Doukas had died 
                                                 
551 Buckler (1929): 43. 
552 See, for example, Anna Komnene: VI.8.2.  For discussion of this aspect of the Alexiad, see Buckler 
(1929): 35-46; Maltese (1987); Quandahl & Jarratt (2008). 
553 Numerous sources attest to Anna’s interactions with the outside world during her apparent period of 
exile.  An encomium Michael Italikos was commissioned to write for Anna’s mother Eirene, probably 
c.1128, notes the presence of Anna among his audience (Michael Italikos: 151.12-13); Italikos later 
wrote a prologue to Anna’s will, in c.1135, confirming close relations (ibid: 106.1-109.14). George 
Tornikios’ epitaph for Anna describes how she gathered a number of scholars to her circle, discussing 
philosophy and commissioning commentaries on Aristotle.  Mention of the death of Anna’s mother 
places this development some years after John II’s accession (George Tornikios: 283.9-301.19).  In 
c.1139, Theodore Prodromos wrote to Anna bemoaning his financial plight (Theodore Prodromos: 
XXXVIII).  For Anna’s surroundings at the Kecharitomene monastery, see Gautier (1985): esp. 136-
139. 
554 Frankopan (1998): 12.  Anna is thought to have died in 1153 – see Browning (1962b): 4. 
555 ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ τὰ πολλὰ τούτων συνελεξάµην, καὶ κράτιστα ἐπὶ τοῦ µετὰ τὸν ἐµὸν πατέρα τρίτου τὰ τῆς 
βασιλείας σκῆπτρα διέποντος (Anna Komnene: XIV.7.5.47-49).  The view that Manuel may have 
relaxed the restraints placed upon Anna was put forward also by Chalandon (1900): x-xi; France 
(1984): 20.  For Anna writing during the reign of Manuel, see Magdalino (2000b): esp. 15. 
556 This concern is likewise raised by Frankopan (1998): 75. 
557 …καὶ τὰ παρ’ ἐκείνων πρὸς τὰ παρ’ ἐµαυτῆς, ἅπερ αὐτὴ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τὲ τοὐµοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τῶν πρὸς 
πατρὸς καὶ µητρὸς ἐµοὶ θείων ἠκηκόειν πολλάκις (Anna Komnene: XIV.7.7.76-78). 
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by 1136, probably earlier.558  Alexios’ brothers Isaac and Adrian Komnenos passed 
much sooner, prior to 1105.559  Only Alexios’ youngest brother, Nikephoros, may 
have still been alive after 1136, though very little is known of his career, and the very 
fact that he is mentioned only once suggests Anna did not rely on him for 
information.560  These observations may be applied to other figures who feature 
prominently in the Alexiad.  Nikephoros Katakalon Euphorbenos, Anna’s brother-in-
law and close associate of Nikephoros Bryennios, died within a few years of Alexios 
Komnenos.561  Eustathios Kamytzes is another who appears among the deceased in 
the typikon of the monastery of Christ Pantokrator, drafted in late 1136.562  We may 
conjecture that very few of Alexios’ key subordinates would have survived the reign 
of John II Komnenos.  Anna admits as much in her proomion, where she relates that 
the ‘fathers and grandfathers of some men alive today saw these things’.563  This 
would be a peculiar thing to say had the ‘fathers and grandfathers’ been around when 
                                                 
558 The typikon of the Pantokrator monastery, issued in October 1136, lists these men among the dead 
for whom prayers ought to be said (Typikon of the Emperor John II Komnenos for the Monastery of 
Christ Pantokrator in Constantinople: ll.230, 233-235; Gautier 1969: 253-254).  Polemis (1968: 66-70) 
puts the date of John Doukas’ death at any time between 1110 and 1136, such is the paucity of 
evidence.  Nikephoros Melissenos passed in November 1104 (Papachryssanthou 1963: 252).  
Intriguingly, both Michael and John Doukas died as monks, the latter having taken the name Antonios 
when he entered the Theotokos Evergetis monastery c.1110 (Kouroupou & Vannier 2005: 13 & 14; 
with discussion at 53-54, where Michael Doukas’ death is dated c.1110-1115; Typikon of Timothy for 
the Monastery of the Mother of God Evergetis: ll.1346-1347; Gautier 1982: 10-11).  For the sake of 
completion we should mention Michael Taronites, who married Alexios’ sister Maria in 1061 
(Bryennios: 85.18-20).  This in any case would suggest a date of death not too long into the twelfth 
century, though his exile for his role in the revolt of Nikephoros Diogenes against Alexios in 1094 
confirms that he would not have been close to Anna (Anna Komnene: IX.8.4). 
559 Papachryssanthou (1963); Typikon of the Emperor John II Komnenos for the Monastery of Christ 
Pantokrator in Constantinople: ll.220, 227; Gautier (1969): 249, 253; also Kouroupou & Vannier 
(2005): 55-56, 61-62.  The pair also became monks towards the end of their lives, with both taking the 
monastic name John. 
560 Kouroupou & Vannier (2005): 65-66.  
561 Theodore Prodromos: II.18-19; Typikon of the Emperor John II Komnenos for the Monastery of 
Christ Pantokrator in Constantinople: l.226; Gautier (1969): 252-253. 
562 Typikon of the Emperor John II Komnenos for the Monastery of Christ Pantokrator in 
Constantinople: l.249; Gautier (1969): 256-257. 
563 ἐνίων γὰρ τῶν νῦν ὄντων ἀνθρώπων οἱ µὲν πατέρες, οἱ δὲ πάπποι ἐγένοντο οἱ τούτων συνίστορες 
(Anna Komnene: pr.2.3.45-46). 
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Anna was writing.  A similar state of affairs is presented in the aforementioned 
passage where Anna laments her inability to converse with the friends of her father, 
conceding that ‘many of them have passed away’.  Admittedly she also affirms that 
others were still alive, but we should give serious consideration as to the capacity in 
which they served under Alexios as well as the strength of their memories in old age. 
On account of the number of deceased and Anna’s apparent exile, Buckler concluded 
that Anna collected all her first-hand testimony before her father’s death, almost three 
decades before she began work on the Alexiad.564  Kambylis similarly suggested that 
Anna may have immediately transcribed conversations between her father and George 
Palaiologos.565  Yet there is nothing to suggest that Anna contemplated a historical 
work prior to the death of Nikephoros Bryennios in c.1138.566  Anna cites 
Nikephoros’ inability to complete a chronicle of her father’s life as her reason for 
undertaking the project.567  If one is unconvinced by this motive, the cluster of studies 
which identify parts of the Alexiad as a response to Manuel’s handling of the Second 
Crusade and indeed her nephew’s reign in general firmly place the genesis of the 
work long after Alexios’ death.568  Anna herself explains that Alexios would condemn 
her mother’s requests for historians to write of his struggles, a stance which 
presumably dissuaded his daughter from conceiving such a project within his own 
                                                 
564 Buckler (1929): 232. 
565 Kambylis (1975): 143. 
566 Chrysostomides (1982): 33. 
567 Anna Komnene: pr.3. 
568 R. D. Thomas (1991); Magdalino (2000b); Stephenson (2003c). 
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lifetime.569  Consequently, Buckler’s argument appears unsound, and her conclusion 
that Anna’s sources were ‘almost exclusively oral’ unmerited.570 
Alexios Komnenos as a Source for the Alexiad 
I see no reason for Frankopan to doubt Anna’s claim to have recalled stories she had 
heard in the company of her family:571 ‘Above all I have often heard the emperor 
[Alexios] and George Palaiologos discussing these matters in my presence’.572  Anna 
reveals that the story of Alexios’ return journey with captive Nikephoros Bryennios 
the Elder was one she had ‘heard…many times’.573  In relating the Battle of Dristra,574 
Anna digresses after describing a blow Nikephoros Diogenes dealt a pursuing 
Pecheneg: 
In later years we have heard Alexios tell that story; never, he said, had he seen 
such agility and speed of hand.  “If I had not been holding the standard that day”, 
he went on, “I would have killed more Scythians than I have hairs on my head” – 
and he was not bragging…when the conversation and the subject of discussion 
compelled it, he would sometimes tell of his adventures to us, his relatives, in our 
own circle, especially if we put much pressure on him to do so.575 
                                                 
569 Anna Komnene: XV.11.1. 
570 Buckler (1929): 231.  The same may be said for John France’s suggestion (1994: 110-111) that for 
much of the work, Anna ‘probably relied on the recollections of elderly people’. 
571 Frankopan (1998): 14. 
572 µάλιστα δὲ καὶ αὐτοπροσώπως περὶ τούτων διηγουµένων πολλάκις ἤκουον τοῦ τε αὐτοκράτορος 
καὶ Γεωργίου τοῦ Παλαιολόγου (Anna Komnene: XIV.7.5.45-47; trans. 421).  
573 ταῦτα ἐγὼ ἐκείνου διηγουµένου πολλάκις ἤκουον (ibid: I.6.9.85-86). 
574 For discussion of the battle see Chalandon (1900): 114-117. 
575 καὶ ὡς τοῦ βασιλέως ἐν ὑστέροις χρόνοις διηγουµένου ἠκούοµεν, οὐδέποτε τάχος τοιοῦτον ἢ 
περιδεξιότητα ἀνδρὸς ἐθεάσατο, καὶ ὡς, “εἰ µή”, φησίν, “ἐγὼ τὴν σηµαίαν κατεῖχον κατ’ ἐκείνην τὴν 
ἡµέραν, ὑπὲρ τὰς ἰδίας τρίχας πλήξας ἂν Σκύθας ἀνεῖλον”, οὐ περιαυτολογῶν.  τίς γὰρ τοσοῦτον εἰς 
ἔσχατον ταπεινότητος ἤλασεν; ἀλλὰ γὰρ ὁ λόγος καὶ τῶν πραγµάτων ἡ φύσις αὐτὸν ἠνάγκαζε καὶ τὰ 
κατ’ αὐτὸν πρὸς ἡµᾶς κυκλόθεν τοὺς οἰκείους αὐτῷ ἐνίοτε ἐκλαλεῖν καὶ ταῦτα παρ’ ἡµῶν πολλὰ 
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Frankopan has ‘serious reservations’ against accepting such conversations as a source.  
While I would concur with his concerns over the accuracy of their recollections, it is 
to be expected that Alexios and his colleagues exaggerated and embellished their 
feats.  With regard to Anna’s account of the Battle of Kalavrye, where the young 
Alexios defeated the army of the rebel Nikephoros Bryennios the Elder, Charles 
Oman remarked: ‘No doubt she accurately put down her father’s account of his 
doings, and we are really reading Alexios’ version of his fight’.576  This observation 
could be extended to all of Anna’s records of her father’s battles.  Frankopan’s qualms 
as to how often, and indeed why, Alexios and George Palaiologos would reminisce 
about old battles are unnecessary.  According to Michael Psellos, the Emperor Isaac I 
Komnenos would entertain the court ‘with stories of the old times, recalling all the 
witty sayings of…Basil (II) the Great’.577  The popularity of the anecdotal tradition at 
this time is evident in the works of Kekaumenos and Nikephoros Bryennios.578  
Evidently, there was a culture of relating war-themed anecdotes in Middle 
Byzantium.579  
It is telling that Anna rarely cites her father as a source for specific episodes, and in 
the aforementioned instance where she does, she stresses that Alexios’ heroics could 
be corroborated.  Having related how her father slew a pursuing Pecheneg, Anna 
notes: ‘Nor was he the only one to be killed by the emperor; according to the 
                                                                                                                                            
βιαζόµενον· πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἔξωθεν οὐδεὶς τῶν ἁπάντων ἤκουσεν ὑπέρκοµπόν τι τὸν αὐτοκράτορα 
διηγούµενον (Anna Komnene: VII.3.11.37-45; trans. 145-146). 
576 Oman (1924): I, 226 n.1.  For the battle see Tobias (1979). 
577 κατεῖχέ τε ἡµᾶς ἄχρις ἑσπέρας, ἀρχαῖά τε διηγούµενος καὶ ὁπόσα ὁ βασιλεὺς ἐκεῖνος Βασίλειος ὁ 
τοῦ Ῥωµανοῦ παῖς ἐπικαίρως ἐφθέγξατο (Psellos, Chronographia: ΙΙ, 130 [LXXVI]; trans. 323).  Upon 
his death, Isaac’s father Manuel entrusted his sons to the care of Basil, so it is highly likely that Isaac 
heard these stories from the man himself during his formative years (Bryennios: 75.9-13). 
578 See Howard-Johnston (1996): 282-288 for Bryennios; Roueché (2002) for Kekaumenos; idem 
(1988) for the tenth-century development of stories and storytellers in Byzantium.  The anecdotal 
tradition is also discussed below, 306-315. 
579 Relevant is the discussion of McGeer (1995a): 191-194. 
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testimony of those present, others met the same fate’.580  After she describes Alexios’ 
expedition to Dalmatia to establish solid defensive measures, Anna insists that the 
operation was more demanding than her brief report suggests: ‘My account might 
sound as if these measures were simple, but many eyewitnesses, still alive today, bear 
evidence to the strain caused by that tour on the emperor’.581  By citing the testimony 
of participants as her source, rather than Alexios himself, Anna elicits greater 
admiration for her father’s labours.582  Therefore, while Anna asserts that her father 
was an important source of information, she is reluctant to attribute specific 
information to him, lest readers doubt the accuracy and impartiality of the testimony.  
This correlates with Anna’s declaration that she collected much of her evidence 
during the reign of Manuel, ‘at a time when all the flattery and lies about his 
grandfather had disappeared…no one makes the slightest attempt to over-praise the 
departed, telling the facts just as they are and describing things just as they 
happened’.583  The reader is thus assured that Anna’s sources possessed no particular 
allegiance towards Alexios.   
Though it is implausible to attribute all of Anna’s comprehensive information about 
Alexios and his campaigns to his oral testimony,584 her claim to have listened 
                                                 
580 οὐκ αὐτὸν δὲ µόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλους, ὡς οἱ τότε συµπαρόντες διενίσταντο, ἀνεῖλεν (Anna 
Komnene: VII.3.11.32-33; trans. 195, with amendments). 
581 ἀλλ’ ὁ µὲν λόγος ῥᾳδίαν ἴσως τὴν τοιαύτην οἰκονοµίαν τοῖς ἀκροαταῖς παρίστησιν· ὁπόσον δὲ τὸν 
ἱδρῶτα ὁ αὐτοκράτωρ τῷ τότε ὑπέστη, µαρτυροῦσι πολλοὶ τῶν τότε παρόντων καὶ εἰσέτι καὶ νῦν 
περιόντων (ibid: IX.1.2.15-18; trans. 237). 
582 This mode of seeking believability through witnesses other than the chief protagonist is exhibited 
also with George Palaiologos.  Whilst narrating Alexios’ rapid campaign against the Pechenegs in 
1091, Anna explains that she ‘learned’ (µανθάνω) about George Palaiologos’ angry reaction at not 
having been involved, a response which ‘eyewitnesses’ – and not Palaiologos – ‘related to us’ (οἱ γὰρ 
συµπαρόντες ἡµῖν διηγοῦντο) (ibid: VIII.2.5; trans. 218). 
583 ὅτε καὶ πᾶσα κολακεία καὶ ψεῦδος τῷ πάππῳ αὐτῷ συναπέρρευσε, πάντων τὸν ἐφιστάµενον µὲν 
θρόνον κολακευόντων, πρὸς δὲ τὸν ἀπερρυηκότα µηδέν τι µὲν θωπείας ἐνδεικνυµένων, γυµνὰ δὲ τὰ 
πράγµατα διηγουµένων καὶ αὐτὰ λεγόντων ὥσπερ ἐσχήκασιν (ibid: XIV.7.5.49-52; trans. 421). 
584 It is unlikely that there existed polished narratives of Alexios’ campaigns for Anna to consult.  Had 
Alexios’ achievements been richly documented, there would have been little need for Anna to compose 
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attentively to the recollections of her father and George Palaiologos is perhaps the 
most convincing of all those concerning unwritten correspondence.  How these 
accounts were rendered by the time Anna came to draft the Alexiad is another matter 
entirely, with inaccuracies inevitable when working from recollection.  Whilst relating 
the trouble caused by philosopher John Italos, for example, Anna laments that she 
might have named his followers, ‘if time had not dimmed my memory’.585 
Anna’s Use of Written Sources 
Thus far we have proposed that Anna probably recalled stories of her father and 
George Palaiologos, but could not have collected extensive material by conducting 
personal interviews with survivors of Alexios’ reign.  Consequently, we must 
conclude that Anna made considerable use of written material, more than she would 
have the reader believe.  Certainly, she was familiar with Psellos’ Chronographia,586 
and on several occasions she references the Hyle Historias of Nikephoros 
Bryennios.587  The ‘ξυγγραµµάτων’ mentioned by Anna have already been discussed, 
and may refer to dispatches and/or memoirs.  Chalandon suggests that correspondence 
between Alexios and his subordinates, such as the letter Leo Kephalas sent to Alexios 
                                                                                                                                            
the Alexiad.  Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that Anna did not possess a full account of her 
father’s life and deeds.  Anna says the following of the decision to blind the rebels Nikephoros 
Diogenes and Katakalon Kekaumenos after their revolt, for which they had been pardoned by the 
emperor: ‘These events have been the subject of controversy ever since.  Whether the emperor was 
informed of the plan by them and then gave his consent, or was himself the author of the whole idea, 
God alone knows.  For my part, I have been unable so far to discover anything for certain’ (ibid: 
IX.9.6; trans. 257).  Anna is to be commended for linking Alexios at all with the blinding 
(Chrysostomides 1982: 38), but there is an obvious sense of convenience in that she is apparently ill-
informed on a matter which would paint her father in an unfavourable light.  It may be speculated that 
she knew more about these events than she would have us believe.  
585 εἰ µὴ ὁ χρόνος µε τὴν µνήµην ἀφείλετο (Anna Komnene: V.9.4; trans. 151, with amendments).  Of 
course, memory failure in this particular instance may be a device to avoid naming particular 
individuals, but it remains a legitimate concern of an elderly author. 
586 Linnér (1983). 
587 Anna Komnene: pr.3, I.1.3, I.4.2. 
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whilst besieged at Larissa,588 may also have been among this material.589  The Alexiad 
certainly appears to contain a number of complete documents, including two 
chrysobulls, a letter Alexios sent to Henry IV of Germany, and the treaty of Devol 
agreed with Bohemond in 1108.590  Frankopan has questioned how Anna could have 
gained direct access to written material given her apparent exile,591 though the 
inclusion of these documents surely confirms that her ‘seclusion’ is greatly 
exaggerated.592  On the basis of Anna’s claim to have collected evidence during the 
reign of Manuel, both Chalandon and John France have argued that any restrictions 
placed upon Anna were relaxed following the death of John II, enabling her to scour 
the archives and access texts and documents.593   
Anna is surprisingly well-informed on events in Italy as well as the movements of the 
Norman army prior to Guiscard’s Dyrrachion campaign of 1080-1081, as Graham 
Loud has shown.594  Ostensibly, this can be explained by Anna ascribing the account 
to an envoy of the bishop of Bari, said to have accompanied the expedition.595  Anna 
asserts that this correspondence was verbal in form (ὡς ἔλεγε), though we should be 
wary of such statements in the Alexiad.596  Roger Wilmans proposed that the 
individual from Bari supplied Anna with a written account, one which also formed the 
                                                 
588 Ibid: V.5.3-4. 
589 Chalandon (1900): xii-xiv. 
590 Anna Komnene: III.4.4-8 (chrysobull for Anna Dalassene); III.10.3-8 (letter to Henry IV of 
Germany); VI.5.10 (chrysobull for the Venetians); XIII.12 (Treaty of Devol).  For further discussion, 
see Chalandon (1900): xii-xiv; Buckler (1929): 234-239; Howard-Johnston (1996): 278-279; 
Frankopan (1998): 14, 72-73.  
591 Frankopan (1998): 13 n.31; idem (2002a): 73 n.29. 
592 Anna’s inclusion of these texts may be linked with the concern of biographers such as Eusebius to 
employ official documents in order to gain credibility.  See Cox (1983): 60-63.  
593 Chalandon (1900): x-xi, xii-xiii; France (1984): 20.  
594 Loud (1991).  
595 συνῆν δὲ αὐτῷ καὶ ὁ ταῦτα µοι διηγούµενος Λατῖνος, ὡς ἔλεγε, πρέσβις τοῦ ἐπισκόπου Βάρεως 
πρὸς τὸν Ῥοµπέρτον ἀποσταλείς, καί, ὡς διεβεβαιοῦτο, σὺν τῷ Ῥοµπέρτῳ <περὶ> τὴν τοιαύτην 
διέτριβε πεδιάδα (Anna Komnene: III.12.8.80-83). 
596 Frankopan (1998): 73 n.99. 
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basis of the Gesta Roberti Wiscardi of contemporary Norman historian William of 
Apulia.597  Chalandon concurred,598 though Marguerite Mathieu and Emily Albu 
argue that Anna and William used similar but ultimately different sources.599  Jakov 
Ljubarskij and Peter Frankopan, however, have demonstrated links between the two 
accounts, observing similarities in content and even the direct translation of exact 
phrases and sentences from the Latin.  The difficulty with this hypothesis is that Anna 
shows no evidence of understanding Latin; indeed, the opposite is true.600  Given this, 
Frankopan postulates that Anna had access to a Greek source which, while based on 
William, contained many mistakes, contradictions and chronological errors.  The 
intermediary is suggested to have been Nikephoros Bryennios, though there is nothing 
to indicate that he had any more knowledge of Latin than his wife.601 
Frankopan is influenced in this idea by James Howard-Johnston, who controversially 
argues that Anna drew from a large dossier compiled by Bryennios.602  Howard-
Johnston insists that the detailed campaign narratives of the Alexiad could not have 
been produced by a Constantinople-bound princess, and must surely have stemmed 
from a ‘latterday Procopius’ or retired soldier, identified as Nikephoros Bryennios.  
Upon Bryennios’ death in 1138, his literary project was apparently incomplete, and so 
Anna picked up the mantle, essentially acting as editor and polisher of:   
                                                 
597 Wilmans (1849). 
598 Chalandon (1900): xii; idem (1907): I, xxxviii-xl. 
599 Mathieu (1961): 38-46; Albu (1975): 83-86; idem (2001): 135 n.55. 
600 Anna confesses to having difficulty pronouncing the names of Crusader leaders (X.10.4) and later 
complains of having to write them (XIII.6.3). 
601 Frankopan (1998): 75-83; citing Ljubarskij (1964): 112-113. 
602 Howard-Johnston (1996).  Howard-Johnston will advance his views in a forthcoming article, 
perhaps undeterred by the criticism of other scholars.  Chalandon (1900: xi-xii) had earlier proposed 
that Bryennios supplied Anna with information about the First Crusade and Alexios’ expedition to 
Philippopolis in 1114. 
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…a large dossier of notes, some stored in files, others worked up into preliminary 
drafts, others transmitted into more or less polished prose.  The material was, on 
this hypothesis, only half-digested and the story which it told episodic at best.  
Much remained to be done to turn it into connected, homogeneous, high-style 
classicizing history.603 
The suggestion has not been well received.  Ruth Macrides proposes that Anna’s 
focus on military affairs merely placed her in the tradition of classicizing historians, 
and, moreover, in the epic, Homeric style which characterized twelfth-century 
descriptions of warfare.604  Vlada Stanković shows that Anna did not simply copy 
Bryennios, but adjusted his presentation in order to fulfil her own objectives.605  
Diether Reinsch disproves Howard-Johnston’s claim that the anecdotal narrative 
episodes in the Alexiad, similar to those of the Hyle Historias, serve as evidence of 
Bryennios’ authorship; indeed, Anna adds one of her own such stories to Bryennios’ 
narrative of the capture of his homonymous grandfather by Alexios Komnenos.606  
John Pryor observes that Anna’s description of a naval battle between the Normans 
and the Venetians ‘bears the literary imprint of Bryennios’, but it is to be expected 
that Anna would have been influenced by her husband’s style.607  Indeed, the key 
strand on which Howard-Johnston’s theory comes undone is that Anna frequently 
mentions and praises the Hyle Historias; this tendency contradicts any notion that she 
suppressed Bryennios’ contribution.608  Admittedly, Anna does not cite the 
provenance of all her information, such as the various official documents she quotes, 
                                                 
603 Howard-Johnston (1996): 277-278. 
604 Macrides (2000); also Ljubarskij (2000b). 
605 Stanković (2007a). 
606 Reinsch (1996); idem (2000): 97-101. 
607 Pryor & Jeffreys (2006): 409-410 & n.14. 
608 Reinsch (2000): 98. 
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but, as Reinsch asserts, there was little need to emphasize the authenticity of such 
texts.609  While I have argued above that Anna omitted or concealed her informants in 
certain cases, there is no logical reason why she would deliberately omit the origin of 
official documents.  In short, Howard-Johnston’s hypothesis that the Alexiad is 
essentially the work of Nikephoros Bryennios cannot really be sustained. 
Anna as a Military Historian 
The very notion of crediting the Alexiad to a soldier stems from a prejudice that a 
woman could not have been responsible for the comprehensive, informed narrative of 
military events.610  This observation could be extended to any ‘armchair historian’; 
certainly, lack of a military education and combat experience did not prevent Agathias 
and Leo the Deacon from writing dense narratives of campaign and battle.  Anna was 
exposed to a military culture at court, and her personal fascination with warfare is 
evident in her focus on the ‘new’ marching formation her father devised during the 
return march from Philomelion in 1116,611 as well as lengthy ekphraseis on siege 
machinery and the crossbow.612  Denis Sullivan reveals Anna’s descriptions of siege 
warfare to be replete with technical knowledge and comparatively more impressive 
than those of her recent historiographical peers.613  Sullivan determines that Anna 
                                                 
609 Ibid: 98. 
610 While Charles Oman did not question the authorship of the Alexiad, his famous quip that Anna ‘for 
a lady, had a very fair grasp of things military’ is more than a little condescending (Oman 1924: I, 226 
n.1).  For discussion of gender as an obstacle to acceptance of Anna in modern scholarship, and further 
references, see Frankopan (2002a): 61, 72 nn.12 & 13. 
611 Anna Komnene: XV.3-7.  For discussion of this formation, which Anna claims was inspired by her 
father’s reading of the Hellenistic manual of Aelian, see Bennett (2001). 
612 Anna Komnene: X.8.6, for the famous digression on the crossbow (tzangra).  For further discussion 
of the technical aspects of this passage, see Kolias (1988): 245-253; Nishimura (1988): 433-434.  Kelso 
(2003) discusses artillery as a classicizing digression, while Den Hengst (1999) explores the specific 
case of Ammianus Marcellinus and his digressions on siege engines. 
613 Anna’s naval terminology was understandably more problematic, with archaic terms inconsistently 
employed – see Pryor & Jeffreys (2006): 409-410. 
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possessed a knowledge of these matters from the military treatises, which afforded her 
greater comprehension of her complex narrative sources.614  By Anna’s admission, 
this material was written by military men, apparently in a low-style, which betrays a 
practical purpose and is extremely suggestive of the vernacular.615  We should not 
seek to find linguistic identifiers of such material within the Alexiad, since Anna 
herself wrote in a high style616 and almost certainly reworked her written sources 
extensively.   There is an intriguing instance where Anna retains the vernacular, 
quoting in the ‘common idiom’ a popular song about Alexios, which she then 
‘translates’ into pure Greek, presumably for reasons of consistency and so her 
audience could better comprehend it.617  While one finds nothing like this in a military 
context, there is a peculiar use of an army colloquialism during the account of the 
victory of Nicholas Maurokatakalon over a Pecheneg force in 1087.  Anna includes 
the phrase ‘τὸν οὑτωσὶ καλούµενον κοπὸν’ (translated by Sewter and Frankopan as 
‘hacked off’), which, she explains, ‘was an expression known to soldiers’.618  The 
most plausible explanation for the inclusion of this phrase is that Anna came across 
the saying in her source material, probably a campaign report.  It was through such 
documents and her own learning that Anna was able to write convincingly about 
military events, despite having no direct experience of war. 
Conclusion 
Some would deprive Anna of a great literary achievement.  Yet there is likewise a 
danger of going too far in her defence, as evidenced in Jakov Ljubarskij’s claim that 
                                                 
614 Sullivan (2010a): 56. 
615 See Beck (1971): 27; Beaton (1987): 9-10; Kazhdan & Epstein (1985): 84.  For the growth of 
vernacular literature in this period, see Beaton (1988). 
616 Still, Anna occasionally employs terms not of Attic Greek derivation – see Buckler (1929): 488-497. 
617 Anna Komnene: II.4.9. 
618 λέξις δὲ αὕτη συνήθης τοῖς στρατιώταις (ibid: VII.1.1.16-17). 
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Anna wrote ‘for the most part, from memory’.619  The extensive detail of Anna’s 
narrative, along with her own statements about her sources, argue against such a 
suggestion.  Anna’s ‘Methodenkapitel’620 is replete with enough inconsistencies to 
suspect the presence of rhetorical elements, though we cannot doubt her basic claim to 
have derived information from those soldiers at the centre of the events described.  
John France and Peter Frankopan insist that Anna called upon the testimony of her 
father’s generals in some shape or form.621  Nikephoros Bryennios,622 George 
Palaiologos,623 John Doukas624 and Tatikios625 have all been suggested as possible 
informants.  Frankopan considers it ‘clear’ that Anna had access to a ‘substantial 
military archive’.626  Written accounts – ξυγγραµµάτων – mentioned by Anna almost 
certainly included memoirs and dispatches.  James Howard-Johnston viewed Anna’s 
detailed narrative, and the shifting perspectives between commanders in the field, to 
be suggestive of the use of post-action reports.627  Furthermore, we should not entirely 
                                                 
619 Ljubarskij (2000b): 176. 
620 Kambylis (1975): 134. 
621 France (1984): 23; Frankopan (2002a): 64-65. 
622 Chalandon (1900): xi-xii. 
623 Ibid: xi-xii. 
624 Frankopan (2002a: 64-65) asserts that Doukas provided Anna ‘with a substantial amount of material 
which appears in the Alexiad’.  See also Appendix I. 
625 It has been suggested that Tatikios was one of Anna’s chief informants, furnishing reports on the 
passage of the Crusaders which formed the basis of Anna’s account of the expedition, in particular the 
siege of Antioch.  For this view, see Chalandon (1900): xvii; Buckler (1929): 231 n.8; Runciman 
(1951): 224-225; Shepard (1988): 196-197; Lilie (1993): 35-37; Frankopan (2002a). 
626 Frankopan (2009a): xix. 
627 ‘The sometimes arbitrary shifts between viewpoints which take place in the course of the narrative 
of a given episode are probably best explained as reflecting editorial transitions from source to source, 
each with its own particular perspective.  In most cases, the viewpoints are those of different 
commanders in the field…or alternate between such commanders and the imperial authorities scanning 
the world around Constantinople…Since the narrative is normally densely packed with the sort of 
detailed information which can only be conveyed in writing and since the material normally seems to 
have an official character, it can safely be inferred that prominent among the sources used for the 
military and diplomatic history in the Alexiad were those which were obviously useful for writers of 
contemporary history from the time of Julius Caesar to the present, namely state (and possibly private) 
papers.  Adopting this as a working hypothesis, it is possible to identify a wide range of official sources 
underlying the Alexiad’s text, chiefly military dispatches, ambassadors’ reports, official 
correspondence and position papers’ (Howard-Johnston 1996: 279-280). 
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discount Anna’s claim to have heard oral accounts.  She appears to recall tales told by 
her father and George Palaiologos.  It is also plausible that she remembered 
conversations with her husband Nikephoros Bryennios.  And while many key 
participants may have passed away by the time Anna began to research her work, their 
descendants could have supplied Anna with material.  Leo Kamytzes was an 
important figure during the reign of Manuel I Komnenos,628 while Constantine 
Kamytzes was married to Maria Komnene, daughter of Theodora,629 who was the 
sister of Anna Komnene; Anna may have gained information about Eustathios 
Kamytzes via this route.  There is evidence from council edicts that two of Anna’s 
cousins – Constantine and Adrian Komnenos, sons of Alexios’ brother Isaac – were 
still alive as late as 1147 and 1157 respectively.630  While we cannot prove that Anna 
conversed with any of these individuals, or indeed other descendants of protagonists 
in the Alexiad, the connections were clearly not lost on her, given her aforementioned 
statement that the ‘fathers and grandfathers of some men alive today saw these 
things’.631  Anna’s extended family would have provided a logical conduit to useful 
information. 
Anna appears to have been a synthetic historian of considerable skill, culling from a 
raft of different sources and testimonies.  Frankopan speaks of Anna’s ability to draw 
from ‘a rich tapestry of witnesses to events’.632  Indeed, whilst relating the Battle of 
Dyrrachion, Anna refers to the ‘vast material’ (ὕλης ἀµφιλαφοῦς) at her disposal.633  
Inevitably, however, Anna was better informed about certain events than she was 
                                                 
628 Stiernon (1965): 233, 240. 
629 Theodore Prodromos: LXIV. 
630 For Constantine, see Σύνταγµα τῶν θείων καὶ ἱερῶν κανόνων: V, 307; for Adrian, see Πατµιακὴ 
Βιβλιοθήκη: 317. 
631 Anna Komnene: pr.2.3.45-46; trans. 4. 
632 Frankopan (2002a): 64-65. 
633 Anna Komnene: IV.8.1.77. 
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others, and her narrative is not especially balanced and consistent in its portrayals.634  
John France’s summation of Anna’s record of the First Crusade may be applied to the 
Alexiad as a whole: ‘Anna’s account…is very inconsistent - sometimes she is well 
informed, at other times quite the opposite.  This reflects both the limited source 
material available to her and the way in which she selected information in order to 
make her case’.635   
                                                 
634 See Appendix I. 
635 France (1984): 32. 
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VII. The Epitome of John Kinnamos and the Chronike Diegesis of Niketas 
Choniates 
Born around 1140, John Kinnamos may have served as a soldier636 before acting as 
secretary (grammatikos) to the Emperor Manuel I Komnenos.  His Epitome, written 
c.1180, begins at 1118 with the accession of John II Komnenos and probably 
concluded with the death of Manuel Komnenos.  The surviving version, however, 
ends abruptly, prior to the Battle of Myriokephalon in 1176.637  Carl Neumann’s late-
nineteenth century study on Kinnamos has been complemented by Jakov Ljubarskij’s 
article on Kinnamos as a writer, while Paul Stephenson has explored Kinnamos’ 
presentation of John Komnenos’ Hungarian campaign of 1127-1129.638  Aside from 
these, specific studies on Kinnamos are woefully lacking. 
Kinnamos’ contemporary, Niketas Choniates, has fared better in modern scholarship.  
Born around 1160 in Phrygia, Niketas, whilst still a young man, was sent to 
Constantinople to complete his education.  Having served as governor of 
Philippopolis around the time of the Third Crusade, Choniates held a variety of civil 
posts for the remainder of the century.  After the fall of Constantinople in 1204, he 
eventually settled in Nicaea, where he lived until his death c.1216.639  Niketas began 
production on his Chronike Diegesis, which covered the period 1118-c.1207, during 
                                                 
636 See Neumann (1888): 93-95, 98-99.  There is little basis for this claim. 
637 Brand (1974): 1-11 remains a solid overview of Kinnamos. 
638 Neumann (1888): 78-102; Ljubarskij (2000a); Stephenson (1996).  Useful also is Hunger (1978): I, 
409-415. 
639 For fuller accounts of Niketas Choniates’ life and works, see van Dieten (1971): 1-55; Simpson 
(2004): 14-24. 
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the 1190s at the latest.  It is thought that he originally completed the work prior to 
1204, but continued to revise the entire text for the rest of his days.640 
Any study of Niketas Choniates owes a debt to editor Jan Louis van Dieten, 
responsible also for a biographical study of Choniates and a closer look at his 
correspondence and orations.641  The diverse scholarship of Riccardo Maisano on 
Niketas ranges from discussion of his source material to his use of Homeric 
allusions.642  The numerous studies of Alexander Kazhdan on Choniates include 
articles on Choniates’ terminology of warfare.643  Historical causation in the Chronike 
Diegesis, and Choniates’ thoughts on the collapse of Byzantium, are the subject of 
articles by Jonathan Harris.644  Antony Littlewood’s research into Niketas’ use of 
vegetal and animal imagery is particularly useful for understanding metaphors in his 
descriptions of battle.645  Yet it is Alicia Simpson who has done most to advance our 
understanding of Niketas Choniates and his work in recent times.646  In 2009, 
Simpson, along with Stephanos Efthymiadis, edited a volume of papers on Niketas 
and his literary output, continuing the revival of scholarly interest and shedding 
further light on Choniates’ values, interests and working methods.647 
The near-contemporary texts of Kinnamos and Choniates are ripe for comparative 
study.  Vasile Grecu argues that Choniates was familiar with Kinnamos, electing to 
limit coverage of an event if Kinnamos had dealt with it comprehensively and in an 
                                                 
640 Simpson (2004): 25-63; idem (2006) presents the previous scholarship of van Dieten on the 
production of the Chronike Diegesis and contributes further insight. 
641 van Dieten (1971). 
642 Maisano (1993); idem (1994a); idem (1994b); idem (1998); idem (2000). 
643 Kazhdan (1994); idem (1995c); idem (1997b).  Also idem (1990); idem (1995b). 
644 Harris (2000); idem (2001). 
645 Littlewood (2007). 
646 Simpson (2004); idem (2006). 
647 Simpson & Efthymiadis (2009). 
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acceptable fashion, or expand and change details if he felt an imbalance needed to be 
addressed.648  Paul Magdalino’s study of Manuel I Komnenos discerns a number of 
similarities between Choniates and Kinnamos, suggesting common sources, most 
probably bulletins or encomiastic material.649  With Magdalino’s hypothesis discussed 
in relation to imperial campaigns in chapter three, we focus here on historical 
portrayals of two important commanders who served under Manuel Komnenos – John 
Doukas and Andronikos Kontostephanos.  Though we observe a reliance on the 
testimony of participants and written accounts, we also see how each historian shaped 
this material to their own purposes. 
The Sources of Kinnamos and Choniates for Military Campaigns 
Both Kinnamos and Choniates are rather coy in respect of their sources.  Describing 
John II Komnenos’ conquest of Cilicia in 1138-1139, Kinnamos expresses 
dissatisfaction with his material: ‘But to record these matters in detail exceeds, I think, 
our undertaking.  It was my purpose to speak of the present events in summary, 
because I was not an eyewitness, nor did I receive a faithful account of them’.650  The 
legitimacy of this statement is contestable - it is possible that Kinnamos effectively 
glossed over John’s achievements so as not to risk overshadowing those of his 
beloved Manuel.  This idea is supported by Choniates, who offers a more detailed 
narrative of John’s campaigns and suggests, by contrast, that sources for these events 
were not lacking: ‘Since I was not an eyewitness of that which I have recorded, I 
                                                 
648 Grecu (1949): esp. 201-202.  Cf. Maisano (1994a); Simpson (2004): 206-209.  Stephanos 
Efthymiadis (2008), for example, has shown Choniates to have elaborated upon Kinnamos’ account of 
the poisoning of King Stephen IV of Hungary. 
649 Magdalino (1993a): 413-488. 
650 ἀλλὰ ταῦτα µὲν πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν ἱστορεῖν ὑπόσχεσιν οἶµαι ὑπερβαίνει τὴν ἡµετέραν. ὡς γὰρ ἐν 
κεφαλαίῳ προὔκειτό µοι περὶ τῶν παρόντων εἰπεῖν, ἅτε µηδὲ αὐτοπτήσαντι ταῦτα µηδὲ τὸ πιστὸν 
ἐντεῦθεν λαβόντι (Kinnamos: 20.19-22; trans. 25). 
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could not describe these events extensively but have set down what I heard from those 
contemporaries who personally knew the emperor and who escorted him on his 
campaigns against the enemy and accompanied him into battle’.651  Simpson notes 
that these interviews must have been conducted when Choniates began conceiving of 
his historical work during the 1180s, as veterans of John’s campaigns could not be 
expected to have lived past the year 1200.652  The statements made by Kinnamos and 
Choniates are in any case somewhat rhetorical, as neither historian was present at the 
majority of military events they describe for the reign of Manuel, and yet they do not 
make similar statements.   
In such instances, there can be little question that the testimony of soldiers was again 
sought by Kinnamos and Choniates.  Charles Brand speculates that Kinnamos may 
have employed simple accounts drafted by soldiers, yet, like Chalandon, is convinced 
that Kinnamos gathered most of his information from autopsy and the oral reports of 
participants and eyewitnesses.653  More has been said of Choniates.  While Kazhdan 
was convinced of Choniates’ use of archival documents,654 Chalandon and Maisano 
are less sure.655  More recently, Simpson asserts that Choniates made ‘comparatively 
little use’ of the archives, citing dating errors and his vague coverage of diplomatic 
affairs.656  On the basis of Choniates’ claim to have interviewed eyewitnesses to 
John’s campaigns, Simpson proposes that Choniates also spoke to individuals who 
                                                 
651 οἷα καὶ ἡµῶν µὴ τὰ τοῖς ὀφθαλµοῖς ἐπὶ τῷδε παρειληµµένα συγγραφοµένων κἀντεῦθεν µηδ’ 
ἐπιτάδην ἐχόντων ταῦτα διεξιέναι, ἀλλ’ ἅπερ εἰς ἀκοὴν ὠτίου εἰλήφειµεν ἐκ τῶν ὅσοι τῶν καθ’ ἡµᾶς 
τὸν βασιλέα τουτονὶ ἐθεάσαντο καὶ συνωµάρτουν ἐκείνῳ πρὸς ἐναντίους χωροῦντι καὶ τὰς µάχας 
συνετολύπευον (Niketas Choniates, Chronike Diegesis: 4.76-80; trans. 4).  For the implications of this 
statement with regard to the composition of Choniates’ Chronike Diegesis, see Simpson (2004): 35. 
652 Simpson (2004): 35. 
653 Chalandon (1912): xv-xvii, who nevertheless suggests that Kinnamos made some use of archival 
documents; Brand (1974): 6. 
654 Kazhdan (1994): xv. 
655 Chalandon (1912): xxv-xxvi; Maisano (1994a): 404-405. 
656 Simpson (2004): 218-219. 
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took part in the campaigns of later emperors, speculating that these men would have 
been high-ranking officials rather than the rank-and-file soldiery.657   
The Historical Record of John Doukas’ Expedition to Italy, 1155-1156 
Kinnamos’ account of the doomed Italian expedition of 1155-1156 forms a central 
episode of his history.658  Brand speculates that Kinnamos may have been an 
eyewitness to these events, but this is improbable given the author’s age at the time 
(about twelve).  More likely is Brand’s alternative suggestion: that one of the 
commanders involved, John Doukas,659 was Kinnamos’ informant, and that some 
written source ‘should confidently be hypothesized’.660  Andrew Stone similarly 
asserts that Kinnamos ‘must have interviewed survivors’ of the expedition.661  The 
account provides a thorough itinerary of Doukas’ movements and extensive detail on 
the actions conducted by the commander.662  Topographical exposition is uncommon 
but the natural defences of Mottola are vividly described.663  Detail of military 
operations is, in at least two instances, extensive.  The Roman battle line at Trani is 
outlined: Cumans and infantry archers were positioned in front, while half the cavalry 
took the centre, and Doukas commanded the rear with Cumans and the remainder of 
the cavalry.  In the ensuing battle, the archers broke quickly while the centre was 
                                                 
657 Ibid: 219-221.  Herbert Hunger (1978: I, 432) also suggests that veteran officers were among 
Choniates’ informants. 
658 For the campaign and Manuel’s policy towards Italy in general, see most recently Tolstoy-
Miloslavsky (2008). 
659 For John Doukas’ military career and his involvement in Apulia, see Stone (1999): esp. 150-154. 
660 Brand (1974): 230 n.30.  Brand states of Kinnamos: ‘If he did not participate in this expedition, he 
had available an unusually complete and reliable source, whether a written memoir or living persons’ 
(ibid: 228 n.9).  While Kinnamos (5.6-9) does reveal that he accompanied the emperor on campaign 
from a young age, he says nothing of the campaigns of Manuel’s subordinates. 
661 Stone (1999): 152-153 
662 For an outline of the campaign and Doukas’ involvement, see Chalandon (1912): 363-370. 
663 Kinnamos (152) describes inaccessible ravines and streams protecting Mottola on each side. 
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forced back, leaving Doukas and the heavy infantry to stem the tide.664  Furthermore, 
in the narrative of the siege of Brindisi, the process of undermining a stone wall is 
carefully described.665  Kinnamos’ account also offers some remarkably specific 
numbers: at Trani, the nobleman Richard of Andria is accompanied by thirty-six 
knights;666 nine men are said to have led the Italians at Bosco;667 Doukas commands 
only fourteen ships at Brindisi, and seizes four belonging to the enemy;668 the 
engagement with three hundred enemy infantry at Barletta results in the loss of only 
one mercenary cavalryman on the Byzantine side;669 and the confrontation at Bosco 
leaves four of Doukas’ men dead for two of the enemy.670  This knowledge could only 
have been imparted by one who participated in the expedition and was involved in the 
command process. 
The focalizer throughout Kinnamos’ account of the expedition is most often John 
Doukas, indicating him as the primary informant.  Michael Palaiologos671 was co-
commander, but aside from his early acquisition of Bari, we do not hear of him at 
length until mention of his illness, tonsure, and subsequent death.672  Having seized 
Bari, Palaiologos combined his forces with those of Doukas, and thereafter assumes a 
secondary role in the narrative.  When the army is divided, the narrative follows 
Doukas’ operations, and we hear nothing of Palaiologos’ experiences while stationed 
                                                 
664 Ibid: 143-144. 
665 Ibid: 164.  Elaborate descriptions of undermining are common in Byzantine historiography - see 
Agathias: I.3; Leo the Deacon: 25-26; 52-53. 
666 Kinnamos: 144.12-13. 
667 Ibid: 149.16-17. 
668 Ibid: 162.23-163.1; 163.13-15. 
669 Ibid: 142.6-17. 
670 Ibid: 148.16-18. 
671 For this individual see Hörandner (1974): 503. 
672 Kinnamos: 151. 
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at Bari.673  This might be understandable if Palaiologos were subordinate to Doukas, 
but this was not the case; having become a monk, Palaiologos continued to issue 
orders to Doukas, implying his seniority in the partnership.674  Though Niketas 
Choniates does not describe the expedition in detail - perhaps because Kinnamos had 
already done so - he does offer more information about Palaiologos’ actions.  The 
revelation that Palaiologos constructed a stone wall around Bari may hint at the 
general’s activities during Doukas’ aforementioned absence.675  Choniates also adds 
that Palaiologos was relieved of his command for being meddlesome, and wasteful 
with money.676   While the accuracy of this report may be questioned, it nevertheless 
confirms that the historian had access to a different perspective on the campaign.677   
Describing a small clash at Barletta, Kinnamos can almost be seen to apologize for his 
narrow viewpoint - ‘as to the other Romans there I am unable to say how each fared in 
valiant deeds’ – as he describes Doukas charging the enemy and, ‘they say’ (φασιν), 
sending more than thirty to the ground.678  Doukas’ brilliance as a general and 
gallantry in combat are demonstrated at several points in the narrative.  At Monopoli, 
Doukas charged the enemy with just thirty men.679  Doukas rouses the courage of his 
men against a larger enemy force at Bosco, and, when pressed, mounts a desperate 
                                                 
673 Ibid: 145-150.  Palaiologos is not the only commander to be marginalized in Kinnamos’ narrative.  
Shortly before Palaiologos’ death, Manuel sent another fleet to Italy, with John Angelos in overall 
command, though nothing else is said of this force (ibid: 148).  We know only that the party joined up 
with Doukas on account of a later reference, where Angelos is mentioned during the narrative of the 
defence against the Sicilian relief force at Brindisi.  Even then, however, we follow only the naval 
operations of Doukas; there is no discussion of the actions of the land force led by Angelos (ibid: 162). 
674 Ibid: 151. 
675 Niketas Choniates, Chronike Diegesis: 91. 
676 Ibid: 94. 
677 Chalandon (1912: xxix-xxx) opines that Choniates was ‘très insuffisamment renseigné’ on 
operations in Italy during the reign of Manuel.  Supporting Kinnamos’ testimony is contemporary 
Theodore Prodromos, whose epitaphs for Michael Palaiologos confirm that Michael became a monk 
following an illustrious military career, dying shortly after (Theodore Prodromos: LXVI-LXVII). 
678 ἔνθα Ῥωµαίοις µὲν τοῖς ἄλλοις οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν ὅπως ἑκάστῳ ἀνδραγαθίσασθαι ἐξεγένετο 
(Kinnamos: 142.6-15; trans. 111). 
679 Ibid: 146. 
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charge, putting the enemy to flight.680  At Brindisi, Doukas’ outnumbered force attack 
the Sicilian fleet by sea and land and win a great victory.681  Admittedly, his are not 
the only feats of individual prowess described.682  At various times there are 
references to single combat.683  Perhaps Kinnamos invented these incidents, inspired 
by the heroic tone of Procopius’ record of conflict in Italy, evidently the model for 
this section of the Epitome.684  But if these episodes reflect actual events, it is quite 
possible that they were mentioned in reports filed by Doukas, given that generals were 
encouraged to make a record of particular deeds of valour so that soldiers might later 
be rewarded by the emperor.685 
                                                 
680 Ibid: 149-150. 
681 Ibid: 162-164. 
682 In the encounter at Bosco, it is stated that two anonymous Alans performed nobly, in addition to 
many Romans (ibid: 148.20-22); during the siege of the town, two of Doukas’ guardsmen made a bold 
attempt to burn the gates, but having failed were forced to retreat, somehow avoiding an aerial 
bombardment (ibid: 149.4-12).  Amid the assault on Monopoli, one soldier, Hikanatos, speared a 
troublesome defender and roused his comrades, enabling the Romans to almost take the town (ibid: 
155.13-156.6).  Credit is also given to another of Doukas’ soldiers, Skaramankas, who fell during the 
repulse of the Sicilian fleet at Brindisi.  Kinnamos writes that Skaramankas prevented an enemy ship 
from fleeing at the cost of his life, not unlike the famed Kynegeiros, who perished in similarly heroic 
fashion at the Battle of Marathon (ibid: 163.17-164.3, echoing Herodotus: 6.114).  In the final battle at 
Brindisi, the soldiers Ioannikios Kritoples and Bairam are commended for their actions at the head of a 
Georgian and Alan skirmishing unit, which inflicted casualties upon the Sicilian rearguard before 
returning safely to Byzantine lines (Kinnamos: 167.4-12). 
683 Before Brindisi, one Thomas, from Antioch, fought a resident, Angelo, in single combat – a joust is 
described - with the clash and slight wounds suffered by each man carefully detailed (ibid: 159.18-
160.15).  Elsewhere, Kinnamos is more ambivalent: again at Brindisi, it is reported that one unnamed 
mercenary emerged to challenge one of the enemy in single combat, though nothing appears to have 
come of his offer (ibid: 168.8-11), while Kinnamos notes that several Romans leapt out in front of their 
lines and displayed marvellous feats during an encounter, without delving into any specifics (ibid: 
153.9-12). 
684 See below, 134-136 for the argument that Procopius served as Kinnamos’ literary model.  For the 
Homeric tone of Procopius’ Gothic Wars, see Whately (2009): 256-261.  Jacqueline Rosenblaum 
(1972: 221) suggested the possible influence of western interest in heroism for these sections of the 
Epitome. 
685 In an oration to the troops of the east, Constantine VII advised his commanders to keep ‘written 
records’ (ἐγγράφως) so that he could reward those picked out for commendation, even common 
soldiers (Constantine VII Porphyrogenitos, Military Oration of the Emperor Constantine VII: 399.82-
96). 
133 
Only with the arrival in Italy of the Emperor Manuel’s cousin, the megas doux 
Alexios Komnenos Bryennios, does the narrative seem less focused on Doukas.  This 
ambiguity, however, may have been deliberate, intended to lessen Doukas’ role in the 
imminent failure of the expedition.  Bryennios is criticized for not doing as 
commanded by the emperor and assembling a force prior to his arrival at Brindisi.686  
In the final summary, Bryennios is lambasted by Kinnamos for not bringing fresh 
troops as the emperor ordered.687  Blame is apportioned to everyone and everything – 
with the notable exception of Doukas.  Thus ally Robert of Bassonville abandons the 
Byzantines, while the knights of Ancona are depicted as fickle mercenaries, leaving 
the employ of Doukas when their excessive pay demands are rejected.688  As King 
William of Sicily converged on Brindisi, it is noted that the Byzantine army had been 
decimated by the desertion of its Norman contingents.689  The Byzantines fight 
bravely, but the superior numbers prove too much.690  Conspicuous by his absence in 
this final stage of operations is Doukas; as the chief source of Kinnamos’ account, it 
would seem that he blamed certain parties and a lack of manpower for the failure of 
the expedition.   
Kinnamos does not appear to have been entirely privy to the command process at this 
stage.  In discussing the advance of William of Sicily on the Byzantine forces 
stationed at Brindisi, Kinnamos remarks that bad advice and, ‘I think’ (οἶµαι), the 
inevitability of defeat dissuaded the Byzantines from engaging William’s fleet before 
the king arrived with his land army.  By choosing to engage both at once, Kinnamos 
                                                 
686 Kinnamos: 165. 
687 Ibid: 169. 
688 Ibid: 165. 
689 Ibid: 167. 
690 Ibid: 168. 
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decrees, they encouraged disaster.691  Kinnamos’ view was probably not too dissimilar 
to the official line, which would have almost certainly disregarded any suggestion that 
Manuel had not provided enough manpower and resources for the expedition.  
Magdalino viewed Kinnamos’ decision to blame John Doukas and Alexios Komnenos 
Bryennios as a response to criticisms voiced over the viability of the campaign and 
Manuel’s Italian policy in general.  The pair are deemed responsible not just for the 
defeat, but also for ruining a fresh offensive by making unauthorized promises to 
William concerning a peace agreement whilst in captivity.692  Yet Kinnamos’ rhetoric 
fails to completely shroud the underlying viewpoint of John Doukas, who contended 
that he was waiting for further troops to arrive, and consequently postponed battle 
until the last possible moment.  Stone recognizes ‘ambivalence’ in the way Kinnamos 
presents Doukas, at times a superb tactician and at others incompetent.693  This can 
only be explained by Kinnamos failing to reconcile his eagerness to extricate Manuel 
from blame with his considerable reliance on Doukas’ testimony. 
Kinnamos may be seen to shape his material and subvert the image Doukas attempted 
to present.  The letter which Doukas purportedly sent to Manuel, asking for more 
ships and men to contend with the threat of Sicily, is pivotal in this respect.694  In 
context and, to some extent, content, it is strikingly similar to a letter featured in 
Procopius’ Wars.  While besieged at Rome in 537, Belisarius purportedly wrote to 
Justinian requesting more troops.695  There is a clear parallel in both generals asking 
                                                 
691 Ibid: 166-167. 
692 Magdalino (1993a): 60-61. 
693 Stone (1999): 152-153. 
694 Kinnamos: 158.9-159.7. 
695 Procopius, Wars: V.24.1-17.  The legitimacy of Belisarius’ letter is questionable.  The letter 
contains Procopius’ usual language and rhetoric, though this alone would not be enough to condemn 
the legitimacy of the letter, given the possibility that Procopius himself, as Belisarius’ personal 
secretary, may have penned it (Treadgold 2007: 184-185, 216).  More damning to its credibility is the 
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for aid from the emperor whilst leading expeditions in Italy.  Yet just as Belisarius 
recognizes the fickle nature of fortune and urges that human action can also dictate 
the course of events – in this case an increase in men and supplies to boost the 
probability of a Roman victory – Doukas can also be seen to ponder the uncertainty of 
fate prior to writing to Manuel.696  It is apparent that Kinnamos read Procopius,697 and 
given that the paragraph immediately following the letter contains an obvious 
paraphrase from Procopius’ Wars, there can be little doubt that he had Procopius to 
hand whilst drafting the narrative of Doukas’ campaign in Italy.698  There is no reason 
to doubt that Doukas wrote to the emperor requesting aid, but it is improbable that the 
letter is quoted verbatim here.699   
                                                                                                                                            
nature of the rhetoric and the image of Belisarius presented.  Army numbers are non-specific and 
inflated, implying that they are not the calculations of the general, but rather an individual keen to 
exaggerate the achievements of his hero (Whately 2009: 278 n.152).  Furthermore, the conclusion of 
the letter, which sees Belisarius questioning the backlash Justinian would face if he let his general die 
at Rome, is, as Averil Cameron observes, ‘sheer bravado’.  Cameron (1985: 148-149) is undoubtedly 
right to suggest that this ‘outpouring...can hardly have been sent in this form’.  Aid was probably 
requested by Belisarius – perhaps even Procopius himself drafted the request – but it is unlikely that the 
letter presented is that same original document.  A similar letter may be found at Wars: VII.12.3-10, 
where Belisarius’ lays bare to Justinian the full extent of the problems afflicting his expedition to Italy 
in 544.  While the letter underlines the difficulties facing Belisarius and attempts to extricate him from 
blame for future events, it is more convincing than the earlier letter and is essentially devoid of 
rhetorical elements.  Given these stylistic differences, and also that Procopius did not participate on this 
venture, it may be that this letter was not composed by his hand.  Pertinent comments on speeches (a 
similar rhetorical exercise) in Procopius’ Wars may be found in Kaldellis (2004): 29-34. 
696 Ὁ δὲ ∆ούκας ὁσηµέραι τὴν τύχην Ῥωµαίοις προσµειδιῶσαν ὁρῶν οὐ πάνυ τι πιστεύειν εἶχεν αὐτῇ, 
τὴν ἀποστροφὴν ὡς εἰκὸς εὐλαβούµενος, µήποτε κατὰ τοὺς µοχθηροὺς (φασὶ) τῶν συνοδοιπόρων ἐκ 
µέσης λιποῦσα τούτους ἀνακάµψῃ τῆς ὁδοῦ (Kinnamos: 158.5-8). 
697 Carl Neumann (1888: 85) and Jacqueline Rosenblaum (1972: 9) propose that Kinnamos imitated 
Procopius’ literary technique. 
698 ἀλλὰ πολὺς µετ’ ἐκεῖνα ἀναστρεψαµένοις ἐπιγενόµενος αἰὼν ἐνεόχµωσε τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν ὀνοµάτων, 
ἐφ’ ἕτερα ἢ παντάπασιν ἀνόµοια ἢ ὀλίγῳ διαφέροντα µεταθείς (Kinnamos: 159.11-13); χωρὶς δὲ 
τούτων καὶ µέγας αἰὼν µετὰ τοὺς ἐκεῖνα ἀναγραψαµένους ἐπιγενόµενος ἀεί τε συννεωτερίζων τοῖς 
πράγµασι τὰ πολλὰ τῶν καθεστώτων τὰ πρότερα νεοχµῶσαι ἴσχυσεν, ἐθνῶν τε µεταστάσεσι καὶ 
ἀρχόντων καὶ ὀνοµάτων διαδοχαῖς (Procopius, Wars: VIII.1.11).  The observation was made by 
Neumann (1888): 96; Hunger (1978): I, 414. 
699 See Neumann (1888): 91-93; Chalandon (1912): xvi-xvii, for the argument that Kinnamos does not 
quote genuine documents and letters.  Gyula Moravcsik (1958: I, 325-326) proposes that Kinnamos 
consulted receipts of the letter from a register. 
136 
Kinnamos constructed this letter for a particular purpose, which only becomes clear 
when examined alongside his evaluation of the expedition.  Crucial are the words 
attributed to Doukas’ hand near the close of the letter: ‘For while it is agreed that 
successfully to pursue great ends with few men is more gratifying than with many, 
failure imports a multitude of shame, because along with defeat it also implies 
ignorance of strategy in the defeated, as your majesty has often taught us’.700  If we 
compare this to Kinnamos’ musings on why the expedition failed, it is evident that 
Doukas’ ‘admission’ is designed to hint at his own shortcomings and foreshadow the 
defeat: 
So present-day men are: some survive entirely bereft of military science and 
bring affairs to ruin, others perchance know a part of military science but are 
wrong about the more important part.  For strategy is an art, and one who 
practices it must be supple and cunning and know how to make a timely 
alteration at every turn of it.  For there is a time when it is not shameful to flee, if 
the occasion allows…where success would seem more by cunning than by force, 
risking everything is to be deprecated.  Since many and various matters lead 
toward one end - victory - it is a matter of indifference which one one uses to 
reach it.701 
                                                 
700 τὸ γὰρ σὺν µικροῖς τὰ µεγάλα µετιέναι κατορθούµενον µὲν πλείω τοῦ σὺν µεγίστοις χαρίζεται 
δόξαν, ἁµαρτανόµενον δὲ πολλαπλάσιον ἐπάγεται τὸ αἶσχος, ἅτε πρὸς τῇ ἥττῃ καὶ ἀµαθίαν 
στρατηγικῶν ἐπιτρῖβον τοῖς πταίσασιν. ὥς γε πολλάκις ἡµᾶς κράτος ἐδίδαξε τὸ σόν (Kinnamos: 
158.24-159.4; trans. 122). 
701 οὕτως οἱ νῦν ἄνθρωποι οἱ µὲν παντάπασι στρατηγικῶν ἄµοιροι διατελοῦντες τὰ πράγµατα 
σφάλλουσιν, οἱ δὲ τοῦτο µὲν τυχὸν ἴσασι στρατηγικῆς µέρος, τῷ πλείονι διαµαρτάνουσι. τέχνη γάρ τίς 
ἐστι καὶ ἡ στρατηγία, καὶ χρὴ τὸν ταύτην µετιόντα πολυειδῆ τινα καὶ ποικίλον εἶναι καὶ πρὸς ἕκαστον 
ἐπικαιροτάτως τῶν ταύτης µετατάττεσθαι εἰδῶν. φεύγειν τε γάρ ἐστιν ὅτε χρὴ µηδὲν αἰσχυνόµενον εἰ 
τοῦτο διδοίη καιρός, καὶ αὖ ἀνυπόστατα διώκειν, πρὸς τὴν χρείαν ἑκάτερον· ἔνθα τε ἐπινοίᾳ µᾶλλον ἢ 
χειρὶ κατορθοῦν φαίνοιτο, παραιτεῖσθαι τὸ τοῖς ὅλοις διακινδυνεύειν.  πολλῶν γάρ τινων καὶ διαφόρων 
πραγµάτων ἐς ἕν τι τέλος τὴν νίκην ἀγόντων, ἀδιάφορόν ἐστιν ὁποτέρῳ τις χρησάµενος ἐπ’ ἐκεῖνο ἥξει 
(ibid: 168.22-169.10; trans. 129-130). 
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Doukas ultimately fails by not heeding his ‘own’ advice and trying to achieve a 
victory with inferior numbers,702 which, by the theory expounded here, exposes 
deficiencies in a commander.  When read in this light, a rousing speech delivered by 
Doukas to his men at Brindisi prior to the speculated arrival of reinforcements takes 
on added significance: ‘I have vowed, fellow soldiers, that we shall first seize victory, 
lest we who have hitherto born the weight of toil shall have to share the blessings of 
victory with those who join late in the struggle’.703  Observing the poor morale of his 
troops, Doukas contrived to produce a letter purportedly sent by Manuel, proclaiming 
that additional forces would arrive shortly.  The model for this episode is to be found 
in the Histories of Agathias; at the siege of Phasis in 555-556, the magister militum 
per Armeniam Martin similarly feigned news of a report of reinforcements to his men, 
stating his wish to send the apparent aid away so that they would not take all the 
glory.704  Averil Cameron viewed Martin’s conduct to be ‘patently absurd’, dismissing 
the entire episode as an obvious invention of Agathias.705  The provenance of Doukas’ 
scheme is equally questionable, especially given that Kinnamos opens discussion of 
this particular event with λέγεται.  It would appear that the incident was invented by 
Kinnamos to hint at Doukas’ impatience, portraying him as an over-eager general who 
failed to see beyond short-term success.  At the conclusion of the campaign, both 
Doukas and Alexios Komnenos Bryennios should have recognized their inferiority 
and engaged the Sicilian fleet first, then withdrawn to sea and returned to land in due 
course.  ‘But as they kept in mind the dishonour of retreat, they fell into the disgrace 
                                                 
702 Ibid: 166-168. 
703 “ἀλλ’ ηὐχόµην” ἔφη “ὦ συστρατιῶται, φθάσαντας ἁρπάσαι τὴν νίκην ἡµᾶς, ὡς µὴ αὐτοὶ τῶν εἰς 
δεῦρο καµάτων τὸ βάρος βαστάσαντες εἶτα τῶν ἐκ τῆς νίκης ἀγαθῶν καὶ τοῖς ὀψὲ πρὸς τὸν ἀγῶνα 
διαπαντῶσιν ἐπικοινωνεῖν ἕξοµεν” (ibid: 163.5-8; trans. 125). 
704 Agathias: III.23.5-13. 
705 Averil Cameron (1970): 46-48. 
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of being destroyed with their whole force’.706  The fault for the failure was placed 
entirely at their feet.  
Kinnamos undoubtedly relied upon the testimony of John Doukas for his record of the 
Italian campaign; given the extent of the detail and the critical slant, it is highly likely 
that this took the form of written dispatches rather than oral correspondence.  It is 
likewise apparent that Kinnamos also followed the official line and heaped blame on 
Doukas and his colleague Alexios Komnenos Bryennios, distancing Manuel from 
responsibility.  The evidence points towards a reprieve for Doukas, however.  In the 
1160s he played a crucial role in campaigns against Dalmatia and Hungary, and was 
later involved in important diplomatic missions to Palestine and Libya.707  An oration 
of Eustathios of Thessaloniki, whilst including only a brief summation of Doukas’ 
time in Italy, nevertheless draws attention to the ‘lake of blood’ Doukas made in 
‘Latin land’.708  While this praise is questionable, John’s rehabilitation perhaps 
confirms that his apparent culpability for the failure in Italy was merely for public 
purposes, to draw attention away from Manuel’s failings.  
The Historical Record of the Hungarian Campaign of Andronikos Kontostephanos, 
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706 ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνοι τὴν ἐκ τοῦ ὑποχωρεῖν ὑφορώµενοι ἀδοξίαν εἰς τὴν τοῦ πανστρατὶ διεφθάρθαι 
περιπεπτώκασιν ἀτιµίαν (Kinnamos: 169.14-19; trans. 130). 
707 See Stone (1999): 154-163.  While there is some disagreement on the number of John Doukas’ in 
this period, most scholars are generally in agreement that the one who served in Italy later took part in 
the Hungarian wars: Brand (1974): 250 n.53; Polemis (1968): 128-129; Kazhdan (1969); Karlin-Hayter 
(1972): 263.  The fall-out from the expedition seems to have been minimal in respect of the personnel 
involved: Alexios Komnenos Bryennios was later part of a delegation which journeyed to Antioch in 
1161, and remained megas doux (Kinnamos: 210).   
708 Τί δέ µοι θρόµβους µὲν ἱδρώτων λέγειν αἱµατηρούς, σιγᾶν δὲ τὰ αἵµατα, οἷς τὴν Λατινικὴν αὐτὸς 
ἐλίµνασε, πολλὴν µὲν αὐτῆς καὶ νεκροῖς καταστρώσας, οὐκ ὀλίγην δὲ καὶ καταβρέξας αἵµασιν, ἐξ ὧν 
ἑαυτῷ στολὴν εὐδοξίας ἔχρωζε; (Eustathios, Orations: 198.8-11).  I follow here the interpretation of 
Stone (1999): 151-152. 
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The megas doux Andronikos Kontostephanos is the subject of extensive coverage in 
the histories of both Kinnamos and Choniates, offering greater scope for discussion of 
sources and historical method.  Comparison here is concerned with the historical 
record of Kontostephanos’ decisive victory over a Hungarian force at the Battle of 
Sirmium in 1167.  We cannot postulate the use of a common source.  Kinnamos’ 
account is pragmatic and succinct.  Having learned details about the Hungarian army 
from an enemy prisoner, Kontostephanos drew up his own army; Kinnamos provides 
a reasonably detailed list of commanders and their units.  The battle unfolds 
dramatically, as the initial plan of Kontostephanos fails and much of his army gives 
way, before the Byzantines rally with a charge, finally driving the Hungarians from 
the field.709  Choniates, by contrast, offers a more rounded and polished version of 
events.  There is insight into events at the imperial camp at Sardica prior to 
Kontostephanos’ departure, with greater attention afforded to the Emperor Manuel.  
The detail about Kontostephanos questioning a Hungarian captive is omitted, while 
the battle line and composition of the Byzantine army is related in much briefer terms.  
Instead, there is an episode where Kontostephanos ignores a request from Manuel to 
delay the battle, before rousing his troops with a speech.  Choniates’ narrative of the 
battle itself is very different in its basic outline of events.   The tactics employed differ 
from those described by Kinnamos, while there is no suggestion of a Byzantine 
collapse.  Finally, the aftermath is fleshed out: we are told of Andronikos’ return to 
the capital, and the grand triumph he celebrated with Manuel to mark the victory.710  
The sources of the two historians may have been loosely similar in content but were 
obviously distinct. 
                                                 
709 Kinnamos: 270-274. 
710 Niketas Choniates, Chronike Diegesis: 151-158. 
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Kinnamos appears to have derived much of his information from Kontostephanos.  
The perspective offered is generally that of the general, and, perhaps more 
significantly, Kinnamos indicates that he was aware of Kontostephanos’ thinking.  So 
we learn that Andronikos did not consider the use of spies and scouts against the 
enemy useful,711 and that his familiarity with the Hungarian custom of placing their 
best troops in the front line led him to deploy his own men in the opposite fashion.  
Kinnamos even knows of Kontostephanos’ initial plan to have his archers part to the 
sides once the Hungarian mass drew near, a tactic which fails in practice.712  A 
detailed breakdown of the Byzantine army and the personnel involved strengthens the 
notion that Kinnamos was privy to information from high command.713  There is little, 
however, to indicate that Kinnamos relied upon the testimony of other participants.  A 
small degree of perspective is afforded to Hungarian commander Dionysios, but it is 
clear that Kinnamos did not have a source from the Hungarian side, as he remarks that 
Dionysios fled ‘in a fashion I am unable to relate’.714  Kinnamos describes the brave 
end of Demetrios Branas, though it is unlikely Demetrios’ brother George, a survivor 
of the battle, informed Kinnamos, given that George is alleged to have ‘lacked 
courage for the conflict’.715  More prominent is Andronikos Lampardas, whose pre-
emptive charge to save Kontostephanos helped swing the battle in favour of the 
                                                 
711 Kinnamos: 270. 
712 Ibid: 272. 
713 The Cumans and most of the Turks, together with lance-armed knights marched out first, followed 
by regiments of Byzantines commanded by Kogh Basil, Philokales and Tatikios Aspietes.  Infantry 
mixed with bowmen and an armoured body of Turks followed, and behind them marched Joseph 
Bryennios and the brothers George and Demetrios Branas, as well as Constantine Aspietes the 
sebastos.  Thereafter came the chartoularios Andronikos Lampardas with elite Romans, Germans and 
Turks, and probably John Kontostephanos.  In the rear was Andronikos Kontostephanos himself, with 
Italians and Serbs, armed with spears and wide shields (ibid: 271). 
714 µόλις ἐκείνου καὶ τρόπῳ ᾧπερ αὐτὸς ἐρεῖν οὐκ ἔχω τὸν κίνδυνον πεφευγότος (ibid: 274.4-5; trans. 
205). 
715 οὐκ ἐθάρρησε τὴν συµπλοκήν (ibid: 272.18-23; trans. 204). 
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Byzantines.716  It is said that Lampardas, along with Andronikos’ brother John 
Kontostephanos,717 distinguished themselves above all others in the battle.718  This 
partiality towards friend and kin supports the idea that Andronikos Kontostephanos 
was the source of Kinnamos’ information.  The pragmatic narrative, restricted focus 
from the perspective of the commander, and awareness of the composition and 
deployment of the army suggests that Kinnamos employed a report drafted by 
Andronikos. 
Choniates perhaps also relied upon Andronikos Kontostephanos for his account of the 
Battle of Sirmium.  Prior to the battle, it is reported that Andronikos ignored letters 
from the emperor urging him to delay the engagement due to ominous astrological 
readings.719  As Andronikos is reported to have hid the letter from his fellow officers, 
seemingly Choniates could only have learned this confidential detail from 
Kontostephanos himself.720  This idea might be supported by Choniates’ account of 
the Battle of Myriokephalon.  Here the historian discloses details about Manuel’s 
secret plan to flee, and since Kontostephanos is said to have been shocked by the 
proposal, Maisano argues that it was he who informed Choniates of this incident.721  
With Kontostephanos’ involvement in the attack on Damietta also described at 
                                                 
716 Ibid: 273. 
717 On a related note, Kinnamos’ account of John Kontostephanos’ victory over a Turkish force in late 
1161 is also suggestive of a report of the commander.  Kontostephanos, encountering a 22,000 strong 
Turkish army, moved to a nearby hill, and with the support of his men charged at the Turks, who 
retreated under the strain of the charge.  Kinnamos comments that numerous others achieved deeds 
worthy of mention, but it was Kontostephanos’ actions which shined above all others (ibid: 200-201).  
It seems therefore that John Kontostephanos was the source of this report.  Evidently, Kinnamos 
possessed testimony from the Kontostephanos brothers and was keen to describe their military feats in 
an appropriately grandiose manner. 
718 Ibid: 274.11-13. 
719 Niketas Choniates, Chronike Diegesis: 154.43-55. 
720 Simpson (2004): 220-221. 
721 Niketas Choniates, Chronike Diegesis: 187.  See Hunger (1978): I, 435; Maisano (1994a): 402-403. 
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length,722 the text points towards a connection between the historian and his subject.  
Kazhdan hypothesizes that Andronikos may have known Choniates personally, since 
the lands of the Kontostephanoi were in the valley of the Maeander River, near 
Chonai, the homeland of the author.723   
While there can be little doubt that Choniates sought to portray Kontostephanos in a 
positive light, it is difficult to argue that the historian based his entire account of the 
Battle of Sirmium on Kontostephanos’ personal testimony.  The knowledge of the 
command process evident in Kinnamos’ history is not displayed by Choniates.  Had 
Kontostephanos provided Choniates with his recollections of the battle, we would 
expect more details about his own feats; moreover, there is no mention of 
Kontostephanos’ heroic charge turning the tide of battle, as reported by Kinnamos.  
The lengthy speech given by Kontostephanos prior to the engagement, emphasizing 
Byzantine superiority over the ‘barbarian’ foe, is almost certainly a rhetorical 
invention on Choniates’ part.724  Identifying the sole source as Kontostephanos would 
also not account for the prominence afforded to Manuel.  The emperor converses with 
Kontostephanos, recommending tactics, equipment, and formations for the campaign.  
He also rouses his troops with a speech, promising gifts if they should be victorious; 
the men were moved by his words and hailed their emperor.725   
The involvement of Manuel and the subdued role of Kontostephanos suggests that 
Choniates’ utilized an official account of the expedition.  Though not physically 
present at Sirmium, Manuel nevertheless plays an important part.  Since Kinnamos 
                                                 
722 Niketas Choniates, Chronike Diegesis: 160-168.   
723 Kazhdan (1994): xlviii-xlix. 
724 Niketas Choniates, Chronike Diegesis: 154-155.  Maisano (1994a): 402.  For fictitious speeches of 
Choniates, see Simpson (2004): 233-237. 
725 Niketas Choniates, Chronike Diegesis: 152. 
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corroborates Manuel’s role in preparations, it appears that this image of Manuel as 
architect of the victory was widely propagated.726  Kontostephanos, nephew of the 
emperor and his most valued general, remains the subject of considerable attention in 
the account, and victory is rightly ascribed to him.  Yet the emperor’s prominent place 
in the subsequent triumph illustrates that he was keen to bask in the success.727  The 
triumph itself was laced with potent imagery, attested by the prominence Manuel 
afforded to an icon of the Virgin, placing it in a silver chariot and proceeding behind, 
very much like Tzimiskes.728  Though Manuel is reported to have dispatched a victory 
bulletin to the capital following the campaign,729 such a source obviously would not 
have discussed the triumph.  This would suggest that the official narrative was drafted 
in Constantinople after the campaign.  In any case, the triumphal procession 
underlined the significance of this victory to Manuel and his eagerness to exploit it.   
That Choniates’ source was an official account would also explain the seemingly 
sanitized report of the battle itself, which omits any mention of a momentary 
Byzantine collapse.  Kinnamos and Choniates describe the course of the battle using 
their own vocabulary and style – note, for example, Choniates’ customary Homeric 
references730 and his description of the armies moving back and forth ‘like an 
undulating serpent rattling its scales’, animal imagery prevalent in several of his 
                                                 
726 Kinnamos: 270.6-8.  Simpson (2004: 208) overlooks that Manuel’s guidance is mentioned by 
Choniates also. 
727 The emperor being followed by the victorious general appears to have been an innovation – see 
Magdalino (1993a): 241-242. It confirms the importance afforded to Kontostephanos but likewise 
serves as a reminder of the pre-eminence of the emperor. 
728 Niketas Choniates, Chronike Diegesis: 157-158. 
729 Ibid: 157.48-52. 
730 κατὰ γὰρ τὴν Ὁµηρικὴν καὶ τότε παράταξιν “ἀσπὶς ἀσπίδ’ ἔρειδε, κόρυς κόρυν, ἀνέρα δ’ ἀνήρ”, καὶ 
ἴσας εἶχον οἱ ἵπποι τὰς κεφαλάς, ἔφριξε δ’ ἡ µάχη ἐγχείῃσι φθισίµβροτος (ibid: 156.18-20; ref. Homer, 
Iliad: 13.131, 13.339, 16.215).  For Choniates’ use of Homer, see Vasilikopoulou-Ioannidou (1969); 
Maisano (2000); Saxey (2009). 
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descriptive passages.731  Thus it is all the more significant that both historians describe 
the Byzantine cavalry fighting in three progressive stages, using spears, swords, and 
maces, the lethal damage inflicted by the mace being noted in both narratives.732  
Corroborative testimony of the devastating effect of the Byzantine mace against the 
Hungarians may be found in a near-contemporary panegyric of Eustathios of 
Thessaloniki,733 demonstrating that this aspect of the fighting featured prominently in 
official accounts of the Battle of Sirmium.734 
The obvious problem with the hypothesis of an official account is the report of 
Kontostephanos ignoring the emperor’s guidance to postpone battle.  This episode 
could not have featured in an account distributed by the imperial court, and the 
suggestion is that Kontostephanos personally informed Choniates about the incident.  
It is telling that this marks the only point where Choniates intervenes critically, 
                                                 
731 κατὰ κινούµενον δράκοντα καὶ φρίσσοντα τὰς φολίδας ἐκύµαινον οἱ στρατοί (Niketas Choniates, 
Chronike Diegesis: 156.20-21; trans. 89). For Choniates’ use of animal imagery, see Littlewood 
(2007): esp. 249-253 for snakes. 
732 ὡς οὖν ἐδέξαντο τοῦτον Ῥωµαῖοι, διαδορατισµοὶ παρ’ ἀλλήλων ἦσαν καὶ ὠθισµοὶ καὶ ἀντωθισµοὶ 
µέχρι τινός· ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ δόρατα κατεάγη καὶ ἦν τὸ µεταίχµιον ἀποσχεδιασθὲν εἰς φραγµὸν τοῖς τῶν 
κοντῶν στοιβασµοῖς, τὰς ἐπιµήκεις ἐσέπειτα µαχαίρας ἐσπάσαντο καὶ αὖθις συµπεσόντες ἐµάχοντο. ὡς 
δ’ ἤδη καὶ αὗται τὰ στόµατα ἠµβλύνθησαν διὰ τὸ τῶν στρατευµάτων πάγχαλκον καὶ πανσίδηρον, οἱ 
µὲν Παίονες ἠµηχάνουν τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦδε µηδαµῶς κατὰ νοῦν θέµενοι ὡς ἐπιόντας αὐτοὺς Ῥωµαῖοι 
δέξονται, Ῥωµαῖοι δὲ µετὰ χεῖρας τὰς ἐκ σιδήρου κορύνας χειρισάµενοι (ἔθος δὲ αὐτοῖς καὶ τοιόνδε 
φέρειν ὁπλισµόν, ἡνίκα ἂν εἰς πόλεµον ἴοιεν) ἔπαιον τοὺς Παίονας δι’ αὐτῶν· καὶ ἦν καίριον µάλα τὸ 
πλῆγµα κατὰ κεφαλῆς καὶ προσώπων γινόµενον (Niketas Choniates, Chronike Diegesis: 156.23-
157.34); τῶν γὰρ δοράτων σφίσι κλασθέντων καὶ θρυβέντων ἤδη τῶν ξιφῶν, ταῖς κορύναις ἠλόων τοῖς 
κακοδαίµοσι τὰς κεφαλάς (Kinnamos: 273.23-274.2). 
733 εἰ δὲ κορύνην προβαλεῖται, ἣν σίδηρος µὲν ἐχορήγησεν, ἀνδρὸς δὲ δεξιότης εἰς τριβόλων ὀξύτητας 
ἐξηκάνθωσεν, ἐκτρέπονται τὸν κορυνηφόρον ἐκεῖνον οἱ Παίονες· καὶ τὴν ξενίαν ἀπείπαντο καὶ τούς τε 
ὀφθαλµοὺς ἐλόξωσαν καὶ τὸ ὅπλον ἀπέπτυσαν καὶ ἑαυτοὺς ἀπέστρεψαν (Eustathios, Orations: 211.91-
95). 
734 The use of the mace by Middle Byzantine heavy cavalry and its impact upon the enemy is attested 
by Nikephoros Ouranos (Taktika: §61.209-214; trans. 129): ‘The kataphraktoi...will smash in the heads 
and bodies of the enemy and their horses with their iron maces and sabres, they will break into and 
dismember their formations and from there break through and so completely destroy them’.  
Nikephoros Phokas (Praecepta Militaria: §III.53-60) advises that a lance-armed cavalryman also carry 
a sword and additional maces, suggesting that soldiers were well aware of the tendency of arms to be 
broken or lost in battle.  See also Kolias (1988): 173-185; McGeer (1995a): 216-217.  For further 
discussion of Byzantine arms at the Battle of Sirmium in particular, see Birkenmeier (2002): 122. 
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remarking of the emperor’s beliefs: ‘I do not know how it was that Manuel could put 
his trust in the conjunctions and positions and movements of the stars, and obey the 
prattle of astrologers as though they were equal to judgments coming from God’s 
throne’.735  The incident stands out as the only obvious criticism of Manuel in an 
otherwise favourable account of his conduct during the campaign.  It is, however, 
consistent with Choniates’ general presentation of the emperor, which entails 
denigration of Manuel’s interest in occult science.736  Indeed, one observes a 
remarkably similar case elsewhere in the Chronike Diegesis, where Choniates blames 
a naval defeat suffered by one Constantine Angelos in 1154 on the emperor’s 
steadfast belief in timing wars by astrology.737  Kinnamos, by contrast, attributes the 
defeat to the failings of Angelos, which included ignoring the emperor’s advice, 
though this guidance concerned not attacking a greater enemy, rather than astrological 
portents.738  This advice echoes that Manuel apparently gave to John Doukas, 
suggesting that Kinnamos or imperial publicists may have used this line of reasoning 
when seeking to distance the emperor from blame for military setbacks.  Manuel’s 
interest in occult science is well attested in contemporary encomia, leading Magdalino 
to suggest that Kinnamos may have deliberately played down this interest so as not to 
discredit his subject.739   
Nevertheless, it would be wrong to consider Choniates any more accurate than 
Kinnamos just because he dares to criticize Manuel.  For this dislike may have 
                                                 
735 ἀπετρέπετο δὲ ὡς ἀποφρὰς ἡ τότε ἡµέρα καὶ ὅλως ἀξύµφορος πρὸς τὴν κατ’ Ἄρεα συµβολήν, ἐπεὶ 
καὶ ἦν τὰς πλείστας καὶ µεγίστας τῶν πράξεων καὶ παρὰ θεοῦ τὸ πέρας κατ’ εὐδοκίαν εἴτε καὶ µὴ 
δεχοµένας ταῖς τῶν ἄστρων οὐκ οἶδ’ ὅπως περιπλοκαῖς καὶ ταῖς τοιαῖσδε θέσεσι καὶ κινήσεσιν 
ἐπανατιθεὶς καὶ τοῖς παρὰ τῶν ἀστρολεσχούντων λεγοµένοις καθυπαγόµενος ἴσα ταῖς ἐκ θρανίδος θεοῦ 
ἀποφάσεσιν (Niketas Choniates, Chronike Diegesis: 154.49-55; trans. 87) 
736 Magdalino (2006): 146-150. 
737 Niketas Choniates: Chronike Diegesis: 96. 
738 Kinnamos: 120-121. 
739 Magdalino (2006): 145-150, 155-156. 
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influenced him to insert fictional elements, with Choniates not averse to overlooking 
historical accuracy in favour of narrative effectiveness.740  Choniates drafted several 
versions and revisions of his Chronike Diegesis, with the initial draft completed prior 
to 1204 and the last finished c.1215-1217.  For various reasons, Choniates only added 
explicit criticism of Manuel in the final version, including condemnation of Manuel’s 
belief in astrology.  Whereas in the prior version Choniates drew attention to the 
‘thoughtless’ conduct of Constantine Angelos and merely implied that Manuel was to 
blame, the later revision stresses Manuel’s culpability and presents the expedition as a 
complete farce.741  Another major addition was Kontostephanos’ rejection of the 
emperor’s advice prior to the Battle of Sirmium.742  As this episode was not part of 
Choniates’ initial account, it is doubtful that it originated in his main source for the 
campaign.  Simpson considers it ‘likely’ that the insertions are based on ‘information 
that the historian had acquired at the time of the original composition, but felt he 
should not include’.743  Whether or not the relevant information was from Andronikos 
Kontostephanos, or even true, is unknown.  We may at least say that it was added by 
Choniates to discredit Manuel and his irrational belief that victory was dependent on 
the position of the stars, and also to give Kontostephanos greater credit for the 
success.   
While similar, the pragmatic report of Kontostephanos rendered by Kinnamos 
presents a different reality to the bulletin underlying Choniates’ account: the narrow 
perspective affords no place for the emperor; Andronikos is commended along with 
those closest to him; and generally the course of battle is outlined in a more realistic 
                                                 
740 Simpson (2009): 28-29. 
741 See Simpson (2004): 105-107. 
742 For the insertions, particularly those damaging to Manuel’s reputation, see ibid: 112-115, 278-281. 
743 Ibid: 208. 
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fashion.  There is little to suggest that Kinnamos altered his original source in this 
instance.  Choniates’ use of his source for the Battle of Sirmium however is consistent 
with his general treatment of written material.  He did not copy verbatim from the 
works of Kinnamos and Eustathios of Thessaloniki, but modified passages, added 
rhetorical elements, and manipulated content for his own purposes.744  While it is 
impossible to ascertain what alterations Niketas made to the original account of the 
battle, the addition of a section condemning Manuel’s astrological interests formed 
part of a wider argument reflecting his criticism of Manuel and admiration for 
Kontostephanos. 
                                                 
744 Ibid: 204-217. 
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Conclusion 
In the classical tradition, historians of the Middle Byzantine period provide scant 
information about their source material.  While Anna Komnene offers surprisingly 
substantial discussion of her sources, her concern for veracity leads to misgivings over 
her stated historical method.  Yet since these authors were writing about wars in 
which they took no part, some having occurred decades before they were born, they 
must have consulted sources in a position to inform them of these events.  Historians 
assert a preference for interviewing eyewitnesses, but this nod to Thucydides was 
often little more than an attempt to bolster their claims to credence.  Texts and 
documents were in all probability chief among the sources examined by historians 
when seeking information on warfare - encomia, official campaign narratives, 
histories, reports, memoirs, biographies, and written correspondence.  Of course, how 
these historians related this information is another matter, and the most severe 
obstacle in any attempt to reconstruct the underlying source.  While synoptic 
chroniclers such as Skylitzes appear to have followed their material closely, 
classicizing historians such as Leo the Deacon, Anna Komnene and Niketas Choniates 
insisted on greater individuality, adhering to the basic historical framework of the 
source but ensuring it conformed to their wider historical programme.  This practice 
invariably involved the imposition of rhetorical models, the use of mimesis, alteration 
of emphasis, subversion, omission, and perhaps even invention.  Such tactics enabled 
historians to present something new with the information and, perhaps more 
significantly, with their own personal commentary, not so much through offering their 
own opinion, but in how events might be presented.   
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Having touched upon the sources consulted by historians when recounting military 
events, the following chapters offer more detailed examination of the various types of 
material potentially exploited.  We begin with the most obvious way a writer might 
learn of distant events – dispatches and written correspondence sent from the front.  
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CHAPTER II. DISPATCHES, BULLETINS AND THE CIRCULATION OF 
MILITARY NEWS IN BYZANTIUM 
The notion that the Byzantines drafted reports chronicling a particular campaign or 
battle is not new.  In 1983 James Howard-Johnston determined that much 
documentary material, ‘drawn primarily from military dispatches and imperial 
bulletins’, lies embedded in many Byzantine texts.  Howard-Johnston stated his 
intention to apply Quellenkritik to texts in order to identify the use of bulletins and 
dispatches, noting that others had begun to carry out similar investigations on the 
works of Early Byzantine historians, including Theophylact Simocatta.745  This 
statement presumably refers to Michael Whitby’s then ongoing research; Whitby has 
since proposed that dispatches do indeed underlie parts of the narrative of 
Simocatta.746  Howard-Johnston has fulfilled his stated intent for the seventh-century 
Chronicon Paschale and the Chronographia of Theophanes, as will be seen.  
Elsewhere, he suggests that Leo the Deacon based his narrative of Tzimiskes’ 
campaign against the Rus’ on a set of imperial dispatches.747 Finally, Howard-
Johnston’s controversial study of the Alexiad alleges Anna Komnene’s use of files 
containing official reports and documents.748 
Howard-Johnston is not alone in proposing the existence of such sources.  Veselin 
Beševliev suggests that a number of victory bulletins were issued between the seventh 
and early-ninth century, and underlie the narratives of the Patriarch Nikephoros and 
Theophanes.749  Michael McCormick offers general thoughts on bulletins, without 
                                                 
745 Howard-Johnston (1983): 265 n.22. 
746 Michael Whitby (1988): esp. 94-105. 
747 Howard-Johnston (2001): 302-303. 
748 Idem (1996). 
749 Beševliev (1974). 
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advancing any detailed hypotheses for particular examples.750  With these musings in 
mind, this chapter examines campaign dispatches and bulletins, as well as other 
methods by which military news circulated within and beyond the Byzantine Empire.  
It will be shown that regular written reports from the front satisfied a public and 
private interest in distant military operations.  The composition, form, and veracity of 
dispatches and bulletins will be discussed, along with the potential storage of such 
documents, raising the wider issue of Byzantine historians and their use of archives 
and documentary material.  Through this insight, we may, in the following chapter, 
examine the extent to which two historians of the Middle Byzantine period drew upon 
bulletins and associated correspondence when describing imperial campaigns.   
                                                 
750 McCormick (1986): 192-194.  
152 
I. Military News in Byzantium – Campaign Dispatches and Bulletins 
The Byzantine practice of dispatching reports following military actions maintained a 
long-established tradition.  Simon Hornblower suggests that the written reports of 
generals were consulted by Thucydides,751 though he has found little support with this 
theory; scholars doubt the existence of an ‘official record’ of the Battle of 
Marathon,752 while Rosalind Thomas does not acknowledge the potential existence of 
such items in the largely oral society of Classical Athens.753  The situation becomes 
clearer during the Hellenistic period.  At Republican Rome, campaigning consuls sent 
regular updates to the senate, informing them of their progress.754  With the transition 
to empire, generals and officials were obliged to inform the emperor of their 
experiences,755 and the evidence suggests this remained standard procedure in Late 
Antiquity.756  It was this process, and not, as Beševliev mooted, the ‘res gestae’ 
practice associated with inscriptions and epitaphs, which lay behind the Byzantine 
custom of sending dispatches from the field.757   
 
 
                                                 
751 Hornblower (1987): 39-40. 
752 Gomme (1952): 81; Whatley (1964): 122; Hammond (1968): 47; Evans (1993): 289, 303-307; 
Doenges (1998): 1. 
753 R. Thomas (1992): esp. 221-237, where it is argued that the official tradition of military victories at 
Athens was most probably oral rather than written. 
754 For insight and examples see Norden (1920): 434-439; L. Halkin (1953): 80-87; Sherk (1974); 
Austin & Rankov (1995): 95. 
755 Eckstein (1987) argues that generals had relative free rein during the Republican period, though this 
changed under the empire, where generals and provincial governors communicated with the emperor 
more frequently, and received mandata designating their duties – see Millar (1977): 207-208, 215-216, 
313-341. 
756 For victory dispatches from the Roman Empire of Late Antiquity, see McCormick (1986): 17-18, 
39-44; Lee (2007): 38.   
757 Beševliev (1974), corrected by McCormick (1977): 219 n.30. 
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Dispatches and Reports in Prescriptive Literature 
References in a treatise on imperial military expeditions, coupled with supporting 
evidence, confirm the high level of correspondence between a ruler and his 
subordinates.  Leo Katakylas’ treatise on imperial campaigns records that Constantine 
the Great gave instructions to his representative in Constantinople to forward ‘reports’ 
(τὰ µανδάτα) received in his absence on campaign,758 and it is known that emperors 
received military reports from their subordinates whilst in the field.759  Katakylas’ 
treatise also prescribes that the emperor’s deputy at Constantinople write to border 
commanders and receive a response in turn;760 we can deduce that this practice was 
standard when the emperor himself was in the capital.761  Supporting evidence is 
provided by speeches Constantine VII composed for troops serving on the eastern 
frontier.  The first of these, thought to have followed a victorious campaign of 950, 
opens with an explicit reference to receipt of information: 
What great things I have heard about you, and what great tidings have been 
brought back to me through the reports of my faithful servants, for they have 
given me accurate information, they have given me a true account of your valour, 
                                                 
758 Constantine VII, Text B: ll.63-64.  For discussion of the exact meaning of τὰ µανδάτα in this 
context, see Haldon (1990): 163; also Koutrakou (1995a): 132. 
759 John II Komnenos was apparently forced to abandon his siege of Shaizar on account of reports 
(ἀγγελίαι) that Edessa would fall to the Turks without aid (Niketas Choniates, Chronike Diegesis: 
30.87-90), while Alexios I was at Acheloos when he received reports (λόγοις) of Cuman activity 
around Adrianople (Anna Komnene: X.4.1.90-92). 
760 καὶ διὰ τοῦτο µάλιστα γράφειν τε συνεχῶς καὶ δέχεσθαι ἐκ τῶν ἄκρων θεµάτων, καὶ κατασκοπεῖν τὰ 
τῶν γειτόνων ἐχθρῶν, καὶ µανθάνειν καὶ ἀναδιδάσκειν (Constantine VII, Text B: ll.69-71). 
761 Such instructions are noted by Kekaumenos (166-168). 
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the…spirit you have displayed against the enemy, and how you were embroiled 
in combat...762 
At the conclusion of this logos parakletikos, Constantine addresses his officials:  
I therefore administer this oath to you in the name of God...that you will inform 
Our Majesty about all events...Better yet, you will keep written records, so that 
when you come here you may tell us, in order that we will look with favour upon 
the men and deem them worthy of our praises and rewards...763 
The second of Constantine’s speeches, delivered in 958 to a large army stationed near 
Mesopotamia, confirms that reports provided by trusted servants were the emperor’s 
usual means of gaining information about his frontier forces: ‘We have learned 
through dispatches from the same most illustrious men and our most worthy 
attendants...’764  Later in the exhortation, Constantine again reminds the troops that 
                                                 
762 ...(ἀ)κούων ὑµῶν, ὦ ἄνδρες, τὴν ἐκ τῶν ἔργων µεγίστην εὔκλειαν, οὐκ οἶδα ποῖον ὑµῖν τὸν ἔπαινον 
ἐκ βασιλικῆς ἄρτι πλέξω τῆς γλώττης· οἷα γὰρ ἤκουσταί µοι περὶ ὑµῶν καὶ οἷα διὰ τῆς ἀναφορᾶς 
ἀνηγγέλη τῶν ἐµῶν πιστῶν θεραπόντων.  Ἐκεῖνοι γάρ µοι κατεµήνυσαν ἀκριβῶς, ἐκεῖνοι τὴν ὑµῶν 
ἀρετὴν φιλαλήθως ἐγνώρισαν, πόσην µὲν τὴν ἀνδρείαν, πόσην δὲ τὴν ὁρµήν, πόσην δὲ τὴν κατὰ τῶν 
πολεµίων ἐπεδείξασθε γενναιότητα, καὶ ὅπως οὐχ ὡς πρὸς ἄνδρας ἦτε διαµαχόµενοι ἀλλὰ γυναικῶν, 
οἷον ἀθλίων, κατεπαιρόµενοι (Constantine VII, Military Oration of the Emperor Constantine VII: 
397.1-7; trans. 117) 
763 Ὀρκίζω τοιγαροῦν ὑµᾶς καὶ εἰς Θ(εὸ)ν...περὶ πάντων καταµηνῦσαι τῷ ἡµετέρῳ κράτει καθὼς 
ἕκαστος ἀρετῆς ἔχει καὶ προθυµίας.  Μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ ἐγγράφως ἀποσηµήνασθαι, ἵνα καὶ ἐνταῦθα 
εἰσελθόντες ἡµῖν ἀναγγείλητε, ὥστε καὶ ἡδέως αὐτοὺς ὄψεσθαι, καὶ τῶν παρ’ ἡµῶν ἐπαίνων ἀξιῶσαι 
καὶ ἀντιλήψεων...’Αλλὰ νῦν µὲν δι’ ὑµῶν δεχοµένων ἡµῶν τὴν περὶ ἑκάστου πληροφορίαν, µετ’ 
ὀλίγον δὲ οὐθ’ ὑµᾶς, οὔτε τινὰς ἄλλους µάρτυρας τῶν τοιούτων, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἡµετέρους µόνους 
ὀφθαλµοὺς ἔξοµεν, καὶ αὐτοὶ παρόντες, αὐτοὶ τὴν ἑκάστου βλέποντες ἀρετήν, αὐτοὶ καὶ τὰ βραβεῖα 
τοῖς ἀγωνιζοµένοις παρέξοµεν (ibid: 399.82-96; trans. 120). 
764 Ἐπεὶ δὲ διὰ γραµµάτων τῶν αὐτῶν περιφανεστάτων ἀνδρῶν καὶ ἀξιολογωτάτων ἡµῶν θεραπόντων 
ἀνεδιδάχθηµεν, ὡς ἤδη κατὰ τὴν ἡµετέραν πρόσταξιν, µᾶλλον δὲ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ Θεοῦ νεῦσιν καὶ ῥοπὴν 
πᾶν µὲν τὸ ἀχρεῖον καὶ πρὸς πολέµους ἀνεπιτήδειον ἀπεβάλοντο, ὅσον δὲ γενναῖον καὶ χρήσιµον καὶ 
τῶν ἄλλων προκινδυνεῦον προὔκρινάν τε καὶ είς πολέµους ἀφώρισαν, καὶ πάσῃ ἐπιµελείᾳ καὶ σπουδῇ 
καὶ φιλοπόνοις ἀγρυπνίαις πρὸς εὐταξίαν καὶ κατάστασιν ὑµῶν ἐχρήσαντο, καὶ µέλλουσιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι 
τῆς βασιλείας ἡµῶν δοῦλοι ἀναλαβέσθαι ὑµᾶς, ὡς ἤδη κατηρτισµένους καὶ ἡτοιµασµένους καὶ πρὸς 
ταξείδιον ἀποκινῆσαι καὶ κατὰ τῶν ἐχθρῶν ὁρµῆσαι, ὅπου παρὰ τῆς βασιλείας ἡµῶν διωρίσθησαν, ἡ 
µὲν χαρὰ ἡµῶν εἰς τὸ ἀπειροπλάσιον ηὐξήθη (Constantine VII, Address of the Emperor Constantine 
VII to the Strategoi of the East: 3.1-12; trans. 129). 
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their courage and deeds would be witnessed by ‘representatives of Our Majesty who 
are taking my place’.765  While we cannot be sure if such imperial assessors were used 
to record the actions of subordinates at other times in Byzantine history,766 the 
speeches of Constantine VII confirm the necessity to emperors of regular reports 
detailing military activities in distant lands. 
References to Dispatches and Reports in the Sources 
Explicit references to emperors receiving a post-action report from subordinates in 
Byzantine literature are reasonably common.  Justinian I was sent a letter recounting 
the events of the Battle of Callinicum by the magister officiorum Hermogenes;767 
later, another report was sent by Hermogenes concerning a battle between Roman and 
Persian forces.768  Michael III received a letter from his domestikos ton scholon 
reporting that the emir of Melitene was pillaging areas of Asia Minor.769  Andrew the 
stratelates, having won a great victory over the Arabs of Tarsos, reported the success 
to Basil I.770  Bardas Phokas reported his success over Bardas Skleros in a letter to 
Basil II.771  Constantine Arianites wrote to Constantine IX Monomachos documenting 
the disastrous loss to the Pechenegs at Diampolis.772  Having completed his 
reconquest of Crete and Cyprus, John Doukas sent a ‘full report’ of the success to 
                                                 
765 ἔχετε τοὺς τὴν ὑµῶν κατοψοµένους ἀνδρείαν τοὺς ἀντιπροσώπους τῆς βασιλείας ἡµῶν καὶ τὸν 
τόπον ἡµῶν ἀναπληροῦντας (ibid: 4.21-23, trans. 130).  
766 Catherine Holmes (2012: 67) has intriguingly argued that Constantine was forced to send officials to 
keep tabs on the army since progress reports from the front were not forthcoming. 
767 ὁ µάγιστρος ἐδήλωσεν τῷ βασιλεῖ Ῥωµαίων. καὶ ἐντυχὼν τοῖς γράµµασιν ὁ βασιλεὺς 
Ἰουστινιανός... (John Malalas: 18.60 [389.55-57]). 
768 µήνυσις κατεπέµφθη παρὰ Ἑρµογένους (ibid: 18.65 [391.25-26]). 
769 καὶ ἐπὶ τούτῳ στυγνάσαντος µὲν τοῦ πρωτονοταρίου, ἀπαγγείλαντος δὲ µετὰ κατηφείας τὴν ἐκ τοῦ 
δοµεστίκου τῶν σχολῶν ἀπόκρισιν καὶ ἅµα ἐπὶ χεῖρας τὰ γράµµατα φέροντός τε καὶ δεικνύοντος 
(Theophanes Continuatus: 198.20-199.3). 
770 ἔγραψε δὲ καὶ τῷ βασιλεῖ δηλοποιήσας τὴν νίκην (Skylitzes: 144.43). 
771 Τῆς δὲ τοῦ Σκληροῦ τροπῆς ἀγγελθείσης τῷ βασιλεῖ διὰ γραµµάτων τοῦ Φωκᾶ καὶ τῆς εἰς 
Βαβυλῶνα ἀναχωρήσεως (ibid: 327.30-31). 
772 ὁ µὲν οὖν µάγιστρος ὑπέστρεψεν ἐν Ἀδριανουπόλει, τῷ βασιλεῖ δὲ διὰ γραµµάτων ἄγγελος τοῦ 
ἀτυχήµατος γίνεται (ibid: 467.88-90). 
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Alexios I Komnenos.773  Michael Italikos’ basilikos logos to John II Komnenos notes 
the dispatch of ‘τὰ βασιλικὰ…γράµµατα’ disclosing news of the emperor’s success in 
Cilicia and northern Syria in 1137-1138.774  Following Manuel I Komnenos’ 
campaign in Serbia over the course of 1149-1150, ‘he wrote a letter of good tidings to 
the inhabitants of the City indicating the recent achievements’.775  The same emperor, 
when informed of Andronikos Kontostephanos’ victory over the Hungarians at 
Sirmium, ‘communicated these cheering successes to the inhabitants of the queen of 
cities, [and] dispatched letters of glad tidings heralding the splendid victory’.776  In 
1176, after the defeat at Myriokephalon, ‘messengers were sent on ahead’ to inform 
Constantinople of the setback.777  We will return to these references and discuss 
numerous others over the course of this chapter and the next. 
Whenever a token of victory was dispatched to the emperor, it appears that a report 
accompanied the prize.778  In 552, news came from Narses at Rome recounting his 
victory over Totila, king of the Goths, with Totila’s bloodstained robe and cap 
brought before the emperor.779  A decade later, news of Narses’ capture of Verona and 
Brescia from the Goths reached Constantinople; according to one account, the keys of 
                                                 
773 τῷ αὐτοκράτορι τὰ συµπεσόντα ἅπαντα διὰ γραµµάτων δηλώσαντες (Anna Komnene: IX.2.3.79-
80). 
774 Michael Italikos: 248.7-8.  Paul Gautier (1972: 232 n.3, 248 n.17) determined that the letter 
probably announced the submission of Antioch and the capture of Leo of Armenia. 
775 καὶ γράµµα εὐθὺς εὐάγγελον ἐχαράττετο τοῖς τῆς πόλεως σηµαῖνον οἰκητορσι τὰ ἐξ ὑπογυίου ταυτὶ 
κατορθώµατα (Niketas Choniates, Chronike Diegesis: 90.2-4; trans. 53). 
776 κοινούµενος δὲ τοῖς τῆς βασιλίδος οἰκήτορσι πόλεως ταῦτα δὴ τὰ εὐφρόσυνα κατορθώµατα 
γράµµατα εὐάγγελα στέλλει τὴν τροπαιουχίαν περισαλπίζοντα (ibid: 157.48-52; trans. 89). 
777 προεκπέµψας δ’ ἀγγέλους τὰ συµβεβηκότα ταῦτα τοῖς Κωνσταντινουπολίταις παρίστα (ibid: 
191.26-33; trans. 108). 
778 See, in general, McCormick (1977); idem (1986): 166-167, 190-191, on the Roman practice of 
commanders sending booty or some other item back to the capital with their victory letters as proof – a 
σύµβολον τῆς νίκης.  For physical tokens providing credibility for military reports in the late medieval 
world, see Ong (1982): 97. 
779 ἐπινίκια ἦλθον ἀπὸ Ῥώµης ἀπὸ Ναρσοῦ (John Malalas: 18.116 [415.7-11]); ἐπινίκια ἦλθον ἀπὸ 
Ῥώµης Ναρσῆ (Theophanes: 228.18-24).  Procopius (Wars: VIII.33.27) reveals that the keys to Rome 
were sent to Justinian immediately following the city’s capture, so it is probable they too were included 
with the dispatch. 
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the cities were included among the accompanying spoils.780  In 589/590, Heraclius the 
Elder won a victory over the Persians, and sent a number of captured items to 
Emperor Maurice as proof of his success; together with the haul, Maurice also 
received ‘the general’s missives announcing victory’.781  With the Paulicians defeated 
and their leader Chrysocheir beheaded, ‘news was immediately sent to the emperor 
along with the head of Chrysocheir’.782  Again during Basil I’s reign, we read that 
whilst on campaign with his son Constantine, he received ‘news of victory’ (ἐπινικίων 
ἀγγελίας) from troops fighting in Koloneia and Mesopotamia, along with booty and a 
number of prisoners.783  After the suppression of the rebellion of George Maniakes, a 
messenger was sent to the Emperor Constantine IX Monomachos with ‘news of the 
victory’ (τὰ εὐαγγέλια τῆς νίκης), while the commander, the sebastophoros Stephen, 
followed a few days later with prisoners and the head of Maniakes.784  We may 
conclude that a report detailing the success would have been delivered alongside 
tokens of victory.785 
                                                 
780 ἐπινίκια ἦλθον ἀπὸ Ῥώµης ἀπὸ Ναρσοῦ (John Malalas: 18.140 [425.29-32]); ἐπινίκια ἦλθον ἀπὸ 
Ῥώµης Ναρσοῦ... (Theophanes: 237.13-15). 
781 τὰς νικηφόρους συλλαβὰς ὑπὸ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ (Theophylact Simocatta: 3.6.5; trans. 80).  
Theophanes (262.10-14) records celebrations but makes no mention of any victory letter. 
782 εὐθὺς οὗν εὐαγγέλια πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα ἐκπέµπονται, µεθ’ ὧν ἦν καὶ ἡ τοῦ Χρυσόχειρος κεφαλή 
(Skylitzes: 140.36-37).  The Vita Basilii, upon which this report of Skylitzes was based, states that the 
head was accompanied by ‘bearers of the good news’ (µετὰ τῶν τῆς χαρᾶς ἀγγέλων – §43.27-28). 
Genesios (IV.37) mentions the sending of the head but makes no mention of an accompanying report. 
783 Vita Basilii: §49.15-19; Skylitzes: 143.11-14 (ἐπινικίους ἀγγελίας). 
784 Skylitzes: 428.92-95.  Michael Psellos (Chronographia: II, 6 [LXXXVI]), however, reports that the 
emperor was presented with Maniakes’ head before his army returned to the capital, suggesting that it 
may have accompanied the victory dispatch.  Since Psellos was serving at court at this time, his version 
of events is perhaps to be preferred.   
785 There are many instances of generals dispatching tokens to the emperor with no mention of a report.  
Numerous examples appear in Procopius’ Wars: when the general John defeated the forces of Solomon 
in Libya, he sent captured standards back to the emperor (IV.28.46); in 536, Belisarius sent Leuderis, 
commander of the Goths, to the emperor, along with the keys to the Asinarian and Flaminian Gates of 
Rome (V.14.15); in 547, after fitting gates to the circuit-wall of Rome on each side following its second 
capture, Belisarius sent the keys to the emperor (VII.24.34); following a Roman victory, four Persian 
standards were sent to Justinian in Constantinople (VIII.14.43).  Further examples appear in Skylitzes: 
after his successful defence of Telouch, George Maniakes cut off the noses and ears of the enemy dead 
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Terminology, Delivery, and Authorship 
The Byzantines do not appear to have had a specific term to denote bulletins and 
dispatches.  The Chronicon Paschale uses the term ἀποκρίσεις, though σάκραι 
appears in the Chronographia of Theophanes Confessor and the ninth-century 
Scriptor Incertus.786  Theophanes, following John Malalas, also employs the term 
ἐπινίκια in reference to victory bulletins.787  Used more often than not, however, is 
simply a form of γράµµα.  These dispatches were often read out before an audience in 
Constantinople.  A bulletin of Heraclius which reached Constantinople in 628 was 
delivered from the ambo in the Hagia Sophia, possibly by the Patriarch Sergius.788  In 
later times we find the Emperor Theophilos regaling a crowd with stories of his 
exploits from a special platform erected before the Brazen House,789 and Eustathios 
Kamytzes speaking of his deeds and those of the Emperor Alexios in the Forum.790  
                                                                                                                                            
and sent them to Emperor Romanos III (Skylitzes: 382).  In approval, Romanos appointed Maniakes 
katepano of Lower Media; Maniakes later captured Edessa, and sent back to Constantinople the famed 
letter of Christ to the Armenian ruler Abgar (ibid: 387).  After defeating a Russian army near Varna, 
Katakalon Kekaumenos sent 800 captives to the emperor (ibid: 433).  Anna Komnene relates that her 
father Alexios sent the rebel Nikephoros Bryennios the Elder as a prize of war to Nikephoros III 
Botaneiates (Anna Komnene: I.6.7).  Anna also reports that the general Kantakouzenos was keen to 
impress Alexios with his victory, and so he had the heads of Normans stuck on spears and delivered to 
the emperor, along with his most illustrious captives (ibid: XIII.6.2).  Reference to Kantakouzenos 
sending counts and further prisoners following a subsequent victory suggests this was a favoured 
practice of the general (ibid: XIII.6.6). 
786 See below, 184-187. 
787 See references above, 155-157.  For further discussion on the term ἐπινίκια in particular, see 
McCormick (1986): 39-40. 
788 See below, 175-180 for discussion of Heraclius’ dispatch.  That patriarchs discussed secular military 
events with their flock is confirmed by the homilies of Photios on the Russian attack of 860 (Patriarch 
Photios, Homilies: 82-110) and also the sermon of Nicholas on the Arab sack of Thessaloniki in 904 
(Nicholas Mystikos, Sermon on the Sack of Thessaloniki).  For the idea that the church was responsible 
for the dissemination of campaign reports to their flock in the twelfth century, see Magdalino (1993a): 
314. 
789 See below, 160.  For the Brazen House, see Mango (1959). 
790 Anna Komnene: XIV.6.6. 
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This corroborates the thoughts of McCormick, who argues that public announcements 
were delivered in the Forum by the eleventh century.791   
Responsibility for drafting imperial dispatches and bulletins fell to imperial 
secretaries and officials.  In a letter to the logothetes, Stephen Meles, sent c.1137-
1138, Michael Italikos expresses his awareness that a victory letter purportedly 
written by the Emperor John II Komnenos was actually composed by Meles.792  We 
cannot confirm that the logothetes tou dromou or other logothetoi were responsible 
for the composition of bulletins,793 though Constantine Manasses’ eulogy for Michael 
Hagiotheodorites, logothetes under Manuel I Komnenos, corroborates the notion,794 
while the epitaph of logothetes Demetrios Tornikios records that he drafted a victory 
letter whilst campaigning with Isaac II Angelos in the late twelfth century.795  Before 
him, Niketas Choniates, serving as logothetes ton sekreton under Isaac, appears to 
have composed a victory bulletin describing the emperor’s successful campaign 
against the Vlachs and Cumans in 1187, intended for the patriarch in 
Constantinople.796  In 1246-1247, imperial secretary and future megas logothetes 
George Akropolites assisted in the writing of victory letters on behalf of the emperor 
of Nicaea, John III Vatatzes, following the acquisition of territory in Macedonia and 
                                                 
791 For further discussion of how and where victory bulletins may have been delivered in 
Constantinople, see McCormick (1986): 192-194. 
792 Michael Italikos: 231-234. 
793 D. Miller (1976) omits this function from his proposed list of duties of the logothetes tou dromou.  
Rodolphe Guilland (1971: 36) at least mentions the logothetes tou dromou being responsible for the 
dispatch of imperial directives to the provinces. 
794 Constantine Manasses, Eulogy for Michael Hagiotheodorites: 180-181. 
795 καὶ τί δεῖ τὰ πολλὰ λέγειν; Γράµµατα κοσµοχαρῆ τε καὶ εὐάγγελα τοῖς ἐν ἀρχείοις καὶ τοῖς ἐν τέλει 
γράφειν ἐπισκήπτει τῷ λογοθετῃ (Euthymios Tornikios: 100-102, esp. 100.25-101.2).  For the 
campaign and Demetrios’ involvement, see Darrouzès (1968): 100 n.9. 
796 Niketas Choniates, Orations and Letters: 6-12.  For discussion, see van Dieten (1971): 65-79; Wolff 
(1949): 184 n.43; Stephenson (2000): 292.  For the duties of the logothetes ton sekreton, see Guilland 
(1971): 75-84, esp. 80-81 for Niketas Choniates. 
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Bulgaria.797  On the basis of this evidence, Paul Gautier determines bulletin writing to 
have been a regular function of the various forms of logothetes.798 
Italikos suggests that the emperor was billed as the author of campaign dispatches, 
even if the reality was quite different.  In 1069, Michael Psellos was entrusted with 
the delivery of news as he returned to Constantinople ahead of the expeditionary 
army.  Writing to the emperor, Psellos relates that the populace was shocked by this 
novel mode of broadcast, since they were apparently used to the emperor himself 
heralding the victory or putting it to writing.799  Psellos concludes by urging Romanos 
to return so that he might report his deeds personally.800  That this practice was 
common is suggested by record of the Emperor Theophilos making ‘a speech himself 
on the successes of the war’ upon his triumphant return from campaign in 837.801  In 
any case, the evidence indicates a prominent imperial involvement in the composition 
and delivery of dispatches. 
Public and Private Interest in Military News 
There are few explicit references to how a report or bulletin was received by the 
populace of Constantinople.  The citizens of the capital are said to have been 
delighted with news sent by Heraclius in 626,802 while Psellos notes the joyous 
reaction at court, among the clergy and indeed of the entire public to news of 
                                                 
797 ἐγὼ δὲ αὐτὸς ἐν τοῖς ἐπιστολιµαίοις τῶν λόγων ὑπούργουν, ἑκάστῳ τῶν ἁλισκοµένων ἄστεών τε καὶ 
χωρῶν καὶ γραφὴν ἐγχαράττων βασιλικήν (Akropolites: 79.1-3).  For identification of these ‘imperial 
letters’ as victory bulletins, see Macrides (2007): 235 n.22.  For the duties of the megas logothetes, see 
Guilland (1971): 110-115, esp. 104-106 for Akropolites. 
798 Gautier (1972): 232 n.4. 
799 See below, 164 n.825. 
800 Psellos, Letters: 224-227. 
801 δηµηγορήσας ἀφ’ ἑαυτοῦ τὰ περὶ τῆς ἐπιτυχίας τοῦ πολέµου (Constantine VII, Text C: ll.867-868; 
trans. 151).  
802 Theophanes: 312-313.  See Mary Whitby (1998): 250-251 for the morale-boosting qualities of 
commemorative works chronicling military successes under Heraclius. 
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Romanos IV Diogenes’ successes.803  Anna Komnene reveals that people were eager 
to learn of Eustathios Kamytzes’ exploits against the Turks, and keener still to hear 
about those of the emperor.  The whole city apparently buzzed with excitement over 
Alexios’ heroics.804   
These authors could be accused of exaggerating the public response, but the general 
interest in military events beyond Constantinople is affirmed by the case of 
Thessaloniki.  Given its close proximity and status as the second city of the empire, it 
might be expected that the people of the capital had a particular concern over its 
welfare.  Howard-Johnston has suggested that the second book of the seventh-century 
Miracles of Saint Demetrios derives much of its information from an official account 
of the Avar-Slav siege of Thessaloniki in 586, perhaps compiled from contemporary 
dispatches intended for Constantinople.805  Shortly after the Arab sack of Thessaloniki 
in 904, Patriarch Nicholas I Mystikos delivered a moralizing sermon on the disaster in 
the Hagia Sophia;806 the lack of any real detail suggests his audience were already 
familiar with events.  Thessaloniki was again sacked in 1185, and, according to 
Niketas Choniates, the Emperor Andronikos I Komnenos delivered a ‘public address’ 
(δηµηγορῶν) in which he played down the significance of the incident.807  For the 
well-educated, a counterbalance was eventually provided in the form of the 
Archbishop Eustathios’ shocking account of the assault.808   
                                                 
803 Psellos, Letters: 224-227. 
804 Anna Komnene: XIV.6.6-7. 
805 Howard-Johnston (2010): 152-154. 
806 Nicholas Mystikos, Sermon on the Sack of Thessaloniki. 
807 Niketas Choniates, Chronike Diegesis: 320.88-91. 
808 Leone (1964) proposed that Eustathios’ Capture of Thessaloniki began life as a brief sermon 
delivered to the people of Thessaloniki in Lent 1186, before it was expanded into a literary work and 
suitably embellished, presumably for wider readership among the literati of the empire.  This at least 
hints at a purpose of informing the wider population about a provincial military event.  
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The correspondence of two notable literati indicates a personal demand for up-to-date 
information on military affairs.  In a letter to Andronikos Doukas, who was at that 
time campaigning against Romanos Diogenes, Michael Psellos attests to the great 
anticipation and subsequent joy at court when messengers arrived with news of 
Andronikos’ success.809  At other times, Psellos complains that news of military 
enterprises was not forthcoming or appropriately relayed.  Writing to Isaac I 
Komnenos, Psellos bemoaned that he was unable to write an encomium, since he was 
ignorant of the emperor’s Danubian campaign.810  In 1068, Psellos wrote to one 
Eustratios Choirosphaktes, praising the reported achievements of Romanos Diogenes, 
but at the same time questioning why news of his successes had not been more loudly 
proclaimed - with a trumpet-blast - in Constantinople.811  In his aforementioned letter 
to Doukas, Psellos concludes with a request for more news after Andronikos’ final 
victory, so that he might compose an oration for his friend upon his triumphant 
return.812   
Theophylact, archbishop of Ohrid, was another bureaucrat eager for news of distant 
events.  In the summer of 1094, Theophylact sent a letter praising Gregory Taronites’ 
                                                 
809 Τέως δὲ ἐν µετεώρῳ πάντες ἑστήκαµεν, ἐπ’ ἀµφότερον τὰς γνώµας διῃρηµένοι καὶ πρὸς τὴν 
αὐτόθεν περιχαίροντες ἀγγελίαν· οἱ δὲ πλείους ἡµῶν καὶ φωνῶν θειοτέρων ἀκούειν ἔδοξαν, ναὶ νὴ τὴν 
τριπόθητόν σου καὶ µεγαλοπρεπεστάτην ψυχήν, τὸ σὸν ἐπαγγελλοµένων ὀνοµαστὶ τρόπαιον καὶ 
κατόρθωµα (Psellos, Letters: 393). 
810 Ibid: 416-419. 
811 Πεφυγάδευται ὁ µέγας ἐχθρός, ὃς ἠλπίζετο ἀντὶ µεγάλου κύµατος καλύψαι τὴν γῆν.  πολέµου 
συρραγέντος, τρόπαιον µέγα κατὰ βαρβάρων ἐστήσατε.  τῶν ἐθνῶν τὰ µὲν ὑποκύπτει, τὰ δὲ πεφρίκασι, 
τὰ δὲ δουλοπρεπέστατα σπένδεται.  τί µὴ τῶν µὲν τὴν φυγήν, τῶν δὲ τὴν σπονδὴν δεχόµεθα, ἀλλὰ 
βουλόµεθα ἐν µησὶν ὀλίγοις καὶ τὴν γῆν οὐρανὸν ἀπεργάσασθαι; πρὸ πάντων ἐπιπλήττω σοι τῷ 
φρονιµωτάτῳ.  διατί, ὀπηνίκα ὀ σουλτάνος τοῖς ὅλοις ἐξαπορήσας φυγῇ, ἵν’ οὕτως εἴπω, τὴν οἰκείαν 
ἐπορίσατο συντηρίαν, τοῦ κρατίστου βασιλέως ἡµῶν τὰς συντάξεις καὶ τὰς στρατηγίας µεµαθηκώς, οὐ 
παραυτίκα ἐβροντήσατε ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτόθεν σάλπιγξιν ἀντὶ γραµµάτων χρησάµενοι, ἵνα πάντες τὸ 
ἀπροσδόκητον κατεπλάγησαν, ἀλλὰ διετέθητε ὥσπερ οὐδενὸς καινοῦ γεγονότος; πλὴν ἐγὼ πρὸς 
πάντας ἀντὶ πάντων ἐξήρκεσα, εἰ καί µου λόγος οὐδεὶς ἢ βραχύς· µυριόγλωσσος γάρ, ἵν’ οὕτως εἴπω, 
ὑπὲρ τοῦ αὐθέντου µου τοῦ βασιλέως καὶ ὑµῶν γίνοµαι ἐν θεάτροις, ἐν συλλόγοις, ἀπανταχοῦ (Psellos, 
Some Letters: ep.25.47-61). 
812 Psellos, Letters: 394. 
163 
martial qualities, asking to be kept informed of Taronites’ progress.813  His request 
was granted; Theophylact again wrote to Taronites in the summer of 1103, noting the 
receipt of a letter from Taronites and expressing his delight at reading of Taronites’ 
successes in the Pontos.814  It would appear that Taronites responded to Theophylact, 
as the bishop’s next letter reveals his joy at having received further news of Taronites’ 
victories.815  Theophylact’s praise of Taronites’ defeat of the Franks and Turks, his 
role in the ransoming of Bohemond, the liberation of Greek cities from Turkish 
dominion and the prospective reconquest of Neokaisarea offer some insight as to 
events and details mentioned by Taronites.  Theophylact’s final correspondence to 
Taronites in autumn 1103 offers further praise for the general, urging him to write 
frequently with news of any developments.816  Taronites’ subsequent rebellion against 
Alexios and loss of command accounts for the lack of communication between the 
pair after this date. 
Both Psellos and Theophylact had a vested interest in keeping abreast of distant 
developments, hoping as they were to gain favour with important individuals through 
praise of their achievements.817  Court poet Theodore Prodromos wrote of his 
                                                 
813 εἰ δὲ καὶ γράµµατι δηλώσαις, χρυσοῦν ὄντως ἡµῖν ἐπισκευάσεις τὸν ὄροφον (Theophylact of Ohrid: 
II, 363.24-25). 
814 Ibid: II, 415-417, with mention of Taronites’ γράµµατι at 415.5. See Mullett (1997a): 396, for 
acknowledgement of Taronites’ letter. 
815 Theophylact of Ohrid: II, 427-433, with reference to Taronites’ earlier letter at 427.8: ὅπερ ἠγγέλη 
µοι. Taronites’ letter is logged by Mullett (1997a): 397. 
816 Theophylact of Ohrid: II, 473-475.  For discussion of the full correspondence between Theophylact 
and Taronites, see Leroy-Molinghen (1936); Mullett (1992b): 239-243. 
817 For the career interests of panegyrists, see Dennis (1997b): 136-137.  A further example is furnished 
by Michael Italikos, who wrote to Nikephoros Bryennios while the latter was absent on campaign, 
requesting the kaisar maintain regular correspondence.  In one letter, Italikos (141-144) commends 
Bryennios for frightening him with military descriptions and amusing him in other regards, continuing 
his praise of Bryennios’ literary skills in another letter (152).  In a final correspondence (153-154), 
Italikos expresses his clearest longing for further word from Bryennios.  Italikos knew the value of 
maintaining important relationships, and thus his letters to Stephen Meles and John Axouch, while full 
of praise for the emperor’s achievements and the individual contributions of the two men, end with a 
request that they beseech the Emperor John II Komnenos on his behalf (229-230, 231-234). 
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destitution during the prolonged absence of John II Komnenos, such was his reliance 
on imperial commissions.818  In a letter to grammatikos Theodore Stypeiotes, who 
accompanied the emperor on campaign, Prodromos bemoans that his one-time student 
neglected to send him details about John’s victories, so that he might write of imperial 
glories and ease his plight.819  The appeals of Psellos should probably be viewed more 
as a reflection of his concerns at being left ignorant of the actions of campaigning 
emperors.820  Psellos sent various letters to officials who accompanied Isaac I 
Komnenos821 and in particular Romanos IV Diogenes,822 anxiously inquiring as to 
why the army had yet to return and why certain individuals had been slow in writing 
to him.  In 1068, Psellos sent a despairing letter begging Romanos to return from 
campaign;823 the following year, prior to Romanos setting off once more, Psellos 
requested that the emperor allow him to compose a panegyric celebrating his recent 
successes.824  That Psellos was given the responsibility of disclosing Romanos’ 
progress on the subsequent expedition confirms that the emperor took him up on his 
offer.  The link is apparent: in announcing Romanos’ successes, Psellos likens himself 
to a trumpet,825 recalling his earlier comments to Eustratios Choirosphaktes about the 
                                                 
818 Theodore Prodromos: XV; XVI; XVI; XXIV; XXXVIII, LXIX; LXXI.  For further discussion see 
Kyriakis (1974); Beaton (1987). 
819 Theodore Prodromos: LXXI.1-83. 
820 This fear of Psellos is observed in relation to Isaac Komnenos by M. Jeffreys (2010): 80-81. 
821 Psellos, Letters: 305-306, 485-486. 
822 Idem, Scripta Minora: II, ep.146 (to the epi tou kanikleiou Basil); ep.147 (to Eustratios 
Choirosphakes); ep.148 (to the protoasekretis Aristenos); ep.149 (to an anonymous epi ton deeseon); 
idem, Some Letters: ep. 25 (to Eustratios Choirosphaktes). 
823 Idem, Letters: 230-232. 
824 Idem, Scripta Minora: II, ep.5. 
825 Ἴσθι µέντοι γε δέσποτά µου καὶ βασιλεῦ, ὡς ἐσείσθη πᾶσα ἡ πόλις τῷ µεγάλῳ σου κατορθώµατι, 
ἐθαύµασαν δὲ σύµπαντες ὅτι µὴ τὴν νίκην ἐκόµπασας, µὴ δὲ ἦρας τῷ λόγῳ τὸ τρόπαιον, εἰ καὶ µόνος 
ἐγὼ σάλπιγγος µεγαλοφωνότερον πάσαις ἀκοαῖς τοῦτο διήχησα (idem, Letters: 224-227, at 225). 
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lack of fanfare for military news, and confirming that as early as 1068 Psellos was 
seeking to advertise himself as the emperor’s chief encomiast.826 
Theophylact’s interest in military affairs was similarly driven by self-interest.  
Margaret Mullett decrees that Theophylact’s practice of writing to patrons 
congratulating them on their military success was merely him ‘oiling the wheels’ of a 
relationship.827  While Theophylact did not request any favours of Taronites, in other 
correspondence we see him operating with greater intent.  In 1092, Theophylact sent a 
letter of congratulations to the megas doux John Doukas following his reconquest of 
the western seaboard of Asia Minor, wishing him further glory in reclaiming Cyprus 
and Crete; Doukas, then stationed in Hellas, is also asked to keep watch over 
Theophylact’s relatives in Euboia.828  Taronites is likewise considered among those 
contacts in Theophylact’s network who served an important practical function.829 
Distribution of Military News in the Provinces and Beyond 
We can surmise that the provinces were also informed of major military events.830  
George Akropolites, responsible for drafting bulletins, explains that it was ‘an old 
custom among the emperors of the Romans, to make their own accomplishments 
known to those who are far away through letters’.831  The Emperor Leo V is reported 
                                                 
826 For Psellos’ general self-interest in his letters to military and civil officials, see Cheynet (1999). 
827 Mullett (1990): 136-137. 
828 Theophylact of Ohrid: II, 153-155, 189. 
829 Mullett (1997a): 180-181. 
830 James Howard-Johnston (2010: 51-52) suggests that bulletins would have been circulated among the 
elite in the city and provinces alike; also McCormick (1986): 234-235.  For pertinent comments on the 
transmission of news to the provinces of Asia Minor, see Ševčenko (1980): 722. 
831 ἐγὼ δὲ αὐτὸς ἐν τοῖς ἐπιστολιµαίοις τῶν λόγων ὑπούργουν, ἑκάστῳ τῶν ἁλισκοµένων ἄστεών τε καὶ 
χωρῶν καὶ γραφὴν ἐγχαράττων βασιλικήν· ἔθος γὰρ τοῦτο παλαιὸν τοῖς βασιλεῦσι Ῥωµαίων, δῆλα τοῖς 
µακρόθεν διὰ γραµµάτων ποιεῖν τὰ σφῶν αὐτῶν κατορθώµατα καὶ πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἐπεγείρειν, ἧς δὴ καὶ 
οὗτοι διὰ τῶν ἔργων µεταλαγχάνουσιν (Akropolites: 79.1-7; trans. 232).  For further discussion see 
Macrides (2007): 235 n.22. 
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to have ‘sent messages to all cities and lands’ announcing that he had inflicted a 
mortal arrow wound on Khan Krum and repelled the Bulgar invaders.832  Following 
the Battle of Antioch-on-the-Maeander in 1211, Theodore Laskaris of Nicaea sent 
newsletters to all the ‘Greek’ provinces to announce his victory and the death of 
Kaykhusraw, the sultan of Rum.833  Theodore II Laskaris dispatched a bulletin to the 
eastern provinces proclaiming his victory over Bulgarian rebels.834  Even the rebel 
Thomas the Slav, conducting an attack on Constantinople, ‘sent out letters everywhere 
proclaiming that he had won a victory’.835   
Letters and hagiographical texts originating in the provinces occasionally show an 
awareness of distant campaigns and battles, though, as the letters of Theophylact 
demonstrate, such knowledge can be attributed to means other than a dispatch.  It has 
been speculated that a homily of Neophytos the Recluse discussing the Emperor 
Manuel’s loss at Myriokephalon was informed by an imperial bulletin sent to 
Cyprus.836  The eleventh-century Vita of Saint Nikon, written in southern Greece, 
                                                 
832 ἐπαρθεὶς τοίνυν τῶν φρονηµάτων ὁ Λέων, ὡς ὅτι αὐτὸς κατέβαλεν τὸν πόλεµον καὶ οὐχ ὁ θεός, 
ἐπεµψεν εἰς πάσας τὰς πόλεις καὶ χώρας σάκρας, ἀναγγέλλων ὅτι εὗρον τοὺς Βουλγάρους ἐγγὺς ὄντας 
τῆς πόλεως, καὶ διὰ τῆς φρονήσεως καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ διαταγῆς µου τοξεύσας τὸν πρῶτον αὐτῶν πάντας 
ἀπήλασα, ὅς τις καὶ διὰ τὴν πρόφασιν ταύτην ἀποθνήσκει, ἔφη, ὁ ἐχθρὸς ἡµῶν (Scriptor Incertus: 
348.16-22).  Dölger, Regesten: I, no. 302. 
833 As revealed in a contemporary letter of the Latin emperor Henry to the counts of Flanders: ‘Qua de 
causa Lascarus acrior et elatior factus misit lit[te]ras ad omnes Grecorum provincias, continentes 
honorem et lucrum sue victorie...’ (Letter of Emperor Henry of Constantinople, January 1212: ll.83-
96).  For discussion see Macrides (2007): 36-38. 
834 Theodore II Laskaris: 279-282.  See Macrides (2007): 235 n.22. 
835 γράµµασιν ἐπιστέλλων τὰ ἑαυτοῦ περιαγγέλλει ἁπανταχοῦ, ὡς εἴη τε νενικηκώς, ὅπερ οὐκ ἦν 
(Theophanes Continuatus: 63.19-21).  For discussion, see Lemerle (1965): esp. 258-259. 
836 ‘In its gist, the information which Neophytos imparts almost certainly originated in the official (and 
heavily distorted, in terms of factual reality) version of events, which would have reached Cyprus and 
other provinces through imperial bulletins’ (Galatariotou 1991: 214).  Paul Magdalino (1993a: 458) 
suggests that the newsletter may have been sent to the bishop of Paphos.  Niketas Choniates confirms 
that Manuel sent bulletins to Constantinople, though Eustathios of Thessaloniki (Orations: 246.78-92) 
also affirms that Manuel distributed word of his successful Maeander campaign against the cities of 
Panasion and Lakerion in 1177-1178 further afield.   
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mentions the successes of Basil II against the Bulgarians, which, the author adds, ‘the 
story about him shows in fuller detail’.837  The precise nature of this ‘story’ is 
unknown, though it is possible that information was originally brought to the region 
by monks, merchants, or returning soldiers, rather than via an imperial communiqué.  
The Bulgarian armies of Samuel had, at one stage, pushed deep into Greece, as the 
Vita attests, so there was an obvious local interest in the war.838  That said, Basil 
journeyed to Athens in 1018 after the conclusion of the conflict; as with triumphs 
celebrated in Constantinople, his coming would have necessitated prior word of his 
achievements, suggesting that he may have dispatched bulletins to the region ahead of 
his visit.839 
News might be disseminated to realms beyond the empire by mercenaries or allied 
troops,840 while monks could also serve as distributors of information.841  Yet there 
are many instances of the imperial court sending official word of notable successes to 
                                                                                                                                            
      Diffusion of official news to Cyprus may also have been behind a tenth-century inscription from 
the remote village of Syngrasis, which attests to contemporary local knowledge of the revolt of Bardas 
Skleros, despite the rebellion having no direct effect on the island (Papacostas 2002). 
837 καθὼς ἡ περὶ αὐτὸν ἱστορία πλατύτερον παριστᾷ (Vita of St. Nikon: §43.11-19; trans. 149). 
838 Ibid: §40.8-10. 
839 Skylitzes: 364.  For further discussion of this occasion, see Kaldellis (2009b): 81-91.  Paul 
Stephenson (2000: 53 n.18, 72) speculates that the story of the 1014 Battle of Kleidon, famous for the 
blinding of some 15,000 Bulgarian prisoners - undoubtedly an exaggeration - may have originated in a 
victory bulletin, and perhaps it is something such as this to which the author of the Vita of St. Nikon 
refers.  For the Battle of Kleidon, see Skylitzes: 348-349.  Analysis and further discussion is provided 
by Stephenson (2003a). 
840 In his letter to King Henry II of England, Manuel I Komnenos instructed his fellow ruler to ask 
returning English soldiers for further details on the Battle of Myriokephalon (Roger of Howden: II, 
102-104).  Krinije Ciggaar (1961) suggests that Varangian guardsman Eindredi the Young informed an 
Old Norse miracle which relates the destruction of the Flemish regiment in 1094/1095 in battle against 
the Cumans, since the Varangian Guard probably fought alongside them.  For further examples of 
Varangian veterans transmitting information concerning Byzantine military actions, see idem (1980).  
This mode of transmission is also discussed by Stender-Peterson (1934): esp. 77-90; R. Cook (1986): 
esp. 74-89.   
841 One such case is that involving the French monk and chronicler Ademar, who appears to have relied 
upon St. Symeon of Trier, a monk of St. Catherine’s Monastery on Mount Sinai, for information on the 
wars of Basil II, among other events in the Byzantine Empire (Wolff 1978: esp. 143-144).  For general 
discussion of the role of monks in information transmission between Byzantium and the west, see 
Ciggaar (1996); Harris (1999). 
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foreign rulers.842  Beševliev proposed that the report in the Royal Frankish Annals of 
the arrow wound inflicted upon Khan Krum by Leo V and the Bulgar leader’s 
subsequent flight probably derives from imperial dispatches.843  A letter to Louis the 
Pious offers an account of the rebellion of Thomas the Slav, presumably serving as a 
counterbalance to that propagated by Thomas himself.844  The Annals of Saint Bertin 
note that Louis received another imperial letter c.839 reporting successes achieved by 
the armies of the Emperor Theophilos.845  Leo, metropolitan of Synada, was stationed 
in Italy when he wrote to Nikephoros Ouranos to congratulate him on his success 
against the Bulgarians in 997, noting that word had reached his ears and even those in 
                                                 
842 See, in general, Dölger & Karayannopoulos (1968): 90-93 for discussion of the Auslandsbriefe; also 
Shepard (2005): 177-178.  It is worth noting that Constantinople likewise received official dispatches 
from foreign powers.  The Vita of St. Symeon Stylites the Younger attests that following the Battle of 
Chalcis between the Lakhmids and the Ghassanids in 554, a victory bulletin (ἐπινίκια) was dispatched 
by the Christian Ghassanid foederati to Byzantine Antioch (Shahid 2009: 214-216).  Closer to the 
period under discussion, the Venetians, following their victories over the Normans, sent full reports to 
the Emperor Alexios, and were handsomely rewarded for their efforts (Anna Komnene: IV.2.6; VI.5.9). 
843 At Michahel imperator Bulgaros bello adpetens haud prosperis successibus utitur ac proinde domum 
reversus deposito diademate monachus efficitur; in cuius locum Leo, Bardae patricii filius, imperator 
constituitur.  Crumas rex Bulgarorum, qui Niciforum imperatorem ante duos annos interfecit et 
Michahelem de Moesia fugavit, secundis rebus elatus cum exercitu usque ad ipsam Constantinopolim 
accessit et iuxta portam civitatis castra posuit.  Quem moenibus urbi obequitantem Leo imperator 
eruptione facta incautum excepit et graviter vulneratum fugiendo sibi consulere ac patriam turpiter 
redire coegit (Annales Regni Francorum: 139).  For this observation, see Beševliev (1974): 75.  
Intriguingly, the fourteenth-century Chronica Venetum of Andrea Dandolo (140) is aware, like 
contemporary Byzantine sources (see below, 185-187), that Leo announced the victory to the people of 
Constantinople (Leo Armenus…cum Crimino duce non verens bello inire, Deo favente victoriam 
consecutus est, Constantinumque filium suum consortem decrevit).  According to Panos Sophoulis 
(2011: 33), ‘this may suggest that copies of the sacra were also distributed to the west, particularly to 
those areas that were still under nominal Byzantine authority, such as Venice’.  Sophoulis’ observation 
supports the idea that Leo sent official word to the west depicting himself as the heroic victor over 
Krum and his Bulgar hordes. 
844 Letter of Michael II to Louis the Pious: 476-478.  For discussion, see Lemerle (1965): 258-259; 
Kaegi (1981a): 261-262. 
845 Venerunt etiam legati Grecorum a Theophilo imperatore directi, Theodosius videlicet Calcedonensis 
metropolitanus episcopus et Theophanius spatarius, ferentes cum donis imperatori dignis epistola; quos 
imperator quinto decimo Kalendas Iunii in Ingulenheim honorifice suscepit.  Quorum legatio super 
confirmatione pacti et pacis atque perpetuae inter utrumque imperatorem eique subditos amicitiae et 
caritatis agebat, necnon de victoriis, quas adversus exteras bellando gentes caelitus fuerat assecutus, 
gratificatio et in Domino exultatio ferebatur; in quibus imperatorem sibique subiectos amicabiliter 
Datori victoriarum omnium gratias referre poposcit... (Annales Bertiniani: 19-20).  See Shepard 
(1995b). 
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France and Spain.846  In 975, John Tzimiskes wrote to King Ashot III of Armenia, 
boasting of how he invaded Palestine, reclaimed holy relics, and was intent on 
regaining Jerusalem.847  Perhaps the most famous example is that of King Henry II of 
England, who received a letter from Manuel I Komnenos providing an account of the 
Battle of Myriokephalon.848 
There appears to have been considerable convergence between information disclosed 
to foreigners and imperial bulletins, which should be expected given that the 
department of the dromos was responsible for correspondence with foreign lands as 
well as the provinces.849  The Chronicle of Fredegar, thought to have been composed 
by a Burgundian Frank in the mid-seventh century, offers an extraordinary description 
of the Emperor Heraclius’ decapitating a Persian general during the Battle of Nineveh 
in 627.850  John Michael Wallace-Hadrill suggests that Fredegar utilized a similar 
source to Theophanes Confessor.851  Theophanes and the Patriarch Nikephoros, 
writing around the turn of the ninth century, are the first extant Byzantine chroniclers 
to preserve Heraclius’ duel with the Persian general Rhazates, though evidently the 
legend must be contemporaneous with Heraclius’ reign.852  Steven Wander proposes 
that ambassadors of the Frankish King Dagobert brought the report back to western 
Europe from Constantinople.853  Evidence suggests that the story reached further 
                                                 
846 Ἤχησε τὰ ἔργα σου, θαυµάσιε στρατηγέ, κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν πᾶσαν...καὶ ἀκουστά, ἃ ἐγένετο, κατ’ 
αὐτὰς τὰς Γαλλίας, Ἱσπανίας (Leo of Synada: ep.13.1-5).  For the battle in question, see McGeer 
(1991): 130-131. 
847 Matthew of Edessa: 32-33. 
848 Roger of Howden: II, 102-104.  Dölger, Regesten: II, no. 1524. 
849 See Guilland (1971): 31-45.  Also Lewis (1993): 634-635 for such links in the Hellenistic world. 
850 The Fourth Book of the Chronicle of Fredegar: 52-53. 
851 Wallace-Hadrill (1962): 89. 
852 Theophanes: 318-319; Patriarch Nikephoros, Short History: §14. 
853 Wander (1975).  The Fourth Book of the Chronicle of Fredegar (51) affirms that Dagobert, who 
ruled various realms between 623-639, sent two ambassadors to Heraclius who returned home with a 
peace agreement. 
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afield still.  The Chronica Muzarabica, a chronicle of Spain written in the mid-eighth 
century, relates Heraclius’ feat independently of Fredegar.854  The precise details of 
the encounter differ across the various accounts, but this does not detract from the 
sense that the episode stemmed from official propaganda, with western Europe 
informed through Heraclius’ court or perhaps by imperial letters.   
Additional examples of this phenomenon may be cited.  The near-contemporary 
Scriptor Incertus, like western chronicles, reports that Leo V shot Krum with an 
arrow, suggesting this was the official version of events propagated within the 
Byzantine Empire.855  Jonathan Shepard viewed written reports to foreign rulers as an 
‘offshoot’ of domestic propaganda, presenting battles and campaigns in a favourable 
light.856  This is particularly evident with Tzimiskes’ letter to Ashot of Armenia, 
which McCormick classified as a ‘victory bulletin’.857  Paul Walker, reconstructing 
the chronology of the campaign from Arabic sources, determined Tzimiskes’ claims 
to have pressed on to Palestine and threatened Jerusalem to be false.858  Walker does 
not doubt the authenticity of the letter,859 but argues that the fictional parts were 
propaganda, aimed to impress the Armenians by highlighting Byzantium’s 
commitment to the Christian cause.860  While victories were magnified, defeats were 
                                                 
854 Corpus Scriptorum Muzarabicorum: I, 17. 
855 See below, 185-187. 
856 Shepard (2005): 179-180. 
857 McCormick (1986): 195-196. 
858 Walker (1977): 313-324.  Starr (1936: 94-95) already decreed that the furthest south Tzimiskes 
reached was Sidon, despite the emperor’s claims to the contrary in his letter.  Walker however was the 
first to offer a convincing argument as to why Tzimiskes exaggerated his feats. 
859 Walker (1977: 320) maintains that the letter was probably taken from the Armenian royal archives.  
860 For the increasing importance of the Christian Armenian and Iberian potentates to Byzantium in the 
tenth century, and the relations between the various parties, see Whittow (1996a): 310-321; Shepard 
(2001): 22-34.  Whittow (1996a: 356-357) argues that the correspondence may have been designed to 
encourage Armenians to join the war effort, with the letter presenting a fantastical vision of what might 
be possible if the Armenians assisted Byzantium.  Tzimiskes had received 10,000 troops from Ashot to 
participate in the campaign (Matthew of Edessa: 27-28), and may well have exaggerated his gains in 
order to encourage further assistance.  Indeed, Shepard (1988: 111-112) likened Tzimiskes’ apparent 
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played down; in his letter to Henry, Manuel places a surprisingly positive spin on the 
defeat at Myriokephalon, drawing attention to his own heroic effort and the 
favourable treaty agreed with the sultan.  As the following chapter shows, the report 
was probably not too dissimilar to that Manuel offered his own subjects.861 
Accounts of Campaign and Battle in Private and Diplomatic Correspondence 
Discussion of letters detailing military events raises questions over exposition, 
particularly important when we consider that diplomatic correspondence would 
probably have been copied, stored, and potentially available for consultation to 
historians.862  Margaret Mullett stresses that narrative was typically ‘outside the 
limits’ of the genre of letter writing; ‘thus’, Mullett decrees, ‘we do not go to the 
Byzantine letter for a description of the Battle of Manzikert’.863  By the Palaiologan 
era, it is suggested that Byzantine letters progressed; hence Manuel II Palaiologos 
describes his latest campaign, ‘something inconceivable to a Middle Byzantine letter-
writer’.864 
                                                                                                                                            
exploitation of the Christian desire to gain Jerusalem to Alexios’ appeal to the west for military aid in 
the late eleventh century.  On the importance of Armenians to Byzantium’s military arm, see Charanis 
(1963): 32-34; Kazhdan (1984b): 441-445; McGeer (1995c); Garsoïan (1998): esp. 61-66; Dédéyan 
(1999).  The eleventh-century Armenian historian, Stephen of Taron (134-135), reveals how important 
the Armenian troops were during Tzimiskes’ Bulgarian war, perhaps an indication of why the emperor 
was keen to strengthen ties. 
861 Jonathan Shepard (2003a: 94-94) notes that visiting foreigners of renown were probably also offered 
the ‘official’ line about military events.  He cites the example of Liudprand of Cremona, who reports 
that Constantinople was saved from the Rus’ in 941 by the intervention of the Lord, who calmed the 
sea, thus aiding Byzantine efforts to destroy their enemy with Greek fire (Antapodosis: V.16).  
Liudprand was obviously repeating what he had heard at the imperial court. 
862 It is unclear whether historians had access to older private letters, since we have little evidence to 
inform us of the fate of letters in Middle Byzantium.  Of the collections that survive, Mullett (1997a: 
41-43) finds that some seem to have been preserved because of their subject matter, while others were 
seen as impressive works of a noted writer. 
863 Idem (1981): 82.  
864 Ibid: 88-89.  The general value of Byzantine letters as sources of historical information has been 
questioned, among others, by Dennis (1977): xix; idem (1988). 
172 
Close analysis of the letters of Manuel II suggests Mullett overstates the extent of his 
campaign description.  In a letter to Nicholas Kabasilas of autumn 1391, Manuel 
acknowledged Kabasilas’ request for information on the expedition against the Turks 
in Asia Minor, but thought it better to converse with Kabasilas upon his return, given 
that he had only depressing things to report.865  Manuel was more forthcoming with 
Demetrios Kydones in a letter from the same campaign, complaining about the camp 
site, his surroundings, the winter conditions and the illnesses ravaging his army.866  
However, Manuel still bemoaned his inability to write a thorough account of his 
experiences, not wishing to elaborate further as he considered the letter already long 
enough.867  Manuel mentions that he ‘could also enumerate other difficulties, [though] 
the rules of letter writing exclude [this]’.868  The rules of letter writing, such as they 
were, bore heavily on Manuel’s mind when drafting his correspondence.  Writing to 
Constantine Asanes whilst on the same campaign, Manuel states: ‘I know very well 
the kind of letter you love to receive…lengthy letters full of lengthy reports’.869  It 
appears the emperor could not supply Asanes with the information he requested 
because of the limitations of the literary genre.  A follow-up letter to Kydones perhaps 
best expresses these difficulties.  Manuel again laments the hardships facing his army, 
‘all of which call for a historian, not a letter writer’.870  Manuel’s accounts within his 
letters amount to little more than a list of complaints about the rigours of war, barely 
                                                 
865 Manuel II Palaiologos: ep.15. 
866 Ibid: ep.16. 
867 Ibid: ep.16.84-97. 
868 τά τε ἄλλα ὅσα τε ὁ νόµος εἴργει τῆς ἐπιστολῆς ἀριθµεῖν καὶ ὅσα γε (ibid: ep.16.64-68; trans. 46).  It 
should be noted that this letter is considered by editor George Dennis (1977: 48 n.1) to contain a 
surprising amount of information. 
869 τὰ δέ ἐστι µακρά τε γράµµατα καὶ µακραῖς διηγήσεσι κεχρηµένα (Manuel II Palaiologos: ep.18.2-7; 
trans. 54). 
870 ἱστορικοῦ δεοµένοις, οὐκ ἐπιστέλλοντος (ibid: ep.19.4-8; trans. 56). 
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different to those written by Nikephoros Ouranos some four hundred years prior.871  
There is nothing to suggest that the aforementioned letters of Gregory Taronites to 
Theophylact of Ohrid were any more substantial; they need not have consisted of 
anything other than a general overview of Taronites’ accomplishments. 
Foreign correspondence dealing with military events may have offered more 
extensive coverage of military episodes.  Mullett has proposed that diplomatic letters 
were more functional and succinct,872 though coverage and detail will have varied 
depending on the subject and relations with the recipient.  Tzimiskes’ letter to Ashot 
contains little strategic or tactical detail; his concern rather is to present an overview 
of territorial acquisitions and material gains designed to appeal to Armenia’s common 
Christianity.  By contrast, Manuel Komnenos’ letter to Henry II of England describes 
the unfolding of the Battle of Myriokephalon, with Manuel endeavouring to protect 
his own reputation in the face of the defeat.873  Even so, Manuel does not go into 
extensive detail; he refers Henry to returning English soldiers should the monarch 
wish to know ‘all the circumstances in the order in which they happened’.874  Indeed, 
it has been suggested that envoys to foreign rulers may have delivered an oral 
message quite different to the content of the letter, intended to provide greater 
detail.875  This is relevant also in relation to domestic letters, since they too could be 
                                                 
871 Épistoliers byzantins du Xe siècle: 217-248, esp. 244-247.  For discussion see McGeer (1995a): 339-
340; Mullett (1996a): 49-50.  The Byzantines followed a long tradition of corresponding to friends 
whilst on campaign.  Cicero vividly described his progress in Cilicia in his letters to colleagues at 
Rome, which Mary Beard (2007: 187-188) considered to represent ‘the only day-to-day first-person 
account of campaigns to have survived from antiquity’.  For further discussion of Cicero’s 
correspondence see idem (2002). 
872 Mullett (1992a): 212-216. 
873 For the links between Manuel and Henry, see Vasiliev (1929-1930). 
874 ‘Gratum autem habuimus, quod quosdam nobilitatis tuae principes accidit interesse nobiscum, qui 
narrabunt, de omnibus quae acciderant, tuae nobilitati seriem’ (Roger of Howden: II, 104; trans. 239-
240). 
875 Shepard (2005): 176-177. 
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supplemented by an oral report given by the carrier. 876  In his final missive to 
Gregory Taronites, Theophylact mentions that he had been told of Taronites’ 
achievements by one Theodosios, presumably a member of Taronites’ entourage who 
carried a letter to Theophylact.877  Such a practice counteracted the limitations 
epistolary standards imposed upon including an abundance of detail in civil 
correspondence. 
Conclusion 
There is substantial evidence to support the idea that dispatches and bulletins detailing 
a battle or campaign were routinely sent to Constantinople and the provinces.  Letters 
to foreign peoples chronicling military events corroborate notions of officially-
produced accounts, though such diplomatic correspondence may only have been of 
limited use to historians searching for comprehensive accounts of military operations.  
Private individuals eager for the same sort of information were also forced to rely 
upon imperial dispatches, as the confines of a personal letter did not allow for detailed 
exposition.  Bulletins and dispatches operated under very different guidelines in 
respect of their coverage of warfare.  Discussing their function and features should 
give us a better idea of what information might have been presented to historians and 
chroniclers. 
                                                 
876 Mullett (1989): 181-182; idem (1992a): 212-216; idem (1997a): 36-37.  The Patriarch Nicholas 
Mystikos (Letters: 58-61) treats letters and unwritten messages as complementing one another.  
Messengers had a similar function in the medieval west - see Crosby (1936). 
877 Ἀκούω δὲ ἑκάστοτε ἀεί µοι ταῦτα τοῦ Θεοδοσίου διηγουµένου γλώττῃ εὐγνώµονι µέν, ἐλαττουµένῃ 
δὲ τῆς ἀξίας εὐφηµίας τῶν ἔργων, ὃς σὐνεστιν ἡµῖν τὰ µέγιστα χαριζόµενος (Theophylact of Ohrid: II, 
475.46-48).  For Theodosios’ role, see Mullett (1997a): 372. 
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II. Campaign Dispatches and Bulletins – Content and Veracity 
A dispatch mentioned briefly in an influential article by Veselin Beševliev would 
eventually be recognized as the only firm example of a complete campaign report 
preserved in Byzantine historiography.878  Beševliev’s call for ‘besondere 
Untersuchung’ into a victory bulletin of the Emperor Heraclius, featured in the 
Chronicon Paschale, was duly taken up by James Howard-Johnston.  His research 
into the bulletin, together with other references, permits us to make some general 
observations about the composition and content of campaign dispatches. 
Heraclius’ Victory Bulletin in the Chronicon Paschale 
The Chronicon Paschale, a chronicle of world history from Creation to the author’s 
present day (c.630), appears to quote verbatim a campaign dispatch (ἀποκρίσεις) sent 
from the field by Heraclius, and read from the ambo in the Hagia Sophia in May 
628.879  The bulletin opens with a biblical quotation, instantly establishing a 
triumphant religious tone.  The following passage – heralding the demise of the 
Persian ruler Khusro II and the crowning of his son Kavad Shiroe - heightens the 
pious sentiment by attributing this turn of events to God.  It is revealed that following 
a harsh winter Heraclius was able to make contact with an ambassador of the new 
Persian king and begin peace negotiations.  Detail, including the movements of the 
Byzantine army and the names and rank of individuals from both sides, is extensive.  
The peace process is charted at length; copies of the correspondence between Shiroe 
                                                 
878 Beševliev (1974): 77-78. 
879 Chronicon Paschale: 727-734.  Dölger, Regesten: I, no. 192. 
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and Heraclius are said to have been appended to the dispatch.880  The text concludes 
with a note that the army was venturing homeward.   
It is unclear why the author of the Chronicon Paschale included this particular 
dispatch in its entirety.  The likelihood of it being the only such document available to 
the anonymous chronicler is remote, since the aforementioned dispatch includes a 
reference to an earlier missive chronicling events from mid-October 627 to mid-
March 628.881  Evidently, Heraclius made a habit of informing Constantinople of his 
progress throughout his major expeditions against Persia.882  Furthermore, it is 
apparent that the author of the Chronicon Paschale examined and included other 
official records and letters, suggesting ready access to documentary material.883  A 
lack of source material therefore cannot be the answer.  The author of the Chronicon 
Paschale was primarily interested in events which had a direct effect on 
Constantinople, the siege of 626 being a particularly good example.884  The successful 
conclusion of Heraclius’ long war with Persia was momentous, heralding the end of a 
serious threat.  Not only was it worth recording in full, but audiences would surely 
have wished to read about the emperor’s defining achievement in detail. 
No battles are described in the dispatch of the Chronicon Paschale; rather, it is 
diplomacy which dominates proceedings.  However, this was merely one of a number 
of dispatches from Heraclius’ reign; James-Howard Johnston has convincingly 
                                                 
880 For this correspondence, and an attempt to reconstruct it, see Oikonomides (1971).  For other 
memoranda and documents referred to in this dispatch, see Howard-Johnston (2010): 49 n.25. 
881 Chronicon Paschale: 729.15-18. 
882 Walter Kaegi (2003: 73) muses that Heraclius ‘probably’ issued bulletins from the time of his first 
imperial campaign. 
883 See M. & M. Whitby (1989): xx-xxi; Howard-Johnston (2010): 37-41, 45-52, 55-58.  Also Scott 
(1981): 17-20. 
884 M. & M. Whitby (1989): xxv-xxvi, 167 n.452; Howard-Johnston (2010): 54-55.  For local interests 
influencing historiography in general, see Michael Whitby (1992): 70. 
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demonstrated that a number of other reports underlie the narrative of Theophanes 
Confessor, with long descriptions of campaigning and military operations generally 
more predominant.885  The text is very specific and detailed in regard to persons, 
locales, and chronology, while exposition on military matters – command decisions, 
army movements, composition, tactics – is extensive.  This information can only have 
derived from dispatches not dissimilar to that preserved in the Chronicon Paschale.  
Indeed, Howard-Johnston believes there is ‘little doubt’ that the earlier dispatch 
referred to by Heraclius, covering the events of the winter campaign of 627-628, 
underlies the corresponding narrative of the Chronographia of Theophanes.  
Theophanes himself notes that Heraclius sent a progress report to Constantinople 
whilst at Amida in March 626, containing news of his operations since the start of the 
campaign.886  Heraclius was well aware of the value of public announcements, and 
probably issued many documents and proclamations to serve a variety of needs.887 
Style and Content 
The value of the Chronicon Paschale for the study of military dispatches is difficult to 
measure.  Howard-Johnston feels it gives us a ‘full, unabridged, undoctored example 
                                                 
885 The content in question is Theophanes: 306-314, 317-327.  For discussion and analysis, see 
Howard-Johnston (1994): 67-69; Kaegi (2003): 100-191. 
886 ἐντεῦθεν καὶ γράµµατα πρὸς τὸ Βυζάντιον ὁ βασιλεὺς ἡδυνήθη ἀποστεῖλαι καὶ τὰ καθ’ ἑαυτὸν 
πάντα δηλῶσαι καὶ χαρὰν πολλὴν ἐµποιῆσαι τῇ πόλει (Theophanes: 312.30-313.2).  For this dispatch, 
see Howard-Johnston (1994): 70.  Walter Kaegi (2003: 127, 129-130, 131-132, 156), perhaps 
influenced by Howard-Johnston, also hypothesizes that much of Theophanes’ account of Heraclius’ 
Persian campaigns derives from reports issued by Heraclius. 
887 For Heraclius’ eagerness to exploit public ceremonies and announcements, see Howard-Johnston 
(1999): 36-39; Kaegi (2003): 62-64.  It is speculated that Heraclius and his publicists issued many 
documents to this effect.  Strategios’ infamous account of the Persian capture of Jerusalem in 614 may 
have deliberately exaggerated events in order to shock the Christian world.  See in general Schick 
(1995): 33-39; Stemberger (1999); Stoyanov (2011): 11-24.  The lost history of Theophilos of Edessa 
included a rather fantastical and entertaining account of the 626 siege of Constantinople which, 
Howard-Johnston (2010: 203-204) suspects, was originally an ‘elaborate piece of misinformation’ 
manufactured and disseminated by imperial officials soon after the Persian withdrawal, intended to 
cause dissension among the Persian ranks.  Kaegi (2003: 172) speculates that Heraclius may have also 
promulgated bulletins within Persian territory during his final campaigns to cultivate support. 
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of an imperial dispatch from the field’, and thus equips the historian with indicators 
for locating dispatch-based material in other texts.888  McCormick likewise suggests 
general content and features of a victory bulletin on the basis of Heraclius’ effort.  
They might begin with biblical citations,889 and then proceed with a precise narration 
of facts, including specific dates, places and names.890  Michael Whitby, however, 
warns that the bulletin of Heraclius may not be representative of standard dispatches, 
since the emperor himself was involved and narrating events for public proclamation.  
He concludes that in any report, the general would have ‘at least summarized the 
actions of different parts of the army and made the most of any successes’.891 
Whitby’s caution may be prudent.  From the example of the Chronicon Paschale, 
Howard-Johnston anticipated all dispatches to possess standard traits of document-
based information – lucid, concise exposition and plain, emotionless language.892  Yet 
Michael Italikos confirms that dispatches were not always drafted with little thought 
for style.  Having heard the bulletin recounting the accomplishments of John II 
Komnenos, Italikos lavished praise on the writing skills of shadow author Stephen 
                                                 
888 Howard-Johnston (2010): 69. 
889 The use of biblical quotations and language in the bulletin of Heraclius aligns well with the 
substance of homilies.  Both required widespread understanding, and it is thought that biblical 
references better resonated with the general audience than classical allusions, which were generally 
kept to a minimum in sermons (Cunningham 1990).  The links between homilies and bulletins may go 
deeper still.  Magdalino (1993a: 314) suggests that clergy of the twelfth-century were charged with not 
reading out the original bulletins they received, but paraphrasing them into homilies for their wider 
audience.  It has also been suggested that some military accounts may have been brief sermons 
fashioned into more elaborate literary pieces for greater appreciation.  Leone (1964) proposed that 
Eustathios’ Capture of Thessaloniki began life as a brief sermon delivered to the people of Thessaloniki 
in Lent 1186, before it was expanded into a literary work for wider readership among the literati of the 
empire.  Vasiliev (1925: 93) has similarly speculated that the homilies of Photios on the Russian siege 
of Constantinople in 860 were originally much briefer sermons given in the Hagia Sophia, before being 
fashioned into literary pieces.  For related discussion see Antonopoulou (1997): 43-44.   
890 McCormick (1986): 195-196. 
891 Michael Whitby (1988): 97. 
892 Howard-Johnston (2010): 300.  Simon Hornblower (1987: 40) similarly proposed that ‘dryness, 
occasional triviality [and] would-be comprehensiveness’ may have been the defining features of the 
lost genre of ancient military reports. 
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Meles, suggesting that bulletins could be appreciative literary works in their own 
right.893  Theodore Prodromos likewise hailed Meles as a superb orator and fine 
writer.894  While flattery may be suspected, there is independent evidence to suggest 
that Meles was a man of literature.895  Furthermore, Constantine Manasses praises the 
logothetes Michael Hagiotheodorites for his eloquence in describing the victories of 
Manuel Komnenos.896  Therefore, it may be that dispatches and bulletins were, at 
various times, more polished than that of Heraclius would suggest. 
There is another issue with thinking the dispatch of the Chronicon Paschale to be 
representative of all bulletins.  The document is concerned with diplomatic 
developments and the rigours of campaigning, while potential dispatches underlying 
the narrative of Theophanes appear to have provided a solid overview of the 
campaign.  Set-piece sieges and battles are absent; the notable exception is the Battle 
of Nineveh, essentially formed of the battlefield heroics of Heraclius.897  While it is 
thought that Theophanes summarized and abridged his military information, major 
battles and sieges were unlikely to have been substantially reduced.898  Exciting 
narratives of battles and sieges may have become more prominent in dispatches of the 
Middle period.  In his letter to Stephen Meles, Michael Italikos describes the audience 
being enthralled by stories of ‘battle lines, invasions, attacks on barbarian cities, the 
capture of countless peoples, how each of them fled headlong, how [John Komnenos] 
                                                 
893 Michael Italikos: 233.1-13. 
894 Theodore Prodromos: LXIX.1-17.  See also Hörandner (1974): 111. 
895 See Mercati (1925). 
896 Constantine Manasses, Eulogy for Michael Hagiotheodorites: 180-181. 
897 Theophanes: 318-319.  See below, 368-371. 
898 Howard-Johnston (2010): 278, 283-284 
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pursued and dispersed their ranks’.899  This indicates a greater focus on fighting and 
thrilling anecdotes in the bulletins of John II Komnenos than those of Heraclius.  
Supporting this notion is Manuel Komnenos’ letter to King Henry II, which focuses 
on the heroics of the emperor at Myriokephalon rather than provide an overview of 
the full course of the campaign.900  With the military aristocracy of the Middle period 
favouring exciting military accounts and reports of individual heroism, it may be that 
bulletins of the later period adopted a different focus to those of Heraclius’ day.901  
Veracity in Imperial Bulletins and Dispatches 
As the official line of the state, bulletins required careful management: success was to 
be exploited, defeat played down, and the emperor was to be presented throughout in 
panegyrical tones.902  A timely bulletin allayed fears and boosted an emperor’s 
popularity, though even if the emperor had suffered a defeat, it was nevertheless 
crucial to suppress destructive rumours and initiate a programme of damage 
limitation.903  The turbulent events following the Battle of Manzikert illustrate that 
chaos could prevail without official word, as civil war erupted from the confusion 
surrounding the fate of Romanos IV Diogenes.904  Similarly, rumours of Theophilos’ 
                                                 
899 τὰς παρατάξεις, τὰς εἰσβολάς, τὰς καταδροµὰς τῶν βαρβαρικῶν πόλεων, τὰς ἁλώσεις τῶν µυρίων 
ἐθνῶν, ὡς οἱ µὲν ἔφευγον προτροπάδην, ὁ δὲ καταδιώκων ἐκλόνει τὰς τούτων φάλαγγας (Michael 
Italikos: 232.1-20).   
900 See below, 249-259. 
901 See below, 267-378. 
902 Howard-Johnston (1994): 67.  Kaegi (2003: 156), discussing Heraclius’ campaign bulletins, notes 
that such items cannot be considered ‘objective archival documents’.  See Appendix II for strong 
evidence to this effect presented by Ammianus Marcellinus. 
903 A prescriptive text of the early tenth century recommends that deputies in Constantinople counter 
malicious rumours about the welfare of the emperor and his army by inventing positive reports, such as 
that a message had been brought by a member of the imperial expedition, in order to suppress any 
‘disorder’ (τὰς ταραχὰς) (Constantine VII, Text B: ll.77-79).  See also Howard-Johnston (1994): 70. 
904 Psellos, Chronographia: II, 162-163 (XXIII). 
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death at the Battle of Anzen in 838 led to some at Constantinople wanting to proclaim 
a successor.905  
When military success was not forthcoming, exploiting any tangible achievements in 
the field became all the more necessary.906  Victory could be won by many means in 
Byzantium, with the mantra of Anna Komnene telling: ‘When danger hangs over us, 
being unable to make a frontal assault, we change our tactics and seek to conquer 
without resorting to warfare...Victory means the same thing always, but the means by 
which generals attain it are varied and of intricate patterns’.907  Consequently, any 
apparent triumph over the enemy might be exploited with public displays and 
announcements.  The ideological dimension of the prolonged war with Islam between 
c.863-959 saw particular importance lent to propaganda and public celebrations of 
victory.908  In 956 Constantine VII Porphyrogenitos awarded a triumph to the 
strategos Basil Hexamilites for an amphibious victory off Tarsos, which, while 
relatively insignificant, was nevertheless a welcome reprieve after a succession of 
                                                 
905 Theophanes Continuatus: 136; Bar Hebraeus: I, 136; Byzance et les Arabes: I, 154-160. 
906 Michael McCormick (1986: 40-44) has shown that Theodosios I, in the aftermath of the Battle of 
Adrianople, issued many victory bulletins for relatively minor successes, seemingly to restore 
confidence in imperial rule. 
907 ὥσθ’ ὁπόταν κίνδυνος ἡµῖν ἐπικρέµαται ἀπὸ <τοῦ> κατὰ πρόσωπον προσβαλεῖν, τότε τρόπον 
ἕτερον τὸν πόλεµον µεταχειριζόµεθα καὶ ἀµαχεὶ τῶν ἐχθρῶν κρατεῖν ἐπειγόµεθα...ὥστε τὴν µὲν νίκην 
µίαν εἶναι, τοὺς δὲ τρόπους, δι’ ὧν αὕτη τοῖς στρατηγοῖς περιγίνεται, διαφόρους τὲ καὶ ποικίλους τὴν 
φύσιν (Anna Komnene: XV.3.2.13-25; trans. 437). 
908 It is worth noting that this was the case for both sides.  Henri Grégoire (1952) has drawn attention to 
an official communiqué relating how Thessaloniki fell to Arab forces in 904, intended for the Abbasid 
caliph in Baghdad, and later employed by the historian al-Tabari.  Howard-Johnston (2010: 131-132, 
391-392) names al-Tabari among Arabic authors who drew upon official bulletins, and builds a strong 
case for a campaign account compiled by al-Mutanabbi, the court poet of Hamdanid emir Sayf al-
Dawla, to commemorate a particularly successful raid on Byzantine Anzitene in 956.  It is proposed 
that the final work resembled a concise prose account of the campaign replete with precise details about 
military operations (a victory bulletin) embellished by a commemorative poem of al-Mutanabbi 
(Howard-Johnston 1983: esp. 241-245).  Such a work, perhaps one of many commissioned by Sayf al-
Dawla, should undoubtedly be viewed as propaganda in the war between Sayf and the armies of 
Constantine VII Porphyrogenitos, as much an ideological contest as one fought on the battlefield.  On 
this last point see Shepard (2001). 
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defeats suffered by his principal eastern forces.909  Though a relationship between 
triumphs and victory bulletins cannot be assumed, we might recall that the Emperor 
Theophilos is said to have made a speech about his successes upon his triumphal 
return from campaign.910 
Yet even militarily successful rulers resorted to exaggeration in their dispatches.  
Michael Italikos stressed that the feats accomplished by John II Komnenos surpassed 
any achieved by previous emperors and those recorded in books: ‘compared to those 
[victories] of today they are actually reduced to nothing, and if we compare their 
number and size, they appear few and insignificant’.911  Italikos may embellish the 
facts, but then it is probable the bulletin did also.  After all, it was important for an 
emperor succeeding a successful ruler to ensure that his deeds surpassed those still 
fresh in the memory.  The problem is highlighted in a letter of Leo of Synada, sent to 
Nikephoros Ouranos following his victory over the Bulgarians in 997.  Leo tells 
Ouranos to pay little heed to those playing down the success.  ‘My elders…will claim 
that they saw and their elders will boast what they heard…’912  The successes his 
‘elders’ recall are no doubt those of Nikephoros Phokas and John Tzimiskes.913  The 
burden posed by famous predecessors would have necessitated exaggeration and 
distortion in imperial bulletins, so as to dispel any sense of inadequacy. 
                                                 
909 Theophanes Continuatus: 452-453.  See also McCormick (1986): 165-166. 
910 Constantine VII, Text C: ll.867-868.  
911 ἐκεῖνα γὰρ πρὸς τὰ νῦν συγκρινόµενα εἰς τὸ µηδὲν ὡς ἀληθῶς κατακλείεται καὶ τὰ πλήθη πρὸς 
πλήθη καὶ τὰ µεγέθη πρὸς µεγέθη εὐαρίθµητα καὶ µικρὰ καταφαίνεται (Michael Italikos: 232.7-9). 
912 Τί τούτου µεῖζον ἐξηκοντούτης ἐγὼ τυγχάνων ἢ εἶδον ἢ ἤκουσα; Ἀλλ’ οἱ πρὸ ἐµοῦ φήσουσιν ὡς 
εἶδον, οἱ δὲ πρὸ ἐκείνων αὐχήσουσιν ὡς ἤκουσαν – αὐτοὶ δ’ οἱ γέροντες, οἱ ψυχρολόγοι, οἱ µυθολόγοι 
οἰήσονται σὺν τῇ κορύζῃ χάναι καὶ φάναι· µὴ ἐµβλέψαι εὔχοµαί τ[ι] τούτων ἢ αὐτὸ τὸ µηδὲ ὂν 
γενέσθαι (Leo of Synada: ep.13.4-9; trans. 23). 
913 Leo of Synada was sixty at the time, so he too would have been familiar with the accomplishments 
of Basil’s predecessors.  This makes it all the more likely that he was seeking to reassure Ouranos. 
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Defeats represent a more complex case.  Jonathan Shepard accuses imperial bulletins 
of ‘playing loose with the truth’, but concedes that they rarely concocted ‘sheer 
fantasy’.914  The assertion is questionable.  While it was unwise to dwell on 
unsuccessful endeavours in bulletins,915 major defeats were disclosed to the public, as 
the case of Manuel and the Battle of Myriokephalon demonstrates.  The various 
accounts of the encounter are discussed in the following chapter, though it may be 
said that the bulletin almost certainly put a positive slant on events.  According to 
Niketas Choniates, Manuel claimed to have forced the sultan to a treaty under his 
terms, a boast also made in the emperor’s letter to Henry II of England.  Given that 
the same letter draws attention to the military heroics of Manuel, we may surmise that 
the official account presented something of a personal triumph.916  There was almost 
certainly a precedent for this sort of manipulation in state media.  Kaegi postulates 
that lost bulletins played down Heraclius’ hasty retreat from the Persians in 625, 
whilst at the same time exaggerating the emperor’s personal role in stemming the 
Persian advance.917  Shifts of focus, distortion, and the suppression of embarrassing 
elements were undoubtedly common in imperial bulletins.918 
The ‘sheer fantasy’ Shepard speaks of (turning defeat into victory) was not unknown.  
One treatise recommends that deputies in Constantinople invent ‘positive reports’ 
about imperial messages arriving with members of an imperial expedition, to combat 
                                                 
914 Shepard (2003b): 10. 
915 Howard-Johnston (1994): 71. 
916 See below, 249-259. 
917 Kaegi (2003): 131-132.  It may have been the case that Heraclius’ publicists operated similarly 
during the early defeats against Islam (see ibid: 248-249, 256). 
918 Howard-Johnston (2010): 422-423. 
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‘indifference’ or worse, ‘disturbances’.919  Theophanes Continuatus relates that the 
rebel Thomas the Slav ‘sent out letters everywhere proclaiming he had won a victory’, 
a premature and ultimately false claim.920  Nevertheless, the letters did gain Thomas 
some temporary support, and it is testament to the pretender’s propaganda that some 
historical works may be seen to preserve aspects of Thomas’ account alongside the 
official record.921  In the case of rulers proper, concocting lies may not have been 
feasible without jeopardizing prestige.  The inhabitants of Constantinople were 
apparently not always easily led: according to Theophanes, in 809 the Emperor 
Nikephoros I attempted to convince the citizenry that he was celebrating Easter in the 
camp of the defeated Bulgar khan Krum via sworn dispatches (σάκραις), the 
suggestion being that few were fooled by his claims.922   
The use of falsified dispatches is perhaps best demonstrated by the Emperor 
Constantine V.  Veselin Beševliev has shown that a number of dispatches charting 
Constantine’s campaigns in Bulgaria underlie the narratives of Theophanes and the 
Patriarch Nikephoros.  While Nikephoros presents Constantine as successful in his 
endeavours, Theophanes offers a different version of events, whereby Constantine 
was partly successful but was ultimately powerless to prevent Bulgar raids against 
Thrace.  That Nikephoros was using official press releases for this part of his 
                                                 
919 ἐστὶν ὅτε καὶ πλάττειν ἀγαθὰς φήµας ὡς κελεύσεως ἐλθούσης πλὴν ἀορίστως, ἢ καὶ ἄλλως ἀπό 
τινος τοῦ λαοῦ ἐλθόντων, τῶν µὲν τὴν ῥᾳθυµίαν, τῶν δὲ τὰς ταραχὰς παύοντα (Constantine VII, Text 
B: ll.77-79; trans. 87). 
920 γράµµασιν ἐπιστέλλων τὰ ἑαυτοῦ περιαγγέλλει ἁπανταχοῦ, ὡς εἴη τε νενικηκώς, ὅπερ οὐκ ἦν 
(Theophanes Continuatus: 63.19-21). 
921 See Lemerle (1965): esp. 258.  The official record damning Thomas’ insurrection, thought to have 
been written by one Ignatios the Deacon is discussed by Treadgold (1988): 244-245. 
922 Theophanes: 485.12-14.  Dölger, Regesten: I, no. 369.  Theophanes, who disliked Nikephoros (see 
Tinnefeld 1971: 74-78), believes Nikephoros deceived his subjects, since it was practically impossible 
for him to travel such distances in the stated period of time.  Panos Sophoulis (2011: 190) suggests that 
Nikephoros probably captured another fortified encampment but exaggerated his achievement to 
extract maximum political benefit from an otherwise uneventful campaign.  For discussion of the 
campaign in general, see Treadgold (1988): 157-159; Sophoulis (2011): 188-191. 
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Breviarium is seemingly confirmed by a passage in another of his works, the 
theological discourse entitled Antirrheticus.  Here Nikephoros, apparently free from 
censorship concerns, writes: ‘whilst what [Constantine V] may have done was minor 
and not particularly noteworthy, from the letters he addressed to the inhabitants of the 
capital it became apparent that he was the servant and bedfellow of the openly-
proclaimed lie’.923  Thus Constantine was apparently willing to publicize fabricated 
accounts of his campaigns, though in doing so he too ran the risk of losing the trust of 
his subjects.   
Reaching firm conclusions regarding the accuracy of these reports is somewhat 
hazardous, since Theophanes and Nikephoros bore an obvious dislike for the 
iconoclast Constantine.924  Nonetheless, the strong sentiments of the iconodule 
historians provides the best evidence for the misuse of victory bulletins.  The anti-
iconoclast Scriptor Incertus de Leone Armenio, thought to have been written in the 
820s,925 reports that the Bulgar ruler Krum died suddenly in mysterious circumstances 
in April 814, before setting out against Constantinople.  Emperor Leo V, however, 
was of the belief that he, not God, had bested the enemy, and dispatched victory 
messages (σάκρας) announcing that he had encountered the Bulgars near the capital 
and repelled them through his bravery, mortally wounding Krum with an arrow.926  
Leo probably made regular use of bulletins: Panos Sophoulis proposes that historical 
accounts of Leo’s subsequent victory over the Bulgars near Mesembria later that year 
                                                 
923 Εἰ δέ τι µικρὸν καὶ οὐ πάνυ ἀξιόλογον ἔδρασε, καθά γε ἡµῖν ἐκ τῶν γεγραµµένων αὐτῷ πρὸς τοὺς 
ἐνηυλισµένους κατὰ τὴν βασιλεύουσαν, ἀναλεξαµένοις ἔγνωσται· ἐν οἶς πολλὰ κατακοµπάσας ὁ τοῦ 
ψεύδους ὑπηρέτης καὶ σύντροφος (Patriarch Nikephoros, Antirrheticus: 508 col. 72). 
924 Tinnefeld (1971): 60-74; Beševliev (1974): esp. 74-77, 81, 82-83; also idem (1971a); idem (1971b). 
925 See Ševčenko (1992b): 280 n.3; Markopoulos (1999): 261.  For the most recent discussion of the 
text, see Sophoulis (2010). 
926 Scriptor Incertus: 348.16-22.  For discussion of these events and the author’s possible reliance on an 
official communiqué, see Beševliev (1974): 75; Treadgold (1988): 201-207; Sophoulis (2011): 264. 
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derive from ‘official sources commissioned by the government soon after the 
event’.927  The author of the Scriptor Incertus overlooks this victory of Leo, drafting a 
work which Markopoulos termed ‘une sorte de pamphlet contre cet empereur’.928   
The hesitancy of the Scriptor Incertus to follow the official line is seen also in its 
earlier account of the Battle of Versinikia.  Theophanes writes that the strategos of the 
Anatolikon, the future Leo V, wisely exhorted Michael I Rangabe to attack the 
Bulgars, but was foolishly overruled by advisors of the emperor.929  Since this report 
is favourable to Leo, Kaegi suspects that Theophanes was ‘repeating the 
contemporary official account’.930  Whilst the Scriptor Incertus’ narrative of the 
Battle of Versinikia does not, as Theophanes Continuatus might,931 accuse Leo of 
deceiving and deserting the emperor, it nevertheless mentions the Anatolikon troops 
(those under Leo’s command) neglecting to aid their comrades of the Macedonian 
theme and abandoning the field.932  The hero is John Aplakes, strategos of 
Macedonia, who heroically engaged the enemy only to be isolated and killed.  David 
Turner suspects that the original source of this account was ‘probably an official 
document’,933 though the focus on Aplakes and the absence of Leo argue against this.  
Rather, it is apparent that the Scriptor presents an ‘unofficial’ account of the battle, as 
at one point the work lambasts attempts, probably from Leo’s camp, to blame the 
                                                 
927 Sophoulis (2007-2008); idem (2010): 36-37. 
928 Markopoulos (1999): 259. 
929 Theophanes: 500-502. 
930 Kaegi (1981a): 250. 
931 Theophanes Continuatus: 14-15, where an account favourable to Leo is also offered. 
932 Scriptor Incertus: 333-339.  For discussion of the battle see Bury (1923): 352-353; Alexander 
(1958): 113-125; Treadgold (1988): 186-188; Sophoulis (2011): 234-245. 
933 Markopoulos (1999: 259) determined that the author of the Scriptor Incertus probably had access to 
archives, particularly those of the patriarch of Constantinople. 
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terrain for the inability of the Anatolikon troops to support those already engaged.934  
Again then the Scriptor Incertus appears to disregard the official version of events 
propagated by Leo V, though this is more a reflection of the author’s dislike for the 
iconoclastic emperor than his concern over untruths in Leo’s reports.  
Veracity in the Dispatches of Subordinate Generals: David Komnenos and the Sack of 
Thessaloniki, 1185 
Subordinate commanders also exaggerated their achievements and individual 
contribution in victory dispatches, while shifting responsibility and altering the course 
of events when relating setbacks.935  David Komnenos, commander of Thessaloniki 
during the Sicilian attack of 1185, is accused of exaggeration and falsification in his 
dispatches to Andronikos I Komnenos, contributing significantly to the city’s eventual 
downfall.936  According to the bishop Eustathios, David exploited any success, 
however minor, and painted a false picture of the situation.  After his men captured a 
lowly enemy soldier, David had the captive dressed up and paraded through the city, 
as though he was of great standing.  David then ‘wrote to the emperor that the battle 
was going well for us’.937  Soon after there was another foray, with two horses and a 
soldier’s headgear seized; again the booty was showcased to the public as though it 
was a substantial prize. ‘Our wretched leader wrote again to the emperor that we were 
                                                 
934 Turner (1990): 189-193, esp. 191-192.  For the contrasting view, see Rochow (1991): 315-316; 
Sophoulis (2011): 33-34.  By contrast, it is thought that Theophanes employed an official account 
issued by Leo, wherein Leo is presented assisting Aplakes – ibid: 21-22, 242. 
935 See Appendix III for further discussion of personal interest in military reports. 
936 Alexander Kazhdan (& Constable 1982: 150) determined much on the basis of the reports of David 
Komnenos: ‘The information sent by provincial governors and their staff to Constantinople was 
frequently influenced by private interests and was therefore inaccurate, false, or biased’. 
937 καὶ γραφὴ εὐθὺς τοῦ καὶ στρατηγοῦ καὶ δουκὸς εἰς τὸν βασιλέα, ὡς εὐτυχῶς ἡµῖν τὰ εἰς µάχην 
φέρεται (Eustathios, Capture of Thessaloniki: 68.19-26; trans. 69). 
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prospering in war’.938  Finally, an encounter between two enemy horseman and more 
than ten Byzantines took place. ‘Again there was a third report to the emperor, which 
read “Thanks to your Majesty’s supplications and the Imperial good fortune, we have 
been victorious in the third battle” – although I cannot say who it was that we had 
conquered’.939  Eustathios explains that Komnenos had originally wanted to dispatch 
one missive covering these three incidents, but was dissuaded by his dislike for the 
Emperor Andronikos, which fuelled paranoia over his position.  Consequently, he 
resolved to persuade Andronikos that the city was safe, and did not require any 
assistance, be it weaponry, supplies or manpower.940  The emperor had sent an army 
to aid Thessaloniki, but because he believed the lies of David, the relief force did not 
get involved.941  The situation is summarized by the irate Eustathios: 
What he wrote was false, and benefited only himself.  It could not be tested, 
because no one knew what he was writing, and so none could speak, or dared to 
speak; and so he continued to persuade the emperor of this, to our misfortune.  He 
was so concerned to inspire the emperor with confidence that we would come to 
no harm because he needed to remain in sole charge of our affairs, and he had to 
prevent the leadership being given to any one else to save the situation.942  
                                                 
938 καὶ γράµµα πάλιν τοῦ δυσαριστέως παρὰ τὸν βασιλέα, ὡς εὐτυχοῦµεν τὰ κατὰ πόλεµον (ibid: 
68.26-32; trans. 69). 
939 καὶ πάλιν ἀναφορὰ εἰς τὸν βασιλέα τρίτη, ὡς “τῇ βασιλικῇ εὐχῇ τε καὶ εὐτυχίᾳ νενικήκαµεν καὶ τὸν 
τρίτον πόλεµον”, οὐκ οἶδα τίνων περιγενόµενοι (ibid: 70.1-7; trans. 71). 
940 Ibid: 70.7-23. 
941 Ibid: 72.10-16. 
942 ψευδῆ µὲν γράφων πρὸς τὸ ἑαυτῷ µόνῳ συνοῖσον καὶ ἀνεξέλεγκτα, ὅτι µηδὲ ἦν τις ὁ εἴτε εἰδὼς 
ἅπερ ἔγραφεν εἴτε λαλῶν εἴτε λαλεῖν τολµῶν, πείθων δὲ ἐκεῖνον οὐκ εὐτυχῶς ἡµῖν.  πεπραγµάτευτο 
γὰρ θάρρος ἐµβαλεῖν τῷ βασιλεῖ περὶ ἡµῶν, ὡς οὐκ ἂν τι κακόν ποθεν πάθοιµεν, ἵνα κεφαλὴ µόνος 
αὐτὸς ἐφίσταιτο τοῖς ὦδε καὶ µή τινι ἑτέρῳ ἐπιτραπείη τὰ τῇδε, οἵῳ περισώσασθαι ταῦτα (ibid: 70.24-
29; trans. 71). 
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Eustathios cannot hide his anger at the man who abandoned Thessaloniki to its fate, 
though his testimony is rendered more believable by his formerly close relations with 
David Komnenos.943  Presumably David offered a very different interpretation of 
events, though it is not preserved in the historical record; Niketas Choniates, 
employing the account of Eustathios, similarly lambasts the doux for his ineptitude 
and lack of courage in the face of the attack.944   
Conclusion 
Dispatches and bulletins inevitably presented a distortion of the facts, such as they are 
known.  Successes were exploited and exaggerated, while defeats were played down, 
attributed to certain individuals or causes, or even transformed into victories.  Content 
may have varied from an overview of a campaign, such as that offered by Heraclius in 
the Chronicon Paschale, to detailed descriptions of battles and sieges, perhaps more 
suited to the interests of the Middle Byzantine military aristocracy.  These aspects 
should be kept in mind when searching for such underlying material in historical 
works.  For now, however, it is necessary to determine how much of this material 
would have been available to Byzantine historians. 
                                                 
943 Angold (1995): 181. 
944 Niketas Choniates, Chronike Diegesis: 297-298. 
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III. Campaign Dispatches and Bulletins – Form and Archiving 
Before assessing the use of bulletins by historians, we must clarify to what extent the 
transmission of information about military events in Byzantium took the form of a 
written report.  We frequently read that an emperor ‘heard’ or ‘learned’ about an 
event, and that ‘news’ or ‘word’ (invariably λόγος, φήµη, or ἀγγελία) was reported; 
the source of the information, much less how it was transmitted, is often 
undisclosed.945  To assume that a written dispatch was the source in all instances is 
hazardous.946  Rather, relevant references to information transmission should be 
examined on a case-by-case basis before one arrives at such a conclusion.947  This 
                                                 
945 Lee (1993): 147. 
946 In some instances it is quite clear that the source of information was something other than a certified 
report from a commander.  Following the defeat to the Pechenegs at Diampolis in 1049, Constantine 
Arianites retreated to Adrianople before sending details of the disaster to Constantine IX; the emperor, 
however, is said to have ‘known something of what had happened prior to the letter’ (Skylitzes: 
467.88-93; trans. 436).  With armies sometimes in full flight for days following a defeat, a general was 
not always able to dispatch swift word to the emperor; Howard Johnston (2010: 288) observes that ‘a 
halt was a first precondition for the production of a dispatch’.  Theophilos learned of the sack of 
Amorion from his returning ambassadors to the caliph (Theophanes Continuatus: 129-131; Skylitzes: 
78.38-41) while Constantine IX’s official news channels again failed him only a year after Diampolis, 
when he apparently only learned of the loss at Diakene from those who had fled the battle and had 
returned to Constantinople (Skylitzes: 469.62-63).  Perhaps the most famous example is the chaotic 
scene painted by Psellos after the Battle of Manzikert: in the days following, numerous messengers 
trickled into Constantinople, each with a different tale to tell (Psellos, Chronographia: II, 162-163 
[XXIII]).  The droungarios Adrian, sent to aid the besieged Syracuse in 878, officially learned of the 
fall of the city ten days after from soldiers returning to the Peloponnese (Vita Basilii: §§69-70).  For 
informal channels of information diffusion, such as pilgrims, clerics, merchants, mercenaries, and 
deserters, see Lee (1993): 161-165; Austin and Rankov (1995): 83-86.   
947 We should be wary of historians inventing the transmission of information for dramatic purposes.  
Margaret Mullett (1992a: 205-210) observes that Anna frequently focuses on the reception of letters or 
reports, and in particular Alexios’ reaction to them, for dramatic effect.  Thus Alexios remains calm 
upon receiving word that Bohemond had crossed the straits, while those around him panic (Anna 
Komnene: XII.9.6); in a later scene, Alexios rises from his bed only when a third blood-stained courier 
enters his tent, declaring the Turks to be at hand (ibid: XV.2.1-2).  A stark contrast to Alexios’ capacity 
to receive reports and respond accordingly is served by Andronikos I Komnenos, who, if Niketas 
Choniates is to be believed, dismissed alarming reports from messengers proclaiming that towns and 
provinces were under attack (Niketas Choniates, Chronike Diegesis: 320-321).  For the Kaiserkritik 
aspect here, see Simpson (2009): 21-22.  Similarly, Michael III is said to have been handed a written 
report on the hostile activities of the emir of Melitene whilst watching a race, only to berate his 
attendant for disturbing his enjoyment (Theophanes Continuatus: 198-199).  Attaleiates, critical of 
Michael VII Doukas, relates how the emperor barely reacted to reports of Turkish encroachment near 
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process owes much to Doug Lee’s work on strategic intelligence, where he is careful 
to question the probability of information transmission and the capacity of the 
historian to be aware of such matters.948   
The Nature of Information Transmission and Written Reports 
Jonathan Shepard suggests that intelligence and diplomatic reports, similar types of 
documents to military reports, may not have been committed to writing.949  He cites 
three reasons for this.  The first is the lack of evidence to suggest that imperial envoys 
presented anything other than an oral account of their experiences upon their return to 
Constantinople.  In pressing contexts, military reports may have been transmitted on a 
purely oral basis.  The taktika attest that commands entrusted to officers before battle 
were frequently written,950 but once battle unfolded it would have been difficult to 
maintain written communication.  This is perhaps evident in Leo the Deacon’s 
account of the Battle of Arcadiopolis.  Having asked John Alakasseus to scout the 
enemy and provide him with a ‘full report’ (πάντα διαγγέλλειν), Bardas Skleros 
                                                                                                                                            
Chalcedon and Chrysopolis, ‘remaining unmoved as though it was a foreign country which was 
suffering’ (Attaleiates: 147.14-19).  The evidence therefore suggests that an emperor’s reaction to 
military reports and news in general could act as a contrivance for a historian to depict their subject in a 
particular fashion.   
948 Lee (1993). 
949 Shepard (1995a): 113-115.  Lee (1993: 38-39), by contrast, believes that many diplomatic reports 
would have taken the form of written accounts to be housed in the government archives.  For 
discussion of diplomatic and intelligence reports in the Late Roman and Byzantine world, see Lee 
(1986); idem (1993); Austin & Rankov (1995); Shepard (1995a). 
950 The Strategikon of Maurice (§VII.A.4.6-8) reveals that ‘written orders’ (τὰ ἐγγράφως...µανδάτα) 
should be communicated by officers to each individual tagma prior to battle.  Leo VI (Taktika: 
§XII.80) notes that orders and commands for battle should, if possible, be given to each turmarch ‘in 
writing’ (ἐγγράφως).  Leo (§XX.220) further recommends that orders for naval captains be written and 
sealed, to ensure that they did not fall into enemy hands.  Finally, the De Re Militari (§32.4-15) advises 
that daily duties, for scouts and protectors of foragers in particular, be clarified ‘in writing’ (ἐγγράφως). 
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deployed his troops for action once he had heard Alakasseus’ response (τῶν...λόγων 
διακούσας) – the indication being that the message was transmitted orally.951 
When longer distances are involved, the situation becomes more complex.  Explicit 
references to rulers demanding a commander explain his actions in person are rare,952 
and logic dictates that it was not practical for a general to leave his post during an 
ongoing conflict.  Furthermore, an emperor could just as easily gain an insight into 
proceedings and make decisions via letter.953  It may have been the prerogative of the 
commander to decide how the news should be delivered.  Having proved unsuccessful 
in his mission to drive the Arabs from Crete, the protospatharios Photeinos is said to 
have himself reported the failure of the expedition to the Emperor Michael II.954  
Conversely, the opportunity to personally regale the emperor with tales of one’s 
military success presented a useful conduit to praise and favour.  Upon Michael V 
Kalaphates’ accession, Katakalon Kekaumenos arrived back from Sicily, bringing 
word of his skillful defence of Messina.955  Michael VIII Palaiologos, describing his 
service for Nicaean emperor John III Doukas Vatatzes, notes that he informed his 
master about his deeds upon his return.  ‘There was nothing that did not deserve to be 
recounted…the emperor listened with pleasure to reports of my achievements’.956  
                                                 
951 Leo the Deacon: 109.2-11. 
952 Alexios sent a letter to his nephew John, the doux of Dyrrachion, requesting him to come in person 
and render an account of the affairs of his province in preparation for a campaign against the rebel 
Bolkan of Dalmatia.  This, however, was rather exceptional in that John was suspected of rebellion, and 
the request thus appears to have been more a test of his loyalty (Anna Komnene: VIII.7.4).  As an 
aside, we may note that John appears to have reported a defeat to Bolkan to the emperor in person 
(ibid: IX.4.6-5.1).   
953 This matter also benefits from discussion of post-campaign investigations – see below, 200 n.1002. 
954 Theophanes Continuatus: 76-77. 
955 Skylitzes: 419.55-56. 
956 οὐ γὰρ ἦν ὃ µὴ τῶν ἀξίων ἀκοῦσαι, καὶ ἡδυνθῆναι ἤκουε περὶ ἡµῶν πραττόντων βασιλεὺς 
τηνικαῦτα (Typikon of Michael VIII Palaiologos for the Monastery of St. Demetrios of the Palaiologoi-
Kellibara in Constantinople: 451; trans. 1243). 
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The personal mode of reporting success or failure thus clearly had some appeal, and 
may have substituted for written correspondence in some instances.957 
The oral military report should not however be afforded primacy, for the examples 
cited earlier in this chapter confirm that written dispatches were regularly sent from 
the front to keep the emperor abreast of distant military developments.  When Anna 
Komnene writes of commanders such as George Palaiologos, Leo Kephalas, John 
Doukas, Landulph and Eustathios Kamytzes sending military reports to her father 
Alexios and receiving correspondence in turn, she refers to written accounts - διὰ 
γραµµάτων, διὰ γραφῶν, or similar forms.958  In other instances Anna relates that 
Alexios demanded to be kept informed of military developments via letter (διὰ 
γραφῶν).959  Drawing upon other sources, the many allusions to written intelligence 
reports960 and instances of rulers writing to campaigning generals and provincial 
                                                 
957 Generals are known to have reported personally to their superiors.  Having been defeated by Abul-
Aswar, emir of Dvin, outside Tivion, Constantine Iassites and his servant Constantine the Alan fled to 
Ani, where they personally reported the disaster to the domestikos ton scholon Nicholas.  The news was 
in turn related to Constantine IX, and Iassites and Nicholas were relieved of their commands (Skylitzes: 
438). 
958 Anna Komnene: IV.I.1.19-21, IV.II.1.65-66 for Palaiologos keeping the emperor informed of 
Robert Guiscard’s siege of Dyrrachion via letter; V.5.3-4 for Leo Kephalas, governor of Larissa, 
sending letters to the emperor keeping him informed of Bohemond’s siege of the city; IX.2.3.79-80 for 
the megas doux John Doukas sending a written report to the emperor following the reconquest of Crete 
and Cyprus; XIII.7.2 for letters from the admiral Landulph accusing the megas doux Isaac 
Kontostephanos and his brother of being neglectful in guarding the straits of Lombardy against Norman 
convoys; ΧΙV.5.1.83-87 for Alexios receiving a letter from Kamytzes detailing the Turkish attack on 
Nicaea.  An earlier example dates from Nikephoros III Botaneiates’ reign - when Kyzikos fell to the 
Turks in 1080, Anna relates that a letter from the town bore the news (II.3.2.63-65). 
959 Ibid: XI.9.2.54-61 for Alexios insisting the young Bardas and Michael keep him informed by ‘secret 
letters’ of events whilst on campaign with Manuel Boutoumites in Cilicia; XII.8.1.42-47 for Alexios 
wanting his namesake, the doux of Dyrrachion, to immediately send him letters informing him of any 
developments vis-à-vis Bohemond’s invasion; XV.2.5.58-61 for the emperor instructing Leo Nikerites 
to guard Lopadion against Turkish attacks and to report back to him any developments through letters. 
960 Shepard (1995a) is in little doubt that some intelligence reports were put to writing.  He cites an 
example: in the inventory for the 911 expedition to Crete, it is noted that the strategos of the 
Kibyrrheots was to obtain ‘a true report’ (ἀληθὲς µανδάτον), seemingly written, while the archontes of 
Cyprus was also to gather reports (µανδάτα) from his spies (Constantine VII, De Ceremoniis: I, 657) 
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commanders – be it to issue orders961 or perhaps offer their own expertise on a 
particular matter962 - not to mention the survival of tens of thousands of lead seals,963 
further attest to a culture of regular written correspondence between the emperor and 
his subordinates.   
Thus, Shepard’s first concern over the format of diplomatic and intelligence reports, 
once modified to our argument, can be dispelled.  His other two reservations are more 
readily dismissed.  Shepard’s notion that reports contained potentially important and 
sensitive information does not apply to our topic.  His final proposal - that the carriers 
                                                 
961 Some isolated examples may first be cited. Basil I furnished further instructions to his admiral Nasar 
when he requested information from the emperor about military operations (Vita Basilii: §63.17-20).  
Skylitzes frequently records John Tzimiskes (287.83-85, 288.10-12, 291.5-8) and Constantine IX 
Monomachos (424.65-71, 439.91-94, 450.6-16, 457.31-458.36, 467.96) giving orders to their generals 
via letters.  The Alexiad contains many references to Alexios sending letters to his commanders 
containing instructions.  This usually amounts to little more than the standard διὰ γραµµάτων 
(VIII.3.4.89-97; X.2.7.77-83; XI.3.1.42-44; XI.9.3.67-71; XII.8.1.42-47; XIII.1.4) or διὰ 
γραφῆς/γραφὰς (III.9.3.15-25; IV.4.1.85-90; VIII.7.4; XII.3.1.69-71) and related terms, though 
occasionally we see more specific reference to the correspondence taking the form of written 
instructions - διὰ γραφῶν παρεκελεύσατο (X.9.2.72-78) or χρηµατίζοντα διὰ γραµµάτων (XIV.5.4.24-
31).  When George Monomachatos was sent back to govern Dyrrachion by Nikephoros III Botaneiates, 
he received ‘written orders’ (τὰς...προστάξεις ἐγγράφως) with regard to his office (I.16.3.69-75).  Paul 
Stephenson (2000: 145-146) supposed this reference ‘confirms that a confidential dossier existed which 
outlined the principal duties of the provincial commander’.  The Emperor Manuel wrote to Andronikos 
Kontostephanos with orders pertaining to the latter’s campaign against the Hungarians in 1167 and the 
siege of Damietta in 1169; on both occasions he was allegedly ignored (Niketas Choniates, Chronike 
Diegesis: 154.43-55; 164.48-61).  
962 The exhortations of Constantine VII Porphyrogenitos serve as an excellent example of this, and 
attest to a history of written correspondence between both parties:  ‘Many times through written 
memoranda (ἐγγράφων ὑπαναγνωστικῶν) have we roused you to courage, very often we have given 
you our guidance, yet we have no surfeit of communication with you’ (Constantine VII, Address of the 
Emperor Constantine VII to the Strategoi of the East: 1.33-35; trans. 128).  Illustrative examples may 
also be found in the Alexiad.  Alexios gives advice by letter to the Albanian commander of Dyrrachion, 
Komiskortes, following a defeat (Anna Komnene: IV.8.4.32-33).  Later, he corresponds with John 
Doukas via letter during the latter’s siege of Mitylene, offering advice on how Doukas might best take 
the city (ibid: IX.1.5-6).  Finally, as Isaac Kontostephanos continued to flounder in the wake of 
Bohemond’s invasion, Alexios sent him a map of the Lombardy straits, and ‘guidance in writing’ 
(ὑποδείξας ἐν γράµµασι) for how best to attack the Normans at sea.  As a result Kontostephanos was 
successful (ibid: XIII.7.4.71-78).  Another example may be found in the Epitome of John Kinnamos, 
where it is said that Constantine Angelos, uncle of Manuel I Komnenos, was given ‘written advice’ 
(γράµµασί τε παρεγγυωµένου) from his nephew exhorting him not to attack King William of Sicily’s 
fleet.  Constantine ignored the advice and was defeated (Kinnamos: 120.11-121.10). 
963 See Mullett (1989): 183. 
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of the information may not have been able to write – again is of limited relevance to 
our argument.  Literacy among lower-class soldiers varied wildly,964 though just one 
of Robert Browning’s literacy classifications – those able only to read, sign their 
names and perhaps write simple messages965 - would be perfectly sufficient for most 
troops, not expected to write any reports beyond perhaps a few brief correspondences 
passed during battle.  Leo VI recommends that turmarchs – divisional commanders - 
be able to read and write, the hypostrategos in particular, as it is he who would 
assume command duties should anything befall the strategos.966  Otherwise, such men 
would not have been entrusted to write progress reports.  The task fell to the 
appointed general, usually a member of the military aristocracy, whose literary 
interests need no further elucidation.967  Even if he were unable to write the report, a 
secretary or member of staff could surely be expected to do so on his behalf.968 
Military Documentation in Byzantium 
Military operations almost certainly entailed a mass of written correspondence and 
administrative records.969  Thematic officials such as the chartoularioi and the 
protonotarioi were responsible for documentation at a provincial level, including 
troop registers and inventories,970 while we can surmise that the complex logistics of 
                                                 
964 Oikonomides (1993). 
965 Browning (1993): 77. 
966 Leo VI, Taktika: §IV.45.185-188.  The manual De Velitatione makes frequent references to 
turmarchs leading scouting parties and reporting their findings back to the general (§§VI; VII.3; IX.1-
7; X.7).  Specifically, they are encouraged to survey the enemy camp and make ‘an honest report’ (τὸ 
ἀληθὲς καταµηνῦσαι) to the general, taking into account enemy numbers, their strength, and the terrain 
(§XIV.3). 
967 See Browning (1978a): 41-44; Mullett (1989): 162-163. 
968 It is said that Leo VI’s admiral, Podaron, was illiterate, and that the emperor was forced to appoint a 
judge to his staff to deal with cases involving rowers (Constantine VII, De Administrando Imperio: 
§51.93-102). 
969 For the importance of literacy in relation to campaigning see Browning (1978a): 41-42; Holmes 
(2002b): 2. 
970 For thematic administration see in general Kaegi (1982): 98-111; Haldon (1997b): 208-253.  
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grand campaigns necessitated extensive, largely statistical, documentation.971  Firm 
evidence is lacking, but John Haldon’s analysis of documents concerning expeditions 
to Crete and southern Italy in the first half of the tenth century is suggestive.  These 
materials, found in chapters forty-four and forty-five of the De Ceremoniis of 
Constantine VII, consist of inventory lists of men and resources and the expenditure 
involved, but their appearance is an intricate web carefully untangled by Haldon.  He 
convincingly argues that the Cretan lists do not represent complete original 
documents, but rather abridged inventories pieced together from the archives of 
various departments of government.972  We may infer that the records proper held 
more detailed information than is presented in the De Ceremoniis, and, further, that 
this mass of administrative paperwork was required for all major campaigns.  Haldon 
also proposes that the document listing items needed for the expedition to southern 
Italy in 934-935 was updated upon the completion of the mission.973  If this is the 
case, the inventory would represent evidence of the state’s interest in documenting the 
consequences and results of major operations. 
The most notable surviving examples of military and diplomatic documentation are 
found in works associated with Constantine VII Porphyrogenitos.974  It has long been 
acknowledged that chapters forty to fifty-seven of the second book of the De 
Ceremoniis draw upon several administrative documents,975 including the 
                                                 
971 See Haldon (1997a); idem (1999): 139-189 for the logistics involved. 
972 Haldon (2000): esp. 243-256, 264-268.  For discussion of documentation relating to provincial fiscal 
matters in Byzantium, highlighting the departmental nature of record-keeping, see Svoronos (1959): 
esp. 57-63. 
973 Haldon (2000): 257. 
974 Toynbee (1973: 602-603) thought both the De Administrando Imperio and the De Ceremoniis to be 
comprised of a set of files, a collection of documents which Constantine was apparently never able to 
fashion into an orderly literary work.  For the documentary nature of the De Ceremoniis, see Bury 
(1907). 
975 Bury (1907): 223-227.  
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aforementioned inventories for the failed Cretan expeditions of 911 and 949, as well 
as that for operations in southern Italy in 934 and 935.976  Similarly, the De 
Administrando Imperio is thought to contain numerous official documents, including 
intelligence and diplomatic reports.977  Beyond these we possess little documentation 
from the Middle Byzantine period, let alone texts relating to military affairs.978 
Military Documentation and the Archives 
Can we attribute the dearth of surviving documentation to Byzantine archival 
practices?  The state archives, long lost, have been discussed in a number of period- 
and departmental-specific contexts,979 though we await the sort of comprehensive 
studies undertaken for ancient depositories.980  It is thought that government archives 
were improved from the fourth century,981 and were perhaps at their most substantial 
over the following three hundred years.982  Warren Treadgold is convinced that in the 
centuries following Heraclius’ reign the government continued to maintain official 
records, while generals and other officials kept writing reports for their superiors, 
which were filed in the archives.983  Arnold Toynbee did not doubt that the archives 
contained a ‘continuous series’ of documents detailing the functions of the army.984  
According to Christopher Kelly, a constant flow of documents, including reports from 
                                                 
976 The documents are also discussed by Treadgold (1992): 100-141. 
977 For discussion of these documents and Constantine’s sources for the De Administrando Imperio in 
general, see Toynbee (1972): 599-600; Treadgold (1992): 93-100; Whittow (1996a): 229-241, 244; 
Howard-Johnston (2001).  
978 The problem is discussed by Whittow (1996a): 1-3. 
979 For the period from the third to the sixth century, see C. Kelly (1994); for the late period, see 
Oikonomides (1985); idem (1997).  For an overview of archival material concerning diplomacy, see 
Dölger & Karayannopoulos (1968): esp. 11-20; Beihammer (2008). 
980 See, for example, Posner (1972); Sherk (1969); Schwirtlich (1981); Culham (1989). 
981 Lee (1993): 33-34; Millar (1977): 259-268; idem (1982): 18.  
982 Bury (1911): 7-9; C. Kelly (1994). 
983 Treadgold (1992): 78-79; idem (2007): 348-349. 
984 Toynbee (1972): 577-578, 600-601.  
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imperial agents in the provinces, were summarized and filed, while copies of replies 
or instructions were kept.985  Mark Whittow adopts a similar stance, identifying 
surviving lead seals as ‘the ghosts of vanished archives’, and arguing that archives 
were kept by departments of state, housing, among other items, diplomatic papers and 
military lists and reports from across the empire.986   
Others, however, using works associated with Constantine VII as a barometer, are less 
sure.  Ihor Ševčenko was not convinced that Constantine had abundant archival 
materials at his disposal; rather, he suggests that information was sparse and in some 
cases, entirely lacking.987  He cites as example Constantine’s difficulty in finding 
material on imperial expeditions, with the work of Leo Katakylas found not in the 
palace, but in the library of a monastery.988  Toynbee similarly considered 
Constantine’s inability to locate documents relating to the genesis and development of 
the themes for the De Thematibus indication that ‘such documents were not to be 
found – and this because there had not ever been any’.989  The composition of the De 
Administrando Imperio is a particular point of discussion.  James Howard-Johnston, 
contesting Ševčenko’s comments, attributes the long-recognized inadequacies of the 
De Administrando Imperio990 to the failings of Constantine VII during the process of 
transcription, rather than to the department of the Dromos, which, he believes, kept 
much fuller and more accurate documents.991  Howard-Johnston proposes that 
chapters twenty-seven to forty-six of the work represent four dossiers commissioned 
                                                 
985 C. Kelly (1994): 164-165. 
986 Whittow (1996a): 1-3. 
987 Ševčenko (1992a): 189-193.   
988 Constantine VII, Text C: ll.24-39. 
989 Toynbee (1972): 577-578, 600-601.  For a similar view on a lack of material for the De Thematibus, 
see Huxley (1980): 31-32. 
990 For the shortcomings of Constantine’s information, see also Beaud (1990): 553, 558. 
991 Howard-Johnston (2001): 319 n.55. 
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by Leo VI, which Constantine merely updated and partially expanded.992  In the view 
of Jonathan Shepard, however, the vague and repetitive nature of the De 
Administrando Imperio does not support the idea of a collection of materials 
‘amounting to a coherent historical synthesis’.  Consequently, he concludes that 
extensive internal memoranda and narratives on foreign relations ‘were most probably 
not to be had in Byzantium’, with Constantine instead forced to rely on a mixture of 
old accounts and contemporary oral reports – essentially, whatever was available.993  
There is a fundamental divergence between Howard-Johnston’s belief that ‘the 
collective memory had to be accurate (so written down) and accessible (so stored in a 
functioning archive)’,994 and Shepard’s doubts that the Byzantines even committed 
reports to writing, let alone maintained vast organized archives. 
The Preservation of Campaign Accounts: Purposes and Problems 
Extent of the archives aside, there can be little question that certain documents were 
granted long-term storage.  Those pertaining to foreign relations, such as official 
letters (both outgoing and incoming),995 treaties,996 and border agreements997 were 
almost certainly copied and kept, so that they might serve as a point of reference in 
ongoing relations and future exchanges.998  Documents concerning legal matters 
                                                 
992 Ibid. 
993 Shepard (2003a): 109-112.  Also idem (1985); idem (2004). 
994 Howard-Johnston (2001): 319 n.55. 
995 For the suggestion of a register of high-level outgoing imperial communications on the basis of 
evidence in the Alexiad, see Kresten (1997): 31-37 & n.78, 43, 53. 
996 For the storage of treaties, see D. Miller (1971): 71-73.   
997 Shepard (2005): 182. 
998 Idem (2003a): 112-113; idem (2005): 180-181, 185-186.  On the evidence of the De Administrando 
Imperio, Howard-Johnston (2001: 308-310) considered that the department of the Dromos ‘kept a 
reasonably well-ordered archive’, which contained information valuable for planners of foreign policy.  
In the sixth-century context, see Lee (1993: 35-40), though it is suspected that the tradition went back 
further and so, we may surmise, continued thereafter. 
200 
would have also been stored for much the same reason.999  Haldon speaks of ‘a literate 
and record-keeping administration, which depended upon the transmission of vital 
information in written form’, not just between officials, but from one generation to the 
next.1000  But what of campaign dispatches and bulletins, intended to keep people 
abreast with current developments?  Such documents were undoubtedly necessary for 
investigations into battlefield conduct1001 and major defeats,1002 but these procedures 
would have been conducted quickly and swiftly.  What purpose might narrative 
records of campaigns serve for future reference?   
Walter Kaegi is alone in postulating one idea: ‘Surviving records of older campaigns 
probably helped the Byzantines to calculate the logistical needs of contemporary 
campaigns’.1003  While the empire’s enemies might change, geography was constant, 
and thus accounts of previous expeditions might prove useful to military planners: 
We have no precise knowledge of how long older records and plans were kept, 
but some knowledge survived of aborted as well as unsuccessful military 
expeditions and invasions.  That does not mean that the results of earlier 
experiences were always communicated to those who were responsible for 
planning and calculating the needs for the latest military operations.  There 
                                                 
999 Morris (1985b): 140-141. 
1000 Haldon (2008): 542. 
1001 Constantine VII (Military Oration of the Emperor Constantine VII: 399.82-96) recommends that 
written accounts of military actions be made by his agents so that specific deeds may be recorded and 
duly rewarded with honours and titles. 
1002 The inquiry into the loss at Callinicum in 531 is discussed in Appendix III.  Other inquiries are 
known, though documents are not mentioned in these proceedings.  Following the failure of an 
expedition to Italy, the Emperor Basil I investigated the circumstances of the campaign; when he 
discovered that one of the leaders, Procopius, had perished because of a rift with his co-commander, 
Leo, he dismissed the latter (Vita Basilii: §66).  An inquiry took place following the defeat to Symeon’s 
Bulgarians at Acheloos in 917 (Skylitzes: 204-205).  Romanos III held a thorough inquiry into his 
disastrous Syrian campaign in 1030 (Psellos, Chronographia: I, 39-40 [XI]).  Following a crushing 
defeat to the Hungarians in 1156, Michael Gabras and Michael Branas were called before the emperor 
to explain their conduct during the battle (Niketas Choniates, Chronike Diegesis: 132-133). 
1003 Kaegi (1993): 40. 
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probably was no systematic culling of surviving materials, but some traditions 
and reports survived, accurate or inaccurate as they might be.1004 
Kaegi’s hypothesis is certainly plausible, but not entirely convincing.  He speculates 
that old reports may have been of particular use to non-campaigning emperors with 
little experience, but appears indecisive in his conclusion that what rulers learned 
from the ‘oral or written reports of others’ is ‘hard to judge and may have been 
extensive’.1005  Kaegi is more specific in a subsequent study, proposing that Heraclius 
may have benefited from ‘historical records on warfare with the Persians’.  Kaegi 
hypothesizes that the ‘writings’ consulted by Heraclius during the winter of 621-622, 
mentioned by George of Pisidia as part of the emperor’s military preparations on the 
eve of his Persian campaign, may have been earlier tracts and memoranda about 
military scenarios and plans for invasions of Persia.1006  However, he ultimately 
settles on the idea that it was military manuals, namely the Strategikon of Maurice, 
which proved most useful to Heraclius in his military planning.1007   
Military manuals were in all probability a critical influence on Byzantine generals, 
since there is nothing to suggest that the Byzantines consulted recent official records 
of campaigns for military planning.  Certainly, records could not be readily accessed 
whilst an emperor or general was on campaign.1008  And just as Shepard observed that 
the number of foreigners living and serving in Constantinople would have negated the 
                                                 
1004 Ibid: 47-48. 
1005 Ibid: 46. 
1006 Idem (1979): 224-227. 
1007 Idem (2003): 74, 101-102, 107-109, 117-118, 308-309. 
1008 Shepard (1992a: 47-48) argues that campaigning emperors were at a distinct disadvantage from 
those bound to the palace in that they did not have access to a mobile archive of information.  Though 
he refers to diplomatic material, the point may be made of military items also.  Intriguingly, Doug Lee 
(1993: 40) suggests that the growth in archiving had much to do with the lack of campaigning emperors 
in the wake of Theodosios; prior to this, the need to be mobile would have encouraged emperors to 
limit the quantity of paperwork they brought with them. 
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need for written documents charting every development and nuance of foreign rulers 
and lands,1009 military expertise would have been available from veteran commanders, 
who could better advise an emperor or general on military matters than a specific 
report.1010  In addition to these concerns, a more fundamental reason for the reticence 
in consulting recent reports may be put forward.  Shepard notes the Byzantine 
preference for established insight over more contemporary perspective.1011  Thus, 
Alexios I and the kaisar John Doukas are said to have consulted the Hellenistic 
military theorists Aelian and Apollodorus,1012 while Constantine VII recommended 
bringing the first-century A.D. Strategika of Polyainos on campaign.1013  The 
antiquarian Taktika of Leo VI further illustrates this mentality.  In his constitution on 
naval warfare, Leo notes with apparent regret that he was unable to find any 
information on this subject in older manuals, and so was forced to draw upon the 
thoughts of his own commanders.1014  This logic seems to have been entrenched in 
Byzantine military thinking.  Though Nikephoros II Phokas produced a manual 
entirely reflective of current practice, he still felt it necessary to explain why the 
formations and tactics of Alexander the Great were no longer practical in the current 
climate of warfare, in order to justify his departure from tradition.1015   
                                                 
1009 Shepard (2005): 187-188.  For examples, see idem (1992a): 61 & n.81, 82. 
1010 Austin and Rankov (1995: 119-120) likewise doubted the potential of dispatches being used for 
strategic ends by later emperors:  ‘Indeed, with the exception of itinerary-type material, the older the 
information...the less valuable it would have become for military purposes’.  They argued that reports 
or memoirs might have provided rough guidance, but in any case were secondary to the 
recommendations of experienced advisors.   
1011 Shepard (1995a): 108.  Cyril Mango’s observation (1975: 14-15) that Constantine VII 
Porphyrogenitos favoured the older authors Strabo and Stephanus Byzantinus over information 
provided by his commanders and other agents when compiling the De Thematibus, a book on the 
provincial themes, is of great relevance here. 
1012 Anna Komnene: XV.3.6; Psellos, Chronographia: II, 181 (XVI). 
1013 Constantine VII, Text C: ll.198-199.  For discussion of Polyainos see below, 306-315. 
1014 Leo VI, Taktika: §XIX.3-8. 
1015 Nikephoros II Phokas, Praecepta Militaria: §I.65-74.  See also McGeer (1995a): 182. 
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While Shepard spoke in relation to prescriptive literature, the notion is perhaps true 
also of prose military literature.1016  Though well outside our period, the Emperor 
Julian’s expedition against Persia in 363 provides an excellent example of the 
influence of classical accounts on contemporary military thinking.  Kaegi has 
suggested that Julian may have consulted lost writings (τὰ συγγράµµατα) of his uncle 
Constantine the Great on fighting the Persians, mentioned solely in the sixth-century 
De Magistratibus of John Lydus.1017  The exact substance of Constantine’s writings is 
unknown, though given that he was merely planning for an expedition against Persia 
in 337, we may presume that they consisted of plans and advice rather than his own 
experiences.  Kaegi eventually determines that Julian’s strategy was ‘the product of 
the consultation of many writings’,1018 and it has long been argued that historical 
accounts of the campaigns of Alexander the Great and Trajan were among these.1019  
In one oration, Julian relates that he always took with him ‘a narrative of a campaign 
composed long-ago by an eyewitness’, partly for advice, but also so that he might 
emulate the deeds described.1020  Julian describes how, at one momentous point in the 
campaign, he read an account of Crassus’ defeat at Carrhae to his officers, which 
served as a warning not to repeat the same mistakes;1021 the suggestion being that the 
aforementioned accounts covered much older events.  Indeed, Ammianus Marcellinus 
relates that Julian read Polybius and was inspired to attack the gate of Pirisibora with 
                                                 
1016 Theophylact Simocatta, for example, relates that Emperor Maurice’s brother-in-law, Philippikos, 
studied Scipio’s campaigns against Hannibal (I.13-2-4).  Kaegi (1990: 66) suggests that Procopius may 
have been read by soldiers of the tenth and eleventh century purely to delight in the stratagems of 
Belisarius, and while a more current general than Scipio, he nevertheless predates the period by several 
centuries.  For the didactic element of Procopius’ Wars, see Whately (2008). 
1017 John Lydus: 3.33.34. 
1018 Kaegi (1981b). 
1019 Kaegi (1964b): esp. 34-35; Baldwin (1978b); Lomas Salmonte (1990); Lane Fox (1997). 
1020 ἀλλὰ καὶ στρατευοµένῳ µοι ἕν γέ τι πάντως ἕπεται οἷον ἐφόδιον τῆς στρατείας πρὸς αὐτόπτου 
πάλαι ξυγκείµενον (Julian: 3.124A-D; trans. 329). 
1021 Ibid; Libanius, Orations: 18.53; 18.72; 18.233. 
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only a small group of men, just as Scipio Aemilianus did at Carthage.1022  There is 
thus little to suggest that Julian was informed by near-contemporary military reports, 
but much to advocate his consultation of historical accounts.1023 
It is possible that statistical information may have been more useful to military 
planners, but we should note that the inventory documents in the De Ceremoniis are 
preserved only because they were considered useful to a contemporary author with a 
particular interest in seaborne expeditions.1024  Otherwise, such records may well have 
been lost, discarded or perhaps even scraped clean for recycling purposes.1025  
Howard-Johnston considered it ‘unlikely’ that pragmatic campaign documentation, 
including ‘reports from subordinate commanders’, would be maintained for an 
extensive period of time.1026  In general terms, Kelly questioned if the state would 
have held onto any documents once they had served their purpose.1027  Rosalind 
Thomas argued that administrative documents in the Ancient world were ‘probably’ 
destroyed as soon as they served their immediate function.1028  Richard Britnell, 
speaking of medieval archives in general, considered it ‘rational to destroy many 
                                                 
1022 Ammianus Marcellinus: ΧΧΙV.2.14-17.  See Lendon (2005): 290-309 for discussion of Ammianus 
likening the deeds of Julian to past heroes, suggesting that the emperor was frequently seeking to 
emulate them. 
1023 Kaegi (1964b).  The approach attributed to Basil I in the Vita Basilii (§72.10-14; trans. 249) 
perhaps encapsulates the general attitude of soldier emperors: ‘At times he could explore the customs, 
lives, statecraft and military exploits of generals and emperors and after careful scrutiny, would choose 
the best and the most praiseworthy among these and would strive to emulate them in his own deeds’. 
1024 It is possible that these documents were intended to serve as an accompaniment to Constantine 
VII’s treatises on imperial military expeditions, but the most convincing scenario is that the 
parakoimomenos Basil Lekapenos compiled the material in light of the projected expedition to Crete in 
960, which, prior to Constantine’s death, it seems he was scheduled to lead.  See Haldon (2000): 236-
238, 265-268; Treadgold (1992): 142-144.  For the most recent affirmation that Lekapenos was 
involved in the production of the De Ceremoniis, see Featherstone (2004): 118-119.  For Basil 
Lekapenos in general see Brokkaar (1972). 
1025 We know that the Byzantine administration used both paper (originally eastern from the mid-
eleventh century, progressing to the western sort after 1204) and parchment for its archives – see 
Dölger & Karayannopoulos (1968): 27-28. 
1026 Howard-Johnston (1994): 69-70. 
1027 C. Kelly (1994): 166. 
1028 R. Thomas (1992): 53-55. 
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records once the operation to which they related had been accomplished’.1029  It is 
perhaps unrealistic to expect that thousands of military reports would have been 
housed in an organized fashion for centuries.1030  Such practicalities should be borne 
in mind when discussing the use of these documents by historians. 
Archival Documents, Military Reports and Byzantine Historiography: Suitability of 
Purpose 
We have noted instances where historians use or quote official documents.  The 
majority of these are treaties and letters, which were almost certainly more accessible 
than military accounts.  At all times, written reports of many types – military, 
diplomatic, those containing strategic intelligence – would have been filed by 
generals, envoys, spies and other imperial agents.1031  This glut of information posed 
great difficulties to a historian undertaking research.  If reports were archived, they 
must have been almost impossible to index with any accuracy, especially if, as 
Shepard suggests, the date on reports may have been limited to the date of the month 
and/or the year of indiction.1032  It is apparent that certain historians had problems 
locating precise dates for military events: the author of the Vita Basilii protested that 
‘the exact date of each deed was not known’,1033 while lacunae in the Alexiad imply 
that Anna Komnene sought chronological details after completing her work, the 
                                                 
1029 Britnell (1997): 186. 
1030 Of course, there may also have been practical reasons as to the lack of data, such as rot and damage 
caused by fire or other disasters.  On this point, see Britnell (2007); for an example, see Lee (1993): 35-
36. 
1031 Christopher Kelly (1994: 164-165) speaks of ‘a government heavily dependent for its operation on 
written reports, records and instructions’.  For intelligence gathering in military contexts, see Dvornik 
(1974); Dagron & Mihăescu (1986): 248-254; Lee (1993): esp. 170-182. 
1032 Shepard (1995a): 111-113; idem (2005): esp. 187-188. 
1033 ...ἀλλ’ ὅµως ἐπεὶ ὁ ἑκάστης πράξεως ἀκριβὴς ἠγνοεῖτο χρόνος (Vita Basilii: §71.29-33; trans. 247). 
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suggestion being that they may not have been present in her original material.1034  A 
related concern is voiced by Treadgold, who speculates that Byzantine historians did 
not make extensive use of the archives because all but the most recent material would 
have been hard to consult, given that the Byzantines perhaps lacked an efficient filing 
system.1035  Therefore, locating older documents must have required extensive time 
and effort.1036  Moreover, it is important to note that the idea of keeping records for 
the benefit of historians is a modern conception.1037  Nikos Oikonomides regarded the 
Byzantine archives as being well kept ‘for practical – and not for historical – 
purposes’.1038   
This all points to a limited window for a historian or chronicler to consult a report or 
bulletin.  Proposed campaign narratives which made use of dispatches, such as those 
perhaps commissioned by Heraclius and John Tzimiskes, were drafted in the years 
immediately following the event.  At the other end of the spectrum, we might cite 
Anna Komnene, who could have drawn upon campaign reports as late as seventy 
years after the fact.  Dynastic stability, time to peruse the archives, and, possibly, the 
earlier information-gathering efforts of her husband could account for Anna’s good 
fortune.1039  Others writing long after events do not appear to have benefited from 
similar access.  By Howard-Johnston’s hypothesis, Theophanes did not have direct 
                                                 
1034 Ljubarskij (1998): 19.  The many chronological errors in the Alexiad support this hypothesis – see 
Frankopan (1998). 
1035 Treadgold (2007): 365; C. Kelly (2004): 117-120.  The problem of finding information in archives 
without the aid of an alphabetical index was prevalent in the medieval west also - see Clanchy (1993): 
168-169. 
1036 These problems would have been exacerbated by the complex archival system in place at 
Constantinople, with document depositories spread across the various bureaus.  John Haldon (2000: 
243-256), for example, argues that the redactor of the inventory list for the Cretan expedition of 911 
made several errors as he did not have before him documents from certain departments. 
1037 See in general Clanchy (1993). 
1038 Oikonomides (1997): 196-197. 
1039 See above, 97-124. 
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access to the dispatches of Heraclius, but rather knew them from his source: a 
contemporary history drafted by Heraclius’ contemporary George of Pisidia.1040  
Similarly, Theophanes and also the Patriarch Nikephoros are not thought to have 
directly consulted reports for their narratives of the 717-718 siege of Constantinople, 
instead employing a lost historical work, believed to have been completed in the early 
720s, as an intermediary source.1041  Nikephoros enjoyed better fortune in consulting 
victory reports Constantine VI sent to Constantinople during his wars with the 
Bulgars,1042 but only a few decades had passed since these were drafted.  If not 
preserved by a historian, accounts of campaigns and battles sent from the front may 
have been either lost to the archives or destroyed before too long. 
                                                 
1040 Howard-Johnston (1994). 
1041 Idem (2010): 259, 306-307.  For a different view on this lost source, see Afinogenov (2002). 
1042 Patriarch Nikephoros, Antirrheticus: 508 col. 72.  For discussion of probable bulletins issued by 
Constantine VI and used by chroniclers, see Sophoulis (2011): 16-17. 
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Conclusion 
Though bulletins and dispatches may have been subject to poor and short-term 
archiving, this chapter argues that they were regularly circulated and later consulted 
by Byzantine historians.  Since historians wrote predominantly about warfare, it is 
logical to think that prose reports made by those present in the field would have held 
considerable appeal.  The following chapter, which investigates the links between the 
historical works of Kinnamos and Choniates and contemporary encomia, examines 
the argument that dispatches and bulletins may explain the many common elements of 
these sources. 
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CHAPTER III. BETWEEN ENCOMIA, HISTORIOGRAPHY AND 
BULLETINS: THE CAMPAIGNS OF THE EMPERORS JOHN II 
KOMNENOS AND MANUEL I KOMNENOS 
Orations and poems addressed to the emperor, typically delivered in the aftermath of 
major events, are often thought to reflect the official line of the imperial court.1043  
General observations must be tentative, given that encomia praising Nikephoros II 
Phokas, John I Tzimiskes and Basil II have almost certainly been lost.1044  While the 
poems produced by John Geometres and John of Melitene extol the martial prowess 
of Phokas and Tzimiskes and list their conquests,1045 it might be expected that 
panegyrists commemorated individual campaigns, sieges, and battles in more detail.  
Nonetheless, surviving encomia from the tenth and eleventh centuries do not permit 
thorough reconstruction of military operations.1046  In 901-902, Arethas of Caesarea 
delivered a number of orations to Leo VI, embellishing minor triumphs while omitting 
major disasters.   None of these divulge many details about campaigns, perhaps 
inevitable given that Leo did not lead them personally, and was praised for his 
wisdom and piety rather than his skills in war.1047  Leo’s paranoia about his lack of 
military prowess perhaps manifests itself in the funeral oration he composed for his 
father Basil, which draws surprisingly little attention to Basil’s campaigns and martial 
skill.1048  If there had been greater focus on military actions in encomia of the great 
                                                 
1043 Morris (2003): 243-244. 
1044 The probability of lost panegyrics from the reign of Nikephoros is noted by Cheynet (1990): 190. 
1045 See Lauxtermann (1998); idem (2003a); Kazhdan (2006): 249-252; van Opstall (2008) 
1046 For an overview of developments in imperial panegyric during this period, see Stone (2011). 
1047 For the orations see Arethas of Caesarea: II, 1-48, with further discussion in Jenkins, Laourdas & 
Mango (1954): 12-14.  As Shaun Tougher (1997a: 164-193) demonstrates, it is incorrect to say that Leo 
had no interest in war, but the fact remains that his propaganda could not and did not cultivate the 
image of a warrior ruler. 
1048 Basil I Funeral Oration.  For discussion see Adontz (1933b). 
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soldier emperors, then this was no longer the case by the mid-eleventh century.1049  
Michael Psellos praised Constantine IX Monomachos largely for his unwarlike virtues 
and victories achieved principally through diplomacy,1050 while the orations of John 
Mauropous to the same emperor heralded ‘bloodless’ triumphs over barbarians and 
rebels alike.1051  Psellos’ compositions for Romanos IV Diogenes are more belligerent 
in tone, focusing on Romanos’ physical prowess and soldiering, but still do not 
provide details of military actions.1052  Orations survive from the reign of Alexios 
Komnenos,1053 but only from the period prior to his notable successes, and 
consequently are rather subdued.  That of Theophylact of Ohrid, delivered in 1088, 
praised Alexios’ martial prowess though heralded the peace he achieved with the 
Turks and Pechenegs.  John the Oxite, writing two years later, went so far as to 
criticize Alexios’ operations, counting the cost of the emperor’s unsuccessful 
campaigning.1054  Though Manuel Straboromanos commended Alexios’ ‘restoration’ 
of the empire in a speech delivered after 1103, it is little more than a list of conquered 
peoples and territories.1055 
                                                 
1049 For developments in the imperial image, see Kazhdan (1983a): esp. 20-21; idem (1984a): 48-51; 
Dennis (1997b): 135. 
1050 Psellos, Orations: 1-106 (Or.I-VII).  See Chamberlain (1986): esp. 19-20; Stone (2011): 177-179. 
1051 Lefort (1976).  See also Stephenson (2000): 111-112. 
1052 Psellos, Orations: 175-186 (Or.XVIII-XXI). 
1053 It seems others have been lost – see Theophylact of Ohrid: I, 217; Manuel Straboromanos: 181.  
See also Gautier (1965): 181 n.11.  George Tornikios (233-235) mentions there being a vast number of 
orators (µύριοι ῥήτορες) at the court of Alexios.  For discussion of the poems of Stephen 
Physopalamites, one of which concerned Alexios’ capture of a Norman-occupied fortress, possibly 
Kastoria, see Mullett (1996b): 371-373. 
1054 Theophylact of Ohrid: I, 113-117; John the Oxite: 29-37. For discussion see Mullett (1996b): 367-
370; Frankopan (2008): 72-89. 
1055 Manuel Straboromanos: 190-191.  For discussion of Alexios’ presentation in contemporary 
panegyric, see Mullett (1996b). 
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The vague and abstract nature of these orations suggests that audiences would have 
been familiar with the events discussed.1056  Yet it cannot be maintained that 
encomiasts glossed over military operations because people already knew of them.  
Certainly, there is no indication that the lack of lengthy descriptions of warfare in 
encomia was attributable to the rules of panegyric; examples from Late Antiquity 
demonstrate that colourful ekphraseis of war were not unknown in the genre.1057  One 
suspects it is simply that the aforementioned surviving panegyrics date from times 
when authors and/or emperors were not particularly eager (nor indeed able) to 
propagate a martial image, and thus declined to provide lengthy accounts of military 
actions.  Such content is evident once more in encomia from the reigns of John II and 
Manuel I Komnenos, owing perhaps as much to good fortune in survival than to the 
increasing militarization of the imperial image or changes in literary practice.1058 
Modern historians have encouraged reading these encomia alongside Kinnamos and 
Niketas Choniates to better understand the imperial image projected during the 
period.1059  Michael Jeffreys recently described the output of twelfth-century poets 
Theodore Prodromos and ‘Manganeios Prodromos’ as ‘versified press-releases’, a 
means of communicating important news to a broad audience.  Their works served a 
similar function to bulletins, though we might postulate a closer relationship still.  
Paul Magdalino has shown there to be considerable concurrence between details 
provided by ‘Manganeios Prodromos’ and John Kinnamos on the campaigns of 
                                                 
1056 Shepard (2005): 179-180.  The importance of narrative to a speech had long been contested, with a 
number of older commentators arguing that it was unnecessary since the facts would be known to the 
audience in advance (Heath 1997: 105-106). 
1057 See Russell (1998): 39-40 for examples.  For military interest in imperial panegyric of Late 
Antiquity, see Lee (2007): 40-42. 
1058 Admittedly, encomia of the twelfth century appear longer and more developed than those of earlier 
periods – see Magdalino (1993a): 247-248. 
1059 Ibid; M. Jeffreys (2011). 
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Manuel Komnenos.1060  Consequently, it is thought that the two authors consulted the 
same sources: prose bulletins, or ‘press releases’.1061  This practice was not new: 
Michael Psellos similarly sought material from high-placed sources to enable his 
writing of an encomium for Romanos Diogenes.  While encomium need not be as 
comprehensive as history,1062 good panegyric required historical investigation to 
determine truth and accuracy.1063  Embellishment was inevitable, but complete 
fabrication was unlikely, given that listeners and readers may have participated in the 
events described.1064  Bulletins served as attractive sources in this respect, not least 
since they ensured encomiasts conformed to the official version of events.1065   
Our possession of two historical narratives and an abundance of encomiastic sources 
covering the reigns of John II and Manuel I Komnenos presents us with a unique 
opportunity.  Shared content points towards a common source, almost certainly 
contemporary bulletins.  Analysis of the sources sheds light on the content and 
purpose of imperial dispatches, as well as providing additional insight into the 
working methods and objectives of John Kinnamos and Niketas Choniates. 
                                                 
1060 Magdalino (1993a): 442-453. 
1061 M. Jeffreys (2011): esp. 27-29. 
1062 A thirteenth-century panegyrist maintained that encomium should be briefer than a historical 
narrative, though Dimiter Angelov (2007: 60-61) contests this statement, arguing that encomiasts 
generally wrote something akin to ‘official biographies’ of the emperor. 
1063 Russell (1998): 39. 
1064 Dennis (1997b): 137. 
1065 The link is all the more tangible when we recall that Choniates occasionally composed victory 
letters and bulletins, with the example of thirteenth-century imperial secretary Manuel Holobolos 
perhaps providing further evidence of the link between writers of bulletins and orators.  Holobolos 
accompanied the Emperor Andronikos II on campaign to Asia Minor in 1284.  On account of a letter 
which Patriarch Gregory of Cyprus sent to Andronikos, requesting that Holobolos become a messenger 
of imperial victories, Dimiter Angelov (2007: 44-45, 46 n.51) speculates that Holobolos was charged 
with writing bulletins for Andronikos, none of which survive. 
213 
I. Military Description in Encomia 
Byzantine encomia generally adhered to the guidelines of popular rhetorical 
handbooks and exercises from Antiquity.  The fourth-century rhetorician Menander 
Rhetor is credited with two treatises on epideictic (display) speeches, with one 
discussing the imperial oration, or basilikos logos.1066  Menander continued to be 
consulted by Byzantine encomiasts well into the Late period.1067  If not Menander, 
then instructional guides of a similar nature formed an important part of the rhetorical 
curriculum in Byzantine education.1068  Equally influential were the four Hellenistic 
treatises attributed to the sophists Aelius Theon, Pseudo-Hermogenes, Aphthonius, 
and Nicolaus on progymnasmata, preliminary exercises in numerous areas of rhetoric, 
including encomium.1069  The progymnasmata credited to fourth-century sophist 
Libanius of Antioch, whose works were well-known to the Byzantines, collected 
actual exercises in prose composition for learning purposes.1070  While Byzantine 
encomiasts were not bound to Hellenistic principles, these treatises and exercises (or 
derivatives of) remained essential reading.1071  Consequently, it is important to 
consider what these treatises have to say about exposition of military affairs.  
 
 
                                                 
1066 Menander Rhetor, Peri Epideiktikon.  For Menander’s life and teachings see Heath (2004). 
1067 Angelov (2007): 51-56. 
1068 See above, 9-10 for bibliography. 
1069 See above, 9-10 for bibliography. 
1070 See Kennedy (1983): 150-163. 
1071 This cursory look at the background to oratory and encomium is not intended to be exhaustive, and 
does not take into account important models from Antiquity, such as Isocrates, Demosthenes and 
Themistius (see Kennedy 1997: 15-18; Russell & Wilson 1981: xi-xxxiv).  For a study of standard 
influences and models on rhetoricians of the thirteenth century, unlikely to differ much from those of 
the preceding period, see Angelov (2007): 51-64. 
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Menander Rhetor 
Menander, asserting that ‘courage reveals an emperor more than do other virtues’, 
encouraged panegyrists to precede an account of their subjects’ actions during peace 
with those in war.1072  The author should describe the topography and geographical 
features of the regions where the campaigns and battles took place, while ambushes 
organized and foiled by the emperor are also to be mentioned.  One set of 
prescriptions is particularly significant: 
You will also describe infantry battles, the equipment of cavalry for battle, and the 
engagement of a whole army against a whole army…There are many such things 
in the historians, in the Persian wars in Herodotus, in the Peloponnesian war in 
Thucydides, in Theopompus’ Philippica, and in Xenophon’s Anabasis and 
Hellenica.  You should also describe the emperor’s own battles, and invest him 
with all impressiveness and knowledge, as Homer does for Achilles, Hector, and 
Ajax.  You should also describe his armour and his campaigns, dwelling on the 
display of prowess and combat.1073 
                                                 
1072 ...γνωρίζει γὰρ βασιλέα πλέον ἡ ἀνδρεία (Menander Rhetor, Peri Epideiktikon: 372.25-31; trans. 
85). 
1073 διαγράψεις δὲ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι ταῖς τοῦ πολέµου καὶ φύσεις καὶ θέσεις χωρίων ἐν οἷς οἱ πόλεµοι, 
καὶ ποταµῶν δὲ καὶ λιµένων καὶ ὀρῶν καὶ πεδίων, καὶ εἰ ψιλοὶ ἢ δασεῖς οἱ χῶροι, καὶ εἰ <λεῖοι ἢ> 
κρηµνώδεις. ἐκφράσεις δὲ καὶ λόχους καὶ ἐνέδρας καὶ τοῦ βασιλέως κατὰ τῶν πολεµίων καὶ τῶν 
ἐναντίων κατὰ τοῦ βασιλέως· εἶτα ἐρεῖς, ὅτι σὺ µὲν τοὺς ἐκείνων λόχους καὶ τὰς ἐνέδρας διὰ φρόνησιν 
ἐγίνωσκες, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ τῶν ὑπὸ σοῦ πραττοµένων οὐδὲν συνίεσαν. καὶ µὴν καὶ πεζοµαχίας ἐκφράσεις 
καὶ ἱππέων διασκευὰς εἰς ἱπποµαχίαν καὶ ὅλου στρατοπέδου πρὸς ὅλον στρατόπεδον µάχην, ἤδη δέ 
που καὶ ναυµαχίαν, εἰ γένοιτο· οἷα πολλὰ παρὰ τοῖς συγγραφεῦσιν, ἐν τοῖς Μηδικοῖς παρὰ Ἡροδότῳ, 
παρὰ Θουκυδίδῃ πάλιν ἐν τοῖς Πελοποννησιακοῖς, καὶ παρὰ Θεοπόµπῳ ἐν τοῖς Φιλιππικοῖς καὶ 
Ξενοφῶντι ἐν τῇ Ἀναβάσει καὶ τοῖς Ἑλληνικοῖς βιβλίοις. καὶ µὴν καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ βασιλέως ἐκφράσεις 
µάχας καὶ µεριθήσεις ἅπασαν ἰδέαν καὶ ἐπιστήµην, ὡς Ἀχιλλεῖ, ὡς Ἕκτορι, ὡς Αἴαντι περιτίθησιν ὁ 
ποιητής. διαγράψεις δὲ καὶ πανοπλίαν βασιλέως καὶ ἐπιστρατείας, ἐπιτείνας µὲν τῷ καιρῷ τῆς 
ἀριστείας καὶ τῆς συµπλοκῆς, ὅταν βασιλέως ἀριστείαν ἐκφράζῃς (ibid: 373.16-374.6; trans. 87). 
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Menander recommends that military operations undertaken by the emperor be related 
in great detail.  That the encomiast is advised to look to Thucydides and Xenophon for 
descriptions of battle suggests that an encomium could resemble a historical account.  
Byzantine panegyrists similarly consulted prose narratives – almost certainly 
dispatches and bulletins - for inspiration as well as information.  Menander’s 
emphasis on the physical prowess and courage of the emperor is reflected in 
Byzantine encomia of the twelfth century, a reflection also of the preoccupation of 
bulletins with the courageous feats of the emperor. 
Progymnasmata 
The fifth-century sophist Nicolaus observed that by his day encomium was no longer 
limited to a single form, but included speeches of arrival, addresses to officials, and 
funeral orations; he declines to cover these individually, instead disclosing only that 
appropriate for beginners.1074  Encomia celebrating a ruler or his return from 
campaign are not specific topics for discussion, but there are nevertheless stipulations 
in the Hellenistic treatises on the progymnasmata which may be applied to military-
themed compositions. 
The central element in any encomium were the actions of the subject, liable to include 
deeds in war.  Pseudo-Hermogenes writes: ‘Most important are deeds…for example, 
having chosen a soldier’s life, what did he accomplish in it?’1075  Relevant also are the 
musings of Aelius Theon, the earliest of the Hellenistic commentators: 
                                                 
1074 Nicolaus: 47, 49; trans. 155-156. 
1075 τὸ δὲ κυριώτατον αἱ πράξεις...οἷον στρατιωτικὸν βίον ἑλόµενος τί ἐν τούτῳ κατέπραξε (Pseudo-
Hermogenes: VII.7; trans. 82). 
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Actions are praised on the basis of the occasion and whether someone did them 
alone or was the first when no one else acted, or did more than others or with few 
helpers or beyond what was characteristic of his age or contrary to expectation or 
with toils or because they were done very easily or quickly.1076 
We might apply this guidance to individual feats of valour in battle, especially when 
we come to observe the attention drawn to Manuel Komnenos’ heroics at the age of 
twenty-two in panegyrical literature.   
Panegyrics of the twelfth century can be highly descriptive in the episodes they 
choose to focus on.  Ekphrasis, a rhetorical technique of description which 
endeavoured to bring the scene before the eyes of the audience, was seen to have a 
function in encomium, as Pseudo-Hermogenes explains:  ‘You should know that some 
of the more exact teachers do not make ekphrasis an exercise, on the grounds that it is 
already included in…encomium; for there too, we describe places…and actions and 
persons’.1077  Scenes of war were considered favourable subjects.  Aelius Theon 
suggests objects such as weapons, armour and siege engines, citing Thucydides’ 
description of the preparation of a siege engine.1078  Thucydides was considered useful 
for a number of other models for ekphraseis: naval battles, cavalry encounters and 
sieges, in particular his account of the siege of Plataea, known to have served as a 
                                                 
1076 ἐπαινεταὶ δέ εἰσιν αἱ πράξεις καὶ αἱ διὰ τὸν καιρόν, καὶ εἰ µόνος ἔπραξέ τις ἢ πρῶτος, ἢ ὅτε οὐδείς, 
ἢ µᾶλλον τῶν ἄλλων, ἢ µετ’ ὀλίγων, ἢ ὑπὲρ τὴν ἡλικίαν, ἢ παρὰ τὴν ἐλπίδα, ἢ µετὰ πόνων, ἢ ὅσα 
ῥᾷστα ἢ τάχιστα ἐπράχθησαν (Aelius Theon: 110.21-25; trans. 51). 
1077 Ἰστέον δέ, ὡς τῶν ἀκριβεστέρων τινὲς οὐκ ἔθηκαν τὴν ἔκφρασιν εἰς γύµνασµα ὡς προειληµµένην 
καὶ ἐν µύθῳ καὶ ἐν διηγήµατι καὶ ἐν τόπῳ κοινῷ καὶ ἐν ἐγκωµίῳ· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ, φασίν, ἐκφράζοµεν καὶ 
τόπους καὶ ποταµοὺς καὶ πράγµατα καὶ πρόσωπα (Pseudo-Hermogenes: X.7; trans. 86).  For ekphrasis 
in encomia, see most recently Webb (2009): esp. 78-81. 
1078 Aelius Theon: 118-119; Thucydides: 4.100.  On a related note, it is possible that such guidance 
contributed to the preponderance of digressions on siege equipment in classicizing Byzantine 
historiography.  See Kelso (2003); Sullivan (2010a). 
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point of reference for Byzantine historians.1079  Yet to write one’s own ekphrasis of a 
war was an important exercise for a rhetorician.  Aelius Theon provides a brief 
overview of the process: 
In an ekphrasis of a war we shall first recount events before the war; the raising of 
armies, expenditures, fears, the countryside devastated, the sieges; then describe 
the wounds and the deaths and the grief, and in addition the capture and 
enslavement of some and the victory and trophies of others.1080 
This summary, applicable to most accounts of a war, is expanded somewhat by 
Libanius, whose progymnasmata include a model description of an infantry battle.  
Having mentioned the composition and deployment of both armies, the writer should 
progress to the action, describing those killed, the wounds they suffered, and the 
weapons employed.1081  These elements - the gore in particular - feature in battle 
descriptions of the Middle Byzantine period.1082  Byzantine historians and rhetoricians 
gained experience in writing battle accounts through such exercises, in conjunction 
with their reading of Homer and historical works from Antiquity.  Menander insists 
that the author of a basilikos logos ‘describe…the engagement of a whole army 
against a whole army’, leading Ruth Webb to conclude that ‘ekphraseis of battles and 
military actions had a role in epideictic’.1083  This notion is affirmed by study of 
                                                 
1079 Aelius Theon: 68.  For discussion of this in relation to historians of Late Antiquity see above, 14-
15. 
1080 ἐπιχειρήσοµεν δὲ τὰ µὲν πράγµατα ἐκφράζοντες ἔκ τε τῶν προγιγνοµένων, καὶ ἐκ τῶν 
συµβαινόντων τούτοις, οἷον ἐπὶ πολέµου διεξελευσόµεθα πρῶτον µὲν τὰ πρὸ τοῦ πολέµου, τὰς 
στρατολογίας, τὰ ἀναλώµατα, τοὺς φόβους, τὴν χώραν δῃουµένην, τὰς πολιορκίας, ἔπειτα δὲ τὰ 
τραύµατα καὶ τοὺς θανάτους καὶ τὰ πένθη, ἐφ’ ἅπασι δὲ τῶν µὲν τὴν ἅλωσιν καὶ τὴν δουλείαν, τῶν δὲ 
τὴν νίκην καὶ τὰ τρόπαια (Aelius Theon: 119.14-21; trans. 46).  The same is suggested by Pseudo-
Hermogenes: X.2-4; Aphthonius: XII.1-2. 
1081 Libanius, Progymnasmata: 428-431. 
1082 See below, 335-344. 
1083 Webb (2009): 158-159.  Menander even uses the term ekphrasis twice during the passage in 
question. 
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twelfth-century panegyric commemorating the successes of John II and Manuel I 
Komnenos. 
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II. The Historical Record of the Campaigns of the Emperor John II Komnenos 
The rhetors Michael Italikos, Theodore Prodromos and Nikephoros Basilakes 
composed a number of panegyrical works during the reign of John II Komnenos.1084  
Through comparison with the historical record, as well as other sources, one is able to 
establish the presence of a common source, unquestionably official material.  This not 
only allows us to identify important strands of the record of campaigns, but also gain 
further insight into the approach and method of Kinnamos and Niketas Choniates. 
Encomiasts Seizing upon Bulletins: The Example of Michael Italikos 
Michael Jeffreys has argued that Theodore Prodromos may have pioneered the genre 
of the ‘versified press release’, a process which involved taking a prose ‘press release’ 
– typically a dispatch – and reworking it into verse, allowing for communication of 
imperial news to a wider audience.1085  Prodromos’ oration recounting John II 
Komnenos’ expedition to Cilicia and northern Syria in 1137-1139 is cited as an 
example of this, though letters of Michael Italikos regarding the same campaign better 
demonstrate how prose bulletins could be seized upon by orators for a different mode 
of broadcast.  In his letter to Stephen Meles praising the logothetes for the bulletin 
heralding the achievements of John, Italikos reveals that the words of Meles still 
resonated within him as he mounted a platform, and, in his capacity as didaskalos tou 
apostolou,1086 ‘made [Meles’] words drift over the crowd’.1087  This process is 
described in Italikos’ letter to megas domestikos John Axouch:  
                                                 
1084 For Nikephoros Basilakes, see Browning (1962a): 181-184.  For Theodore Prodromos, see 
Hörandner (1974): 21-35. 
1085 M. Jeffreys (2011): esp. 27-28. 
1086 The didaskalos tou apostolou was a cleric who taught at the Patriarchal School of Constantinople.  
On the didaskaloi see Angold (1995): 91-98.  For the Patriarchal School, see Browning (1962a). 
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Then, carried away by delirium from hearing [about the campaign], and, since I 
am didaskalos, I jumped on my platform, and submerged everybody in the flow of 
my words: I celebrated the struggles of the emperor and told my audience of how 
he attacked the Cilicians, how he has submitted all of Syria, how the brilliance of 
your spear reduced the Kelts to ash in Syria.1088 
In his basilikos logos, Italikos again champions his role as herald of John Komnenos’ 
accomplishments.  He tells of how he shook the eardrums of the crowd.1089  As John 
captured towns of Syria, Italikos described his battles, drawing many listeners to his 
platform.1090  Prior to this latest conflict, he had celebrated John’s wars against the 
Pechenegs, Hungarians and Turks in similar fashion.1091  Perhaps this praise also took 
the form of prose and verse compositions, now lost, to which Italikos refers in the 
oration, though he also discloses that he often informed large groups of John’s 
progress.1092  One may deduce that Italikos heard the original bulletin and was then 
charged with rewording it and distributing the message to larger audiences.1093 
 
                                                                                                                                            
1087 Ἐναύλους τοίνυν ἔχων τὰς τοιαύτας ἐγὼ φωνὰς καὶ προσιζήσασαν τὴν ὅλην ἁρµονίαν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, 
ἀνῆλθον ὡς εἶχον εὐθὺς ἐπὶ τοὺς τῆς διδασκαλίας ὀκρίβαντας καὶ ὧν ἐνεφορήθην λόγων πρὸς ἄλλους 
ἐπλήρουν καὶ µετωχέτευον τὰ σὰ ῥεύµατα ἐπὶ τὸν λαόν, διακόνῳ τῇ γλώσσῃ χρώµενος.  καὶ τότε οἶδα 
τοῖς σοῖς λόγοις καλλωπισάµενος καὶ ἔδοξα τότε κοµψότερός τε καὶ ῥητορικώτερος ἢ τὸ πρότερον 
(Michael Italikos: 233.14-20).  
1088 αὐτίκα γοῦν πρὸς τὴν ἀκοὴν ἐνθουσιάσας καὶ ἐπὶ τοὺς ἐµοὺς ἀναπηδήσας ὀκρίβαντας – 
διδάσκαλος γάρ εἰµι – πᾶσαν κατακλύζω ψυχὴν τῷ τοῦ λόγου ῥεύµατι, τοῦ βασιλέως τοὺς ἀγῶνας 
δηµηγορῶν καὶ τοῖς περιεστηκόσιν ἀφηγούµενος ὅπως Κιλίκων ἐπέβη, ὅπως Συρίαν ὅλην 
κατεδουλώσατο, πῶς ὑπερέσχε τοῦ δόρατος ὑµῶν ἡ ἀστραπὴ τῆς µελίας τῶν ἐν Συρίᾳ Κελτῶν (ibid: 
229.21-230.4). 
1089 Ibid: 246.12-25. 
1090 Ibid: 256.12-257.15. 
1091 Ibid: 267.17-268.4. 
1092 Ibid: 268.5-9. 
1093 See Magdalino (1993a): 313-314.  We might infer a similar process in Michael Psellos’ claim that 
the achievements of Romanos IV Diogenes had been proclaimed with little fanfare, as he put forward 
his own case for serving as herald of these feats (see above, 162-165). 
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The Campaign against the Pechenegs, 1121-1122 
Since encomia composed prior to 1130 have not survived, we are reliant on Kinnamos 
and Niketas Choniates for the first half of John’s reign.  Their accounts of John’s 
victory over the Pechenegs at Beroe in 1122 possess many similarities.1094  Both 
mention the efforts of the emperor to win over Pecheneg chieftains, though only 
Choniates describes the full extent of John’s trickery, a stratagem which involved 
seducing the chiefs through lavish gifts so that the emperor might sow dissent and 
divert focus while he committed his troops to battle.1095  In an oration of 1143, 
Michael Italikos mentions that John made use of a ‘splendid ruse’ (καλὴν ἐξαπάτην) 
against the ‘Scythians’, likening it to God’s deception of King Ahab of Israel.1096  
This is probably a reference to the actions described by Choniates, though a quick 
perusal of the life of Ahab does not yield anything remotely similar.1097   
The full extent of John’s deceit is perhaps revealed by the Armenian Basil bar 
Shumana, bishop of Edessa, who, it is said, was present during these events and 
drafted an account, apparently preserved verbatim in the thirteenth-century chronicle 
of Michael the Syrian.  The Pechenegs are said to have come to Constantinople and 
agreed peace with John, who allowed them to dwell on Roman land.  John, however, 
‘availed himself of cunning’, and swiftly ordered that the thousands of new arrivals be 
detained.  On that same day, he marched to battle.1098  We might reconcile Basil’s 
testimony with that of Choniates by suggesting that the ones who made agreements 
                                                 
1094 For the battle of Beroe, see Chalandon (1912): 48-51. 
1095 Niketas Choniates, Chronike Diegesis: 14. 
1096 Michael Italikos: 284.28-285.1. 
1097 III Kings 16.29-22.39; II Chronicles 18.  Possibly Italikos merely intended to make a general 
reference to God using an anonymous prophet to fool Ahab into condemning himself to divine 
judgment; the arrogant king was later enticed by God to give battle, unaware that he would perish (III 
Kings 22).  For discussion of these events, see Niditch (1993): 35-37. 
1098 Michael the Syrian: III, 207. 
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with John and whom he later detained were those he tempted with gifts.  It seems that 
John employed diplomacy to divide the enemy and afford him the element of surprise.  
His skill in deceit appears to have been a significant aspect of post-battle reports. 
Description of the battle itself varies, influenced by the rhetoric of Choniates and 
Kinnamos.  Choniates, for example, pays greater attention to tactics, elucidating how 
the Pechenegs deployed their wagons in a circle and left gaps at certain points, 
enabling them to retreat when hard pressed.1099  Yet, despite these differences, the 
basic outline of the battle is essentially the same: following a fierce engagement, the 
Pechenegs retreat within their wagon laager, which the Byzantines eventually breach 
through an assault by the Varangian Guard.1100  These concurrences would suggest 
that a common source underlies the accounts of Kinnamos and Choniates. 
That this underlying source was originally a bulletin or commemorative account is 
indicated by a number of elements.  Choniates includes several details which reflect 
favourably on John Komnenos.  So we are told that the emperor ‘provided assistance 
all the while to his beleaguered troops’,1101 and that he was ‘valiant and a cunning 
tactician by nature…the first to execute the instructions he gave his generals and 
soldiers’.1102  It is John who devises the plan to break the Pecheneg lines, and he who 
                                                 
1099 Niketas Choniates, Chronike Diegesis: 15.  Basil of Edessa, whose account of the battle is 
preserved by Michael the Syrian (III, 207), notes that the Pechenegs, according to custom, surrounded 
their camp with wagons, forming a defensive wall.  Basil further states that Pecheneg wives and 
children would accompany their men everywhere, confirming that they would have been present. 
1100 Kinnamos: 8; Niketas Choniates, Chronike Diegesis: 16. 
1101 καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ βασιλεύς, τοὺς ἑταίρους ἔχων µεθ’ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ὅσον περὶ τὴν τοῦ σώµατος φυλακὴν 
ἀποτέτακτο, ἀεί πως ἐπεβοήθει τοῖς κάµνουσι µέρεσιν (Niketas Choniates, Chronike Diegesis: 14.68-
15.70; trans. 10). 
1102 Ἦν οὖν τηνικαῦτα τὸν Ἰωάννην ὁρᾶν σοφόν τι χρῆµα τοῖς ὑπ’ αὐτὸν καθιστάµενον· οὐ γὰρ ἀγαθὸς 
µόνον καὶ ποικίλος τὸ ἦθος ἐδείκνυτο σύµβουλος, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρῶτος παρεῖχε πέρατι ὁπόσα στρατηγοῖς 
καὶ τάγµασιν ὑπετίθετο (ibid: 15.83-86; trans. 10). 
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leads them into the struggle ‘like an unbreakable wall’.  The attention drawn to John’s 
religious fervour is very much indicative of an official tradition:   
His behaviour on the battlefield gave witness to his great piety: whenever the 
Roman phalanxes were hard pressed by the enemy…he would look upon the icon 
of the Mother of God and, wailing loudly and gesturing pitifully, shed tears hotter 
than the sweat of battle.  It was not in vain that he acted thus; donning the 
breastplate of the power from on high, he routed the Pecheneg battalions just as 
Moses had turned back the troops of Amalek by raising his hands.1103 
This element is not preserved by Kinnamos, something we might view in light of Paul 
Stephenson’s proposal that Kinnamos occasionally restrained his coverage of John 
Komnenos so that his deeds did not overshadow those of Manuel Komnenos.1104  
Such reasoning might also account for Kinnamos hinting at some dissension in the 
Byzantine ranks.  According to him, the Byzantines did not agree with their leader’s 
plan to march against the Pecheneg wagons on foot; only the axe-wielding Varangians 
indulged his bold scheme.1105  Commanders were not encouraged to expose 
themselves to danger, and so it is to be expected that John Komnenos’ subordinates 
would have attempted to dissuade him.1106  Their concerns may have been heightened 
by the injury the emperor suffered, with Kinnamos reporting that an arrow struck John 
                                                 
1103 τὸ δὲ δὴ καινὸν καὶ πολλὴν ἐκείνῳ µαρτυροῦν τὴν εὐσέβειαν, ὁπότε τῶν Ῥωµαίων αἱ φάλαγγες 
ἔκαµνον ἐπιβριθόντων τῶν πολεµίων καὶ συµπιπτόντων παραβολώτερον, τὴν τῆς θεοµήτορος εἰκόνα 
παρεστῶσαν ἔχων, µετ’ οἰµωγῆς ἐµβλέπων, ἐλεεινοῖς τοῖς σχήµασι θερµότερα τῶν ἐναγωνίων ἱδρώτων 
κατέλειβε δάκρυα. καὶ ἦν οὔκουν εἰς κενὸν διαπραττόµενος οὑτωσί, ἀλλ’ ἐκ τοῦ µάλα αὐτίκα τὴν ἐξ 
ὕψους θωρακιζόµενος δύναµιν τὰς Σκυθικὰς ἐτροποῦτο παρεµβολάς, ὡς Μωϋσῆς πρότερον τῇ τῶν 
χειρῶν ἐκτάσει τὰς Ἀµαληκίτιδας ἴλας ἐνέκλινεν (ibid: 15.86-93; trans. 10). 
1104 Stephenson (1996). 
1105 Kinnamos: 8. 
1106 See below, 353-355. 
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in the foot early in the contest.1107  Choniates oddly overlooks this event, but it is 
mentioned in imperial panegyric.1108  Michael Italikos’ oration for Manuel Komnenos 
recalls ‘the Scythian arrow which pierced the foot’ of his father John.1109  The 
encomium Nikephoros Basilakes composed in honour of John Axouch devotes 
considerable attention to the occasion when his subject rushed to the side of the 
Emperor John, who had been afflicted with a foot wound whilst leading the infantry 
guardsmen into battle against the ‘Scythians’.1110  Writing c.1159, ‘Manganeios 
Prodromos’, encomiast of Manuel Komnenos, recalls how John ‘made an assault 
against the Scythians and soaked his sandal with his heel’s honourable blood’.1111   
Though Basilakes’ encomium was written at least fifteen years after the battle, there is 
no reason to doubt that the dramatic incident was prevalent in contemporary reports of 
the battle, especially given that Axouch was John’s most trusted servant.1112  Michael 
Italikos, for example, was certainly familiar with Axouch’s contribution to the 
emperor’s successes beyond the Danube.1113  It is surprising that Choniates omits the 
episode, given his favourable portrayal of Axouch and the stress placed upon his close 
relationship with John Komnenos.1114  Such discrepancies between the reports of 
Choniates and Kinnamos suggest that by the late twelfth century there existed a 
number of accounts of the Battle of Beroe which stemmed from an official tradition 
but had since been distorted.  In support of this theory we may cite the actions of John 
                                                 
1107 ὅτε καὶ αὐτὸς βασιλεὺς βέλει τὸν πόδα ἐπλήγη (Kinnamos: 8.2-3). 
1108 See below, 335-338 for the importance attached to wounds in official accounts. 
1109 τὴν ἀκίδα τὴν Σκυθικήν, ἣ τῷ ποδὶ τοῦ βασιλέως ἐµπέπηκτο (Michael Italikos: 285.1-2). 
1110 πόδα τετρωµένον being just one of several references (Nikephoros Basilakes: 89.6-91.12). 
1111 ὃς τότε πρῶτος ὥρµησε κατὰ Σκυθῶν ἐκείνων 
       καὶ πέδιλον ἐφοίνιξε λύθρῳ ταρσοῦ τιµίῳ (Manganeios Prodromos: 8.123-124; trans. Jeffreys).  
There is also mention in the same poem of John being the first man to take booty – a Pecheneg male 
child – encouraging others to follow suit.  Perhaps this incident also stemmed from official tradition. 
1112 See Brand (1989): 4-6 for the close relationship between the two men. 
1113 Michael Italikos: 229.1-18. 
1114 For Niketas Choniates’ portrayal of Axouch, see Maisano (1998). 
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Komnenos’ brother, the sebastokrator Andronikos Komnenos.  Michael Italikos’ 
epitaph for this individual, probably composed in the early 1130s, pays tribute to the 
role Andronikos played at the Battle of Beroe, relating how, when the battle seemed 
lost, Andronikos berated a standard bearer, ordering him to hold the banner aloft.1115  
This sort of bravado would have been well-placed in contemporary accounts of the 
battle alongside the heroic actions of the emperor and Axouch. 
We may conclude by saying that the historical record of the Battle of Beroe appears to 
derive from an official bulletin and associated encomia, which drew attention to the 
piety and heroism of John Komnenos as well as the contribution of leading notables, 
including John’s brother Andronikos Komnenos and close companion John Axouch.  
Since John held a triumph1116 and instituted an annual holiday in celebration of his 
victory,1117 it is extremely likely that the victory would have been commemorated 
with panegyrical works, and the key episodes remembered for many years in 
Constantinople and beyond.1118  
The Kastamon Campaign of 1132 and John’s Mariolatry 
That John’s piety and in particular his Mariolatry formed an important strand of his 
propaganda is affirmed by accounts of the triumph he celebrated following the capture 
                                                 
1115 Michael Italikos: 83.17-24. 
1116 τὸν µέγιστον ἐπὶ τοῖς ἑαλωκόσιν ἐκεῖνον θρίαµβον (Michael Italikos: 285.2-3). 
1117 Niketas Choniates, Chronike Diegesis: 16.  The juridical text, the Ecloga Basilicorum, written in 
1142, attests to the existence of a holiday celebrating the victory over the Pechenegs, which, it has 
recently been argued, can be dated to 20th-26th April 1122.  See Ivanov & Lubotsky (2010). 
1118 Basil of Edessa’s account also states that the emperor dismounted and ordered his fellow troops to 
do likewise, leading them into battle on foot (Michael the Syrian: III, 207).  The key role of the 
Varangians in this battle is strongly alluded to in the Nordic Heimskringla saga of the period.  The saga 
also notes that John led from the front.  See Dawkins (1937); Blondal (1978): 148-153; Ciggaar (1961): 
esp. 53-55.  It was presumably Varangian veterans of the battle who were ultimately responsible for 
this transmission of information. 
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of Kastamon in 1132.1119  Court poet Theodore Prodromos composed several pieces to 
mark the great occasion,1120 the first triumphal procession of the Komnenian period to 
be recorded in detail.1121  In a lengthy composition, Prodromos sets the tone by 
remarking that John’s bloodless conquest of Kastamon was a sign that God approved 
of his endeavour.1122  Prodromos stresses that the army triumphed over the enemy by 
placing its trust in the Theotokos.1123  Theodore, along with Kinnamos and Choniates, 
reports that an ostentatious, silver-plated chariot was prepared for the emperor.1124  
John, however, ignored the public pleas to mount the chariot, choosing instead to 
walk ahead of it whilst grasping a processional cross.1125  Prodromos was dismayed 
by the emperor’s decision,1126 so much so that one poem is little more than a petition 
for John to bow to public clamour.1127  The emperor instead afforded primacy to an 
icon of the Theotokos, placing it upon the chariot.1128  Niketas Choniates is emphatic 
as to John’s reasoning: ‘To her as the unconquerable fellow general he attributed his 
victories’.1129  Michael Italikos likewise notes that the Theopaida accompanied John 
in the procession as ‘the architect of the victory’.1130  While there are strong parallels 
                                                 
1119 For records of the campaign see Kinnamos: 13.9-15; Choniates: 18.70-76; Theodore Prodromos: 
III-IV. 
1120 Though his are the only efforts to survive, by his own admission Prodromos was merely one among 
many rhetors participating with contributions in prose and verse (Theodore Prodromos: VI.98-104). 
1121 Magdalino (1993a): 240-241. 
1122 Theodore Prodromos: IV.91-100. 
1123 οὐ γὰρ ἐθάρρησε χρησµοῖς οὐδὲ λοξαῖς µαντείαις, 
      ἀλλὰ τῆς θεοµήτορος τῇ θείᾳ συµµαχίᾳ 
      καὶ τῇ πρὸς τὸν παντάνακτα πίστει τοῦ βασιλέως (ibid: IV.157-159). 
1124 Ibid: VI.57-97. 
1125 Ibid: VI.152-172. 
1126 Ibid: V.41-50. 
1127 Ibid: V.  Also IV.251-260. 
1128 Paul Magdalino (1993a): 425 speculates that John may have brought this icon on campaign with 
him.  It is possible that it was the same icon of the Virgin he had at the Battle of Beroe. 
1129 τὰς νίκας ὡς συστρατηγέτιδι ἀµάχῳ ἐπιγραφόµενος (Niketas Choniates, Chronike Diegesis: 18.78-
19.97; trans. 12). 
1130 τὴν ἔξαρχον τῆς νίκης Θεόπαιδα τῷ βασιλεῖ συµποµπεύουσαν (Michael Italikos: 285.12-14). 
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with the triumph celebrated by John Tzimiskes,1131 whereas Tzimiskes followed the 
chariot on a white horse, John Komnenos went before it on foot, making him appear 
more modest still.  Consequently, Kinnamos is perhaps correct to assert that the 
episode was something ‘not previously witnessed since [the time of] the Herakleians 
and Justinian’.1132  Both he and Choniates clearly drew upon an official record of the 
triumph, if not the encomia of Theodore Prodromos.  Evidently, religious militancy 
was an important strand of John’s propaganda, just as it was of many soldier emperors 
of the preceding centuries.1133 
The Campaign in Cilicia and Northern Syria, 1137-1139 
Upon John Komnenos’ return from a prolonged campaign in Cilicia and northern 
Syria in 1139,1134 Michael Italikos prepared a basilikos logos to commemorate the 
emperor’s success.  Given that Italikos refers therein to imperial letters sent from the 
front,1135 we may surmise that the historical content of the oration, if not the rich 
classical references and allusions, derived from the bulletin(s).1136  Through 
comparison with Choniates and Kinnamos, and the encomia of Nikephoros Basilakes 
and Theodore Prodromos also composed to mark John’s return, one may attempt to 
reconstruct the official record of the campaign and determine the extent to which the 
aforementioned historians adhered to it.  
                                                 
1131 See Magdalino (1993a): 240-241. 
1132 θαῦµά τε ἦν Βυζαντίοις ὁρᾶν, ὅπερ οἶµαι οὔπω µέχρι καὶ τότε κατεῖδον ἐξ ὅτου Ἡράκλειοι καὶ 
Ἰουστινιανοὶ τὴν Ῥωµαίων διεῖπον ἀρχήν (Kinnamos: 13.15-14.2; trans. 20). 
1133 See above, 68-79. 
1134 For discussion, see Lilie (1993): 103-134; Harris (2003): 80-85. 
1135 τὰ βασιλικὰ γράµµατα (Michael Italikos: 248.7-8). 
1136 That said, synkrisis with Alexander the Great is prevalent throughout both orations of Basilakes and 
Michael Italikos, as observed by Paul Magdalino (1993a: 432).  This might suggest that such allusions 
and imagery formed part of the original dispatches, substantiating the notion that the bulletins of 
Stephen Meles could be appreciated beyond their factual content.  
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Italikos begins with a recollection of John’s campaign against the Armenians in 
Cilicia.  Like Kinnamos and Choniates, Italikos briefly mentions the conquest of 
Tarsos, Adana and Mopsuestia, but makes a set-piece of the thirty-five day siege of 
Anazarbos.  The accounts differ in certain respects.  Italikos is the only writer to refer 
to the defenders setting fire to the town, while Choniates discloses that a band of 
Turks sent ahead of the main Byzantine army were routed by the Armenian garrison.  
That said, all the commentators mention that the defenders attempted to burn the 
Byzantine siege machines, but were ultimately thwarted by the Byzantines 
surrounding the devices with brick wall defences.  From this point, they again 
pounded the city into submission with bombardments of stones.1137  This aspect of the 
siege most probably derived from the dispatch relating events in Cilicia.  Given the 
lack of coverage of other sieges, it may be that the emperor’s publicists opted to focus 
on the most gruelling siege of the first stage of the campaign. 
The effectiveness of siege artillery in this expedition, and indeed in other campaigns 
conducted by John Komnenos, is a prominent feature in encomia and historical 
narratives.  George Dennis and Paul Chevedden have noted the devastation wrought 
by Byzantine stone-throwing counterweight trebuchets, a recent development in 
warfare.1138  Theodore Prodromos’ epitaph for the emperor recalled him as one who 
‘brought down walls and demolished cities’ with his many siege engines.1139  In 
celebrating John’s capture of Kastamon in 1132, Theodore commended the emperor 
for electing to destroy the fortifications of the enemy rather than risk his troops in an 
                                                 
1137 Michael Italikos: 254.5-255.8; Nikephoros Basilakes: 60.5-62.5; Kinnamos: 17-18; Niketas 
Choniates, Chronike Diegesis: 25-27.  Armenian historian Gregory the Priest (241) notes that John 
invested Anazarbos for thirty-five days during which time he ‘battered its walls with his catapults’. 
1138 Dennis (1997b): 138-139; idem (1998): 110-113; Chevedden (1999): esp. 92-93, 104; Birkenmeier 
(2002): 182-205. 
1139 τείχη καθῄρουν καὶ κατήρειπον πόλεις (Theodore Prodromos: XXV.65-72). 
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assault.1140  The second capture of Kastamon in 1135 is described in similar terms:  
Prodromos writes that John bombarded the city with ‘a hailstorm of stones’ until it 
capitulated.1141  During the same campaign Gangra was subjected to similar treatment, 
with John unleashing a barrage of stones against the city.1142  According to Choniates, 
artillerymen specifically targeted the houses, weakening the resolve of the 
inhabitants.1143  Prodromos has the emperor assume an active role, helping load a 
stone onto a trebuchet.1144  John’s Mariolatry recurs at this point.  Prodromos explains 
that the emperor had initially heeded the guidance of the Virgin to leave Gangra, so 
insulted was she by the blasphemous words of the leader of the city.1145  Upon his 
eventual return, John prayed to the Theotokos, acknowledging her assistance in past 
victories and imploring her to aid him once more.  The Virgin appeared to answer his 
prayer by guiding the stone he himself placed on the trebuchet to a direct hit; before 
long, the Turks relinquished control of the city.1146  Nikephoros Basilakes, the only 
commentator to cover the 1137 siege of Tarsos in any detail, describes how the city 
defences were destroyed by an incessant bombardment of huge stones launched by 
trebuchets - an ‘extraordinary artificial hailstorm’1147 - prompting the capitulation of 
the inhabitants.1148  Choniates records John using trebuchets to destroy the 
                                                 
1140 ἔθνεα δ’ ἔνδον ἔην εὖ εἰδότα δηϊοτῆτος 
       πολλὰ µάλ’, ὅσσα πόλιν θ’ ἅµα πλῆσε, πλῆσε δὲ κρηµνὸν 
       πετρήεντα, πλῆσε δὲ τείχεα πίσυρα πάντα. 
       πρὸς τόσον οὖν πτολίεθρον ἰὼν τότε, κοίρανε γαίης, 
       τήνδε περιφραδέως ἐσκέψαο µῆτιν ἀρίστην (ibid: ΙΙΙ.65-69; 68-77 describes the use of siege 
machines in capturing the city, as noted also by Niketas Choniates, Chronike Diegesis: 18.73-74). 
1141 χαλαζοβόλει δέ τε πέτρους (Theodore Prodromos: VIII.59-73).  For discussion of the technical 
terms employed by Prodromos, see Hörandner (1974): 242-243. 
1142 Theodore Prodromos: VIII.74-94, 118-145. 
1143 Niketas Choniates, Chronike Diegesis: 20. 
1144 Theodore Prodromos: VIII.170-185. 
1145 Ibid: VIII.45-60. 
1146 Ibid: VIII.146-259. 
1147 The meteorological imagery used by Prodromos and Basilakes to describe the aerial bombardment 
is derived from Homer, and appears elsewhere in Byzantine historiography – see above, 58-59. 
1148 ἀµήχανον χάλαζαν τεχνητήν (Nikephoros Basilakes: 56.17-59.21). 
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fortifications of the Euphrates fortress of Piza in 1138.1149  Crusader historian William 
of Tyre describes a heavy bombardment of Antioch.1150  After departing Antioch the 
emperor unleashed another barrage against Shaizar, an event reported in non-Greek 
sources also.  Syrian soldier Usamah ibn Munqidh notes in his memoirs that the 
stones of ‘huge trebuchets’ destroyed whole buildings and inflicted gruesome 
injuries.1151  William of Tyre supports this testimony, reporting that the volleys of 
stones ‘shook the towers and walls and even the houses of the people within’.1152  
John’s trebuchets were evidently a formidable weapon, and given the many sieges he 
conducted it is to be expected that these devices featured frequently in his dispatches 
and thus caught the eye of panegyrists and historians writing about John’s wars.   
After capturing Anazarbos and receiving the submission of Prince Raymond of 
Antioch – an episode prominent in all the sources - John, now allied with Antioch and 
Edessa, set out for northern Syria in the spring of 1138.1153  The great booty acquired 
from towns captured along the Euphrates – Bazaah in particular – is likely to have 
been emphasized in John’s original dispatches, given that it is mentioned in all 
accounts.1154  Less apparent is the siege of Aleppo.  This enterprise is rather glossed 
over, and its failure attributed to a lack of supplies and water, which, we might 
imagine, reflected the official line.1155  According to Italikos, John considered Aleppo 
                                                 
1149 Niketas Choniates, Chronike Diegesis: 27 -28. 
1150 William of Tyre: II, 670-671. 
1151 Usamah ibn Munqidh: 143-144; Kamal ad-Din, ‘La chronique d'Alep’: 677-678. 
1152 Hic demum machinis congrua provisione dispositis, turres ac menia et infra muros civium 
domicilia gravium immissione molarium incessanter concutiunt et crebris ictibus et vicaria 
immissorum cautium repetitione non sine multa inhabitantium strage funditus deiciunt, in quibus erat 
defensionis spes maxima, edificiorum munimina (William of Tyre: II, 674.23-30; trans. II, 94-95). 
1153 For John’s dealings with Antioch, see Lilie (1993): 120-125, 298-308; Parnell (2010): esp. 151-
154. 
1154 Kinnamos 19; Niketas Choniates, Chronike Diegesis: 27-28; Michael Italikos: 261.24-262.10; 
Nikephoros Basilakes: 64.23-65.7. 
1155 Kinnamos: 19; Niketas Choniates, Chronike Diegesis: 28. 
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not worth the effort of a prolonged siege,1156 while Basilakes suggests that John was 
content with a mere show of military might.1157  The subsequent siege of Shaizar 
posed a similarly difficult problem for John’s publicists.  Byzantine commentators 
present an incessant barrage from the stone-throwing devices, forcing the emir of the 
town to seek an agreement with the emperor.1158  Satiated with rich gifts, John left 
Shaizar.1159  According to William of Tyre, however, John’s hand was forced by the 
idleness of the Crusader princes Raymond of Antioch and Joscelin II of Edessa.  
Frustrated by the slow progress, a disillusioned John agreed to the peace overtures of 
the emir.1160  Ralph-Johannes Lilie suspects the truth was a combination of various 
disruptive elements.1161  We might note also that Byzantine accounts of John’s 
triumphant entry into Antioch following the siege of Shaizar1162 fail to mention the 
purported riot which caused the Byzantines to swiftly depart.1163  Most probably it 
was considered prudent among John’s staff to omit all references to discord with his 
                                                 
1156 Michael Italikos: 262.5-263.1.  
1157 Nikephoros Basilakes: 65.32-66.10. 
1158 Niketas Choniates is among the few to describe an initial engagement before the city, with the 
victorious imperial army driving a number of the enemy into the nearby river.  Basilakes corroborates 
this report, noting that the river ran red with the blood of the defenders.  By arraying his troops 
according to their ethnicity – Macedonians, Pechenegs, western Europeans – John inspired fear in the 
defenders and compelled them to retreat within the inner wall.  The Byzantines attacked, with 
Choniates summarizing the action thus: ‘For many days there were hand-to-hand combats, clashes and 
battles, duels between the best, flight and retreat, and pursuit on both sides’ (Choniates: 30.76-78; trans. 
17-18).  These irregular skirmishes between the Byzantines and the defenders are confirmed by 
Usamah ibn Munqidh (122, 143-144).  The missile bombardment seems to have occurred in unison 
with these attacks, since Usamah describes fighting taking place in the breaches created by the 
Byzantine siege engines. 
1159 Kinnamos: 19-20; Niketas Choniates, Chronike Diegesis: 29-31; Michael Italikos: 263.1-265.10; 
Nikephoros Basilakes: 66.9-68.9.   
1160 William of Tyre: II, 675-678.  For William’s slant on the expedition, see Lilie (1993): 284-297; 
Harris (2003): 81-83. 
1161 Lilie (1993): 126-128; Harris (2003): 84-85.  Various sources hint that John departed because of 
news of other cities being attacked by the Turks (Niketas Choniates, Chronike Diegesis: 29-31; 
Michael the Syrian: III, 425) or the imminent arrival of a relief force (Kamal ad-Din ‘La chronique 
d’Alep’: 678). 
1162 Niketas Choniates, Chronike Diegesis: 31; Michael Italikos: 265.18-266.29; Nikephoros Basilakes: 
46.14-17, 69.6-72.22. 
1163 William of Tyre: II, 676-681.  For discussion see Lilie (1993): 128-130. 
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Crusader allies, along with any suggestion that he was responsible for the failure of 
the sieges of Aleppo and Shaizar. 
The presentation of a united front against the forces of Islam may be seen as part of 
the triumphant Christian tone of contemporary encomia, with Magdalino identifying a 
distinct ‘holy war’ sentiment.1164  Perhaps the most explicit realisation of the 
‘Crusader’ ideal is found in the oration of Nikephoros Basilakes, where he praises the 
emperor for opening up the route to Jerusalem for pilgrims.1165  Also ripe for 
exploitation was the acquisition of sacred objects.1166  Among the great prizes 
bestowed upon John at Shaizar, none was more valued than a ruby cross, which, 
according to Choniates, had been seized from the Byzantine camp at the Battle of 
Manzikert.1167  Both Basilakes and Michael Italikos assert that the cross was crafted 
by order of Constantine the Great, one who conquered by the sign of the cross, 
confirming that the trophy was a symbol of divinely-sanctioned victory.1168  Accounts 
of John’s preceding campaigns indicate that this intensification of the religious 
element was a natural progression from the tone of earlier dispatches.1169 
A number of striking concurrences confirm Paul Magdalino’s proposal that there 
existed an official record of John’s 1137-1139 campaign.1170  Inevitably, however, not 
                                                 
1164 Magdalino (1993a): 420. 
1165 Nikephoros Basilakes: 56.10-16. 
1166 While Michael Italikos mentions that John seized relics when he captured the Armenian ruler Leo 
and his family (256.1-5), oddly he does not specify what they were; according to Gregory the Priest 
(241), a ‘holy icon of the Theotokos’ was among the items taken back to Constantinople.  This is 
consistent with John’s personal faith so it is unusual that his encomiasts did not draw attention to the 
object. 
1167 Niketas Choniates, Chronike Diegesis: 30.1-31.7.  Nikephoros Bryennios (119) notes only one 
specific object taken by the Turks at Manzikert – a famous pearl called ‘The Orphan’. 
1168 Michael Italikos: 264.10-265.10; Nikephoros Basilakes: 67.13-68.9.  Kinnamos (20) also notes the 
legend that Constantine ordered the cross to be made. 
1169 Indeed, Wolfram Hörandner (1974: 242) describes one of Theodore Prodromos’ earlier works 
marking John’s capture of Kastamon and Gangra (VIII) in 1135 as ‘kreuzzugartige’ in tone. 
1170 Magdalino (1993a): 432. 
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all commentators used the information in the same fashion, and may even have sought 
supplementary material.  We have noted that Basilakes is the only writer to afford 
extensive coverage to the siege of Tarsos.  Theodore Prodromos largely ignores the 
siege of Shaizar,1171 preferring instead to elaborate upon the crossing of the Euphrates 
and the actions against Ferep and Aleppo.1172  Michael Italikos devotes two sections 
to the feats of the ‘lion cub’ Alexios, John’s son and co-emperor, who led an 
independent action against Ankyra1173 and later supported his father in the capture of 
Gastounai.1174  Alexios is omitted entirely from all other accounts of the campaign.1175  
Given that Italikos’ oration seems to have followed that of Basilakes, it may be that he 
focused on other aspects of the expedition to make his work unique and perhaps 
attract the attention of another potential patron in Alexios.1176  Magdalino considers 
the possibility that John’s panegyrists employed supplementary sources, though 
ultimately explains the differences as ‘divergences in aesthetic and even ideological 
interpretation, reflecting some sort of ongoing debate among the intellectual elite’.1177   
                                                 
1171 Oddly Shaizar is mentioned only fleetingly in Prodromos’ letter to Theodore Stypeiotes, who 
participated in the expedition as imperial secretary (Theodore Prodromos: LXXI.25). 
1172 Ibid: XI.51-60. 
1173 For the identity of this Ankyra, see Gautier (1972): 251 n.32; Lilie (1993): 118 & n.88. 
1174 Michael Italikos: 251.19-252.14, 258.13-259.9. 
1175 Also missing from most sources are the actions of another of John’s sons, Manuel.  The oration 
Italikos composed for Manuel’s accession to the throne in 1143 confirms that in 1138 the then twenty-
year-old Manuel participated in battles in Cilicia as well as the sieges of Aleppo and Shaizar, his spear 
shining more brilliantly than all others (ibid: 286.1-9).  Orators may have been concerned to recall his 
deeds lest they overshadow those of his father. 
1176 For the competitiveness between Basilakes and Italikos, see Garzya (1973). By contrast, Italikos 
and Prodromos appear to have been close associates, with Italikos providing his friend with 
geographical material for describing John’s campaigns (Michael Italikos: 64.1-65.19, 99.1-101.8, 
237.1-238.13).  Dimiter Angelov (2007: 56-57) affirms that literati from the reign of Andronikos II 
Palaiologos took an active interest in each other’s orations, which might have led to differentiation in 
order to appear distinct. 
1177 See Magdalino (1993a): 432-433, for discussion of further differences in the orations of Basilakes 
and Italikos concerning style, imagery and emphasis.  Riccardo Maisano (1994a: 391-393) highlights 
the tendency of encomiasts and historians to embellish geographical aspects of John’s campaigns.  
Nikephoros Basilakes (55.11-12) recalls the pass of Thermopylae in his description of the route 
through Cilicia, while Niketas Choniates (Chronike Diegesis: 21.57-60) alone asserts that John passed 
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It is difficult to extend such an explanation to Kinnamos and Choniates, who wrote 
decades later.  These historians lack some details provided by the encomiasts, though 
include others which are unique.  The capture of Vahka, referred to fleetingly by 
Theodore Prodromos,1178 becomes a significant narrative episode in Choniates’ 
Chronike Diegesis.  Choniates reports that the Armenian Constantine, commander of 
the fortress, reviled the emperor and challenged one of his troops to single combat.  
To face him the officers selected Eustratios, a soldier of the Macedonian regiment.  
Eustratios withstood the violent attacks of the Armenian until he split the ‘Hectorian’ 
shield of his opponent in two, leaving the humbled Constantine to retreat back within 
the fortress.  The emperor bestowed many gifts upon Eustratios, and within days 
Vahka was captured.1179  Lilie questioned the accuracy of this section, deeming it to 
be ‘heavily laden with rhetoric’.1180  Stephanos Efthymiadis interpreted the duel as ‘a 
kind of Homeric fictionalization’.1181  Yet rather than accuse Choniates of inventing 
this episode, we might suppose that Eustratios was among the participants of the 
expedition whom Choniates mentions in his prooimion as having interviewed.  
Admittedly we should not overstate the ‘unofficial’ information that might have been 
available to Kinnamos and Choniates; had, for example, the pair known of the discord 
                                                                                                                                            
through the Cilician Gates.  Maisano rightly notes that this was unlikely, given that these areas were 
then controlled by the sultan of Ikonion.  Maisano attributes the confusion to contemporary rhetoric, 
with Choniates apparently elaborating upon the descriptions of Italikos and Basilakes, though the 
inconsistency suggests that the original bulletin merely emphasized the difficulty of the route, with the 
various authors adding their own spin and exaggerating John’s troubles with references to ancient sites.  
In support of this hypothesis we may cite the letter Italikos sent to Theodore Prodromos, listing 
geographical information about southern Anatolia and Syria from a number of ancient authors (Michael 
Italikos: 99.1-101.8).  Presumably this was because Theodore was preparing a work on John’s military 
activity in the region, and required archaic information for rhetorical purposes rather than accuracy. 
1178 The Vachenoi, almost certainly residents of Vahka, are mentioned by Theodore Prodromos among 
John’s conquests in a letter to Theodore Stypeiotes (Theodore Prodromos: LXXI.24). 
1179 Niketas Choniates, Chronike Diegesis: 22-25. 
1180 Lilie (1993): 125 n.117.  Its dating is also suspect – see ibid: 118 n.93. 
1181 Efthymiadis (2009): 38. 
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between John and his Crusader allies, they would surely have mentioned it.1182  Even 
so, that Choniates was compelled to supplement his narrative with other material is 
supported by Kinnamos, who abruptly concludes his own account of the campaign 
with a note that he was unable to record the particulars of the emperor’s actions 
against the Turks of Ikonion, since he lacked ‘a faithful account of them’.1183  Again 
the official record of a campaign led by John is preserved in large part by Kinnamos 
and Choniates, but evidently the redaction consulted was not wholly satisfactory, 
forcing the latter to seek information from alternative sources. 
Choniates’ use of other material is all but confirmed by his account of John’s 
expedition against Neokaisareia in 1139-1140.  As a contemporary oration of 
Theodore Prodromos bemoans the severe winter which forced John to abandon his 
projected siege of Neokaisareia,1184 Kinnamos and Choniates also stress the poor 
conditions as the reason behind John’s failure.1185  The widespread reports of the 
heroic performance of the young Manuel at Neokaisareia, discussed below, confirms 
the notion of a common source.  Yet, at the outset of the campaign, Choniates 
describes how the Emperor John had become increasingly ‘unremitting and 
imperious…as though he had forgotten or was unaware that the Romans had spent 
three years fighting in the east’.  The troops are said to have felt a fierce hatred 
towards John, since many had not been allowed to return to their homesteads in 
between campaigns.  The emperor acknowledged their complaints, but did little to 
                                                 
1182 Lilie (1993): 126-127, 281. 
1183 ἀλλὰ ταῦτα µὲν πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν ἱστορεῖν ὑπόσχεσιν οἶµαι ὑπερβαίνει τὴν ἡµετέραν. ὡς γὰρ ἐν 
κεφαλαίῳ προὔκειτό µοι περὶ τῶν παρόντων εἰπεῖν, ἅτε µηδὲ αὐτοπτήσαντι ταῦτα µηδὲ τὸ πιστὸν 
ἐντεῦθεν λαβόντι (Kinnamos: 20.19-22; trans. 25).  Various sources report that John attacked the Turks 
of Ikonion upon his return journey through Anatolia, an act of reprisal for raids on Byzantine Bithynia 
in his absence (Niketas Choniates, Chronike Diegesis: 31; Michael Italikos: 267.3-14; Theodore 
Prodromos: XI.56-60, 81-100; Gregory the Priest: 242). 
1184 Theodore Prodromos: XIX.21-111, 181-191. 
1185 Kinnamos: 21-22; Niketas Choniates, Chronike Diegesis: 34-36. 
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address their grievances.1186  This discord is not mentioned by any other source.  The 
likelihood is that Choniates learned of the restlessness from a participant,1187 perhaps 
the same informant who briefed him on events at Vahka. 
Conclusion 
Analysis of the accounts of campaigns conducted by John II Komnenos reveals a 
strong reliance on the official tradition originally propagated in imperial bulletins.  
These dispatches drew particular attention to the emperor’s tactical ability and 
siegecraft, as well as his courage and piety.  While contemporary encomia appear to 
reflect the official line, there are signs that the official tradition had become distorted 
when Kinnamos and Choniates came to pen their works.  It was perhaps for this 
reason that the more industrious Choniates appears to have sought information from 
other sources.  Contributions from outside the official record are not apparent in 
Choniates’ accounts of John’s earlier campaigns, undoubtedly because few soldiers 
who participated in these operations would have been alive at the time Choniates was 
gathering his research.  It is only with coverage of John’s campaigns from 1138 
onwards that one observes Choniates occasionally drawing upon alternative sources.  
This tendency of supplementing the official record with additional material continues 
with Choniates’ accounts of Manuel’s campaigns.
                                                 
1186 καὶ ἡ µὲν ἐκ θεσπισµάτων βασιλείων συνήγετο, αὐτὸς δὲ κατὰ τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον ὡς οὐδέποτε τοῖς 
στρατευοµένοις ἀσυγγνώµων ἔδοξε καὶ βαρὺς καὶ τὸ πλέον µηδὲ µέτρα ἐκστρατείας εἰδώς, ὡς εἴπερ 
ἐλάθετο ἢ οὐκ ἐνόησεν ὡς τρισσὸν ἔτος ἐν τοῖς ἑῴοις πολέµοις Ῥωµαῖοι διήνεγκαν... (Niketas 
Choniates, Chronike Diegesis: 33.61-83; trans. 19-20). 
1187 Simpson (2004): 219-220. 
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III. The Historical Record of the Campaigns of Manuel I Komnenos 
While the campaigns of John II Komnenos have hitherto not been subject to a 
comparative study of the historical and encomiastic sources, the same cannot be said 
of expeditions conducted by his son Manuel.  Paul Magdalino initially speculated ‘the 
close connection between epideictic rhetoric and narrative history of the period’ to be 
‘crucial to their interpretation’,1188 following up his observation with a detailed study 
of Manuel’s presentation in the sources.1189  Magdalino’s research showed substantial 
convergence between the historiographical sources and encomia from Manuel’s reign, 
‘in ways which suggest a common fund of official information’.1190  In this section we 
discuss the record of Manuel’s major campaigns, employing Choniates and Kinnamos 
alongside the most prolific panegyrist of the period, ‘Manganeios Prodromos’.1191  It 
is in these accounts we observe the most striking parallels between history and 
encomia, and gain insight into the line of official bulletins.   
Manuel at the Siege of Neokaisareia, 1140 
Manuel makes an immediate impression in the historical record, where he is 
introduced as a twenty-two year-old in the service of his father at the siege of 
Neokaisareia in 1140.1192  Both Kinnamos and Choniates relate how the young 
Manuel broke ranks to engage the enemy, earning a mixed response from the 
                                                 
1188 Magdalino (1988): 176 n.12. 
1189 Idem (1993a): esp. 413-488. 
1190 Ibid: 442. 
1191 The poems of ‘Manganeios’ were once attributed to Theodore Prodromos, though modern 
scholarship views them as two separate figures.  See Hörandner (1975); Kazhdan (1984c): 87-93; 
Beaton (1987); E. & M. Jeffreys (2001): 101-102.  It has been speculated that ‘Manganeios’ served as 
the emperor’s correspondent from imperial campaigns during the 1150s, which would again reinforce 
the link between writers of encomia and bulletins (Anderson & Jeffreys 1994).  For discussion of how 
the encomiasts of John’s reign fared under Manuel, and which panegyrists Manuel favoured, see 
Stanković (2007b). 
1192 For this campaign, see Chalandon (1912): 176-180. 
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emperor.  According to Kinnamos, John made a public show of lambasting Manuel’s 
recklessness, but was privately thrilled by his son’s heroic deeds.1193  Choniates, by 
contrast, reports that John publicly rewarded his son, but later punished him in 
private, forbidding Manuel to act this way in future.1194   
One suspects that Choniates may be correct in this instance, since Theodore 
Prodromos’ oration marking John’s return celebrates Manuel’s heroism, recalling how 
the youngster was able to put the ‘Persian’ forces to flight merely by shouting.1195  A 
basilikos logos delivered by Michael Italikos shortly after Manuel’s accession in 1143 
lingers on the precocious martial talents of the new emperor.1196  Italikos recounts 
how Manuel, seeing the imperial troops routing at Neokaisareia, launched himself into 
the midst of the Turks, saving the army through his courage.1197  These references 
indicate that Manuel’s exploits were stressed in imperial dispatches, the high point of 
an otherwise disappointing campaign.  A precedent had been set for how Manuel 
would conduct himself in battle and how his actions would be presented in dispatches 
and encomia. 
The Campaign against Ikonion, 11461198 
Manuel’s military prowess is consistently praised in accounts of his campaign against 
the Turkish sultanate of Ikonion in 1146.  Having abandoned the idea of a siege, 
                                                 
1193 Kinnamos: 21-22.  Kinnamos remarks that Manuel was not yet eighteen at this point in time, an 
error which should perhaps support our preference for Choniates’ version of events. 
1194 Niketas Choniates, Chronike Diegesis: 35. 
1195 Theodore Prodromos: XIX.73-81, 142-151.  ‘Manganeios Prodromos’ (2.79-80) says the same of 
Manuel in a more general context - καὶ καταπλήττων, ὅ φασιν, αὐτοβοεὶ καὶ µόνον, τοὺς ἐµπεσόντας 
αἰφνηδὸν τοῦ κράτους σου τῷ ξίφει.  Also ibid: 27.29, where Manuel is said to defeat opponents 
merely by roaring (ὁ µόνοις τοῖς βρυχήµασι νικῶν τοὺς ἀντιπάλους). 
1196 Michael Italikos: 282-284. 
1197 Ibid: 286-287. 
1198 See Appendix VI for discussion of visual depiction of events of this campaign, supporting the 
notion that certain episodes featured in an imperial bulletin. 
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Manuel departed, conducting a fighting withdrawal through enemy territory.  Events 
from this phase of the campaign provided much material for Manuel’s encomiast 
‘Manganeios Prodromos’ and also John Kinnamos.  The commonalities are almost 
certainly a result of the pair following the cue of the original dispatch.  The official 
line appears eager to show that Manuel threw himself into the midst of the enemy, 
fuelled by a desire to impress his new western wife.1199  According to Kinnamos, 
Manuel ignored the pleading of his colleagues and charged the enemy, claiming that 
‘a yearning for valiant deeds draws me completely to itself’.1200  He rushed a 
contingent of five hundred Turks, slaying many with his lance.1201  Manuel scoffed at 
the urgings of one Poupakes to think of his well-being, arguing that ‘it was impossible 
for him to flee without lasting disgrace’.1202  While his officers wished to erect a 
fortified camp when surrounded by the Turks, Manuel did not want to be hemmed in, 
and so heroically repelled the enemy.1203  ‘Manganeios Prodromos’ echoes these 
claims, expressing astonishment that Manuel alone had been able to repulse forty 
men.1204  Manuel is said to have launched six assaults against the enemy, putting them 
to flight each time; one suspects that Kinnamos is chronicling such instances 
whenever he writes of Manuel’s daring.1205  ‘Manganeios’ also relates that Manuel 
                                                 
1199 Kinnamos: 47.5-10. 
1200 “...µε ἡ τοῦ ἀνδραγαθίζεσθαι ἐπιθυµία δεινῶς ἐφ’ ἑαυτὴν ἕλκει” (ibid: 49.5-21; trans. 46, with 
amendments). 
1201 Ibid: 50.3-7. 
1202 οὐ γὰρ ἐξῆν αὐτῷ µὴ οὐχὶ σὺν ἀτιµίᾳ τοῦ λοιποῦ διαδρᾶναι (ibid: 50.14-51.7; trans. 47, with 
amendments). 
1203 Ibid: 55.17-56.18. 
1204 Σὺ δὲ πρὸς τεσσαράκοντα καὶ τούτους ὡπλισµένους 
      … καὶ γὰρ οἱ τεσσαράκοντα φεύγουσι σὲ τὸν ἕνα (Manganeios Prodromos: 25.36-51). 
1205 Πρῶτον φασὶ τὸν ἀριθµὸν τὸν ἓξ ἐν τοῖς τελείοις· 
       καὶ σὺ τοῖς Πέρσαις προσβαλὼν ἐν προσβολαῖς τοσαύταις  
       καὶ τοσαυτάκις εἰς τροπὴν ἐκείνους ἀποκλίνας  
       νικητικὸν καὶ τέλειον τὸ στέφος ἀνεδήσω (ibid: 25.62-65). 
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was urged to withdraw by his men after the third attack, but instead boldly advanced, 
a scene reminiscent of those described by Kinnamos and also Choniates.1206   
A focal point of both accounts is the wound suffered by Manuel.  Whilst fighting, 
Manuel received an arrow to the heel, a wound which, at the time, apparently gave 
him little trouble,1207 but, as ‘Manganeios Prodromos’ illustrates, became a recurrent 
feature in imperial panegyric.  In his encomium celebrating this campaign, 
‘Manganeios’ devotes considerable attention to Manuel’s injury, noting how the blood 
stained the emperor’s footwear.1208  He describes how the unseen Turk, like a snake 
lurking in thick reeds, pounced to ‘bite’ Manuel in the heel.1209  This image of the 
Turks in hiding is consistent with the general depiction of the sultan as a coward, 
shirking from Manuel’s attempts to face the imperial army in the field.1210  Perhaps 
more significantly, the metaphor of the enemy as a snake attacking the heel is used 
                                                 
1206 Μετὰ τὴν τρίτην προσβολὴν καὶ τὴν αἰχµαλωσίαν, 
       τὸ κράτος ὑποστρέψαι σου πᾶς ὁ στρατὸς ἠξίου· 
       σὺ δὲ προεῖπας ὡς ∆αυίδ, “Πορεύσοµαι καὶ πάλιν” 
       καὶ πορευθεὶς συνέτριψας τὸν ἀλαζόνα Πέρσην, 
       καὶ τρέψας τοῦτον εἰς φυγὴν ὑπέστρεψας ἐνδόξως (ibid: 25.101-105).  Niketas Choniates 
(Chronike Diegesis: 53.38-43) reports that Manuel ignored the advice of his men to turn back at 
Philomelion following his foot injury, discussed below.  Magdalino (1993a: 443) is inclined to link the 
testimony of Choniates and ‘Manganeios’ in this instance. 
1207 Βέλος ἀφεὶς ἄκρου τυγχάνει τοῦ ποδὸς ὄπισθεν, ἔνθα µετὰ τὰ σφυρὰ ἐπὶ πτέρναν ἡ φύσις 
ἀναχωροῦσα τὴν ἐξοχὴν ποιεῖται (Kinnamos: 61.23-62.9).  The arrow wound is also mentioned by 
Niketas Choniates (Chronike Diegesis: 53.36-38), where it is described as afflicting the soul of 
Manuel’s foot: τὸν τοῦ ποδὸς ἐτοξεύθη ταρσὸν...ἐν δὲ τῷ ἀνατραπῆναι τὸ βέλος ἐπαφέντος κατὰ τοῦ 
πέλµατος.  One suspects that the heel placement offered more heroic parallels for panegyrists. 
1208 Manganeios Prodromos: 25.23-35.  This is very reminiscent of George of Pisidia’s presentation of 
the Emperor Heraclius, who also suffered a wound to his heel during a campaign and stained his purple 
boots over the course of the campaign (George of Pisidia: Exp. Pers., §I.163-252).  For further 
discussion see Mary Whitby (1994): 204-205 & n.41; idem (1998): 255-257. 
1209 Εἰς δασυτάτην κάλαµον κρυπτόµενος ὡς ὄφις  
       ἐτήρησε τὴν πτέρναν σου λαθὼν ὁ θὴρ ὁ Πέρσης, 
       καὶ πτερνοδήκτης γίνεται καὶ βάλλει σου τὴν πτέρναν (Manganeios Prodromos: 25.11-13) 
1210 καὶ τούτου χάριν ἔγραψας τῷ βασιλεῖ, σουλτάνε, 
       γενέσθαι προθυµότερος ἐπὶ τὸ πολεµῆσαι· 
       καὶ συµβαλὼν καὶ συµπλακεὶς καὶ γνοὺς αὐτοῦ τὸ κράτος  
       ἐγένου προθυµότερος µᾶλλον ἐπὶ τὸ φεύγειν (ibid: 25.66-70).  Complementing ‘Manganeios’, 
Kinnamos (46.4-19, 58.19-59.4) notes that the emperor wrote to the sultan and sent messages 
reproaching him for his reluctance to fight. 
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also by Nikephoros Basilakes in relation to the same injury suffered by Manuel’s 
father in battle with the Pechenegs;1211 this parallel between father and son, while 
never explicitly acknowledged, cannot have been lost on observers.  Manuel is 
directly compared with Philip of Macedon, who was wounded in the heel on 
campaign and hobbled during his triumphant return; Manuel, by contrast, did not wish 
to earn public sympathy and thus mustered the strength to walk without obvious sign 
of discomfort, displaying his humility.1212 
As Magdalino and Michael Jeffreys have observed, the historical record of Manuel’s 
campaign against Ikonion suggests it was largely intended as a show of force, 
designed to impress Manuel’s new German wife, Bertha-Eirene of Sulzbach, and 
show that he was a capable warrior emperor.1213  This notion is affirmed by 
‘Manganeios Prodromos’, who opines that Manuel had left the city an emperor but 
returned as βασιλεὺς and στρατηγὸς.1214  Nevertheless, one suspects that the chief 
reason for Manuel’s publicists choosing to focus on the individual contribution of the 
emperor was to gloss over the fact that the expedition had been a failure.  The 
formidable defences of Ikonion, combined with notice of the coming of the Second 
Crusade, provided cause for Manuel abandoning his siege.1215  To this end, it is 
Manuel’s fighting withdrawal and affliction that commands the attention of Kinnamos 
and ‘Manganeios Prodromos’.  This heroic strand, which Manuel almost certainly 
                                                 
1211 οἱ µὲν γὰρ ὡς ὄφεις τὴν πτέρναν ἐκαιροφυλάκησαν... (Nikephoros Basilakes: 89.16-17). 
1212 Manganeios Prodromos: 25.202-226.  That memory of Manuel’s heroic wound lingered for some 
time is affirmed by a panegyric composed several years later, wherein ‘Manganeios’ again lavishes 
praise on the emperor’s feet, noting that Manuel’s purple shoes had become more bloodstained over 
time (ibid: 4.708-711). 
1213 Magdalino (1993a): 443, 448-450; M. Jeffreys (2011): 30. 
1214 Ἀποδηµήσας βασιλεὺς µόνον ἐκ βασιλίδος 
       καὶ βασιλεὺς καὶ στρατηγὸς ἐκεῖθεν ἐπανῆλθες, 
       καὶ στρατιώτης ἰσχυρὸς λαµπρῶς ἀνδραγαθήσας (Manganeios Prodromos: 25.79-81). 
1215 Kinnamos: 45.15-21. 
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conveyed in bulletins and which encomiasts in turn propagated, followed his youthful 
heroics at the siege of Neokaisareia. 
Comparison with ‘Manganeios Prodromos’ also demonstrates that an official account 
was not Kinnamos’ sole source for the 1146 campaign.  A section accusing the 
esteemed John Axouch of cowardice is unlikely to have appeared in a public 
document, and its consistency with Kinnamos’ later comments about Axouch leading 
a failed expedition to Ancona corroborates the notion that Kinnamos had access to a 
source hostile towards Axouch.1216  A snippet about Manuel’s uncle, the 
sebastokrator Isaac, intending to usurp the imperial throne had no place in a bulletin, 
and Kinnamos’ use of λέγεται indicates that this information derived from another 
source.1217  Finally, there are details about problems in the camp which were not 
pertinent to disclose to the public.  When many units refused to obey orders, Manuel 
issued commands to the unruly regiments.  He punished those who remained defiant 
but others still paid little attention to his directives.1218  This honest appraisal echoes 
Choniates’ comments about discontent in the army of John II, and made the emperor 
appear weak.  Such controversial details suggest that the two historians supplemented 
the official record with details provided by other sources, presumably eyewitnesses 
and retired soldiers.  
The Campaign against the Hungarians and Serbs, 1150-11511219 
Manuel’s expedition against Serbian rebels and their Hungarian allies in 1150 offered 
a number of episodes ripe for exploitation in encomia and historiography.  According 
                                                 
1216 Ibid: 51, 101-102.  See also Magdalino (1987); Maisano (1998). 
1217 Kinnamos: 53.  For this Isaac see Magdalino (1993a): 193-195. 
1218 Kinnamos: 54, 56-57. 
1219 See Appendix VI for discussion of visual depiction of events of this campaign, supporting the 
notion that certain episodes featured in an imperial bulletin.  
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to Kinnamos, when Manuel reached the Danube he found that the imperial fleet had 
yet to arrive.  Rather than wait, Manuel fearlessly led the crossing on a small wooden 
skiff, towing his horse by its bridle.1220  This feat is also the subject of much praise by 
‘Manganeios Prodromos’, who favourably compares Manuel’s feat to that of Xerxes 
in bridging the Hellespont.  ‘Manganeios’ corroborates the statements of Kinnamos, 
noting how Manuel took to a small craft while dragging horses on either side – ‘just 
like a common soldier’.1221 
The primary focus of accounts is again Manuel’s military prowess.  Kinnamos relates 
how Manuel, with only his relatives John Doukas and John Kantakouzenos for 
company, raced to the aid of certain units of his vanguard who were in distress.  
Having engaged the enemy, Manuel reportedly (Kinnamos uses λέγεται, possibly 
indicating misgivings) floored fifteen with a single spear thrust, putting down forty in 
total.1222  The engagement progressed until Manuel fought an individual duel with the 
giant enemy commander, the grand zupan Bakchinos, which ended with Manuel 
hacking off the arm (or hand) of his opposite number.1223  In a panegyric written 
within two years of the campaign, ‘Manganeios Prodromos’ recalls how Manuel 
‘bravely engaged the giant’ in Serbia, risking his life for the Roman cause.1224  There 
is a suggestion in the poem – not noted in the historical record – that Manuel received 
a nick to a finger, with ‘Manganeios’ mentioning the bloodied hand of Manuel 
                                                 
1220 Kinnamos: 113-114. 
1221 σὺ δὲ µονήρους ἐπιβὰς µονοστελέχου πλοίου 
       … ἵππους ἐξ ἑκατέρωθεν ἐκ τῶν πλευρῶν τοῦ πλοίου 
       ἐφέλκων οὕτως ὡς κοινὸς ὁ θαυµαστὸς ὁπλίτης (Manganeios Prodromos: 2.126-2.140; trans. 
Jeffreys). 
1222 Kinnamos: 109-110. 
1223 Kinnamos: 111-112; Niketas Choniates, Chronike Diegesis: 93. 
1224 αὐτότατος τῷ γίγαντι γενναίως συνεπλέκου, 
       ἀνδρὶ µεγέθει καὶ χειρὶ καὶ τόλµῃ περιφήµῳ, 
       αὐτὸς προθύων ἑαυτὸν ὑπὲρ Αὐσόνων γένους, 
       καὶ µάρτυς ἐθελούσιος καὶ θῦµα χρηµατίζων (Manganeios Prodromos: 4.296-307). 
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alongside his previously bloodied sandals.1225  In a subsequent encomium 
‘Manganeios’, asking what type of crown he should craft for Manuel, decides upon 
one fashioned with blood-coloured rubies, apt given that Manuel had worn such a 
thing at Ikonion and on the mountaintop, where like David he battled Goliath.1226  
This is almost certainly a reference to the two wounds suffered by Manuel in 
engagements against the Turks and Serbs.1227   
Another aspect of the accounts of Kinnamos and Choniates corroborated by 
‘Manganeios Prodromos’ is the role of John Kantakouzenos in the tussle.1228  
Kinnamos reveals that the emperor’s nephew lost two fingers during the fierce 
fighting.1229  It seems that ‘Manganeios’ drafted a poem upon Kantakouzenos’ return 
extolling his efforts.  Contra Kinnamos, ‘Manganeios’ reports that Kantakouzenos lost 
                                                 
1225 ∆ός µοι φιλῆσαι δεξιάν, ὦ δεξιὲ στρατάρχα,  
       ἥτις ἀντηγωνίσατο πρὸς Παίονα τοσοῦτον.  
       …Ὡς εἴθε µοι καθῄµαξα τὰ χείλη τῇ χειρί σου 
       ἔτι σταζούσῃ πάνσεπτον ὑπὲρ Αὐσόνων αἷµα, 
       ἥτις Αὐσόνων µαχητῶν ἀνέπαυσε τὰς χεῖρας, 
       ἥτις ζηλοῦσα τοὺς ταρσοὺς τοὺς ἐρυθροπεδίλους, 
       καὶ τοὺς δακτύλους ἔδειξεν αἱµοβαφεῖς ἐν µάχαις, 
       µονονουχὶ κραυγάζουσα τοῖς ἀριστεύµασί σου, 
       τὸ τὸν ἐρυθροδάκτυλον ὑποδεδύσθαι πρέπειν 
       καὶ πέδιλον κοκκοβαφὲς καὶ πορφυρῶδες ἄνθος (ibid: 4.366-379). 
1226 ποῖον σοι πλέξω στέφανον καὶ προσαρµόσαιµί σοι; 
       Ἐκ λυχνιτῶν αἱµοειδῶν, ὁποῖον σοι καὶ πάλαι; 
       Ναὶ µέντοι, προσαρµόζοντα καὶ τοῦτον ἐφευρίσκω· 
       πολλάκις ἀνεδήσω γὰρ καὶ στέφανον τοιοῦτον, 
       ἐν Ἰκονίῳ πρότερον, εἶτ᾿ αὖθις ἐν γηλόφῳ 
       ὅτε ∆αυὶδ τῷ Γολιὰθ ἐκείνῳ συνεπλάκης, 
       ἀγχεµαχῶν οὐ σφενδονῶν, ῥώµῃ χειρῶν καὶ τόλµῃ (ibid: 7.584-591).   
The biblical motif of Manuel besting Goliath is repeated in another composition: 
       τὸν ὑψηλὸν γὰρ Γολιάθ, τὸν πρὶν µεγαλαυχοῦντα, 
       ὁ βασιλεύς σου σήµερον κατέρραξε, καθεῖλε, 
       κἂν φιλανθρωπευσάµενος ἀφῆκεν ἐν τοῖς ζῶσιν (ibid: 49.315-317). 
1227 In a piece written to commemorate the campaign of 1150, ‘Manganeios’ refers to the famous 
mountain of Serbia which felt the wrath of Manuel (ibid: 27.8-11).  Mentions of hills and mountains in 
another contemporary poem about the battle confirms that it took place on high ground (ibid: 49.304-
308, 320-321). 
1228 For this individual, who perished at the Battle of Myriokephalon in 1176, see Nicol (1968): 4. 
1229 Kinnamos: 110-112; Niketas Choniates, Chronike Diegesis: 92. 
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just one finger on his left hand;1230 ‘Manganeios’ however contradicts himself in a 
later work, lamenting that an ‘Illyrian’ knife removed ‘the fingers’ from 
Kantakouzenos’ left hand.1231  ‘Manganeios’ alone mentions a sword cut to the thigh 
Kantakouzenos sustained during the fighting, again holding the recipient up 
favourably against Philip of Macedon, whose leg wound seemed trifling by 
comparison.1232  Another facet of the engagement not featured in the historical texts 
but stressed by ‘Manganeios’ is that Kantakouzenos was equipped with only a blunt 
instrument during the fighting – a ῥόπαλον or κορύνην, which can mean mace, though 
is more likely to refer to a club or staff, given that Kantakouzenos is said to have 
attacked the enemy ‘without weapons’ and ‘unarmed’.1233  Possibly Kinnamos 
overlooked additional aspects of Kantakouzenos’ endeavours – his thigh wound and 
lack of a weapon – so as not to detract from the heroics of Manuel during the same 
episode. 
That the same moments of the expedition – Manuel’s crossing of the Sava, his routing 
of enemy contingents and him besting Bakchinos in single combat – are stressed by 
Kinnamos and ‘Manganeios’ all but confirms that the pair followed the same official 
tradition, almost certainly originating in a campaign bulletin.  The dispatch also drew 
attention to the exploits of Manuel’s niece’s husband, John Kantakouzenos, who 
                                                 
1230 Ἔκτεινε χεῖρα µοι λαιάν, τὴν ἐκτοµήν µοι δεῖξον· 
       ἀσπάζοµαι τὴν ἐν αὐτῇ τραυµατισθεῖσαν χεῖρα,  
       γεραίρω καὶ τὸν δάκτυλον ἐκεῖνον τὸν τµηθέντα (Manganeios Prodromos: 49.212-216).  
‘Manganeios’ notes also that he was not alone among the rhetors moved to write about Kantakouzenos’ 
sufferings in battle. 
1231 Ἰλλυρικὴ µάχαιρα κατέκοπτέ µε, 
       καὶ χεῖρα λαιὰν ἐστέρει τῶν δακτύλων, 
       καὶ µικρὸν ἐσπάραττεν ὀστέου µέχρι (ibid: 99.12-16; trans. Jeffreys). 
1232 Ibid: 49.259-281. 
1233 Ἐγώ σου καὶ τὸ ῥόπαλον τιµῶ καὶ µεγαλύνω (ibid: 49.220-225); ἄοπλος εἰσέβαλλε τοῖς 
ὡπλισµένοις, µόνην κορύνην ἀντὶ τοῦ ξίφους ἔχων (ibid: 97.21-22); πρὸς οὐ µετρητοὺς γυµνοµαχῶν 
∆αλµάτας (ibid: 99.1-5).  This contrasts somewhat with the account of Kinnamos, who records 
Kantakouzenos attempting to spear Bakchinos. 
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served as Saul to Manuel’s David, killing thousands while his master slaughtered tens 
of thousands.1234  It is important to note however that Kantakouzenos’ feats are only 
extolled by ‘Manganeios’ in poems specifically dedicated to Kantakouzenos or his 
wife.  As is consistent with his general presentation, Kinnamos is ultimately 
concerned with ensuring Manuel was the main hero and at no risk of being upstaged.   
Further Military Actions, c.1147-1180 
The historical record of Manuel’s reign accords with the encomia in other instances.  
Two contemporary poems of ‘Manganeios Prodromos’ present the Second Crusade as 
a great threat to Constantinople and see the flash flood which depleted the host of 
King Conrad III as divine justice.1235  This sentiment is to an extent expressed by 
Choniates, though he subverts the official tradition favourable to Manuel and adopts a 
stance more sympathetic to Conrad.1236  Inevitably, it is Kinnamos who adheres 
closest to ‘Manganeios’ and the encomiastic material.1237  Jason Roche feels that 
Kinnamos’ presentation reflects his direct use of encomia, though Michael and 
Elizabeth Jeffreys suspect that ‘the imperial equivalent of press releases were 
available to all three writers’.1238  The same may also be true of Manuel’s recapture of 
Kerkyra from the Sicilians in 1149.  As Kinnamos laments the passing of the 
emperor’s brother-in-law Stephen Kontostephanos,1239 both Theodore Prodromos and 
‘Manganeios Prodromos’ bemoan the martyr’s death of the megas doux Stephen in a 
                                                 
1234 Οὕτως αὐτὸς ὡς ὁ Σαοὺλ ἀπέκτεινας χιλίους, 
       ὁ δὲ κρατῶν ὡς ὁ ∆αυὶδ κατέβαλε µυρίους (ibid: 49.311-312). 
1235 Ibid: 20, 24. 
1236 Niketas Choniates, Chronike Diegesis: 60-71. 
1237 Kinnamos: 67-89.  See Roche (2008a): esp. 57-93. 
1238 E. & M. Jeffreys (2001): esp. 103 n.7. 
1239 Kinnamos: 96-98; trans. 79.  Kinnamos relates that Kontostephanos selflessly ordered his officers 
to keep the news of his mortal injury from the army, lest they lose heart at a pivotal stage of the siege.  
He commends the ‘expressions of a spirit manly and wholly warlike and patriotic’. 
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series of poems.1240  According to Kinnamos, when Manuel came to prosecute the 
siege, he had to be restrained from personally leading the assault, though later took up 
a shield to deflect enemy projectiles.1241  Manuel’s heroic conduct is also attested by 
Theodore Prodromos in a composition to mark the emperor’s triumphant return.1242  
Again, Choniates is not as complimentary.  In his account Manuel plays the role of 
encouraging commander, while it is a heroic soldier, Poupakes, who upstages the 
emperor.  Choniates further undermines Manuel’s achievement by mentioning discord 
between the Byzantines and their Venetian allies, noting how they mocked Manuel by 
placing an Ethiopian on the imperial ship at Euboia and acclaiming him emperor.1243  
While the two parties eventually agreed an amnesty, it seems improbable that Manuel 
would let this humiliation be known in the public bulletin he is reported to have sent 
to Constantinople prior to his eventual return from campaign.1244 
While there is a lack of surviving encomia for the period 1160-1173,1245 it would 
appear that historians continued to utilize official material for events.  We have 
speculated that this was the case for Choniates’ account of the Hungarian campaign of 
1167.1246  Andrew Stone also observes striking similarities between Kinnamos’ 
account of Manuel’s involvement in the siege of Zeugminon in 1165 and comments 
                                                 
1240 Theodore Prodromos: XLVIII-LI;  Manganeios Prodromos: 60.67, 60.74, 60.207. 
1241 Kinnamos: 99-101. 
1242 Theodore Prodromos: XXX.47-119.  Poems XXXI-XXXIII are hymns composed over the course 
of 1149-1150 praising the same campaign.  ‘Manganeios Prodromos’ does not disclose much about this 
action.  The most substantial reference in his corpus is that to Manuel’s siege of a fortress which ‘rose 
beyond the clouds’, noting the use of ‘strange…ladders supported on watery foundations’ (4.264-295; 
trans. Jeffreys).  This is almost certainly a reference to a device described by Choniates.  Manuel is said 
to have set up a huge wooden scaling ladder in the shape of a tower, propped up by his ships.  It later 
collapsed, sending many men to their deaths.  ‘Manganeios’ conveniently omits this tragic incident 
(Niketas Choniates, Chronike Diegesis: 82-85). 
1243 Ibid: 77.13-88.48. 
1244 Ibid: 90.2-91.8. 
1245 For discussion see Magdalino (1993a): 454-456. 
1246 See above, 139-147.  
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made by Eustathios of Thessaloniki in a later oration.1247  Kinnamos speaks of his 
‘astonishment at many things done at this siege’, adding: ‘I would scarcely believe 
those who reported the emperor’s daring if I had not been present as a witness of what 
happened’. 1248  Yet the key events involving Manuel are strikingly formulaic; battling 
on through a leg injury, and being dissuaded by his officers from scaling a siege 
tower.  This tale is not dissimilar to that recorded in Kinnamos’ earlier account of the 
siege of Kerkyra, which might suggest the continuation of the historian’s use of 
official material, supplementing his own autopsy.  That Kinnamos uses λέγεται when 
describing how Manuel protected a Byzantine archer with his shield lends further 
credence to this notion.1249   
Though Kinnamos’ work ends c.1175, thereafter Choniates continues, in principle, to 
follow the official line in his accounts of Manuel’s campaigns.  The Lenten orations 
of Eustathios of Thessaloniki and Euthymios Malakes, delivered in 1176, dwell on 
Manuel’s rebuilding of the dilapidated fortresses of Dorylaion and Soublaion in 
Phrygia, presenting Manuel as planner, warden and even labourer.1250  It is suggested 
that Choniates’ reporting of Manuel’s refortification programme, replete with 
rhetorical language and similar praise, may well have derived from such panegyrical 
                                                 
1247 Stone (2001): 231-233.  Eustathios of Thessaloniki, Orations: 265-267; also 211-212, 271. 
1248 ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα µὲν τὼν εἰς ἐκείνην τετελεσµένων θαυµάζειν ἔχω τὴν πολιορκίαν, τήν γε µὴν τοῦ 
βασιλέως τόλµαν, εἰ µὴ παρὼν ἐτύγχανον τῇδε τῶν πραττοµένων ἀυτόπτης γινόµενος, σχολῇ ἂν 
ἀφηγουµένοις ἐπίστευσα (Kinnamos: 241.15-18; trans. 181-182). 
1249 Kinnamos: 245.2-5.  Despite this apparently being an eyewitness account, Kinnamos also appears 
to resort to literary borrowing, with one incident involving a woman heckling Byzantine troops during 
the siege highly reminiscent of a scene in Leo the Deacon’s account of the siege of Chandax in 960 
(Leo the Deacon: 24.17-25.8; Kinnamos: 246.2-10).  For this observation see Ljubarskij (2000a): 169 
n.20.   
1250 Eustathios of Thessaloniki, Orations: 17-45, esp. 41-42; Euthymios Malakes: 527-535.  A verse 
poem about Manuel’s rebuilding of Dorylaion similarly affords the emperor the role of placing the first 
stone and encouraging his men to follow suit (Anonymous Poem on the Refortification of Dorylaion: 
ll.46-53).  For discussion of the poem and possible authorship see Spingou (2011). 
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literature or a common bulletin source.1251  In particular, Choniates’ accounts of major 
campaigns conducted by Manuel in 1175 and 1179 bear close witness to the 
encomiastic tradition.  The incident of Manuel discarding a peach and riding out to 
meet a Turkish attack in 1175 is described by both Malakes and Choniates.1252  
Konstantinos Bones and Magdalino argue that the writers were employing a common 
source, most probably a bulletin.1253  An oration delivered by Eustathios of 
Thessaloniki in 1180 refers to a forced march where the emperor joined his men in 
going without food or rest, almost certainly the same march to relieve Claudiopolis 
described by Choniates.1254   
The Battle of Myriokephalon, 1176 
The record of the defeat of Manuel’s army at Myriokephalon represents an interesting 
case.1255  Choniates offers the only substantial account of the battle, with parts 
suggestive of the use of official material.1256  We are told that the emperor led a 
charge against the enemy and managed to slip through, because he was ‘protected by 
                                                 
1251 Niketas Choniates, Chronike Diegesis: 150, 176-177.  For the parallels see Wirth (1962); Stone 
(2001): 242-243; idem (2003). 
1252 Niketas Choniates, Chronike Diegesis: 177. 
1253 Bones (1941-1948): 716.  Magdalino (1993a): 457-458 notes that the two writers connect the 
‘peach’ incident with different aspects of the rebuilding of Dorylaion and Soublaion, which raises 
questions about how Choniates learned of this ‘official information’.  If distorted, it would corroborate 
our suggestions about the official record of John II Komnenos’ reign, though one would expect 
Choniates to be better informed about a more contemporary event.  Possibly he just linked it with the 
refortification of Dorylaion for narrative purposes, as is suggested by Simpson (2004): 214-215.  Stone 
(2003): 197-199 plausibly argues that Choniates merely conflated the rebuilding of Dorylaion and 
Soublaion. 
1254 Eustathios of Thessaloniki, Orations: 184.78-89; Niketas Choniates, Chronike Diegesis: 197-198.  
For recognition of the link and the date see Magdalino (1993a): 99 & n.299; Stone (2001): 248-250.  
Wirth (1957) also discusses the Claudiopolis campaign, suggesting that Choniates was dubiously 
informed about these events. 
1255 For discussion of the battle see Chalandon (1912): 460-466, 498-518; Wirth (1957); Lilie (1977); 
Hendy (1985): 146-154; Haldon (2001): 139-144; Birkenmeier (2002): 131-133. 
1256 Simpson (2004: 213-214) proposes that Choniates ‘relied heavily’ on official bulletins and 
newsletters for his account of the battle. 
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God who long ago had screened David’s head on the day of battle’.1257  Later in the 
battle, the emperor is reported to have defeated several Turks who tried to capture 
him, fighting his way through another eager cluster of the enemy.1258  Other sources 
corroborate that Manuel attempted to salvage his reputation by focusing on his own 
heroic efforts in official reports.  Writing within three years of the disaster at 
Myriokephalon, the Cypriot monk, Neophytos the Recluse, dwells on Manuel’s heroic 
behaviour in the battle.  Distraught at seeing his men cut down, Manuel charged at the 
Turks, protected throughout by God.  As a result, the emperor was able to slay many 
and escape unscathed.  Intriguingly, comparison is again made with the warrior ruler 
David and his imperiousness in battle.1259  Catia Galatariotou asserts that this 
information ‘almost certainly originated in the official (and heavily distorted) version 
of events’, which reached Cyprus through an imperial bulletin.1260  As presented here, 
the defeat at Myriokephalon is transformed into something of a personal victory for 
the emperor.  That this was the intent of official accounts of the battle is supported by 
Eustathios of Thessaloniki, whose oration of 1180 describes how Manuel heroically 
drove off countless waves of Turks at an unspecified battle, which various 
commentators have pinpointed as that fought near Myriokephalon.1261  While 
manuscripts break off prior to his account of the campaign, Kinnamos foreshadows 
the expedition earlier in his history.  Indeed, it seems all but certain that Kinnamos 
was a survivor of the battle.  At one point he speaks of finding Manuel’s deeds 
                                                 
1257 πλὴν καὶ οὕτω παρὰ δόξαν τὰς τῶν βαρβάρων διέδρα λαβάς, ὑπὸ θεοῦ φρουρηθεὶς τοῦ καὶ ἐπὶ 
κεφαλὴν πάλαι ∆ανὶδ ἐν ἡµέρᾳ πολέµου ἐπισκιάζοντος, ὡς αὐτός φησιν ὁ φιλόψαλµος (Niketas 
Choniates, Chronike Diegesis: 182.52-183.84; trans. 103). 
1258 Ibid: 184.9-185.51. 
1259 Ἐδίδαξε γὰρ αὐτοῦ ὁ Θεὸς κατὰ τὸν θεῖον ∆αβὶδ χεῖρας εἰς πόλεµον καὶ ὑπερασπισµὸν σωτηρίας 
τούτῳ ἐβράβευσε καὶ ἡ δεξιὰ αὐτοῦ τοῦ βασιλέως ἀντελάβετο καὶ ἔθετο ὡς τόξον χαλκοῦν τοὺς 
βραχίονας καὶ ἀσθενεῖς τοὺς ἀντιπάλους, ἀπέδειξε καὶ ἰσχυρῶς καὶ γενναίως µεταξὺ τῶν τουρκικῶν 
παρατάξεων συνεστρέφετο (Neophytos the Recluse: 45-46; trans. Galatariotou 1991: 214).   
1260 Galatariotou (1991): 206, 213-215. 
1261 Eustathios of Thessaloniki, Orations: 182-183.  See Kazhdan (1984c): 126; Magdalino (1993a: 
458, 464); Stone (2001): 251. 
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unbelievable; that is, until he witnessed them first hand. ‘I was by chance surrounded 
by the foe and observed from close at hand the emperor resisting entire Turkish 
regiments.  But the history will describe this at the right moment’.1262  Kinnamos can 
only be referring to the Battle of Myriokephalon.  He appears to do so again whilst 
describing the visit of Sultan Kilij Arslan II to Constantinople in 1161-1162.  
Kinnamos notes that years later the Roman army ‘came near a great disaster, save that 
in warfare the emperor was there seen to surpass the bounds of human excellence’.1263  
These thoughts confirm that Kinnamos’ lost account of the battle would have 
followed a similar path of presenting the emperor as a courageous warrior, a shining 
light in the defeat.1264 
These conclusions are supported by descriptions of the battle in letters drafted for 
foreign rulers.  Shortly after the battle, Manuel sent ambassadors to King Henry II of 
England with a written account, preserved by the contemporary English chronicler, 
Roger of Howden.  Manuel quickly offers excuses, revealing that dysentery ravaged 
                                                 
1262 ἕως εἰς ὄψιν ἦλθέ µοι τὰ τοῦ πράγµατος ἐν µέσοις καὶ αὐτῷ πολεµίοις οὕτω τυχὸν περιειληµµένῳ 
κἀκ τοῦ σχεδὸν ὁρῶντι τὸν αὐτοκράτορα τοῦτον φάλαγξιν ὅλαις ἀντικαθιστάµενον Περσικαῖς.  ἀλλὰ 
ταῦτα µὲν κατὰ καιρὸν ἡ ἱστορία διηγήσεται, τὸ δὲ νῦν τῶν προτεθέντων ἐχώµεθα (Kinnamos: 192.12-
22; trans. 147, with amendments). 
1263 τύχῃ τέ τινι δυσχωρίαις ἐµπεσὸν τὸ στρατιωτικὸν τῶν ἐπὶ δόξης τε ἀποβεβλήκει πολλοὺς καὶ 
µεγάλου ἐγγὺς ἦλθε κακοῦ, εἰ µὴ βασιλεὺς ἐνταῦθα ἀνθρωπίνης ὅρον ἀρετῆς τὰ πολέµια παρελθὼν 
ὤφθη (ibid: 207.2-8; trans. 157). 
1264 Kinnamos’ account of the preliminary stages of the campaign makes no hint of the ‘Crusade’ 
rhetoric which pervaded the encomia of Malakes and Eustathios from the spring of 1176, when 
optimism was great.  The absence of this aspect from favourable accounts suggests it was quietly 
suppressed, understandable given that the ideology of ‘holy war’ could not be reconciled with 
Manuel’s subsequent failure.  Indeed, the notion is positively undermined by Choniates, who relates the 
dream of a man named Mauropoulos, of which Manuel was apparently informed prior to the campaign.  
In the dream, the man heard a voice from an icon of the Virgin asking the military saints George and 
Theodore to aid Manuel, but neither was willing to do so (Niketas Choniates, Chronike Diegesis: 190-
191).   That the tale is extremely reminiscent of a dream relating to the campaign of John I Tzimiskes 
in 971 suggests the episode may have been adapted by Choniates in order to denigrate Manuel.  For 
relevant discussion of the ‘holy war’ aspect of Manuel’s campaigns in this period see Chalandon 
(1912): 503-506; Lilie (1977); Magdalino (1993a): 463; Stone (2001): 244-246, 257-258; idem (2003): 
esp. 185-186. 
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his army, ‘greatly weakening’ his forces prior to the battle.1265  Having been set upon 
by many Turks, Manuel was unable to aid his troops as the siege train extended for 
ten miles due to the narrow passage.  While many Byzantine troops were lost in the 
chaos, Manuel, ‘hedged in on every side…inflicting wounds and receiving wounds in 
turn’, persevered until ‘by the benign aid of God we reached the open ground’.1266  
Manuel rallied his guard and fought to the main body of the army.  At this point, Kilij 
Arslan, seeing that Manuel was not broken by the defeat, apparently sued for peace, 
promising to consent to every demand of the emperor.  Manuel agreed a treaty with 
the sultan, ‘confirmed by oath beneath our standards, and granting to him our 
peace’.1267  This last section is very similar to that which apparently concluded 
Manuel’s letter to Holy Roman Emperor Friedrich Barbarossa, parts of which are 
preserved in the thirteenth-century chronicle, the Annales Stadenses.  After offering 
the obligatory introductions to the letter, the chronicler skips to relate the end: ‘The 
sultan…sent envoys requesting peace, confirmed under the imperial banner, and 
swore an oath to serve us’.1268  The authenticity of this letter is supported by its 
                                                 
1265 “Amplius autem dum adhuc propriam regionem peragraret, antequam barbarorum alius adversus 
nos militaret in bellis adversarius, aegritudo difficillima, fluxus ventris, invasit nos, qui diffusus per 
agmina imperii nostri pertransibat, depopulando et interimendo multos, omni pugnatore gravior.  Et hoc 
malum invalescens maxime nos contrivit”. 
1266 “At vero imperium nostrum tot et tantis consertum barbaris, saucians sauciatumque, adeo ut non 
modicam in eos moveret perturbationem, obstupentes perseverantiam ipsius, et non remittebatur, bene 
juvante Deo campum obtinuit”. 
1267 “...suscepit Soltani deprecationem, et foedera et juramenta peracta sub vexillis nostris, et pacem 
suam ei dedit” (Roger of Howden: II, 102-104; trans. 237-240).  Dölger, Regesten: II, no. 1524. 
1268 Eodem tempore Manuel Graecorum imperator, bellum contra soldanum habuit, de quo imperatori 
scripsit, salutatione sic posita: Manuel in Christo Deo fidelis imperator, porphirogenitus, divinitus 
coronatus, regnator, potens, excelsus et semper augustus et Romanorum moderator magnificus, 
nobilissimo et gloriosissimo regi Alemanniae et imperatori et dilecto fratri, imperii nostri salutem et 
fraterni amoris affectum.  Et in fine epistolae sic: Sultanus imperio nostro se dedit et missis legatis 
misericordiam postulavit, fecitque imperio nostro ominium, et iuramento pollicitus est servire nobis 
contra omnem hominem cum exercitu suo, ita ut sit amicorum nostrorum amicus et inimicorum 
inimicus.  Hanc epistolam imperator suscepit scriptam aureis litteris (Annales Stadenses: s.a. 1179, 
349.11-35).  The correspondence between Manuel and Barbarossa is discussed by Kresten (1992-
1993): esp. 107-110. 
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parallels with the letter to Henry, confirming that in correspondence with foreign 
rulers Manuel indicated that it was the sultan, and not he, who sued for peace. 
Lilie saw Manuel’s correspondence with Henry as an attempt to mitigate the loss, 
possibly even to turn it into a victory.1269  There are parallels between this letter and 
the accounts of Neophytos the Recluse and Eustathios of Thessaloniki, as well as 
parts of Choniates.  All concur that Manuel, with the aid of God, fought heroically to 
extract himself from danger.  Both Choniates and the letter refer to wounds suffered 
by Manuel during the fighting, as well as the dysentery which plagued the imperial 
army.  Consequently, Riccardo Maisano suspects that Choniates consulted the letter 
sent to Henry, or at least a document like it.1270  Choniates himself concludes his 
account with mention of the emperor sending messengers to relay the news to 
Constantinople.  It is said that after describing the carnage, Manuel ‘extolled the 
treatises made with the sultan, boasting that these had been concluded beneath his 
own banner’.1271  This account corresponds with the letters sent to Henry and 
Barbarossa, wherein Manuel purports that it was the sultan who sued for peace under 
Manuel’s terms.  Given that he does not present Manuel as being able to impose his 
demands, Choniates evidently did not make extensive use of this particular version of 
events.1272  Magdalino is not convinced however that Manuel’s dispatch represented 
the only official account of the Battle of Myriokephalon.1273  Choniates discloses that 
                                                 
1269 Lilie (1977): 264, 267. 
1270 Maisano (1994a): 403. 
1271 προεκπέµψας δ’ ἀγγέλους τὰ συµβεβηκότα ταῦτα τοῖς Κωνσταντινουπολίταις παρίστα, νῦν µὲν 
ταὐτοπαθῆ πως ἑαυτὸν Ῥωµανῷ τῷ ∆ιογένει κατονοµάζων, ἐπεὶ καὶ οὗτος ὁ βασιλεὺς κατὰ τῶν 
Τούρκων ἐξενεγκών ποτε πόλεµον τό τε πολὺ τῆς στρατιᾶς ἀπεβάλετο καὶ αὐτὸς συλληφθεὶς ἀπήχθη 
αἰχµάλωτος, νῦν δὲ τὰς µετὰ τοῦ σουλτὰν σπονδὰς ὑπεξ αίρων καὶ κάτωθεν τῆς ἑαυτοῦ σηµαίας 
µεγαλορρηµονῶν αὐτὰς περατῶσαι, ἀνέµῳ ἀναπεπταµένης καὶ πρὸς τὸ τῶν ἀντιπάλων ἀφορώσης 
µέτωπον ὡς φόβον ἐµπίπτειν καὶ τρόµον αὐτοῖς (Niketas Choniates, Chronike Diegesis: 191.26-33; 
trans. 108). 
1272 Niketas Choniates, Chronike Diegesis: 189-190. 
1273 Magdalino (1993a): 458-459. 
254 
in the same report the emperor compared his plight to that of Romanos Diogenes, who 
had also suffered a heavy defeat to the Turks.  Manuel does not mention Romanos in 
his letter to Henry, though the reference may have been lost on the English king.  We 
cannot rule out that Choniates himself drew the comparison, but an earlier reference 
in encomia to Manuel as a ‘new Diogenes’ suggests that the emperor may not have 
objected to being equated with such an esteemed warrior.1274  Possibly Manuel was 
seeking to soften the blow by prompting people to recall a more catastrophic 
defeat.1275  This comparison may have been deemed more important in relation to the 
populace of Constantinople than Henry II or even the people of Cyprus.  Therefore, 
while we cannot speak of a single official account of the Battle of Myriokephalon, it 
is evident that the official line involved Manuel extricating himself from blame and 
stressing his own personal heroics, consistent with his presentation in records of 
earlier battles. 
It seems Niketas Choniates did not make extensive use of the official record of the 
battle.  He reveals that a Turkish peace embassy came to Manuel before any fighting, 
promising to acquiesce to the emperor’s wishes.  Manuel was entreated by his senior 
soldiers to welcome this agreement, but their wise guidance was overlooked.  When 
Kilij Arslan perceived that Manuel was intent on war, he began occupying the defiles 
at Tzivritze, waiting for the Roman army to pass through after leaving 
Myriokephalon.  Manuel, however, failed to take due precaution, which included 
sending men ahead to disperse the enemy.  Worst of all, he ignored warnings and 
                                                 
1274 καὶ ταῖς χερσὶ ταῖς κραταιαῖς αὐτὸς ἐµεγαλούργεις,  
       ὡς πρὶν ἐκεῖνος ὁ Φωκᾶς, ὡς ∆ιογένης νέος (Manganeios Prodromos: 25.87-88).  The Timarion, 
produced in the mid-twelfth century, depicts the ‘famous’ Romanos Diogenes as a tragic figure 
lamenting his misfortune (Timarion: ll.549-556). 
1275 Modern commentators have observed similarities between the two campaigns and battles – see 
Vryonis (2005). 
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pushed on through the narrow defile, leading his army into an ambush.1276  By 
contrast, both Neophytos and Manuel’s letter to Henry assert that the enemy suddenly 
fell upon the imperial army, the indication being that Manuel could do little about it.  
Given that Byzantine instructional manuals encourage reconnaissance to avoid falling 
prey to ambushes in defiles, one suspects that Choniates was not alone in being 
sceptical of the official rhetoric.1277  William of Tyre, writing within a decade of the 
battle, notes that the loss was a consequence of the army ‘incautiously trusting 
themselves headlong to dangerous narrow passes already seized by the enemy’.  Still, 
William attributes this error to the ‘imprudence of the imperial officers’ rather than to 
Manuel, which is consistent with his generally sympathetic portrayal of the 
emperor.1278  The Cardinal Boso, who wrote his Life of Pope Alexander III c.1180, 
supports the testimony of Choniates.  According to this account, the sultan beseeched 
Manuel to leave in peace, offering him gifts and even volunteering his services 
whenever the emperor required them.  Manuel however rejected this offer, stating he 
would only commit to peace if given Ikonion.  When Manuel came to enter the 
narrow pass, he did so with ‘too little forethought, rather carelessly and rashly’.  After 
the mass slaughter of Byzantine soldiers, the sultan took pity on Manuel and allowed 
him to go free with gifts, including a captured cross.1279  The similarities with 
                                                 
1276 Niketas Choniates, Chronike Diegesis: 179.40-180.80. 
1277 See, for example, De Re Militari: §§7; 14; 15; 18; 19; 20. 
1278 Dicitur autem suorum ducum, qui preibant agmina, magis inprudentia quam hostium viribus id 
accidisse.  Nam cum patentes ampleque vie ad producendas acies et sarcinarum moles commodius 
trahendas et impedimentorum omne genus subvehendum, quod et numerum excedere dicebatur et 
mensuram, non deessent, incaute nimis in periculosas locorum angustias precipites se dederunt, ubi nec 
hostibus, qui loca eadem iam occupaverant, dabatur resistere nec referendi vices copia ministrabatur 
(William of Tyre: II, 976.1-977.32; trans. II, 414-415).  Lilie (1977: 266) maintains that William was 
well-informed but still considers his report to be highly contradictory. 
1279 Liber Pontificalis: 435-436; part. trans. 100-101.  The Norman monk Robert of Torigny, who also 
wrote his chronicle within a few years of the battle, suggests that the cross was not reclaimed until the 
emperor’s campaign against the Turkish cities on the Maeander in 1178.  Robert refers to the sultan of 
Ikonion as having been successful the previous year, though since his dating is suspect here it is 
apparent that Robert must be referring to the events of 1176.  That the campaign is presented as one of 
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Choniates’ account are numerous.  Hans Kap-Herr, followed by Ferdinand 
Chalandon, postulated that Boso and Choniates employed the same written source.1280  
The learned Boso was clearly well-informed,1281 though his main source could not 
have been an official correspondence sent from Constantinople.1282  A western 
European involved in the expedition at a high level may have served as his informant, 
though given the favourable presentation of Kilij Arslan one might postulate that 
Boso’s version of events reflected that which a delegation from the sultan brought to 
Friedrich Barbarossa, testimony which, the Annales Stadenses confirms, ‘reported the 
opposite’ to the letter Manuel composed for Barbarossa.1283  It is implausible to think 
that Choniates had access to the exact same source; more likely, this sort of 
information was widely distributed, an ‘unofficial’ narrative to counter the distorted 
version of events propagated by the imperial court.1284 
                                                                                                                                            
retribution, and the sultan is even said to have vacated Ikonion in his retreat, suggests that this 
information originated in an imperial letter to Normandy in which Manuel stressed that the setback at 
Myriokephalon had been avenged: Manuel imperator Constantinopolitanus vindicavit se hoc anno de 
Solimano Iconii, qui anno superiori illum fugaverat, et multos de militibus suis ceperat, insuper et 
crucem dominicam ei abstulerat.  Manuel enim imperator fugavit eum, et multos de militibus eius cepit, 
et ipse Solimanus urbem Iconii vacuam reliquit (Robert of Torigny: s.a. 1179 [editor alters to 1178], 
527.55-58).  For Manuel’s campaign of 1178, see Stone (1997).   
1280 Kap-Herr (1881): 130; Chalandon (1912): xxv-xxvi, 508. 
1281 Ellis (1973): 1-39. 
1282 It has been argued that at least part of Boso’s account derived from an official letter from 
Constantinople – see Kresten (1992-1993): 79 n.58.  Manuel had written to Alexander in January 1176 
reporting his military activities of the previous year.  The emphasis appears to have been placed on the 
rebuilding of Dorylaion which, it was suggested, helped make safe the pilgrim route to Constantinople 
(Epistolae Alexandri III. Papae: no. 385).  For discussion see Stone (2003): 185. 
1283 Sed prius legationem sultani acceperat, contraria nunciantis (Annales Stadenses: s.a. 1179, 349.19-
20).  Michael the Syrian (III, 371), a contemporary of these events, records that Kilij Arslan sent tokens 
of victory to the caliph of Baghdad and the sultan of Khorosan, so it is perhaps to be expected that 
written communiqués were sent far and wide.  His account also supports the notion that the precious 
cross and other riches were plundered by Turcomans, only to be later recovered by Manuel at great 
cost.  Michael adds that it was the emperor who first brokered peace talks, with the sultan only too 
happy to negotiate (III, 370-371).  Lilie (1977: 267) maintains that Michael’s account was inaccurate 
and lacking in precise detail, though it would seem that he was informed from a Turkish perspective 
rather than a Byzantine one. 
1284 We should also mention here the report of Romuald, archbishop of Salerno, who again wrote 
within a few years of the battle.  His account is, in the main, very similar to that given by Boso, with 
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Three episodes in Choniates’ account, detrimental to Manuel, are not corroborated by 
other sources.  When Manuel discovered that the water he was about to drink was 
tainted with the blood of his own men, one man apparently commented that the 
emperor had often sipped from a bowl of Christian blood in exploiting his subjects.  
The same individual again reproached the emperor shortly after.  With Manuel 
encouraging his troops to save spilled coins, the man criticized the emperor for not 
giving the money to his men before, and urged him to retrieve the gold himself if he 
was as brave as he claimed.1285  Choniates also reports a major incident in the imperial 
camp that evening.  The emperor apparently expressed a wish to secretly flee to 
secure his own safety, abandoning his men to death.  His followers, not least 
Andronikos Kontostephanos, were dismayed by this, believing that the emperor had 
lost his mind.  An unnamed soldier shamed Manuel into staying with an impassioned 
speech: 
Are you not the one who has squeezed us into these desolate and narrow paths, 
exposing us to utter ruin, the one who has ground us as though in a mortar 
between these cliffs falling in upon us and the mountains pressing down upon us?  
Would not our crossing these rough and harsh paths be the same thing as passing 
through the valley of weeping and the mouth of Hades?  What charge can we 
bring against the barbarians for investing these narrow, rugged, and winding 
                                                                                                                                            
Manuel said to have rejected the initial overtures of the sultan though eventually forced to come to 
terms, managing to regain the captured cross through the negotiations (Romuald of Salerno: s.a. 1175 
[obviously incorrect], 442).  His additional comments - that the humiliation was God’s judgment for 
Manuel sabotaging the proposed marriage between his daughter Maria and King William II of Sicily in 
1172 - would not have been part of the original source but nevertheless provide an intriguing insight 
into how Manuel’s defeat was received in some parts of the west, and perhaps help to explain why 
Manuel’s official account did not find its way into all chronicle sources of western Europe. 
1285 Niketas Choniates, Chronike Diegesis: 185-186. 
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places and ensnaring us?  And now will you deliver us over to the enemy like 
sheep for slaughter?1286 
These episodes, inviting criticism of Manuel, have been cited as evidence for 
Choniates’ use of ‘unofficial’ information.  Herbert Hunger determined these 
revelations to derive from participants interviewed by Choniates.1287  Riccardo 
Maisano also postulates that Choniates relied on a participant for information, 
probably Andronikos Kontostephanos, whose position in the rearguard would have 
afforded him a good observation point.1288  Yet because these episodes mock 
Manuel’s famed heroic prowess, and intimate that he exploited his people and cared 
little for them, there is a suspicion that they may have been invented by Choniates for 
reasons of Kaiserkritik.  Magdalino notes that the anecdotes about drinking water and 
campaign treasure allow Choniates to express ‘indirect criticism’.1289  Jakov 
Ljubarskij has taken this further, suggesting that these parts were invented by 
Choniates for the purposes of irony or, and perhaps more significantly, censuring 
Manuel.1290  The notion is supported in the first instance by Choniates criticizing the 
emperor’s zealous taxation of his subjects elsewhere.1291  One must favour 
Ljubarskij’s idea for the simple reason that common troops were unlikely to have 
rebuked the emperor.  The unnamed men are little more than a mouthpiece for 
                                                 
1286 “οὐχὶ σύ” φησιν “ὁ διὰ τῆς ἐρήµης ταύτης καὶ στενῆς ὁδοῦ ἐκθλίψας ἡµᾶς καὶ εἰς ἀπώλειαν 
διηθήσας, ἢ µαλλον οἱονεί τινι ὅλµῳ ἐκπιέσας τοῖς συµπίπτουσι τούτοις σκοπέλοις καὶ τοῖς πεσοῦσιν 
ἀτεχνῶς ἐφ’ ἡµᾶς ὄρεσι; τί ἡµῖν καὶ τῇ κοιλάδι ταύτῃ τοῦ κλαυθµῶνος καὶ τῷ στοµίῳ τοῦ ᾅδου 
ἄντικρυς καὶ τῷ παρελθεῖν τὰς ἀνωµάλους ταύτας καὶ τραχείας τροχιάς; ἢ τί ἴδιον ἐπάγειν τοῖς 
βαρβάροις ἐπίκληµα εἴχοµεν, οἳ τοὺς χώρους τούτους τοὺς στενούς τε καὶ βιαίους καὶ σκολιοὺς 
περικαθίσαντες ἡµᾶς ἐσαγήνευσαν; καὶ νῦν ὅπως καταπροδίδως ὡς πρόβατα σφαγῆς τοῖς ἐχθροῖς;” 
(ibid: 186.79-187.18; trans. 105-106). 
1287 Hunger (1978): I, 435. 
1288 Maisano (1994a): 402-403.  See also Simpson (2004): 220-221. 
1289 Magdalino (1993a): 8-9.  Cf. Lamma (1957): 280. 
1290 Ljubarskij (2004); idem (2005): esp. 108-109. 
1291 Niketas Choniates, Chronike Diegesis: 204.79-2.  For Niketas’ critique of financial policy, 
particularly that of Manuel, see Simpson (2004): 97-104. 
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Choniates’ own opinions, enabling him to criticize the emperor indirectly.1292  
Andronikos Kontostephanos’ primary function in proceedings, just as in his previous 
appearances, is to upstage Manuel and serve as Choniates’ model hero.  He is not to 
be seen as an informer, but rather as a key weapon in Niketas’ Kaiserkritik. 
We have seen in the first chapter that Choniates may have invented episodes in order 
to denigrate Manuel, and there is every possibility that he continued this practice here.  
There were undeniably official accounts of the Battle of Myriokephalon in which 
Manuel’s personal contribution was stressed, and the conclusion distorted into 
something of a Byzantine victory.  Choniates appears to have followed this line to 
some extent, but he subverts the encomiastic material, suggesting that Manuel had 
been inept in his planning and cowardly in the field.  This process involved 
consultation of ‘unofficial’ sources, such as the testimony of participants, though 
invention allowed Choniates to better manipulate his account to the needs of his 
historical programme.
                                                 
1292 Simpson (2004): 98-99, 233-237.  When Manuel was initially writing under the Emperor Alexios 
III, a relative of the Komnenoi, Choniates could not be seen to openly criticize Manuel.  The final 
version of his history is more explicit in its criticism of Manuel’s policies – see ibid: 112-115, 122-133. 
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Conclusion 
The historical record of Kinnamos and Choniates for the reigns of John II Komnenos 
and Manuel I Komnenos shows a dependence on the official line offered by bulletins 
and encomia.  Possibly the material for John’s rule was truncated because he did not 
interest the historians as much as Manuel, but by their own admission they were better 
informed about military operations conducted under Manuel’s watch.  Greater access 
to participants may have been one reason for this, though comparison with encomia 
suggests that Kinnamos and Choniates derived much of their information from official 
records of Manuel’s campaigns.  While direct use of encomia is possible, the 
concurrences are not thought to be a consequence of this.  Panegyrists such as 
‘Manganeios Prodromos’ occasionally mention events, such as naval victories over 
Sicily, otherwise overlooked by historians.1293  Due to differences in approach, 
Michael Jeffreys, following Peter Wirth, believes it ‘safer to assume’ that the 
historians and encomiasts were using a common source – reports issued by the army.  
While a panegyrist like ‘Manganeios Prodromos’ latched upon these immediately, it 
is thought that Kinnamos probably consulted ‘an official dossier of reports’ decades 
after the fact.1294  Ljubarskij speculates that there may have been ‘a sort of 
Gemeingut’; that is, a collection of stories about the emperor which circulated in 
Constantinople.1295  Yet, as Paul Magdalino shows, there are discrepancies which 
contradict the idea that the encomiasts and historians were employing the exact same 
sources.  In Kinnamos’ case, it is considered that the author did not have access to an 
organized dossier, but inconsistent accounts which he struggled to reconcile.  
Magdalino concludes that ‘neither the encomiasts nor the historians inspire much 
                                                 
1293 Magdalino (1993a): 57 & n.107, 443-444. 
1294 Wirth (1976): 36-39; M. Jeffreys (2011): 29. 
1295 Ljubarskij (2000a): 169. 
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confidence in the existence of a coherent official record of events’.1296  Magdalino’s 
suggestion is supported by study of John’s campaigns, which demonstrates that the 
official record was distorted by the time Kinnamos and Choniates came to write their 
historical works.  The shared content across encomia and historiography can only 
have derived from official information, though the particular documents or even 
informants consulted by the writers cannot have been the same. 
As Magdalino notes, Kinnamos adheres more closely to the encomia of Manuel, 
which is to be expected given his greater admiration for the emperor.  That Kinnamos 
himself was not responsible for such embellishment is seen in a passage where he 
objects to Manuel’s bold conduct in battle, opining that it bordered on reckless.1297  
Kinnamos alludes to the court orators who boasted of Manuel’s deeds.  He initially 
found reports of the emperor alone putting thousands of armoured troops to flight 
‘unbelievable’, and confesses to being rather sceptical upon hearing Manuel’s actions 
extolled at court.  That was, of course, until Kinnamos himself witnessed the emperor 
engaging whole contingents of Turks, in what appears to be a veiled reference to the 
Battle of Myriokephalon.1298  If we are to believe that Kinnamos’ initial suspicions 
about the encomiasts at court represent something more substantial than the ‘truth’ 
                                                 
1296 Magdalino (1993a): 445-446, 477. 
1297 See below, 359-361. 
1298 ταῦτα ἐµοί γε εἰς ἀκοὴν πίπτοντα ἧττον ἀληθῆ ἐδόκει, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὰ Φωκᾶ καὶ Τζιµισκῆ ἔργα τῶν 
οὐ λίαν ἀρχαίων τούτων αὐτοκρατόρων, ἢ εἴ τινες ἄλλοι παρ’ αὐτοὺς ἐπ’ ἀνδρείᾳ ὄνοµα ἔσχον. εἶναι 
γὰρ πέρα πίστεως, ἀνδρὸς ἑνὸς ὅλας ἡττῆσθαι χιλιάδας καὶ δόρατι ἑνὶ µυριοπληθεῖς καταγωνίζεσθαι 
πανοπλίας. ὅθεν εἰ καὶ ποτε ταῖς βασιλείοις ἐπιχωριάζων αὐλαῖς τὰ τηλίκα τῶν ἔργων ἀποθειαζόντων 
ἀκήκοα τῷ βασιλεῖ, ἰλιγγιῶν τοῦ συλλόγου ἀπεπήδων. φύσει γὰρ πρὸς κολακείαν ἄξεστον ἐµπέφυκέ 
µοι τὸ ἦθος, καὶ οὐκ ἂν οὐδὲ ῥῆµα σµικρὸν ἑκὼν ἰέναι προείµην ὅτι µὴ σὺν ἀληθείᾳ καὶ στόµατι 
ἐλευθέρῳ. τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα τοῖς ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἀεὶ πρὸς τοῦ δόµου καὶ τοῖς ἐν τέλεσι 
καταχαρακτηρίζεσθαι εἴων, ἕως εἰς ὄψιν ἦλθέ µοι τὰ τοῦ πράγµατος ἐν µέσοις καὶ αὐτῷ πολεµίοις 
οὕτω τυχὸν περιειληµµένῳ κἀκ τοῦ σχεδὸν ὁρῶντι τὸν αὐτοκράτορα τοῦτον φάλαγξιν ὅλαις 
ἀντικαθιστάµενον Περσικαῖς (John Kinnamos: 192.3-22; trans. 146-147). 
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topos of historiography,1299 then his time on campaign may have moved him to 
employ official accounts and focus on the martial prowess of Manuel. 
There are sections where Choniates’ account better corresponds with the encomiastic 
material, particularly for the latter part of Manuel’s reign.  Magdalino determines 
Choniates to stray from the official line only when critical of Manuel’s conduct, but 
this notion warrants clarification.1300  We have speculated that parts containing the 
most severe criticism of Manuel may be fictitious material inserted by Choniates.  The 
historian possibly had actual sources revealing Manuel’s rashness at Myriokephalon, 
but one sides with Ljubarskij in finding the anecdotes exposing Manuel’s cowardice 
and greed suspect.  A large-scale defeat offered ripe opportunity for Choniates to 
indulge in Kaiserkritik.  By following the line of the encomiastic material, Choniates 
could subvert – even ‘destroy’1301 - the traditional image of Manuel when the occasion 
permitted. 
A final word ought to be said of the depiction of Manuel Komnenos’ military virtues 
in panegyric.  From his first appearance on the historical stage, Manuel is presented as 
a fearless warrior.  Magdalino observes that more space is devoted to domestic 
matters in orations delivered after 1173, perhaps reflecting the fact that Manuel 
campaigned less frequently after 1160.1302  Nevertheless, his martial prowess 
remained a central element in panegyric.  In an oration of 1176, Eustathios of 
Thessaloniki lingered on the emperor’s loss of blood as his chain mail rubbed against 
his skin, continuing a celebration of Manuel’s blood loss present in encomia 
                                                 
1299 Ljubarskij (2000a: 169) maintained that Kinnamos was merely pretending to take issue with the 
rhetoric at court. 
1300 Magdalino (1993a): 442-443, 457-458. 
1301 Ibid: 478-479. 
1302 Ibid: 457. 
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composed thirty years earlier.1303  Both Magdalino and Stone have observed that 
encomiasts did not necessarily write as imperial mouthpieces, and what they chose to 
include or emphasize was left to their own discretion.1304  This may be so, but these 
authors evidently drew upon common material which gave shape to an imperial 
image.  Thus, in the case of Manuel, his actions as a youth at Neokaisareia set a 
precedent for his own behaviour as well as his presentation as a fearless warrior in 
future encomia.   
The idealisation of andreia was stronger perhaps than it had been in encomia for 
Manuel’s father and grandfather.1305  Orations from the first half of Alexios’ reign do 
not dwell on his military prowess, yet it would appear that his skills in war were more 
appreciated as his rule progressed.1306  Euthymios Zigabenos’ dictionary of heresies, 
the Panoplia Dogmatike, is preceded by a prose encomium which praises, among 
other things, Alexios’ capacity for war.  The image of Alexios as a designer of novel 
siege engines, and as a reader of ancient siege manuals, accords with statements made 
by Anna Komnene about Alexios consulting the Taktika of Aelian and creating 
unique devices to assist in the siege of Nicaea in 1097.1307  Zigabenos also praises 
Alexios for his ability as a military strategist, an image of the emperor which persisted 
well into the twelfth century.1308  Absent is the motif of Alexios as a warrior, which is 
                                                 
1303 Eustathios of Thessaloniki, Orations: 44.75-91. 
1304 Magdalino (1993a): 479; Stone (2001): 256-257. 
1305 Magdalino (1993a): 448-449. 
1306 Margaret Mullett (1996b: 388-390) determines that victory imagery became more pronounced later 
in Alexios’ reign.  See also Magdalino (1993a): 419. 
1307 πολεµικῶν στρατηγηµάτων εὐβουλίαι, γνωµῶν ὑποθῆκαι, καὶ µηχανηµάτων ἐπίνοιαι, µηδὲν 
ἐλαττούµεναι πολλάκις τῶν Ἀρχιµήδους καὶ Παλλαµήδους (Euthymios Zigabenos: 20). Anna 
Komnene: XI.2.1, XV.3.6.  For further discussion see Mullett (1996b): 373-376. 
1308 Eustathios of Thessaloniki (Orations: 241.23-30) recalled Alexios as one who would overcome the 
odds by changing his strategy and resorting to hit and run tactics: καί µοι τοῦ λόγου παράδειγµα καὶ ὁ 
µακαριστὸς ἐν βασιλεῦσιν Ἀλέξιος, ὃς ἐν στρατηγίαις, εἴ που µὴ ἐπιτυχῶς αὐτῷ ἡ τοῦ πολέµου σχοίη 
ῥοπή, ὁποῖα µυρία συµπίπτει, ἀλλὰ τὴν νίκην ἑτέρως ἐξ ὑποστροφῆς λαµπροτέραν διετίθετο 
µετατάττων τὸ στράτευµα. Λέοντος καὶ τοῦτο ἀρετή, ὃς οὐκ ἄν ποτε µελετήσῃ δρασµὸν ἀνεπίστροφον, 
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not explicit until the Alexiad of Anna Komnene.  As this text was written in the mid-
twelfth century, possibly as a response to Manuel’s propaganda, there is a suspicion 
that Anna may have been influenced by contemporary martial values in presenting her 
father in this way.  Yet, as the final chapter of this thesis demonstrates, this 
presentation could not have been entirely a consequence of Anna’s design, given that 
she at times censures Alexios for such behaviour, suggesting a conflict with her 
original sources.  For Anna, Alexios was a skilled technician, a brave warrior, and a 
cunning strategist.  When we consider that many encomia from Alexios’ reign have 
been lost, it is probable that Anna’s perception of her father was ultimately not far 
removed from that which developed in the latter half of his reign. 
Further evidence of the importance Alexios placed in warrior prowess is seen in the 
Mousai, words of advice he is alleged to have left to his son John.  Alexios praises 
John’s expertise in battle, asserting that ‘when you chance to ride out armed on 
horseback, you immediately drive the Kelt into a panic’.1309  Magdalino determines 
that the emphasis on martial virtues in panegyric became more pronounced in John’s 
reign.1310  We have seen a particular focus on John’s ability as an expert in siege 
warfare, expounding upon a strand of his father’s presentation in panegyric.1311  Yet 
John’s andreia is also stressed.  His heroism in leading his troops and being wounded 
at the Battle of Beroe is the obvious example in Byzantine literature.  William of 
                                                                                                                                            
ἀλλά, τὸ θαυµασιώτατον, λόχµῃ µὲν κρυπτούσῃ περιτυχὼν ἐρρωµενέστερον ἑαυτὸν εἰς δρόµον ὑπάγει, 
φωτὶ δὲ θεαθεὶς οὐκ ἂν οὕτω ποιεῖν ἀνάσχοιτο, ἀλλὰ τοῦ βασιλικοῦ καλοῦ γίνεται. 
1309 ῥώµης ἔχεις εὖ, καὶ δι’ ἀλκήν σοι κλέος 
       καὶ πεῖρα πολλῶν καὶ µαχῶν ἐµπειρία 
       καὶ µοι κινεῖς εὖ καὶ φέρεις τὴν ἀσπίδα 
       ὤµοις παρ’ ἀµφοῖν οἷον οὐδεὶς Αὐσόνων· 
       καί που µεθ’ ὅπλων ἐξελαύνων ἱππότης 
       τὸν Κελτὸν εἰς ἔκπληξιν ὠθεῖς εὐθέως (Mousai: II.60-65; trans. Jordan & Roueché). 
1310 Magdalino (1993a): 418-420. 
1311 Dennis (1998: 108-110) makes the point that John was able to exploit improvements in the design 
and operation of stone-throwing devices made under Alexios. 
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Tyre, surely drawing on an official Byzantine tradition, describes John’s exploits at 
the siege of Shaizar, noting that ‘he roused [his troops’] valour by his example and 
fought valiantly, that he might render others more courageous for the fray’.1312  The 
attention drawn to John’s effort and endurance is entirely consistent with the image 
offered in contemporary panegyric.   
It is important to conclude that the military image of an emperor in panegyric tallied 
with the particular features of his wars or campaigns.  It was perhaps inappropriate to 
dwell on Alexios’ heroics amidst the succession of defeats he suffered in the first half 
of his reign.  As Alexios matured and took a more cautious approach, evident in his 
defeat of the Normans in 1108 not by open battle but by frustrating the enemy, he 
forged a reputation as an expert strategist.1313  John’s campaigns were dominated by 
siege warfare, which accounts for his depiction as a destroyer of fortresses in 
encomia.  His son Manuel was also a ‘destroyer of cities’,1314 and his easier victories, 
such as that won over Cilicia in 1158-1159, were praised for a lack of bloodletting.1315  
Manuel’s individual displays of daring are a recurring feature, but when these were 
not performed the panegyrists would merely find something else to exploit.  The 
admonitions of Menander show that highlighting strengths had always been a 
fundamental feature of encomia.  While the mood of heroism was strong in the twelfth 
                                                 
1312 Urgebat dominus imperator, sicut vir erat magnanimus, studio fervente propositum et propositis 
braviis adolescentium glorie cupidos ad certamina et congressus Martios accendebat animos, lorica 
quoque indutus et accinctus gladio, casside caput tectus aurea, mediis inmixtus agminibus nunc hos, 
nunc illos sermonibus hortatur congruis, nunc exemplo tanquam unus e popularibus provocat et instat 
viriliter, ut alios ad instandum reddat animosiores. Sic igitur vir egregia animositate insignis sine 
intermissione discurrens, estus belli a prima diei hora usque ad novissimam sustinens nichil sibi quietis 
ut vel cibum sumeret indulgebat, sed aut hos qui machinis deserviebant ut frequentius aut directius 
iacularentur ammonebat, aut his qui in conflictibus desudabant addebat animos, per vicarias 
successiones vires reparans et pro deficientibus recentes subrogans et integris contatibus validos  
(William of Tyre: II, 674.31-765.45; trans. II, 95). 
1313 See below, 358. 
1314 Anonymous Poem on the Refortification of Dorylaion: 162.14; Euthymios Malakes: 555.18-24. 
1315 See, for example, Manganeios Prodromos: 8, 34. 
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century, we should not be misled by the vast amount of surviving panegyric from the 
reign of Manuel.  The warrior emperor image was evident to a degree during the rule 
of his grandfather Alexios, and it is realistic to think that it was propagated by the 
publicists of prolific soldier emperors Nikephoros II Phokas, John I Tzimiskes and 
Basil II, just as it was for the successful campaigner Heraclius centuries before.  The 
final two chapters will demonstrate that the return of the warrior ideology in imperial 
bulletins and panegyric, not to mention historiography, was brought about by the 
spread of aristocratic military values to Constantinople as early as the mid-tenth 
century. 
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CHAPTER IV. PROMOTIONAL LITERATURE OF THE MIDDLE 
BYZANTINE MILITARY ARISTOCRACY 
The prominence of certain aristocratic individuals and families in Byzantine 
historiography of the tenth and eleventh centuries has encouraged a number of 
arguments for the existence of promotional literature pertaining to these subjects.  
These hypothetical works are now lost, but it is suggested that traces may be observed 
in surviving histories, such as those written by Leo the Deacon and Skylitzes.  As a 
potentially significant source for historians of the period, these lost biographical 
compositions warrant close study.  Thoughts shall be offered as to their genesis, 
content, and purpose, which will in turn elucidate how historians may have used this 
material.  By understanding the social milieu from which works concerned with the 
lives and deeds of heroic generals emerged and seemingly thrived, we may account 
for why historians favoured them as sources.  This chapter collates the evidence and 
theories and examines this potential body of literature, previously considered only in 
isolation, as a whole. 
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I. Aristocratic Promotional Literature in Byzantium (c.900-c.1100) 
Family names only appeared in Byzantium in the early ninth century, though they 
quickly became essential to aristocratic identity and social status.1316  As the 
Byzantines gained the upper hand in the war against Islam, a number of military 
families based in Asia Minor were able to accumulate wealth, power and prestige at 
the head of Byzantium’s armed forces.  Representatives of two of the most powerful 
lineages of the tenth century – the Kourkouai and the Phokades – used military 
success as a platform to the imperial throne, and the struggle for supremacy among 
the empire’s leading generals would become a consistent theme in Byzantine politics 
until the end of the eleventh century.1317  Against this backdrop, the allure of 
promotional literature to the military aristocracy is clear.  By documenting their noble 
character and accomplishments, competing factions could show themselves to be 
worthy of acclaim and favour – even of the imperial throne itself.1318 
Though promotional works associated with the military aristocracy are no longer 
extant, a number are alluded to in surviving historical works, while cases have been 
made for the existence of others.  We begin by examining ideas built on the basis of 
the limited evidence, before progressing to more complex hypotheses formed without 
an obvious point of reference. 
 
                                                 
1316 Patlagean (1984); Stephenson (1994); Cheynet (1996); Kazhdan (1997a); Kountoura-Galaki 
(2004). 
1317 The political situation is analyzed by Ostrogorsky (1971); Morris (1976); Cheynet (1990); Whittow 
(1996a): 335-357; Holmes (2005). 
1318 Cheynet (1986): 190; Markopoulos (2003a): 194-196. 
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References and Allusions to Aristocratic Promotional Literature in Middle Byzantine 
Historiography 
The tenth-century chronicle, Theophanes Continuatus, directs the reader to an eight-
volume work which documented the deeds of John Kourkouas, domestikos ton 
scholon for over two decades under the Emperor Romanos I Lekapenos.1319  Little is 
known of the work or its author, Manuel, though Athanasios Markopoulos has 
postulated that the book portrayed Kourkouas as an ideal military man.1320  It can be 
dated to c.945-962, since the author of the sixth book of Theophanes Continuatus was 
writing c.963.1321  After disappearing from the annals following John Kourkouas’ 
dismissal from office in 944, it is only from 955 that the Kourkouas family returned to 
prominence, with new domestikos ton scholon Nikephoros Phokas promoting 
Kourkouai to military commands.1322  It is probable that the text was commissioned 
around this time, with the interests of the Kourkouai best served by extolling the 
virtues of their most famous son.1323   
                                                 
1319 οἱ δὲ λαµπρῶς ποθοῦντες καὶ θέλοντες µαθεῖν τὰς τοῦ Ἰωάννου Κουρκούα ἀριστείας καὶ 
συγγραφὰς εὑρήσουσιν ἐν ὀκτὼ βιβλίοις ἐκτεθείσας παρὰ Μανουὴλ πρωτοσπαθαρίου καὶ κριτοῦ 
(Theophanes Continuatus: 427.20-428.2).  Derivative of this is Skylitzes’ reference: ὅτῳ δὲ βουλητὸν 
τὰς ἐκείνου µαθεῖν ἀριστείας, ζητησάτω τὴν πονηθεῖσαν βίβλον παρά τινος Μανουὴλ πρωτοσπαθαρίου 
καὶ κριτοῦ (ἐν ὀκτὼ γὰρ βίβλοις ἐκεῖνος τὰ τούτου ἀνδραγαθήµατα συνεγράψατο), καὶ ἐξ αὐτῆς 
εἴσεται, οἷος ἦν ὁ ἀνὴρ τὰ πολεµικά (Skylitzes: 230.33-37).  Holmes (2005: 132-133) discusses the 
slight differences between the two references. 
1320 Markopoulos (2004-2005); Kazhdan (2006): 273.  Both scholars suggest that the author may be 
identifiable with the Manuel (Μανουὴλ οἱ Βυζάντιοι) mentioned in the preamble to Skylitzes’ 
chronicle (3.27). 
1321 In addition to the works cited in the previous footnote, see Hirsch (1876): 272; Whittow (1996a): 
344. 
1322 By 956, John Kourkouas’ great-nephew John Tzimiskes appears to have been made strategos of 
Mesopotamia – see Canard (1951): 791; Howard-Johnston (1983): 266-267 n.27; McGeer (2003): 123.  
In 963 he was promoted to the post of domestikos ton scholon tes anatoles (Leo the Deacon: 44; 
Skylitzes: 267).  Romanos Kourkouas, son of John Kourkouas, is noted as an important eastern 
commander (stratelates) in 963 alongside Tzimiskes (Skylitzes: 256).  
1323 For the Kourkouas family, see Charanis (1963): 36-37; Cheynet (1990): 216.  For the prominent 
involvement of the Kourkouai in the eastern offensive between 926 and 944, see Runciman (1929): 
135-150; Canard (1951): 731-753; Whittow (1996a): 317-321. 
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The great Phokas clan, linked to the Kourkouai by marriage, became increasingly 
relevant from the late ninth century with the emergence of Nikephoros Phokas the 
Elder, domestikos ton scholon under Basil I and Leo VI.1324  By 963, the family had a 
representative on the throne - Nikephoros II Phokas - and, following his murder in 
969, waged an intermittent war for rule of the empire until the death of Nikephoros’ 
nephew Bardas in 989.1325  Though the family became largely inconsequential after 
this time, references from texts of the late eleventh century attest to the enduring 
popularity of Nikephoros II Phokas and the celebration of his deeds in literature.  The 
Historia Syntomos, a world chronicle thought to have been written by Michael 
Psellos, states: ‘About the Emperor Nikephoros Phokas many detailed writings have 
been published both by contemporaries and by authors shortly after, and whoever read 
them will know how many things were achieved by this man as an individual and as 
emperor’.1326  According to Jakov Ljubarskij, we should read this as a reference to 
separate biographical works celebrating the deeds accomplished by Nikephoros first 
as a commander and then as emperor.1327 
Probably contemporaneous with the Historia Syntomos was the History of Michael 
Attaleiates.  The deeds of the Phokas family, Attaleiates relates, continued to be ‘well-
                                                 
1324 Grégoire (1953). 
1325 The resentment of the Phokades, and the circumstances surrounding Nikephoros’ murder are 
explored in Morris (1994).  For the rebellion of Bardas Phokas during the 980s, see Forsyth (1977): 
370-462; Kamer (1986): 67-91; Cheynet (1990): 31-33; Whittow (1996a): 361-373; Treadgold (1997): 
513-519; Holmes (2005): esp. 240-298, 450-461.  The brief revolt in 1022 of Nikephoros Phokas, son 
of Bardas Phokas, and Nikephoros Xiphias, strategos of the Armeniakon, is analyzed by Kamer 
(1986): 137-145; Cheynet (1990): 36-37, 333; Holmes (2005): 515-525. 
1326 Ὑπὲρ τοῦ βασιλέως Νικηφόρου τοῦ Φωκᾶ πολλοὶ τῶν κατ’ ἐκεῖνον καὶ τῶν [οὐ] µετ’ οὐ πολὺ 
ὕστερον διεξοδικὰ συγγράµµατα ἐκδεδώκασι καὶ ὁ ἀναγινώσκων ἐκεῖνα εἴσεται, ὁπόσα ὁ ἀνὴρ οὗτος 
ἔν τε ἰδιώτου σχήµατι ἔν τε βασιλείᾳ κατώρθωκεν (Psellos, Historia Syntomos: 98.82-85; trans. 99).  
The issue of authorship of the Historia Syntomos is discussed in Papaioannou & Duffy (2003). 
1327 Ljubarskij (1993a). 
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known and much talked of’.1328  The author boasts that reigning emperor Nikephoros 
III Botaneiates could claim descent from Nikephoros II Phokas, and, in turn, from 
Constantine the Great and the Roman Fabii family.1329  Attaleiates notes that he 
learned of the noble ancestry of Nikephoros Phokas in ‘an old book’.1330  
Markopoulos speculates that this text may have been one of the works alluded to in 
the Historia Syntomos.  No extant work links Phokas to Constantine and the Fabii, 
while Attaleiates’ fantastical digression on Nikephoros’ capture of Crete in 960 does 
not accord with other surviving accounts of the expedition.1331  Attaleiates declines to 
recount further accomplishments of Phokas, since ‘all prose works and poems are full 
of them’.1332  
The extensive and often favourable coverage afforded to the Phokas family in 
historiography of the tenth and eleventh centuries has led to many arguments in 
favour of the use of pro-Phokades sources.  Several scholars have mooted the 
existence of a ‘Chronicle of the Phokades’, perhaps used by Leo the Deacon and 
Skylitzes.1333  Markopoulos and Apostolos Karpozilos have demonstrated that a 
number of narrative sources composed in the 950s and 960s probably also made use 
                                                 
1328 τὰ µὲν τοῦ γένους τῶν Φωκάδων, ὅσα γε ἥκει κατὰ τὰς προσεχεῖς ἡµῶν γενεάς, περίφηµά τε καὶ 
περιβόητα καὶ µαρτυρεῖ τούτοις τά τε τῶν ἄνωθεν διηγήµατα καὶ ὁ βασιλεὺς κῦρις Νικηφόρος ὁ 
Φωκᾶς (Attaleiates: 162.23-26). 
1329 Attaleiates: 158-167.  See Kazhdan (1984c): 27-32; Markopoulos (2003b): 218-219. 
1330 βίβλου τινὸς παλαιᾶς (Attaleiates: 159.18-22).  Editor Inmaculada Pérez Martín (2002: 313-314) 
paid little heed to this, believing that Attaleiates probably crafted this elaborate genealogy himself since 
he was so familiar with Roman history.  Attaleiates’ admiration for Republican Rome is discussed by 
Krallis (2006). 
1331 Tsougarakis (1988): 63-74. 
1332 Τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν αὐτοῦ προτερηµάτων ποιεῖσθαι κατάλογον περιττὸν πάντως τῇ παρούσῃ γραφῇ, 
πλήρης γὰρ τούτων πᾶσα γραφή τε καὶ ποίησις (Attaleiates: 166.22-23). 
1333 Hirsch (1876): 50-51; Tinnefeld (1971): 108-110; Hunger (1978): I, 369; Roueché (1988): 127-
128; Morris (1988): 206; idem (1994); Markopoulos (2003a): 187-188, 195-196; Kazhdan (2006): 167, 
273-274.  
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of pro-Phokades material, including two biographies of Nikephoros II Phokas.1334  
The military manual, the De Velitatione, was probably compiled during the 970s and 
clearly emanated from the Phokas family circle.  The anonymous author,1335 working 
at the behest of the late Nikephoros II Phokas,1336 eulogizes the military feats of 
Nikephoros and his father Bardas, as well as Constantine Maleinos, a member of a 
family with strong ties to the Phokades.1337  The author appears to refer to pro-Phokas 
works where he neglects to describe the deeds of Nikephoros, ‘since there are so very 
many of them and they are so well known’.1338  The De Velitatione, it seems, was 
intended not only as a treatise on border warfare, but also as a promotional tool for the 
Phokades, an explicit reminder of their great deeds at a time when they were still 
vying for the throne.  ‘Le De Velitatione’, decreed Jean-Claude Cheynet, ‘est un traité 
dédié à la gloire d’une famille, les Phokas’.1339  It was merely one among many works 
which celebrated the lives and military successes of the Phokas clan.1340 
 
 
                                                 
1334 Ljubarskij (1993a); Markopoulos (1983): esp. 284; idem (1988); idem (2003a): 187-189; idem 
(2004b): 89-90; idem (2004c): 4-6; idem (2009a): 703-705; Karpozilos (2002): 358-364, 399-400. 
1335 It has been speculated that the author was Nikephoros’ brother Leo Phokas.  See Dennis (1985): 
139-140; Dagron & Mihăescu (1986): 171; Cheynet (1986): 305. 
1336 McGeer (1995a): 173-178. 
1337 For ties between the Phokas and Maleinos families, see Kaplan (1981): 145; Hild & Restle (1981): 
224-226; Saunders (1982); Kamer (1986): 133-134; Cheynet (1986): 309-315; idem (1990): 214-215, 
268; Stephenson (1994): 196-197; Holmes (2005): 333-335; Laiou (1998). 
1338 οὗ τὰς ἀριστείας, καθ’ ὃν ἐστρατήγει καιρόν, συγγράφειν ἢ ἀπαριθµεῖσθαι ὀχληρὸν ἔσται τοῖς 
ἐντυγχάνουσι διά τε τὸ ὑπερβάλλον πλῆθος καὶ τὸ παρὰ πολλῶν γινώσκεσθαι (De Velitatione: pr.7; 
trans. 149).  Use of such material would not only account for the favourable portrayals of Nikephoros 
and Bardas, but also the lengthy digression on the military activities of Nikephoros Phokas the Elder 
(ibid: §XX.2-5).  For these actions see also Byzance et les Arabes, II.1: 84-85, 137-140; Grégoire 
(1953); Cheynet (1986): 293-295; Dagron & Mihăescu (1986): 165-169. 
1339 Cheynet (1986): 312.  See also Dagron & Mihăescu (1986): 165-169, where it is noted that parts of 
the manual are evocative of the tone of an epic family poem. 
1340 Relevant also is the widespread ‘cult’ of Nikephoros which developed following his death, 
stemming from adoration for his piety, his treatment of the poor, and his military ability.  See below, 
295-296. 
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The Presence of Aristocratic Promotional Literature in Skylitzes’ Synopsis Historion 
While Skylitzes has been shown to have relied heavily upon Genesios and 
Theophanes Continuatus for his account of the period 811-c.948, his sources for 
events after this date are no longer extant.1341  Though Skylitzes lists a number of 
authors in his preface – some known, others not – it is clear that he does not list all his 
sources.1342  Speculation that Skylitzes utilized one such unspecified work - a pro-
Phokas source - has encouraged suggestions that other aristocratic compositions 
underlie the Synopsis Historion.1343 
Jonathan Shepard has published several studies concerning Skylitzes’ coverage of 
Katakalon Kekaumenos, a prominent general of the mid-eleventh century.  The first 
of these is chiefly concerned with Kekaumenos’ actions in Armenia between 1045 
and 1047;1344 another study examines his defence of Messina in 1042,1345 while a 
subsequent article explores other aspects of Kekaumenos’ presentation, including his 
involvement in the war against the Pechenegs and the rebellion of Isaac Komnenos in 
1056.1346  The highly detailed narrative of Kekaumenos’ military activities, which 
compliments the general for any success or extricates him from blame in the event of 
defeat, leads Shepard to conclude that Skylitzes employed an autobiography of 
Katakalon Kekaumenos.  Shepard proposes that the laudatory work was written 
                                                 
1341 Hirsch (1876): 356-375; Flusin (2010): xviii-xx. 
1342 For discussion of the authors cited in Skylitzes’ prooimion see Panagiotakes (1996): esp. 239-240; 
Cheynet & Flusin (2003): xii-xiv; E. Jeffreys (2003a): 209-210; Holmes (2005): 91-99, 121-125, 548-
550; Kazhdan (2006): 273; Markopoulos (2009a): 708-709; Flusin (2010): xiii-xxiii. 
1343 Hirsch (1876): 356-375; Sjuzjumov (1916); Morris (1988): 85-86; Ljubarskij (1993a): 252-253; 
Kazhdan (2006): 273-274; Flusin (2010): xx-xxi. 
1344 Shepard (1975-1976). 
1345 Idem (1977-1979): 155-159. 
1346 Idem (1992b). 
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between 1057 and 1060.1347  Kekaumenos may have embarked on the project to 
highlight his contribution to Isaac Komnenos’ rise to the throne, or perhaps even to 
convince Isaac’s successor, Constantine X Doukas, that he was worthy of reward.1348 
Shepard argues for Skylitzes’ use of another biographical source alongside the 
Kekaumenos text: a text dedicated to George Maniakes, who was appointed supreme 
commander in southern Italy in 1035.1349  This source is purported to have related 
how Maniakes defeated Arab armies at Remata and Troina and captured thirteen 
settlements on Sicily, before he was twice removed from command because of the 
machinations of political rivals, leaving him with no choice but to rebel against 
Constantine IX Monomachos in 1042.1350  Shepard speculates that the source was a 
political ‘pamphlet’, focused primarily on the events of 1040-1043, and intended to 
lambast Maniakes’ political enemies as much as commend his own achievements. 
Shepard’s ideas gave rise to further arguments for aristocratic promotional literature 
embedded within Skylitzes’ Synopsis Historion.  Stephen Kamer first speculated that 
Skylitzes may have used a biography of the infamous tenth-century warlord, Bardas 
                                                 
1347 Idem (1977); idem (1992b): 176-178.  In a new article, Shepard (forthcoming) brings together these 
arguments. 
1348 Idem (1992b): 178-179.  By 1060 Katakalon Kekaumenos had become a monk, and wrote to 
Michael Psellos at the imperial court, seemingly requesting assistance with the non-payment of his 
salary to which he, as kouropalates, was entitled.  We lack the original request, though Psellos’ reply 
encouraged Kekaumenos to take up the matter with the Emperor Constantine (Psellos, Scripta Minora: 
II, 91.20-92.24 [ep.59]).  A follow up letter from Psellos (ibid: II, 168.13-169.12 [ep.141]) reveals that 
Kekaumenos had dispatched a servant to entreat the emperor and the patriarch in Constantinople, but 
had apparently failed in his efforts.  Another letter (ibid: II, 43.15-46.12 [ep.30]) confirms that 
Kekaumenos resided at a monastery in Koloneia, situated in northeast Asia Minor.  It is unknown 
whether Isaac or Constantine initially withheld Kekaumenos’ pay, though Shepard is tempted to draw a 
connection between Katakalon’s retirement to the monastery, the loss of his stipend and the 
composition of a laudatory biography (Shepard 1992b: 179 n.25). 
1349 Shepard (1977-1979). 
1350 For these events see Von Falkenhausen (1967): 89-92; Felix (1981): 206-210; Cheynet (1990): 57-
58. 
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Skleros.1351  Charlotte Roueché independently came to the same conclusion, 
observing that passages highlighting the military genius of Skleros might derive from 
‘an account of his life’.1352  Catherine Holmes has since considerably expanded upon 
this hypothesis, arguing that Skylitzes employed a pro-Skleros source extensively for 
his account of the sustained rebellions of Bardas Skleros and fellow general Bardas 
Phokas (976-989).  As with George Maniakes, the encomiastic source attempts to 
mitigate Skleros’ responsibility for rebellion by stressing the disdain with which he 
was treated by the parakoimomenos Basil Lekapenos, effective regent for the young 
emperor Basil II.1353  Holmes suggests that the text was written c.990, to remind the 
state that Bardas and his family might still be of use following the failure of the 
revolt.1354 
We conclude this overview of Skylitzes’ material with another observation initially 
put forward by Charlotte Roueché, and again expanded by Catherine Holmes: that 
Skylitzes utilized a record of the deeds of the general Eustathios Daphnomeles in his 
account of the Bulgarian wars of Basil II.1355  Daphnomeles’ daring and cunning is 
evident in an episode recounting how he crept into the stronghold of the hardy 
Bulgarian nobleman Ibatzes and blinded him.1356  If this anecdote did derive from a 
                                                 
1351 Kamer (1986): 31-32, 406-407 n.134. 
1352 Roueché (1988): 127-128.  Related to this is a proposal by Rosemary Morris, who discussed the 
existence of a ‘Skleroi chronicle’, possibly used by Armenian historian Matthew of Edessa.  Morris 
considers the idea of a provincial source emanating from Anzitene in southern Armenia, a one-time 
power base of Bardas Skleros (Morris 1994: 207 n.28).  For Byzantine Anzitene and its links to 
Skleros, see Howard-Johnston (1983): 248-250; idem (1995a): 93; Bivar (1986). 
1353 For Basil Lekapenos, see Brokkaar (1972). 
1354 Holmes (2005): 255-297. 
1355 Roueché (1988): 127-128; Holmes (2005): 228-233. 
1356 Skylitzes: 360-364. 
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pro-Daphnomeles source, it would, as Roueché mused, suggest that promotional 
literature was exploited even by lesser military aristocrats.1357   
Heroic Tales of the Doukas Family 
As a pre-eminent family in late eleventh-century Byzantium, it is hardly surprising 
that the Doukai were immortalized in oral tales and literature.  Michael Psellos, 
writing c.1080, wrote of the Emperor Constantine X Doukas: 
His family, as far back as his great-grandfathers, had been both distinguished and 
affluent, the sort historians write of in their works.  Certain it is that to this very 
day the names of the celebrated Andronikos, of Constantine…are on everybody’s 
lips – all relatives of his, some on the paternal, others on the mother’s side.1358 
The enduring popularity of Andronikos Doukas and his son Constantine, embroiled in 
rebellions against the state in the early tenth century, is thought to have inspired many 
frontier oral tales and epic poems.1359  The poem Digenes Akrites was probably 
committed to writing in the first half of the twelfth century, and the numerous 
mentions of the Doukas name in the poem have been attributed to the relevance of the 
family at this time.1360  In support of this argument Roderick Beaton cites the Lucianic 
satire, Timarion, produced around the same time as Digenes Akrites; the work 
mentions the Doukai among the ancestors of one of its principal characters, the doux 
                                                 
1357 Little else is known of Daphnomeles but that in 1029 he was one of many Balkan commanders 
exiled for plotting to remove the Emperor Romanos III Argyros (ibid: 376-377).  Given that other 
promotional texts have been viewed as appeals for a reprieve in the wake of rebellion and disfavour, 
perhaps we might view this one similarly. 
1358 τὸ µὲν ἄνω γένος ὅσον εἰς προπάππους ἁβρόν τε καὶ εὔδαιµον καὶ ὁποῖον αἱ συγγραφαὶ ᾄδουσι· διὰ 
στόµατος γοῦν καὶ µέχρι τοῦ νῦν ἅπασιν ὁ Ἀνδρόνικος ἐκεῖνος, καὶ ὁ Κωνσταντῖνος, καὶ ὁ Πανθήριος, 
οἱ µὲν ἐξ ἄρρενος γένους, οἱ δὲ ἐκ θήλεος τούτῳ προσήκοντες, οὐδὲν δὲ ἔλαττον αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ προσεχές 
(Psellos, Chronographia: II, 140 [VI]; trans. 333, with amendments). 
1359 For these individuals see Polemis (1968): 16-25. 
1360 Beaton (1996a): 335-336; also Mavrogordato (1956): lxvi-lxvii. 
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of Thessaloniki.1361  While this argument is valid, it is important to stress that the 
Digenes Akrites acquired its original form in oral songs related along the eastern 
frontier from the tenth century.  There can be little question that the early Doukai 
inspired some characters and scenarios in the poem.  In the Escorial version, the 
eponymous Digenes is said to have descended from the Doukai;1362 the Grottaferrata 
redaction claims that Digenes was related to one Constantine Doukas on his mother’s 
side.1363  George Huxley argues that Andronikos Doukas served as a prototype for 
Digenes’ maternal grandfather, living in exile on the frontier for rebelling against the 
emperor.1364  Successful warriors and popular in the eastern provinces, Andronikos 
and Constantine Doukas were suitable subjects for the popular ballads of the 
frontiersmen.  It is thought that Digenes Akrites and another poem from that time, The 
Sons of Andronikos, derive from oral stories about Andronikos and Constantine.1365  
The testimony of Michael Psellos confirms that such stories continued to be 
transmitted in the late eleventh century.  Anna Komnene also boasted of her mother 
Eirene being of famous descent, ‘for her family derived from the famous houses of 
Andronikos and Constantine Doukas’.1366  While the Doukai of the late eleventh 
century are unlikely to have descended directly from Andronikos and Constantine, 
                                                 
1361 The Timarion notes that the doux of Thessaloniki descended from the ‘famous Doukai, a family 
whose name…has been spread by the lips of many across the sea from Italy and the race of Aeneas to 
Constantinople itself’ (γενῶν φεροµένων καὶ βασιλέων ἐξ αἴµατος κατιοῦσαν καὶ τῶν θρυλλουµένων 
∆ουκῶν οὖσαν ἀπόγονον - ἡρωϊκὸν δέ, ὡς οἶσθα, τὸ γένος τοῦτο καὶ ὡς ἐξ Ἰταλίας καὶ τῶν Αἰνειάνων 
µεταβὰν πρὸς τὴν Κωνσταντίνου πολλοῖς ὑποψιθυρίζεται: Timarion: ll.210-231; trans. 47).  For this 
passage see M. Alexiou (1982-1983): 39-40.  Nikephoros Bryennios (67-69) similarly claims that the 
first Doukas came from Rome to Constantinople and was appointed dux of the city by his cousin, the 
Emperor Constantine the Great; hence the development of the name ‘Doukas’.  For discussion of the 
proclaimed ancestry of the Doukai, see Polemis (1968): 3. 
1362 Digenes Akrites: E136-137 
1363 Ibid: GI.267. 
1364 Huxley (1974): 323-324. 
1365 Grégoire (1933a): esp. 48-63; idem (1933d): 390-396; Polemis (1968): 14-15; Beck (1971): 57-97, 
esp. 57-62; Pertusi (1970): 507-514; Oikonomides (1979): 396, 379-380. 
1366 τὸ γένος περίβλεπτος, εἰς Ἀνδρονίκους ἐκείνους καὶ Κωνσταντίνους τοὺς ∆ούκας ἀναφέρουσα τὴν 
τοῦ γένους σειράν (Anna Komnene: III.3.3.16-18; trans. 85). 
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they evidently exploited the popularity and heroic reputation of the Doukas name to 
support their claim to greatness.1367   
Pro-Doukas prose literature may also have been known in the late eleventh century.  
Leonora Neville has argued for a source detailing the life of the kaisar John Doukas, 
uncle of the Emperor Michael VII.  It is suggested that traces of this work may be 
observed in the Hyle Historias of Nikephoros Bryennios, where an intimate 
knowledge of Doukas’ life and career is displayed.  Neville proposes that Bryennios 
employed a written text because of stylistic and narrative shifts (including 
inexplicable use of the first-person) in the narrative, as well as a more classicizing 
vocabulary in those parts of the text where John is the subject.1368 
Conclusion 
References in the historical works of the Continuator of Theophanes, Michael 
Attaleiates and Michael Psellos confirm that aristocratic generals of the Middle 
Byzantine period were the subject of literary compositions, and the convincing 
arguments put forward by scholars suggest that such works served as useful sources 
for historians and chroniclers.  Further consideration shall be given to their 
composition and content, though having established their existence, it is first 
necessary to examine the literary developments behind the appearance of biographical 
aristocratic texts. 
                                                 
1367 Polemis (1968): 6-15. 
1368 Neville (2008).  In her forthcoming monograph on Bryennios and his work, Leonora Neville argues 
for the historian’s use of another memoir-like source with George Palaiologos as its subject.  It is 
suggested that this source may also have been employed by Anna Komnene. 
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II. Aristocratic Promotional Literature and Greco-Roman Biography 
The promotional literature of the military aristocracy was almost certainly influenced 
by recent trends in hagiography and historiography, as well as older models and 
conventions of the always flexible Greco-Roman biographical tradition.  We observe 
here how literary developments paved the way for biography of a secular nature, 
which the aristocracy exploited to full effect. 
Modern historians have great difficulty defining classical and Hellenistic biography as 
a unique literary genre.1369  It has been observed, for example, that from the outset 
‘biography and panegyric were interwoven’.1370  Arnaldo Momigliano questioned 
how one might distinguish biographies from the Hellenistic political histories which 
took the form of a monograph about an individual.1371  Richard Burridge similarly 
describes biography as ‘a flexible genre, influenced by both historiography and 
encomium’.1372  This observation would remain true of political biography into the 
last phases of its secular use in Late Antiquity.1373  Political biography gradually gave 
way to philosophical and religious biography from the third century, and this 
newfound interest in the ‘holy man’ would contribute significantly to the shift of the 
biographical genre into hagiography in subsequent centuries.1374   
 
                                                 
1369 Leo (1901); Stuart (1928); Dihle (1956); Momigliano (1971). 
1370 Hägg & Rousseau (2000): esp. 15-16. 
1371 Momigliano (1971): 63, 82-83. 
1372 Burridge (2001): 373-374.  A similar view is expressed by Patricia Cox (1983: 54-55), who noted 
that biographies of the Classical period ‘do not fit the abstract formulations’. 
1373 Averil Cameron (1997); idem (2000).  Cf. Barnes (1989). 
1374 Cox (1983); Averil Cameron (1997); A. Wilson (1998); Efthymiadis et al (2011).  For the influence 
of classical biography on hagiography, see Bartelink (1986); Delehaye (1991).  Cf. Swain (1997): 27-
29, 36.    
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Biography, Hagiography and ‘Semi-Secular Hagiography’, c.550-c.900 
Prior to the rise of Islam there does appear to have been an interest in commemorating 
the military achievements of private individuals in literature.  Corippus’ Iohannis, an 
epic Latin poem in eight books, celebrates the campaigns conducted by the general 
John Troglita in North Africa during the 540s.  Both Wilhelm Ehlers and Averil 
Cameron maintain that Corippus had access to informed sources, with the latter 
suggesting that John Troglita supplied Corippus ‘with military details and personal 
history, and sought epic heroization’ in return.1375  In the later period, we will observe 
that ‘epic heroization’ of successful generals is achieved via the literary models of 
Homer and classical historiography.   
Research into the sources employed by seventh-century historian Theophylact 
Simocatta suggests the use of biographical compositions.  Michael Whitby has argued 
that Theophylact employed a military narrative detailing the feats of Priscus, son-in-
law of the Emperor Phokas.1376  Whitby further determines that Theophylact 
consulted a similar source for wars on the eastern frontier, one describing the deeds of 
Heraclius the Elder, father of the Emperor Heraclius.1377  James Howard-Johnston 
took the source to be a ‘dispatch-based military history’, similar to the work linked to 
Priscus.1378  Whitby’s observation that the hypothetical text presented military 
anecdotes and Heraclius’ ‘courageous and cunning tactics’ suggests a work firmly in 
the mould of aristocratic promotional literature in content and purpose.   
                                                 
1375 Ehlers (1980): 117; Averil Cameron (1984): 175. 
1376 Michael Whitby (1988): 94-105.  
1377 Ibid: 230-233, 280-286. 
1378 Howard-Johnston (2010): 143-144.  Frendo (1988) considered that the praise of Heraclius the Elder 
and references to his exploits might imply a kind of ‘panegyric by indirection’, but Efthymiadis (2010: 
176 n.24) is unconvinced. 
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From the seventh century hagiography became the dominant form of biography in 
Byzantium, and when secular biography does eventually reappear, it is inevitable that 
it drew inspiration from hagiography.  Since hagiography was the most important type 
of life narrative in Byzantium, Martin Hinterberger argues for a strong influence on 
autobiography and biography.1379  Indeed, there has been debate in recent scholarship 
as to whether Byzantine saints’ lives represent a ‘genre littéraire ou biographie 
historique’.1380  While it is unnecessary to discuss this issue here, we should note an 
increasing tendency in the ninth century for saints’ lives to exhibit a more secular 
ideology.1381  The Vita Ignatii of Niketas David Paphlagonian, which relates the life 
of the Patriarch Ignatios, has defied straightforward classification.  It is sometimes 
considered a work of historiography and classical encomium, with the polemic against 
Ignatios’ rival, Photios, exceptional in hagiography.1382  The Vita Euthymii of the 
early tenth century, charting the life of the Patriarch Euthymios, is similarly regarded 
as different to conventional hagiography, resembling more a historical chronicle.1383  
Paul Alexander classified these works as ‘semi-secular hagiography’ (the label 
‘historical hagiography/biography’ has also been used1384), and viewed the 
secularization of hagiography as a crucial stage in the eventual appearance of secular 
biography proper.1385  This process intensified from the mid-tenth century, with a 
                                                 
1379 Hinterberger (2000): 145. 
1380 Odorico & Agapitos (2004).  Lennart Rydén (2004: 49) disagreed with the latter notion; he argued 
that ‘historical biography’ suggested ‘a complete and true portrait’ of the subject, something to which 
hagiographers did not conform. 
1381 Efthymiadis (2011). 
1382 Alexander Kazhdan (2006: 90-102) interprets the Vita Ignatii as the ‘reinvention of the pamphlet’, 
infusing encomium with invective.  See also Symeon Paschalidis in reference to a lost work of Niketas 
David which expanded upon the Vita Ignatii: ‘In this manner the field of hagiography made its 
triumphant entrance into the field of historiography, abandoning its status as an autonomous literary 
genre and assuming a perhaps more trustworthy genre, that of historical biography’ (Paschalidis 2004: 
173). 
1383 Kazhdan (2006): 103-111. 
1384 Paschalidis (2004): 161-162. 
1385 Alexander (1939): 202-206. 
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decline in the presentation of the ‘classic’ saint in hagiography and an increasing 
secularization evident.1386 
It is perhaps on account of these developments that some scholars have hypothesized 
the existence of secular biographies as early as the late ninth century.  Patricia Karlin-
Hayter proposed that the tenth-century Basileiai of Genesios and Theophanes 
Continuatus may have employed biographies of important figures of the ninth 
century,1387 an argument which has not met with universal approval.1388  Athanasios 
Markopoulos thought it ‘somewhat easy’ to determine that these historians drew upon 
lost biographies, insisting that secular biographies were ‘inconsistent’ with literary 
practices prior to the mid-tenth century.  He instead favours Juan Signes Codoñer’s 
idea that the passages derived from ‘un-contextualized excerpts’ which were 
favourably disposed towards the subject in question.1389 
Signes Codoñer and Anthony Kaldellis do not, however, dispute the proposal of Henri 
Grégoire which inspired Karlin-Hayter: that Genesios and the Continuator of 
Theophanes consulted semi-hagiographical texts dedicated to two generals, 
Theophobos and Manuel the Armenian.1390  Theophobos, a Kurdish rebel who came 
into imperial service in 834 and converted to Christianity, was prominent during the 
reign of Theophilos.1391  Reportedly murdered, Theophobos’ body was claimed by the 
                                                 
1386 Magdalino (1981); Morris (1981); Oikonomides (2004); Markopoulos (2009a): 713-714.  For an 
overview of developments in hagiography during this period see most recently Paschalidis (2011). 
1387 Karlin-Hayter (1971).  Romily Jenkins (1954: 20-21) came to the independent conclusion that the 
kaisar Bardas may have been the subject of a panegyrical work, perhaps employed in the composition 
of Book IV of Theophanes Continuatus. 
1388 Kaldellis (1998): xvi-xxiv, xxiv. 
1389 Markopoulos (2009b): 146-147; Signes Codoñer (1993-1994). 
1390 Grégoire (1933c): 520-524; idem (1934); Signes Codoñer (1995): 411-412, 461-467, 470-477, 487-
489, 496-500, 508-510, 521-524, 531-533, 549-557, 559-574, 583-590, 652-654.  While Signes 
Codoñer calls for a review of Grégoire’s thesis, he does not generally disagree with his suggestions. 
Anthony Kaldellis (1998: xxiii) determined Grégoire’s proposal to be a ‘reasonable conjecture’. 
1391 For background see Rosser (1974); Letsios (2004). 
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monks of the monastery of Theophobia, with Grégoire suggesting that they concocted 
a legend of Theophobos’ martyrdom and penned a Vita Theophobii in honour of the 
monastery’s founder.  Manuel the Armenian, another important general under 
Theophilos, was interred in his own palace, which later became a monastery.  
Grégoire similarly proposed that the monks of this institution produced a 
hagiographical account of the donor: a Vita Manuelis.  Signes Codoñer suggests that 
there may have been as many as three sources describing the life of Manuel, including 
a hagiography and a biografía laica.1392 
It is suspected that a Vita Manuelis may be the cause of several inaccuracies in 
Genesios and Theophanes Continuatus.  Warren Treadgold has shown that it is 
unnecessary for Grégoire to attribute reports of Manuel saving the life of Theophilos 
at the Battle of Anzen in 838 to the proposed Vita Manuelis.1393  More difficult to 
reconcile are the conflicting accounts of Manuel’s death.  While the Chronicle of 
Symeon the Logothete states that Manuel died of wounds suffered at the Battle of 
Anzen, Genesios and the Continuator of Theophanes assert that Manuel died c.860.  
Grégoire argues that this discrepancy is the result of the latter two chroniclers deriving 
their information from the Vita Manuelis, which suppressed that Manuel had died as 
an iconoclast in 838 and presented him as having recovered to became a champion of 
the cause of icons.  Corroborating this hypothesis is a Synaxarium compiled c.900, 
                                                 
1392 Signes Codoñer (1995): 521-524.  While it is uncertain whether Genesios and the Continuator of 
Theophanes consulted these texts directly or rather used epitomes or an excerpta, we should consider 
that Genesios did use two contemporary saints’ lives - the Vita Nikephorii and Vita Ignatii - which 
indicates a preference for semi-secular hagiographies as source material.  See also Hirsch (1876): 127-
128, 159-161. 
1393 Grégoire (1934): 188-191. Cf. Treadgold (1979): 180-182. 
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which reveals that Manuel died on 27th July, mere days after the known date of the 
Battle of Anzen (22nd July).1394 
The quasi-hagiographical lives of Theophobos and Manuel may represent a 
significant stage in the development of secular biography of military figures.  We 
might place them in a similar tradition to the contemporary Martyrion of Forty-Two 
Generals and Soldiers, a tribute to those captured and executed following the Arab 
sack of Amorion in 842, which Alexander Kazhdan described as a ‘historical 
hagiography’.  One particular rendition is concerned with the exploits of the general 
Theodore Karteros, providing a biographical account of his career prior to his 
capture.1395  There may have been a cluster of semi-hagiographical texts celebrating 
the lives of other generals.  Signes Codoñer proposes the existence of a semi-secular 
hagiography of Bardanes Tourkos, a commander who failed to overthrow Nikephoros 
I and was blinded after retiring as a monk.1396  We have discussed Alexander 
Kazhdan’s argument for a semi-hagiographical tale of the exploits of Andrew the 
Scythian, a prominent commander under Basil I.1397  Even when secular aristocratic 
biographies are first attested in the mid-tenth century, semi-hagiographical accounts 
continue to be popular, as evidenced with Nikephoros II Phokas.1398  We may surmise 
that the growing concern of hagiography with important generals, coupled with the 
increasing secularization of such texts, represented a crucial progression in the 
production of secular biographical literature celebrating the careers of illustrious 
soldiers.  The imperial exploitation of the biographical format in the mid-tenth 
century, combined with the emergence of successful generals wielding great political 
                                                 
1394 Treadgold (1979): 182-183.  See also F. Halkin (1954): 9-11; Signes Codoñer (1995): 508-510. 
1395 For discussion see Kazhdan (1986): 150-160; idem (2006): 206-209. 
1396 Signes Codoñer (1995): 26-27, 31-40. 
1397 Kazhdan (1993).  The idea was recently doubted by Cyril Mango (2011: 13).   
1398 See below, 295-296. 
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influence, provided the catalyst for the widespread production of aristocratic 
promotional literature.1399 
Constantine VII, the Vita Basilii and the Revival of ‘Secular Biography’ 
The reign of Constantine VII Porphyrogenitos saw the production of works which 
marked a departure from traditional historical writing.  While Byzantine 
historiography was hitherto known for its chronological ordering of events, historical 
works of the mid-tenth century favoured a biographical structure, making prominent 
individuals the focal point of the text.1400  It has been suggested that the Basileiai of 
Genesios, which chronicles the period 814-886, was the first of these innovative 
compositions.1401  Constantine VII subsequently commissioned the Theophanes 
Continuatus, a more ambitious work also assuming a biographical format.  The first 
four books cover events from 813-867, with the fifth book – the Vita Basilii -  devoted 
to the Emperor Basil I.  The new literary project enabled Constantine to afford pride 
of place to his grandfather.  By depicting Basil as a divinely-ordained and successful 
ruler, Constantine could whitewash his ancestor’s involvement in the murder of his 
predecessor Michael III, thus confirming the legitimacy of Basil and, by extension, of 
the reigning dynasty.1402 
There have been numerous attempts to define the form and literary models of the Vita 
Basilii.  Paul Alexander identified the work as a fusion of secular biography and 
                                                 
1399 It is relevant to note that some aristocratic families appear to have promoted a family member’s 
claim to sainthood by composing a vita - see Talbot (1996).  It is not unthinkable that a similar trend 
was known in regard to family members pursuing a military career. 
1400 We cannot be certain when and why this occurred, though Roger Scott (1981: 68-70) proposed that 
the decision of Theophanes in the 820s to treat the reigns of emperors as the basic unit of his 
Chronographia marked the first move towards the biographical in historiography. 
1401 Barišić (1958); Markopoulos (2009b). 
1402 Jenkins (1948).  Cf. Agapitos (1989); Markopoulos (2002). 
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panegyric, drawing upon the precepts of a traditional basilikos logos, rhetorical 
elements of hagiography, and the funeral oration for Basil composed by his son, Leo 
VI the Wise.1403  Romily Jenkins was not convinced by Alexander’s suggestion that 
hagiography had any influence on secular biography, suggesting instead that classical 
models were behind the literary projects of Constantine VII.1404  Alexander’s 
arguments for the influence of hagiography on the Vita Basilii were however backed 
by Alexander Kazhdan, who considered the moral conflict between the hero (Basil) 
and the anti-hero (Michael) to be based on hagiographical models.1405  Lieve van 
Hoof, finally, questions whether Paul Alexander is correct to class the Vita Basilii as 
‘biography’.  She observes that the Vita Basilii bears resemblance to the genres of 
encomium, history, and biography, though settles for the label of ‘encomiastic 
biography’.1406 
The literary influences which shaped the Vita Basilii, as well its very form, remain a 
matter for dispute.  Just as Hellenistic Greek biography displayed elements of 
encomia and historiography, the first known work of Byzantine secular biography 
also exhibits signs of influence from these genres.  Athanasios Markopoulos considers 
the Vita Basilii to represent ‘a new type of historical writing…specifically designed 
for the extremely beautified career of its subject’.1407  This new, flexible form of 
historiography would come to dominate Byzantine historical writing over the 
following centuries. 
 
                                                 
1403 Alexander (1939). 
1404 Jenkins (1954). 
1405 Kazhdan (2006): 136-144. 
1406 van Hoof (2002). 
1407 Markopoulos (2009a): 702. 
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The Biographical Element in Middle Byzantine Historiography 
The shift towards the anthropocentric in Byzantine historiography has been seen as a 
result of a growing interest in humanism at Constantinople, reflected also in the 
increasing tendency of authors to intrude into their history.1408  Roger Scott argues 
that the two trends went hand-in-hand, with the biographical element forcing 
historians – often close to their subjects - to assert their own credentials and claims to 
veracity so that they might avoid accusations of bias.1409   
The preference for the biographical format is evident in the surviving historical works 
of the period.  It is thought that the emperors Romanos I Lekapenos and Constantine 
VII Porphyrogenitos were the subjects of lost laudatory biographies utilized by 
chroniclers of the mid-tenth century.1410  While the precise content of these 
hypothetical works is unknown, there can be little doubt that the accession of 
Nikephoros II Phokas in 963 brought significant change.  From this time, imperial 
biographers, like those of aristocratic soldiers, became obsessed with extolling the 
soldierly qualities of their subject, a reflection of the emergence of martial valour as 
the dominant imperial trait during the second half of the tenth century.1411  The 
militaristic History of Leo the Deacon, in the main comprised of biographies of 
Nikephoros II Phokas and John I Tzimiskes, may be considered ‘heroic 
                                                 
1408 See Scott (1981): 63; Ljubarskij (1996); Macrides (1996); Angold (1998). 
1409 Scott (1981). 
1410 For the ongoing argument as to whether rendition ‘A’ of Symeon the Logothete’s chronicle drew 
upon an encomiastic biography of Romanos Lekapenos, see the various proposals of Hirsch (1876): 80-
86; Hunger (1978): I, 349-350; Markopoulos (1983): 279-281; Müller (2009); and James Howard-
Johnston, related by Paul Stephenson at http://homepage.mac.com/paulstephenson/trans/logothete.html 
(last accessed 4/2011).  For the hypothesis that one Theodore Daphnopates was the author of a lost 
history of the reigns of Constantine VII and his son Romanos II, see Frei (1985); Markopoulos (1985). 
1411 Kazhdan (1983a); idem (1984a); Markopoulos (2009a), 697-702, 709-710.  
288 
historiography’ par excellence.1412  Following in this tradition perhaps was a proposed 
biography of Basil II, thought to have been employed by Skylitzes.1413   
With a number of non-campaigning emperors and military setbacks in the decades 
following Basil’s death, it is perhaps to be expected that heroism in battle and martial 
valour did not occupy the mind of Michael Psellos, though his Chronographia 
remains a curious mix of memoirs and imperial biography.1414  The History of 
Michael Attaleiates attests to a renewed interest in martial heroism in its records of 
the reigns of Romanos Diogenes and Nikephoros Botaneiates.1415  The successful 
rebellion of Alexios Komnenos in 1081 and his lengthy rule marked another triumph 
for the military aristocracy.  This state of affairs is reflected in the Hyle Historias of 
Nikephoros Bryennios, a ‘Familienchronik’1416 which celebrates the leading military 
families of the day - the Komnenoi, Bryennioi and Doukai.  Perhaps the finest work of 
biographical history to emerge in the Middle period was the Alexiad of Anna 
Komnene.  Alexander considered that Anna was not writing history, but ‘the praxeis 
of an Emperor’.1417  The martial culture at the Komnenian court is evident also with 
John Kinnamos and Niketas Choniates, who devote considerable attention to military 
campaigns whilst structuring their works around the lives of emperors.   
 
 
                                                 
1412 Markopoulos (2003a): 186; idem (2004a). 
1413 Panagiotakes (1996).  Cf. Holmes (2005): 96-99. 
1414 Pietsch (2005). 
1415 Markopoulos (2003b).  For Attaleiates’ record of Botaneiates’ early career, see Karagiorgiou 
(2008). 
1416 Krumbacher (1897): 272. 
1417 Alexander (1939): 197.  Coincidentally, Plutarch seems to have been a huge influence on the 
Alexiad - see Buckler (1929): 205-206. 
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Conclusion 
Historiography of the Middle Byzantine period was decidedly biographical in its 
focus and structure, and yet this does not discredit its primary function as historical 
writing.  Romily Jenkins believes that to make a prominent personality the focal point 
of the narrative was a ‘perfectly legitimate form’ of Greek historiography.1418  By the 
same token there was, as Paul Alexander reminds us, a tendency for biographical 
writing to assume a historical character.1419  Skylitzes bemoans the failings of certain 
men who attempted to write history and failed: ‘these all set themselves their own 
goals: maybe the glorification of an emperor, the censure of a patriarch, or to extol a 
friend – each attains his own ends under the guise of writing history and every one of 
them falls short’.1420  This statement confirms that writers of biographical 
compositions professed to be writing works of a historiographical nature.  Among the 
authors mentioned we find Genesios, a ‘Leo of Asia’ - most probably Leo the 
Deacon1421 - and Manuel, thought to be the same Manuel who authored the personal 
history of John Kourkouas.  If this identification is correct, it is significant that the 
encomiastic biography of Kourkouas was viewed by contemporaries in the same vein 
as the historical works of Genesios and Leo the Deacon.  We might plausibly consider 
extant historiography to be not far removed from the lost secular ‘biographies’ of 
aristocratic generals; certainly, Évelyne Patlagean saw little distinction between the 
aristocratic propaganda of Kourkouas’ biographer and the writings of Nikephoros 
                                                 
1418 Jenkins (1954). 
1419 Alexander (1939): 197. 
1420 ...οἰκείαν ἕκαστος ὑπόθεσιν προστησάµενοι, ὁ µὲν ἔπαινον φέρε εἰπεῖν βασιλέως, ὁ δὲ ψόγον 
πατριάρχου, ἅτερος δὲ φίλου ἐγκώµιον καὶ ἐν ἱστορίας σχήµατι τὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἕκαστος ἀποπληροῦντες 
σκοπὸν πόρρω τῆς τῶν εἰρηµένων θεοφόρων ἀνδρῶν ἀποπεπτώκασι διανοίας (Skylitzes: 3.19-4.39; 
trans. 2).  See Alexander (1939): 196-197. 
1421 See Panagiotakes (1996): 238-240; Markopoulos (2003a): 193-194; Flusin (2010): xvi. 
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Bryennios and Anna Komnene.1422  We should not view the promotional 
compositions of the military aristocracy as works which adhered rigidly to particular 
conventions of encomiastic biography and/or historiography.  Influences were 
undoubtedly drawn from both. 
                                                 
1422 Patlagean (1979): 269. 
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III. Aristocratic Promotional Literature as Egodocuments
1423 
The very use of the term ‘biography’ to describe the output of the military aristocracy 
is problematic.  The sources discussed here may have invariably been family 
chronicles, political manifestos or pamphlets; the unifying element remains the 
eulogistic focus on a particular soldier or military family.  Furthermore, mention of 
the biographical fails to acknowledge the possibility that some of the hypothetical 
works may have been egodocuments; that is, autobiographies, memoirs and 
journals.1424  Unfortunately there is little to suggest the autobiographical genre ever 
thrived in Byzantium.  Michael Angold’s study on self-penned works highlights but 
three substantial pieces, and only one of these, the memoirs of fourteenth-century 
ruler John VI Kantakouzenos, is concerned with military affairs, though it lies outside 
the scope of this study.1425   
Traces of the Autobiographical in Aristocratic Promotional Literature 
Angold first observes traces of autobiography in Psellos’ Chronographia,1426 and it is 
perhaps in light of this that scholars have pondered whether some soldierly works of 
the eleventh century were autobiographical.  Shepard speculates that Katakalon 
Kekaumenos may have written his promotional work, proposing that he deliberately 
                                                 
1423 Dutch scholar Jacques Presser defined egodocuments as: ‘…those historical sources in which the 
reader is confronted with an “I”, or occasionally (Caesar, Henry Adams) a “he”, continually present in 
the text as the writing and describing subject’.  For recent discussion, see Dekker (2002a); idem 
(2002b); Fulbrook & Rublack (2010). 
1424 See Harari (2007a): 289-290.  For discussion of historical military biography and memoirs, with 
particular attention paid to the Renaissance period, see idem (2004a). 
1425 Angold (1998): esp. 254-255; idem (1999): 50-59; Hinterberger (1999).  Still useful are Misch 
(1962): 766-830; Hunger (1978): I, 165-170.  For further discussion of Kantakouzenos’ memoirs, see 
Kazhdan (1980); Tinnefeld (1993); Nicol (1996). 
1426 Angold (1998): 227, 233-238. 
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wrote in the third person to lend an air of objectivity to his accomplishments.1427  
Leonora Neville, noticing remnants of the first-person relating to John Doukas in 
Bryennios’ Hyle Historias, favours the possibility that Bryennios’ source was a 
personal memoir.1428  Perhaps the firmest evidence for the existence of military 
memoirs in the eleventh century is transmitted by Kekaumenos, whose Consilia et 
Narrationes includes an apologetic account of a revolt of 1066-1067, thought to have 
been penned by one of the perpetrators, Nikoulitzas Delphinas of Larissa.1429  On the 
basis of John VI Kantakouzenos’ history, and personal works of thirteenth-century 
ruler Michael VIII Palaiologos, Yuval Noah Harari determined that emperors and 
senior officials ‘continued to compose memoiristic texts well into the Middle 
Ages’.1430  Yet Harari’s conclusion was based on our only examples of military 
memoirs, dating from the Late era.  He also errs by describing Constantine VII 
Porphyrogenitos as a memoirist;1431 the emperor never went on campaign, and his 
treatises on imperial expeditions represent prescriptive guidebooks rather than a 
record of his own activity.   
Typika as Military Memoirs and Aristocratic Relations with Monasteries 
As success was granted by God, there appears to have been a specific outlet for the 
‘autobiographical impulse’ to manifest itself in Byzantium – monastic foundation 
documents, or typika.1432  Angold determines that the preface to a typikon ‘was the 
                                                 
1427 Shepard (1992b): 175-178; idem (forthcoming).  That said, Skylitzes’ use of the first-person is 
unusually substantial in his record of Michael VI’s rule, during which time Katakalon Kekaumenos 
was most active.  See Kiapidou (2010): 461-463. 
1428 Neville (2008): 186-187. 
1429 Kekaumenos: 248-272.  For discussion see Lemerle (1960): 41-56, where it is suggested that 
Kekaumenos located Nikoulitzas’ account in a family archive.  See also Roueché (1988): 128-129. 
1430 Harari (2007a): 291. 
1431 Idem (2004a): 188. 
1432 For typika in general see Galatariotou (1987a). 
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preferred form of autobiography in Byzantium’.1433  Informative typika of military 
men are rare, the most famous being two composed by Michael VIII Palaiologos, 
which Harari considered to be military memoirs.1434  In the first of these, concerning 
the Monastery of the Archangel Michael on Mount Auxentios, Michael is hesitant to 
give a complete account of his accomplishments.  ‘Although my majesty has spoken 
of them in a brief and cursory way, other writers have described them in a more 
deserving manner and in greater detail’.1435  Michael’s other typikon, dedicated to the 
Monastery of Saint Demetrios of the Palaiologoi-Kellibara at Constantinople, again 
acknowledges that a foundation document is not an appropriate outlet for detailed 
accounts of military actions.  ‘If I were to list our other victories such as those we 
gained in Europe…and in Asia…my words would be transformed into a discourse 
much longer than the present one’.1436  It is difficult to label these typika as military 
memoirs, and Michael indicates that contemporaries shared the sentiment. 
There is no real equivalent of Michael’s writings in the Middle Byzantine period, but 
the typikon of the megas domestikos, Gregory Pakourianos, is pertinent.1437  Peter 
Frankopan has shown the work to reveal important details about Pakourianos’ military 
career during the early 1080s.1438  The typikon conveys an undeniable link between 
the foundation of the monastery and military success, suggesting that Pakourianos 
                                                 
1433 Angold (1993). 
1434 Chapman (1926): 167-177; Angold (1999): 53-54. 
1435 Τούτων τοίνυν οὕτως ἐχόντων, ὡς ἐπιτροχάδην µὲν εἴρηται τῇ βασιλείᾳ µου καὶ συνωπτικῶς, παρ’ 
ἄλλοις δὲ συγγραφεῦσι φιλοτίµως καὶ πάνυ γε πλατικῶς (Typikon of Michael VIII Palaiologos for the 
Monastery of the Archangel Michael on Mount Auxentios near Chalcedon: 771; trans. 1216-1217). 
1436 Ἑτέρας δὲ νίκας εἰ καταριθµοῖµι, ἃς ἐν Μυσίᾳ µὲν τῆς Εὐρώπης µετὰ τὰς εἰρηµένας Βουλγάρους 
ἐνικῶµεν καὶ Τριβαλλούς, ἐν Ἀσίᾳ δὲ Πέρσας, καὶ τούτους κἀκείνους πλειστάκις, µῆκος ἂν γένοιτο 
λόγου µακρότερον, ἢ κατὰ τὴν παροῦσαν ὁρµὴν τοῦ λόγου (Typikon of Michael VIII Palaiologos for 
the Monastery of St. Demetrios of the Palaiologoi-Kellibara in Constantinople: 461; trans. 1246). 
1437 Typikon of Gregory Pakourianos for the Monastery of the Mother of God Petritzonitissa in 
Bačkovo.  For discussion see Morris (1985a): 215-220; Angold (1993): 52, 64-65. 
1438 Frankopan (1996). 
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intended the monastery to serve as a reminder of his deeds and the glory of his 
family.1439  In his typikon for the Monastery of Saint Demetrios of the Palaiologoi, 
Michael VIII Palaiologos recalls the piety, bravery and military expertise of his 
famous ancestor, George Palaiologos.  Michael tells of how George was the first to 
erect a church dedicated to Saint Demetrios in Constantinople, later restored by the 
current ruler.1440  ‘We renewed the memory of the blessed founder, our ancestor, 
which men had already consigned to oblivion’.1441  In this respect, the objective of the 
donor differed little from that of the subjects of aristocratic promotional literature.  
Angold observed that typika could be used to vindicate aristocratic ideals;1442 
frequently read, they ‘pressed home this…subtle propaganda’.1443  As the monastic 
foundation served as a visual reminder of an individual or family, the typikon was a 
commemoration of the founder in words.  Together they served as another avenue by 
which the military aristocracy could ensure recognition and lasting eminence. 
The monastery as a monument may have relevance to the appearance of aristocratic 
promotional literature.  From the tenth century the aristocracy founded many new 
monasteries or renovated existing sites.1444  As patrons, they were venerated in 
monastic liturgies.1445  Family and collective identity are prominent in surviving 
                                                 
1439 Angold (1999): 44-47. 
1440 This foundation of George Palaiologos is otherwise unattested; it is thought that he probably 
undertook the project in the early twelfth century towards the end of his career.  See Dennis’ 
introduction to his translation (1238) for discussion. 
1441 τῷ τε µακαρίτῃ κτήτορι καὶ ἡµετέρῳ προγόνῳ ἀποσβεσθὲν ἤδη παρ’ ἀνθρώποις τὸ µνηµόσυνον 
ἀνανεουµένη (Typikon of Michael VIII Palaiologos for the Monastery of St. Demetrios of the 
Palaiologoi-Kellibara in Constantinople: 463; trans. 1247). 
1442 Angold (1998): 241-243.  Galatariotou (1987a: 89-107) notes the emphasis on family, titles and, to 
a lesser extent, wealth in aristocratic typika. 
1443 Morris (1984): 126; idem (1995): 123. 
1444 Mango (1976): 353-355; Morris (1984); idem (1985a): 215-231. 
1445 Morris (1995): 109.  Though Nikephoros II Phokas forbade the endowment of new monasteries in a 
novel of 964, instead encouraging improvements to existing dilapidated foundations, the law does not 
appear to have had too great an effect - Ius Graecoromanum: I, 249-252.  For discussion see Charanis 
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typika, with monasteries and churches often synonymous with a particular family.1446  
Rosemary Morris discusses monasteries acting as the focus for expressions of ‘family 
esprit de corps’, citing the example of the brothers Nikephoros and Leo Phokas and 
their patronage of the Lavra of Michael Maleinos on Mount Kyminas.1447  There is 
evidence to suggest that the Argyros family established a burial site at the Monastery 
of Saint Elizabeth at Charsianon,1448 while the Gabrades may have done the same at 
the Monastery of the megalomartyr George at Kheriana.1449  Though we lack a family 
chronicle, Jean-Claude Cheynet observes that the commemorative lists found in 
various typika, requesting that certain family members be remembered in prayers, 
have ‘much in common’ with genealogical literature.1450  An interesting parallel may 
be seen in the west.  When the first genealogies and family histories appear in 
northern Europe in the mid-tenth century, a number are composed at monasteries 
associated with the family.1451  With the tradition of monastic chroniclers in 
Byzantium,1452 it might also be the case that some aristocratic promotional literature 
emerged from foundations affiliated with specific individuals and families. 
We have discussed Grégoire’s ideas about ‘epic hagiographies’ of the ninth-century 
generals Theophobos and Manuel the Armenian, produced by monasteries closely 
affiliated with these individuals.  Nikephoros II Phokas appears to have been the 
                                                                                                                                            
(1948): esp. 61 n.23; Lemerle (1979a): 110-112; J. P. Thomas (1983); idem (1987): 149-157; Morris 
(1988): 100-106; idem (1995): 166-169; Laiou (1998): 410-411. 
1446 Galatariotou (1987a): 95-97; Talbot (1990); Morris (1985a): 217-220; idem (1995): 133-137. 
1447 Morris (1984): 122.  For the relationship between the Phokas family and Michael Maleinos, see 
Laiou (1998).   
1448 Vannier (1975): 20, 23. 
1449 Bryer (1969-1970): 181. 
1450 Cheynet (2006c): 9. 
1451 Shopkow (2003).  For the emergence of the family chronicle in the west, see Génicot (1975); Duby 
(1981); van Houts (1995): 33-42. 
1452 Kazhdan & Constable (1982): 101-102.  Admittedly this tradition had subsided by the tenth century 
– see Mango (1988-1989). 
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subject of similar veneration from the Great Lavra monastery on Mount Athos, which 
he co-founded in 964.1453  A commemorative liturgical office read on 11th December 
(the date of his death) at the Great Lavra praised Phokas’ piety and his role as a 
‘mighty soldier of Christ’.1454  Vita B of Athanasios the Athonite, head of the Great 
Lavra and Phokas’ spiritual father, reveals that a cook from the monastery determined 
Nikephoros to be a suitable intercessor to pray to, since many venerated him as a 
martyr.1455  The Apocalypse of Anastasia, an early eleventh-century apocryphal tale in 
which the eponymous protagonist is given a tour of the Otherworld and encounters 
Phokas tormenting a troubled John Tzimiskes, has been ascribed to an Athonite monk 
and partisan of Phokas.1456  The hagiographical tradition of Nikephoros Phokas which 
emanated from Mount Athos provides an interesting counterpart to the secular 
accounts of his military career, though the two may have converged.1457 
The fact remains, however, that we lack a vita of a secular patron like Nikephoros.  
Similar is the case of the Georgian monk and soldier John Tornikios: while his 
                                                 
1453 Dagron (2007): 151-152.  For discussion of Nikephoros’ piety and his wish to retire as a monk, see 
Morris (1988): 102-105. 
1454 στρατιώτης Χριστοῦ περιδέξιος (Office in honour of Nikephoros Phokas: 404.45-46).  Editor Louis 
Petit (1904: 398-401) suggested that the canon was contemporary, and may have been composed by 
Theodosios the Deacon.  For further discussion of the office, see also Morris (1988): 106; Laiou 
(1998): 403; Kazhdan (2006): 287-288. 
1455 Vitae of St. Athanasios: §44 (Vita B). 
1456 Morris (1988): 106-107, 112-113.  For the Apocalypse, see Baun (2007), who concedes that the tale 
may have originated in numerous places where there was something of a ‘Phokas cult’ – southern 
Greece, Cappadocia, Macedonia or Crete.  Kazhdan (2006: 204) cautiously suggested a date as early as 
the 980s, though Baun (2007: 17-18) suggests the second half of Basil II’s reign as the date of 
composition.  Similar is the fourteenth-century legendary Slavonic Lay of Nikephoros and Theophano, 
perhaps inspired by the apocrypha, and also thought to have earlier monastic provenance in the 
Byzantine Empire.  For discussion see Vranoussi (1978); Kazhdan (2006): 287-289. 
1457 Nikephoros II Phokas was venerated at a number of monasteries.  It has been suggested that 
Anatolian landowners in Cappadocia, the heartland of the Phokades, commissioned the decoration of 
the Pigeon House church at Çavusin, including the side-chapel adorned with a fresco featuring 
Nikephoros and his family, in order to commemorate the emperor’s successful Cilician campaign of 
965.  See Restle (1967): I, 135-138; Vryonis (1971): 24-25; Kaplan (1981): 140-148; Rodley (1983): 
301-339; Thierry (1985): 480-483; idem (1989): 222-223; Joliet-Levy (1991): 20-21; Oikonomides 
(2005): 7-8; Baun (2007): 164-167, 225-226; Walter (2003): 282-283.  
297 
military success allowed him to finance the construction of the Iviron monastery on 
Mount Athos, only the vita of his co-founders, fellow Georgians John and Euthymios, 
is known.1458  Rosemary Morris determined Tornikios’ life to have been ‘a little too 
“active” to be fitted into the hagiographer’s mould’, suggesting that individuals such 
as he and Pakourianos were honoured and respected only as lay patrons.1459  
Nevertheless, there are references which should be considered.  The sebastokrator 
Isaac Komnenos mentions bequeathing a book he composed to the Monastery of the 
Mother of God Kosmosoteira.  ‘It [contains] heroic, iambic and political verse, as well 
as various letters and ekphraseis.  I do not want this to lie in an obscure place, but to 
be displayed often as [something to] read (in memory of me)’.1460  We cannot 
discount the possibility that some of this material was autobiographical, especially 
since Isaac links the writings to his own memory.  A typikon of Michael VIII 
Palaiologos indicates the existence of family records which emphasized piety, 
philanthropy and military deeds.  Michael states that he will pass over his ancestry, 
but directs the reader to ‘discourses and books composed by the learned’: 
For these give an account not only of their dignities and honours, the great 
influence they had with rulers, and how they accumulated vast riches, no less than 
of their combat in wartime, their generalship, and their valour, but they also 
                                                 
1458 The Vita of SS. John and Euthymios.  For Tornikios and John and Euthymios, see Adontz (1938); 
Tarchnishvili (1964): 95-97; Actes d’Iviron I: 1-32; Morris (1995): 84-86.  Tornikios was not the only 
former soldier held dear by the Iviron monastery.  A Georgian calendar preserved in the Typikon of 
George Mtatsmindeli, hegoumene of the monastery in the mid-eleventh century, commemorates John 
Tzimiskes on 11th January, the date of his death.  See van Esbroeck (1983), with Tzimiskes’ support for 
the establishment outlined in Actes d’Iviron I: 25-32. 
1459 Morris (1995): 66, 87-88. 
1460 πρὸς ταύταις δὲ καὶ ἑτέραν βίβλον κατέλιπον, ἣ πόνῳ µακρῷ στιχιδίοις ἡρωικοῖς τε καὶ ἰαµβικοῖς 
καὶ πολιτικοῖς καὶ ἐπιστολαῖς διαφόροις τε καὶ ἐκφράσεσι συντέταχα, οὐκ ἐν ἀφανεῖ τόπῳ κεῖσθαι 
βούλοµαι ταύτην, ἀλλὰ πολλάκις ὑπενδείκνυσθαι πρὸς ἀνάγνωσιν καὶ ἡµετέραν ἀνάµνησιν τοῖς 
φιλοπονωτέροις τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ προστυγχάνειν βίβλοις καὶ ἱστορίαις ἐθέλουσιν, ἀνεκποιήτους δὲ 
καὶ ταύτας τῇ µονῇ εἶναι βουλόµεθα καὶ ἐσαεὶ αὐτῇ περισώζεσθαι (Typikon of the Sebastokrator Isaac 
Komnenos from the Monastery of the Mother of God Kosmosoteira near Bera: 69.6-12; trans. 844). 
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inform us of their erection of religious houses, holy convents and monasteries, 
their donation of property, their aid to the poor, their concern for the infirm, and 
their protection of the indigent of all sorts, and all their pious deeds which bore 
fruit before God.1461 
We cannot know if these ‘records of the Palaiologoi’ were produced in a monastic 
environment, but the reference clearly attests to the existence of aristocratic 
genealogical literature containing details about the military careers of its subjects.   
Finally, we should not overlook that many soldiers retired as monks, with John and 
Michael Doukas, Isaac and Adrian Komnenos, and Michael Palaiologos some of the 
more notable examples from our period.1462  During this time they were ideally 
disposed to write about their lives.  Anna Komnene attests to the capacity and 
willingness of soldiers-turned-monks to recall their careers, orally at least.  This is not 
to say that such men did not write about their deeds, especially the more illustrious 
and well-educated.  The critical example is John Kantakouzenos, who, while not 
strictly retired from political affairs, wrote his memoirs as a monk.  Shepard suggests 
that Katakalon Kekaumenos composed an autobiographical work during his monastic 
retirement; perhaps the tradition began much earlier.1463  
 
                                                 
1461 Παραπέµποντος, ταύτην εἴ τις ζητοίη – καὶ ὡς µετὰ τῆς κάτωθεν εὐδαιµονίας οἱ τούτου τοῦ γένους 
καὶ τῷ θεῷ σπουδὴν ἔθεντο πολιτεύσασθαι ὅθεν αὐτοῖς καὶ τὸ κληρονόµους γενέσθαι ὑπῆρξε τῆς παρ’ 
αὐτῷ κεκρυµµένης ζωῆς - εἰς σοφῶν λόγους καὶ βίβλους συγγραφικὰς παραπέµψοµεν; αἵ γε οὐ µόνον 
ἀξιώµατα καὶ τιµὰς αὐτῶν καὶ ὡς τοῖς κρατοῦσι παρεδυνάστευον, καὶ ὡς πλούτους µεγάλους 
περιβέβληντο, οὐδὲ µὴν ἀγῶνας πολεµικοὺς καὶ στρατηγίας καὶ ἀριστείας ἀνάγραπτα φέρουσιν, ἀλλὰ 
καὶ θείων οἴκων καὶ σεµνείων ἱερῶν καὶ φροντιστηρίων ἐκδιδάσκουσιν ἀνεγέρσεις καὶ κτήσεων 
ἀφιερώσεις καὶ πενήτων προµηθείας καὶ ἀσθενούντων ἐπιµελείας καὶ παντοίων ἀπόρων προστασίας 
καὶ ὅσα δὴ εὐσεβῶς ἐκεῖνοι δρῶντες ἐκαρποφόρουν θεῷ (Typikon of Michael VIII Palaiologos for the 
Monastery of St. Demetrios of the Palaiologoi-Kellibara in Constantinople: 449; trans. 1242). 
1462 For the tendency of soldiers to retire as monks, see Haldon (1984): 326-328. 
1463 Shepard (1992b): 179 n.25. 
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Conclusion 
The possibility that some aristocratic promotional literature was self-penned cannot be 
dismissed.  Biographical works documenting military feats immediately call to mind 
the Hellenistic hypomnemata and Latin commentarii.1464  Xenophon’s Anabasis has 
been described as ‘the prototype of commentaries on a campaign written by one of the 
leading generals’;1465 it is written in the third-person, attributed to a phantom author, 
one ‘Themistogenes’.1466  Singing one’s praises was best left to others; thus Roman 
aristocrats often assigned a friend or client to develop their memoirs into a more 
polished historical account in the third-person.1467  These concerns were probably also 
prevalent in Byzantium, particularly if Shepard is correct to argue that Katakalon 
Kekaumenos wrote his memoirs in the third-person.  The extracts pertaining to 
aristocratic generals show an intimate knowledge which indicates their contribution in 
some form, be it direct authorship, or as suppliers of information.  It is plausible that 
aristocrats, like their Roman counterparts, kept memoirs which served as raw material 
for polished compositions.1468  Given that probable aristocratic promotional literature 
lies embedded in surviving historiography, it is feasible that some at least were 
intended to serve a greater literary purpose, ensuring positive representation of the 
subject in more general historical works.   
                                                 
1464 See Bomer (1953). 
1465 Momigliano (1971): 57. 
1466 MacLaren Jr. (1934); Cawkwell (2004). 
1467 Misch (1974): I, 187-188. 
1468 Momigliano (1971): 15.  Yuval Noah Harari (2004a: 37) reminds us however that memoirists were 
not always sincere in stating this - many regardless ended up producing what amounted to a general 
chronicle of their time.  
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IV. Biographical Compositions in Extant Historiography 
The interest in influential individuals and exciting military narratives broadly 
accounts for the exploitation of aristocratic promotional literature in historiography of 
the Middle period.  A more pressing issue is how the likes of Nikephoros Bryennios 
and Skylitzes rendered their written sources.  To answer this question, scholars have 
examined how these historians used other sources which survive intact.  We know 
that Bryennios made some use of the Chronographia of Michael Psellos and the 
Synopsis Historion of Skylitzes;1469 as he followed them rather slavishly, Leonora 
Neville considers it likely that Bryennios adhered closely to the proposed composition 
of John Doukas.1470 
Catherine Holmes’ principal methodology is similar, and entails comparison of 
Skylitzes’ account of the reign of Romanos I Lekapenos with that of Theophanes 
Continuatus.  Holmes demonstrates that Skylitzes was prone to trimming and 
discarding military material, imposing his rather standardized military vocabulary on 
descriptions of battle.  Skylitzes appears to retain only the more extraordinary and 
exciting episodes in extensive detail.  Where he adds to the original source, it is a 
linking phrase, explanatory statement or slight inference, rarely anything 
contradictory or substantial.  As befitting a synoptic historian, Skylitzes, in the main, 
simply abridges his material, showing no obvious intent to make radical changes or 
additions to his source.1471 
In his prooimion, Skylitzes notes that when using his sources he was careful to 
remove ‘all comments of a subjective or fanciful nature…I left aside the writers’ 
                                                 
1469 Carile (1969). 
1470 Neville (2008): 175. 
1471 Holmes (2005): 125-170. 
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differences and contradictions.  I excised whatever I found there which tended toward 
fantasy; but I garnered whatever seemed likely and not beyond the bounds of 
credibility’.1472  Eulogistic biographical compositions extolling the heroic deeds of 
generals do not strike us as the best sources to employ in order to achieve objectivity, 
but they suited a contemporary interest in prosopography at the time Skylitzes was 
writing.  Holmes argues that the great military families who comprised Skylitzes’ 
audience wished to read about the valour and cunning of past heroes, many of whom 
belonged to families who remained influential during the reign of Alexios I 
Komnenos.1473  These familial ties may have been important considerations in how 
Skylitzes chose to present certain individuals, yet it should be noted that any negative 
or positive portrayals are more likely to have been the result of his original material 
than his own invention.1474  Therefore, while Skylitzes was selective with the material 
he included, what he does present appears to have been faithful to the original source. 
                                                 
1472 τὰς τῶν ἄνωθεν λεχθέντων συγγραφέων ἐπ’ ἀκριβὲς ἱστορίας ἀναλεξάµενοι καὶ τὰ ἐµπαθῶς ἢ καὶ 
πρὸς χάριν λεχθέντα ἀποδιοποµπήσαντες καὶ τὰς διαφορὰς καὶ διαφωνίας παρέντες, ἀποξέσαντες δὲ 
καὶ ὅσα ἐγγὺς ἐρχόµενα εὕροµεν τοῦ µυθώδους, τὰ δὲ εἰκότα καὶ ὁπόσα µὴ τοῦ πιθανοῦ ἀπέπιπτε 
συλλεξάµενοι (Skylitzes: 4.44-48; trans. 3). 
1473 Holmes (2005): 171-239. 
1474 See above, 63-68. 
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V. Features of Aristocratic Promotional Literature 
The manner in which Skylitzes and Bryennios utilized their extant sources allows for 
tentative identification of some of the lost material they might have consulted.  While 
we cannot completely reconstruct the underlying source, we may surmise that parts 
where the proposed subject features prominently derived from an aristocratic 
composition.  We are thus able to make some broad observations about potential 
content and cite similarities across these types of works.1475 
Distortion and Fabrication 
Distortion and invention are endemic to any encomiastic work where the subject was 
portrayed as an exemplary figure.1476  According to Patricia Cox, to question the 
integrity of Greco-Roman biography on the basis of factual discrepancy ‘is to 
misconceive the literary tradition of the genre’.1477  Pertinent also are the thoughts of 
Sigmund Freud: ‘Whoever turns biographer commits himself to lies, to concealment, 
to hypocrisy, to embellishments…biographical truth is not to be had, and even if one 
had it, one could not use it’.1478  Yet it should be noted that Byzantine historians rarely 
offer a completely impartial version of events, regardless of their stated intentions.  
Nevertheless, it is useful to examine instances where aristocratic literature seems to 
have distorted military events, in order to understand how a subject ought to be 
presented. 
                                                 
1475 Appendix IV offers observations on the depiction of military aristocrats in historical works which 
may have some relevance to the coverage offered by promotional biographical literature. 
1476 Hägg & Rousseau (2000): 14. 
1477 Cox (1983): 5.  See also Momigliano (1971): 56-57 for biographers being forced ‘to resort to 
fiction’. 
1478 Quoted in Averil Cameron (1997): 146. 
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Jonathan Shepard has shown Skylitzes’ coverage of Katakalon Kekaumenos to be 
extremely favourable, a probable consequence of Skylitzes drawing upon an 
encomiastic biographical source which distorted events to conceal Kekaumenos’ 
failures.1479  By Skylitzes’ account, the Battle of Kaputru would have resulted in 
victory for the Byzantines had the Georgian commander Liparites not failed to carry 
the Turkish centre, with Kekaumenos having already successfully routed the Turkish 
left.1480  This is at odds with the testimony of Armenian historians Aristakes of 
Lastivert and Matthew of Edessa, who insist that it was actually Liparites who upheld 
his part of the plan, with the Byzantines ignobly abandoning him.  Consequently, the 
Turks overwhelmed the Iberian troops and won an emphatic victory.1481  We might 
expect Armenian sources – Matthew in particular – to apportion blame to the 
Byzantines, but the testimony of Attaleiates corroborates the notion that the 
Byzantines were defeated.1482  Where Skylitzes is more honest about defeats 
Kekaumenos was involved in, as with the Battle of Diakene in 1049, he nevertheless 
makes strenuous efforts to preserve Kekaumenos’ integrity.  Thus it is Kekaumenos’ 
sound tactical advice prior to the battle which is ignored by the incompetent 
Nikephoros the rektor, and it is Kekaumenos who stands and fights when all his 
fellow generals flee.1483  When Kekaumenos is involved in a victory, the success is 
usually attributed to him: while Isaac Komnenos wavers at the Battle of Hades in 
1057, it is Kekaumenos who decides the encounter by routing the imperial right and 
                                                 
1479 Shepard (1992b): esp. 173-174. 
1480 Skylitzes: 452-453. 
1481 Aristakes of Lastivert: 69-70; Matthew of Edessa: 78-79. 
1482 Attaleiates: 34-35.  For the argument see Shepard (1975-1976): 276-279.  John Haldon (2003: 47-
48, 56) favours Skylitzes’ account. 
1483 Skylitzes: 468-469.  On a related note, the other Kekaumenos, in his Consilia et Narrationes (96-
98), attributes a second defeat to the Pechenegs at Diampolis that same year to the commander, 
Constantine the rektor, deciding to commit his fatigued army to battle rather than let them rest first (see 
also Attaleiates: 25-27).  The defeats at Diakene and Diampolis as recorded by Skylitzes and 
Kekaumenos are not to be conflated – for discussion of the arguments see Lemerle (1960): 39-40 n.2, 
71-72. 
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cutting through the enemy camp.1484  Attaleiates makes no mention of Kekaumenos, 
and notes only the eventual success of Komnenos’ right flank.1485  Psellos provides a 
different account entirely; according to him, Isaac’s flanks crumbled immediately, 
leaving him alone in the centre, where the battle was won.1486  The prominence and 
favour afforded to Katakalon Kekaumenos in these instances highlights the mandate 
of Skylitzes’ pro-Kekaumenos source. 
As Catherine Holmes has shown, the pro-Bardas Skleros document employed by 
Skylitzes provides further examples of the distortion, exaggeration and deception 
endemic in aristocratic promotional literature.  Skylitzes’ account of Skleros’ victory 
at Arcadiopolis in 970, while more lucid than that provided by Leo the Deacon, 
appears to exaggerate the feat by quadrupling the size of the enemy force and 
reducing Byzantine casualties by more than half.1487  Examples from Basil II’s reign 
are harder to discern given the lack of corroborative Greek sources, but Arabic texts 
indicate that Skleros’ heroic escape from Buyid captivity, as reported in Skylitzes, is 
probably legend; rather, it would appear he was merely allowed to leave by his 
hosts.1488  Holmes determines that ‘many of Skleros’ claims were either extremely far-
fetched or more simply blatant lies’.1489   
Our last example is the presentation of the kaisar John Doukas in his encomiastic 
source, believed to be partially preserved in the Hyle Historias of Nikephoros 
Bryennios.  The Battle of Zompos, where Doukas led the imperial forces against the 
Norman rebel Roussel, is recorded differently by Bryennios and Attaleiates.  
                                                 
1484 Skylitzes: 494-495. 
1485 Attaleiates: 41-42. 
1486 Psellos, Chronographia: II, 90-91 (XIII). 
1487 Holmes (2005): 272-276.  Leo the Deacon: 108-111; Skylitzes: 288-291. 
1488 Holmes (2005): 276-278. 
1489 Ibid: 286. 
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According to Attaleiates, Doukas sent a delegation to Roussel, but merely treated his 
opposite number with contempt, encouraging the bellicose Roussel to fight.  Having 
ignored the wise counsel of fellow commander Nikephoros Botaneiates, the kaisar 
decided to give battle only to be defeated by Roussel’s army.1490  The account of 
Nikephoros Bryennios divulges more details about the course of the battle proper.  It 
is said that the mercenary Franks almost immediately defected to Roussel, with the 
result that Doukas was essentially surrounded.  He was left further isolated when the 
rearguard, commanded by Nikephoros Botaneiates, left the field.  Despite a heroic 
effort, John Doukas and his son Andronikos were eventually captured.1491  We can 
surmise that Bryennios, or rather his source, neglected the preliminary discussions and 
plans as they reflected poorly on Doukas.  It may be that Attaleiates knew of the 
negotiations through his friend Basil Maleses, who was captured along with 
Doukas.1492  It should not be forgotten, however, that Attaleiates was writing to 
appease Botaneiates, and could not include anything which might tarnish the 
emperor’s reputation.  Thus it is telling that the historian gives little thought to the 
fighting, suggesting that an unprepared Doukas was merely overpowered by Roussel’s 
forces.  Conversely, this is where the Doukas source of Bryennios could make a 
greater case for its subject.  The treachery of Doukas’ western troops is stressed, 
while, most notably, Botaneiates is reported to have withdrawn with the rearguard, 
leaving the Doukai to fight alone.  It is hardly surprising that Attaleiates omitted this 
development.  Consequently, we should not consider Neville’s pro-Doukas source to 
distort events any more than other records of the engagement. 
                                                 
1490 Attaleiates: 136-139. 
1491 Bryennios: 169-171.  Skylitzes Continuatus (158) largely echoes the account of Attaleiates. 
1492 Dimitris Krallis (2006: 249-250) suggests that Attaleiates’ view of Roussel was ‘certainly 
influenced’ by Maleses, and regards Maleses as ‘a first rate source for the Historia’.  For Attaleiates’ 
friendship with Maleses, see ibid: 138-151. 
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Military Episodes – Stratagems and Generalship 
The fragmentary evidence analyzed below suggests that aristocratic promotional 
literature featured highly descriptive accounts of campaigns and battles, with 
emphasis drawn to the ability of the subject(s).  Comparison with contemporary 
military handbooks reveals the strategies and tactics employed in the compositions to 
reflect current trends, something which would not have been lost on an aristocratic 
audience.  Authors of soldier biographies appear to depict their subject as one who 
played it by the book, as it were, perhaps deeming it the best way to demonstrate the 
extent of his ability.  And just as the manuals promote original thinking, we similarly 
witness moments of ingenuity and innovation.   
Leo the Deacon’s detailed account of the victory of Leo Phokas over the Hamdanid 
emir Sayf al-Dawla in 960 is suggestive of the use of an informed source keen to extol 
Leo Phokas.1493  The positive traits attributed to Leo Phokas – courage and vigour, 
exceptionally good judgment, supremely clever at devising the proper course of action 
– support Athanasios Markopoulos’ idea of the virtues esteemed in aristocratic 
biographies.1494  Before Leo the Deacon describes the engagement, he provides a brief 
record of an earlier victory won by Leo Phokas over the Magyars.1495  It is probable 
that Leo the Deacon came across this episode in the same document that chronicled 
Leo Phokas’ victory over Sayf al-Dawla.  In both instances the perilous nature of the 
situation is stressed – the enemy army is vastly superior in numbers, skill, arms, and 
morale.  Nevertheless, Leo triumphs through careful planning and the springing of a 
                                                 
1493 For accounts of the battle see Leo the Deacon: 18-24; cf. Skylitzes: 249-250; Theophanes 
Continuatus: 479; Vaticanus gr. 163: 98-99; Yahya ibn Said: 781-783; Ibn Miskawayh: 180-181.  See 
also Canard (1951): 801-803; Bikhazi (1981): 844-847. 
1494 Markopoulos (2004-2005). 
1495 Leo the Deacon: 18-19. Cf. Vitae of St. Athanasios: §55.3-5 (Vita A); §20.3-5 (Vita B).  For 
discussion see Moravcsik (1958): I, 555; Bouras (1981); Cheynet (1986): 301-306. 
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sudden, devastating attack.  In both battles the cautious and tactically-aware Leo 
Phokas is presented as an expert practitioner of the skirmishing warfare presented in 
the contemporary military handbook, the De Velitatione.  As Jean-Claude Cheynet 
and Gilbert Dagron have demonstrated, chapters III (on occupying difficult terrain in 
advance of the enemy), XXIII (on ambushing a withdrawing enemy in mountain 
passes) and XXIV (on night attacks) of the De Velitatione provide principles so 
similar to those followed by Leo Phokas against the Arabs and Magyars that we must 
wonder if his textbook victories provided the blueprint for these sections.1496    
Catherine Holmes proposes that the Bardas Skleros biographical source sought to 
present its subject as an expert general through his cunning and strategic 
awareness.1497  Skylitzes’ extensive use of the work allows us to highlight several 
ways in which the original author did this.  The account of Skleros’ victory over a 
combined Magyar-Pecheneg-Bulgarian force near the Thracian town of Arcadiopolis 
in 970 has been shown by Eric McGeer to present a perfect execution of the tactics 
prescribed for defeating a superior force in the military treatise, the Praecepta 
Militaria.1498  Here Bardas Skleros’ generalship and combat skills are complimented, 
but in other instances it is his quick thinking and innovative stratagems.  At the Battle 
of Lapara in 976, Skleros deceived the imperial army by ordering his troops to fall 
upon them whilst the opposition was eating.  Though the enemy stood firm initially, 
they were eventually unnerved by Bardas’ outflanking manoeuvre and broke 
ranks.1499  It is also suggested that the Skleros manifesto offered a fictitious account of 
Skleros’ daring escape from captivity in Baghdad, apparently made possible through 
                                                 
1496 Dennis (1985): 139-140, 157 n.2; Dagron & Mihăescu (1986): 165-169, 223 n.16; Cheynet (1986): 
293-294, 304-305. 
1497 Holmes (2005): 260-263, 281-289, 291-293. 
1498 McGeer (1995a): 294-300. 
1499 Skylitzes: 319. 
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his considerable ingenuity, courage and military ability.1500  Exhilarating stories and 
accounts of textbook military victories best conveyed the brilliance of Skleros.  
The emphasis on exciting military episodes exhibiting the bravery and cunning of the 
general is also evident in material relating to Katakalon Kekaumenos.  Beset by a vast 
Arab army at Messina in 1041, Kekaumenos delayed while the frustrated Arabs 
turned to drink, and consequently became careless.  This was not lost on 
Kekaumenos, who led a charge against the unprepared enemy, and rode straight for 
the quarters of the enemy leader, cutting him down.  To target the opposition 
commander was a key principle of tenth-century Byzantine military theory, with the 
result that the enemy would be demoralized.1501  Kekaumenos’ boldness paid off as 
the enemy took to disorderly flight, suffering heavy losses.1502  The account paints a 
familiar picture of a skilled general pulling off a defeat through cunning and military 
prowess in the face of overwhelming odds. 
We encounter further episodes showcasing Kekaumenos’ expertise during Skylitzes’ 
discussion of the general’s tenure as governor of Ani and Iberia in Armenia.1503  In 
1048, Kekaumenos, having been called to assist Aaron, governor of Vaspurakan, 
against the incursions of the Turks, favoured abandoning the fortified camp and 
readying ambushes, so that they could set upon the Turks whilst they were pillaging 
the site.  By outlining the plan, and then describing its perfect execution, the text 
stresses that the victory was entirely down to Kekaumenos’ expertise.1504  
Significantly, whenever Kekaumenos’ advice is overlooked, the Turks enjoy success; 
                                                 
1500 Ibid: 332-334.  For further discussion see Holmes (2005): 276-278. 
1501 Nikephoros II Phokas, Praecepta Militaria: §§II.115-120; IV.120-123.  For discussion see McGeer 
(1995a): 307-308. 
1502 Skylitzes: 406-407. 
1503 Shepard (1975-1976). 
1504 Skylitzes: 448-449. 
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the momentum from the initial triumph is lost when Aaron ignores Kekaumenos’ plea 
to attack the Turks massing for a retaliatory raid,1505 while the inhabitants of Artze 
might have been spared had they listened to Kekaumenos and sought refuge within 
walls.1506  The Roman-Iberian force loses the initiative because of the refusal of the 
Georgian noble Liparites to heed Kekaumenos’ call to attack the Turks as they arrived 
in piecemeal fashion.1507  This aggressive stance seems to have been a particular trait 
of Kekaumenos, since precisely the same advice is ignored in relation to a different 
enemy, the Pechenegs, at the Battle of Diakene in 1049; inevitably, the Byzantines 
lose the battle.1508  We might infer that the pro-Kekaumenos source of Skylitzes 
sought to present its subject as an energetic leader, eager to take the fight to the enemy 
to avoid large-scale pitched battle.1509 
The correlation between the tactics employed by these generals and the guidance of 
contemporary handbooks reflects the renewed interest in military theory during this 
period.  The Emperor Leo VI the Wise drafted an exhaustive Taktika which drew 
heavily upon the Strategikon of Emperor Maurice and the works of Hellenistic 
authors on warfare, including Onasander and Aelian.1510  Subsequent manuals, written 
by men with practical experience, show a greater awareness of current tactical 
developments.  The De Velitatione documents the procedures for frontier warfare 
against the Arabs between c.840-958.1511  The shift to more offensive tactics is first 
seen in the largely encyclopaedic Sylloge Tacticorum, compiled during the reign of 
                                                 
1505 Such tactics are advised by Leo VI, Taktika: §XX.212. 
1506 Skylitzes: 449-452. 
1507 Ibid: 452-453. 
1508 Ibid: 468. 
1509 Consistency in Kekaumenos’ tactics, namely that of him attacking before an enemy had chance to 
organize, is similarly noted by Shepard (forthcoming). 
1510 Leo VI, Taktika; Maurice, Strategikon; Onasander; Aelian. 
1511 De Velitatione.  See Haldon & Kennedy (1980); Dagron & Mihăescu (1986). 
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Constantine VII Porphyrogenitos;1512 the relevant sections were soon reworked and 
expanded by the Emperor Nikephoros II Phokas in his Praecepta Militaria.1513  
Instructional works on defensive (De Obsidione Toleranda) and offensive siege 
warfare (the Parangelmata Poliorketika by the so-called Heron of Byzantium) 
appeared in the mid-tenth century.1514  Imperial campaigns in the treacherous terrain 
of Bulgaria were covered in the treatise De Re Militari, thought to have been 
composed in the first half of Basil II’s reign.1515  Finally, in the early eleventh century 
Nikephoros Ouranos, a leading general of Basil II, compiled a comprehensive Taktika 
which included some new content reflecting changes in warfare since Nikephoros 
Phokas’ day.1516   
While there is no evidence outside of the manuals confirming that these particular 
works were read by soldiers,1517 the very fact that they dealt with current 
circumstances and were written by men with military experience suggests that they 
were intended for practical application.  The author of the Vita Basilii stressed the 
importance of military handbooks to those considering engaging in war: ‘Were it 
possible for everyone to learn military science or art without study and considerable 
practice, authors of works on tactics who devote so much labour to this topic would 
                                                 
1512 Sylloge Tacticorum. 
1513 Nikephoros II Phokas, Praecepta Militaria.  See McGeer (1995a). 
1514 Heron of Byzantium, Parangelmata Poliorketika; De Obsidione Toleranda.  See Sullivan (2000). 
1515 De Re Militari. 
1516 Nikephoros Ouranos, Taktika.  See McGeer (1995a). 
1517 Intriguingly the manuals of the tenth century do occasionally show an awareness of the wider field.  
The De Velitatione (§XX.1; trans. 219) directs the reader to actions described ‘in the strategical book 
composed by the revered and most wise emperor Leo’, almost certainly a reference to Leo’s Taktika.  
The following chapter (ibid: §XXI.1; trans. 225) notes that matters of siege warfare ‘have been 
carefully and precisely explained before us by the authors of books on tactics and strategy’.  The De Re 
Militari (§27.9-13; trans. 288-289) writes similarly of siege warfare: ‘the ancient authorities have 
written excellent and very practical things in their books more scientifically and in greater detail than 
the present work’. In addition to ancient commentators, these may well be references to the various 
poliorketika composed in the tenth century.  See Dagron & Mihăescu (1986): 226-227; Sullivan 
(2003a): 144-145. 
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be merely ranting senselessly’.1518  The military education the Emperor Basil II gave 
to the young John and Isaac Komnenos involved the study of taktika.1519  
Kekaumenos advised generals to read military handbooks when not at war, and 
himself appears to have been familiar with such works.1520  Constantine VII 
Porphyrogenitos instructed that military manuals (βιβλία στρατηγικά) be taken on 
imperial expeditions.1521  According to Michael Psellos, Basil II gained a knowledge 
of military formations partly from his own experience but also from what he had read 
in books (τῶν βιβλίων), presumably taktika.1522  Psellos also asserts that the kaisar 
John Doukas acquired a knowledge of strategy and tactics from the works of Aelian 
and other Hellenistic military writers.1523  Anna Komnene similarly revealed that her 
father Alexios ‘was not unfamiliar with the Taktika of Aelian’.1524  With military 
manuals regularly consulted by aristocratic generals and emperors, accounts of 
textbook victories in aristocratic biographical literature were likely to find 
appreciation among their intended readership. 
                                                 
1518 τὴν δὲ πολεµικὴν ἐπιστήµην ἢ τέχνην εἰ δίχα µαθήσεως καὶ ἱκανῆς ἐµπειρίας ἐξῆν εἰδέναι τῷ 
βουλοµένῳ, οὐκ εἶχον ἄρα νοῦν, ἀλλ’ ἐλήρουν, οἱ πολλὰ περὶ τὸ µέρος τοῦτο µονήσαντες ἐν τοῖς 
τακτικοῖς συγγράµµασι (Vita Basilii: §36.18-23; trans. 135). 
1519 Bryennios: 75. 
1520 Ὅταν δὲ σχολάσεις καὶ οὐκ ἀσχολῇ εἰς στρατηγικὰς δουλείας, ἀναγίνωσκε καὶ βίβλους, καὶ 
ἱστορίας, καὶ τὰς τῆς ἐκκλησίας βίβλους. καὶ µὴ εἴπῃς· “τίς ὠφέλεια στρατιώτῃ ἀπὸ τῶν δογµάτων καὶ 
τῶν ἐκκλησιαστικῶν βίβλων;” πάνυ γὰρ ὡφεληθήση. καὶ εἰ ἀκριβῶς προσέχεις, οὐ µόνον δόγµατα καὶ 
ψυχωφελῆ διηγήµατα καρπώσῃ ἐκ τούτων, ἀλλὰ καὶ γνωµικὰ καὶ στρατηγικά σχεδὸν γὰρ πᾶσα ἡ 
παλαιὰ στρατηγικά εἰσιν. ἀλλὰ καὶ γνωµικὰ καὶ ἐν τῇ καινῇ οὐκ ὀλίγα καρπώσεται ὁ σπουδαῖος. ἐγὼ 
γὰρ τοιοῦτον ἐφίεµαι εἶναί σε, ἵνα θαυµάζωσί σε πάντες εἴς τε τὴν ἀνδρείαν σου καὶ εἰς τὴν εὐβουλίαν 
σου καὶ εἰς τὴν γνῶσιν καὶ εὐγλωττίαν σου. καὶ εἰ ταῦτα ἀσπάσῃ καὶ φυλάξεις, µακάριος ἔσῃ. ἐγὼ γὰρ 
συνέταξά σοι ταῦτα µὴ ὄντα εἰς ἄλλο στρατηγικὸν µηδὲ εἰς ἄλλο βιβλίον· ἐξ οἰκείου γάρ µου 
συλλογισµοῦ καὶ ἐξ ἀληθινῆς πείρας ταῦτα συνέταξα. ὠφελήσουσι γάρ σε πάνυ. µέτελθε δὲ καὶ τὰς 
τῶν ἀρχαίων στρατηγίας· καὶ ταῦτα µὲν ἐκεῖσε οὐχ εὑρήσεις, ἕτερα δὲ τούτων κρείττονα καὶ θαυµαστὰ 
καὶ πλήρη σοφίας εὑρήσεις (Kekaumenos: 154.23-156.8).  For Kekaumenos’ reading see Roueché 
(2002): 117-123. 
1521 Constantine VII, Text C: ll.196-199. 
1522 Michael Psellos, Chronographia: I, 20-21 (XXXIII). 
1523 Ibid: II, 181. 
1524 ἦν γὰρ οὐδὲ τῆς Αἰλιανοῦ Τακτικῆς ἀδαής (Anna Komnene: XV.3.6; trans. 439). 
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There is a danger of overstating the influence of established military precepts on 
Middle Byzantine commanders and their biographers.  For advice literature of the 
period also encouraged the reader to break from tradition and use initiative and 
cunning.1525  The opportunism of Bardas Skleros and Katakalon Kekaumenos is 
evident in the episodes mentioned above.  These stories satisfied the great Byzantine 
fondness for trickery and the stratagem, for the surprise attack and avoidance of 
pitched battle;1526 indeed, Everett Wheeler considered stratagems to be ‘the 
predominant theme of Byzantine military theory’.1527  The mentality may be traced 
back to the cunning Odysseus in the works of Homer,1528 and, to a lesser extent, the 
Old Testament,1529 both of which constituted essential reading to educated 
Byzantines.1530  Procopius’ Wars may have impressed upon Middle Byzantine writers 
and readers a certain military ideology and narrative style, with one twelfth-century 
chronicler describing the Wars as ‘the stratagems of Belisarius’.1531  A particular type 
of ancient military writing which collected famous stratagems – strategemata – was 
also popular.  Polyainos’ Strategika, a collection of exempla of trickery and deceit in 
war compiled in the second century A.D., was abridged and restructured by an 
                                                 
1525 Leo VI, Taktika: Ep.35; Kekaumenos: 142.11-18, 148.22-27.  See in general McGeer (1995a): 193-
194. 
1526 ‘It is by means of intelligent planning and changes <in strategy>, with regard to time…and also 
place, such as narrow passes, and by ambushes, by surprise attacks, and by a great variety of ways to 
trick the enemy, that you will achieve victory over them without actual fighting.  This is absolutely 
essential for survival.  It is by your intelligence, planning, courage, and skill that you will defeat the 
enemy’ (Leo VI, Taktika: §XII.4; trans. 217-219).  See also Maurice, Strategikon: §§VII.1; VIII.86. 
1527 Wheeler (1988): 12; Kaegi (1983).  See also Krentz (2000). 
1528 See Edwards (1985). 
1529 For trickery in warfare in the Old Testament, see Niditch (1993): 106-122. 
1530 For the Byzantine appreciation of Homer, see Browning (1975): 15-33; idem (1992); Pontani 
(2005): 159-182.  Kekaumenos encouraged soldiers to read books of the church for ideas, insisting that 
almost all of the Old Testament ‘is stories of strategy’ (see above, 311 n.1520).  For the Byzantine 
reading of the Old Testament see most recently the various studies in Magdalino & Nelson (2010): esp. 
9-10. 
1531 τὰ τοῦ Βελισαρίου στρατηγήµατα (Kedrenos: I, 649.1-3).  See also Kaegi (1990): 66; Whately 
(2009): 168-169. 
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anonymous Byzantine redactor sometime between the sixth and ninth century.1532  
Polyainos’ work formed the basis of the so-called Stratagems of the Emperor Leo, 
preserved in the tenth-century Sylloge Tacticorum, while chapters 123 to 171 of the 
Taktika of Nikephoros Ouranos are also gleaned from Polyainos.1533  Constantine VII 
recommended that Polyainos’ work be among the books brought on an imperial 
expedition.1534  Narrative episodes involving generals exhibiting guile and ingenuity 
adhere quite closely to the strategemata tradition.  The ruse employed by Bardas 
Skleros at the Battle of Lapara, where he fooled his opponents into breaking for 
dinner and then attacked them as they ate, bears a striking resemblance to a stratagem 
used by Kleomenes of Sparta against the Argives, recorded in Polyainos as well as the 
Byzantine excerpta and the Stratagems of Leo.1535  The discussed extracts from 
aristocratic promotional literature strike us as Middle Byzantine equivalents to the 
ancient tales of cunning collected by Polyainos. 
Though we cannot discount that Skylitzes drew from his material selectively, culling 
the more exciting tales from longer campaign narratives, this anecdotal style typifies 
the mode of relating military episodes in Middle Byzantium.1536  James Howard-
Johnston observed the trend in relation to the histories of Anna Komnene and 
Nikephoros Bryennios,1537 while Kekaumenos includes tales of bravado and cunning 
in his Consilia et Narrationes.1538  Indeed, Paul Lemerle maintains that while most of 
                                                 
1532 Strategemata in lucem prolata curis.  See also Dain (1931); Wheeler & Krentz (1994): I, xvi-xxiii; 
Wheeler (2010): 52-54. 
1533 See Trombley (1997): 272-272. 
1534 Constantine VII, Text C: ll.196-199. 
1535 Polyainos: 1.14, taken from Herodotus: 6.77-78; Excerpts of Polyainos: 20.1; Leo VI, Stratagems: 
20.12. 
1536 See in general Roueché (1988).  For Skylitzes’ preference for short lively narrative episodes 
(diegemata), see Holmes (2003a). 
1537 Howard-Johnston (1996). 
1538 Lemerle (1960): 57-77; Roueché (2002); Kazhdan (1984c): 68-70. 
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these twenty-six stories were known to Kekaumenos through his family ties, the first 
– relating how Bulgarian Tsar Symeon used a cunning ruse to capture a town in 
Hellas in 918 – he attributes to a ‘collection of stratagems’.1539  Such a modern 
Byzantine equivalent of the ancient strategemata may have also been responsible for 
a number of other isolated narrative episodes in Skylitzes’ Synopsis Historion.1540  
This anecdotal tradition stemmed in part from military men telling something akin to 
campfire tales.  According to Michael Psellos, Isaac I Komnenos would entertain the 
court ‘with stories of the old times, recalling all the witty sayings of…Basil (II) the 
Great’.1541  Upon his death, Isaac’s father Manuel entrusted his sons to the care of 
Basil, so it is probable that Isaac heard these stories from the man himself.1542  Other 
traditions may also be at work.  Adolf Stender-Peterson argued for the influence of the 
Byzantine mode of storytelling in the twelfth-century Russian Primary Chronicle, 
wherein a number of episodes concerned with tricks and stratagems may be observed.  
It is suggested that these ‘Varagische Kriegslistanekdoten’ were brought north by 
veterans of the famous Varangian Guard, or spread by traders who had come into 
contact with the elite company.  Stender-Peterson viewed the Byzantine military 
anecdote as part of a wider Greco-Roman tradition going back to the stratagems 
collected by Polyainos.1543 
                                                 
1539 Lemerle (1960): 75-76.  Kekaumenos: 182. 
1540 E.g. John Tzimiskes’ bloody victory over the Arabs at Adana in 964 (Skylitzes: 267-268); Michael 
Bourtzes’ bold capture of Antioch in 969 (ibid: 272-273); Manuel Erotikos Komnenos’ defence of 
Nicaea against Bardas Skleros in 978 (ibid: 323); the heroic defence of Manzikert against a Turkish 
siege by one Basil Apokapes in 1053 (ibid: 462-464). 
1541 κατεῖχέ τε ἡµᾶς ἄχρις ἑσπέρας, ἀρχαῖά τε διηγούµενος καὶ ὁπόσα ὁ βασιλεὺς ἐκεῖνος Βασίλειος ὁ 
τοῦ Ῥωµανοῦ παῖς ἐπικαίρως ἐφθέγξατο (Psellos, Chronographia: II, 130 [LXXVI]; trans. 323).  See 
also Garland (1999). 
1542 Bryennios: 75. 
1543 Stender-Peterson (1934): 77-90; R. Cook (1986). 
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The Byzantine tradition of military anecdotes, evident in the extracts of aristocratic 
promotional literature, owes much to the Strategika of Polyainos, which itself was 
almost certainly influenced in its anecdotal style by Hellenistic biography.1544  The 
secular biographical compositions of Middle Byzantium may have followed 
traditional literary conventions in this respect.  However, the popularity during this 
period of military stories showcasing textbook generalship and ingenuity attest to the 
influence of an aristocratic ideology, inspired by contemporary instructional 
handbooks and older literature, including Homer and collections of stratagems.  Eric 
McGeer encapsulates the process, though he failed to develop his argument beyond 
mere observation: ‘The great popularity of the strategemata…combines with the tales 
of illustrious warriors written during the tenth and eleventh centuries…to show that 
the Byzantine military aristocracy was well on its way to creating its own ideals of 
valorous conduct and military proficiency’.1545  The exhibition of these values 
distinguished the biographical compositions of the military aristocracy from the Vita 
Basilii and preceding works of ‘semi-secular’ and historical hagiography. 
                                                 
1544 Pretzler (2010): 107.  Everett Wheeler (2010: 21-27) argues that military treatises and exempla 
collections were among Polyainos’ other influences.  For the anecdotal style of Hellenistic biography 
see Momigliano (1971): 72-76. 
1545 McGeer (1995a): 192. 
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Conclusion 
Though we lack a surviving example of aristocratic promotional literature, a number 
of references confirm their existence.  Theophanes Continuatus directs the reader to 
an eight-volume work documenting the career of John Kourkouas.  The Historia 
Syntomos confirms that there were many books about Nikephoros II Phokas.  Michael 
VIII Palaiologos refers to written accounts recording the military careers of his 
family.  With this in mind, scholars have developed convincing arguments for 
encomiastic works detailing the feats of other aristocratic generals, including Bardas 
Skleros, Katakalon Kekaumenos, George Maniakes, John Doukas, and members of 
the Phokas family.  This chapter has sought to explain the appearance of aristocratic 
promotional literature in terms of social and literary developments, and, for the first 
time, examine the potential body of work as a whole. 
The appearance of aristocratic promotional literature in the mid-tenth century was a 
natural consequence of the rising power of commanders and new literary trends, in 
particular the secularization of hagiography and the use of the biographical model in 
historiography.  The subject himself was almost certainly involved in the composition, 
either supplying information or writing the work himself, perhaps employing the 
third-person and taking the role of shadow author.  It is suggested that such 
promotional literature was designed to glorify the subject and serve as apologia for 
rebellion, though was nevertheless edifying and, in the grand biographical tradition, 
provided examples for readers. 
One cannot speak of an archetypal piece of aristocratic literature.  We can, however, 
attempt a partial reconstruction of these lost sources, since Skylitzes and Nikephoros 
Bryennios are known to have adhered closely to their original material.  In doing this, 
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one identifies similarities across the material and may make a number of general 
observations about the content, ideals and style of aristocratic promotional literature.  
Some notions are speculative, based on wider trends and known aristocratic values.  
Michael VIII Palaiologos’ comment about the records of his family suggests that 
aristocratic literature contained accounts of ‘combat in wartime, generalship, and 
valour’, and indeed it is episodes detailing military actions which we most frequently 
encounter in extant historical works.  Military defeats or setbacks involving the 
subject of the proposed work are omitted or more often distorted to ensure that he 
could not be blamed and at least retained his honour.  The subject is frequently 
presented exhibiting his textbook military skills by adhering to the precepts of 
conventional military handbooks.  Most notable are episodes where the subject shows 
his ingenuity by devising a cunning trick to overcome a superior enemy.  These betray 
an influence of the strategemata, ancient collections of stratagems whose most 
famous exponent, Polyainos, continued to be read and revised in tenth-century 
Byzantium.  This anecdotal style characterized the Byzantine mode of relating 
military episodes in the following centuries, seen most obviously with Kekaumenos, 
Skylitzes, Nikephoros Bryennios and Anna Komnene.  The promotional literature of 
the military aristocracy may thus be seen as part of a wider movement towards the 
revival of secular storytelling in Byzantium, one which would not find its true 
expression until the appearance of fictitious romances in the twelfth century.1546 
The influence of aristocratic promotional literature is evident in its use by other 
historians.  There could be few better informed narratives of military episodes 
available to a historian; furthermore, aristocratic literature provided tales which would 
interest and instruct the reader.  The aristocratic interest in prestigious ancestry fuelled 
                                                 
1546 Magdalino (1993b): 1-5; Mullett (1997a): 76-77. 
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the recycling of these accounts in historiography, as seen with the Synopsis Historion 
of Skylitzes.  It is also important to consider the probable impact the literature of the 
military aristocracy had on the general style of war writing in Byzantium.  The 
depiction of the model commander displaying his knowledge of military science and 
ingenuity has been noted, as has the introduction of the strategemata-style in 
historical writing.  We have yet to discuss the presence of personal valour and the 
warrior code in aristocratic literature.  The final chapter proposes that the ‘heroic 
historiography’ of the Middle Byzantine period, defined by its fascination with single 
combat and Homeric-style heroic displays, owed much to the values and ideals 
exhibited in the promotional literature of the military aristocracy. 
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CHAPTER V. ARISTOCRATIC PROMOTIONAL LITERATURE AND 
‘HEROIC HISTORIOGRAPHY’ 
Instances of excellent generalship and inventiveness in Middle Byzantine 
historiography contrast sharply with accounts of generals risking their lives in battle 
in the same works.  These actions exemplify what Alexander Kazhdan termed 
‘chivalresque historiography’, a moniker he applied to the epic literature of the second 
half of the tenth century, such as Theodosios the Deacon’s Capture of Crete and the 
History of Leo the Deacon.1547  ‘Chivalry’ calls to mind certain ideas – single combat 
(monomachia), bold displays, gentlemanly codes, mutual respect between combatants 
– which are indeed evident in Middle Byzantine historiography.  Nevertheless, the 
very term chivalry, much like feudalism and crusade, is synonymous with the 
medieval west, and is somewhat inappropriate when applied to a Byzantine 
context.1548  Consequently, the label ‘heroic historiography’ is preferred here, since 
many aspects of aristocratic martial culture ultimately derive from Homer and heroic 
epic.  Here we examine the cues taken from epic literature and propose that it was the 
promotional literature of the aristocracy which brought these ideals into the 
historiography of the Middle period. 
                                                 
1547 Kazhdan (2006): 273-287. 
1548 It should be noted that John Haldon (1999: 357 n.40) comments on the ‘chivalric’ aspect of 
Byzantine martial culture during this period, while Dimiter Angelov (2007: 196 n.70) refers to a more 
‘chivalric’ and militarized portrait of the emperor from the late eleventh century onward.  The seminal 
article on the militarization of the imperial image is Kazhdan (1984a).  
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I. Single Combat: Rivalry and Respect in ‘Heroic Historiography’ 
The portrayal of the rivalry between Bardas Skleros and Bardas Phokas in the 
proposed pro-Skleros source of Skylitzes serves as a suitable introduction to the 
conventions of Middle Byzantine ‘heroic historiography’.  A review suggests that this 
piece of aristocratic promotional literature included heroism, respect for martial 
prowess, adherence to an aristocratic warrior code and single combat.  The latter in 
particular was obviously inspired by the duels described by Homer, whose influence 
on aristocratic values on the field and in literature was profound.  
Bardas Skleros and Bardas Phokas: Traces of Aristocratic Heroic Ideals 
The most notable example of single combat in this period is the dramatic duel 
between Bardas Skleros and Bardas Phokas, recorded in Skylitzes’ Synopsis 
Historion.  In 979, at the Battle of the river Halys, Phokas charged Skleros and struck 
him with his mace, causing him to lurch forward in discomfort and bringing the brief 
struggle to a swift end.  Skleros lost the battle and fled to Baghdad, concluding a 
rebellion he had waged for three years since 976.1549  It has been suggested that the 
clash between Skleros and Phokas was invented by Skylitzes,1550 though Catherine 
Holmes asserts that the episode originated in Skylitzes’ pro-Skleros source.1551   
As Skleros’ most formidable adversary, Phokas would have featured prominently in 
any account of the revolt.  Furthermore, the two were brothers-in-law.1552  It has been 
proposed that Tzimiskes established the Skleros family as a ‘groupe des opposants 
                                                 
1549 Skylitzes: 376-377. 
1550 Forsyth (1977): 384-393. 
1551 Holmes (2005): 258-259, 270-272, 453-456. 
1552 Leo the Deacon: 118; Skylitzes: 294. 
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habituels aux Phokas’,1553 but against this one could argue that the feud did not extend 
beyond the two men, and never appears to have been particularly bitter.  Upon hearing 
that Bardas Phokas had been sent against him, Skleros ‘thought that now for the first 
time the fight would be against a true soldier, one who well knew how to conduct 
military operations with courage and skill; not, as formerly, against pitiful fellows, 
eunuchs’.1554  While it is possible that these are the words of Skylitzes rather than 
those of his source, we should note comments made by Jean-Claude Cheynet in 
relation to an earlier section of the Synopsis Historion: ‘This speech has clearly been 
reconstituted, but is not to be attributed to Skylitzes himself, an eleventh-century 
writer, since he respects the content of earlier source material used’.1555  Disdain for 
eunuchs is also apparent in other sections involving Skleros, and seems to reflect the 
general outlook of the military aristocracy.1556 
                                                 
1553 Cheynet (1990): 326-329; Vlyssidou (2003). 
1554 καὶ ὁ Σκληρὸς δὲ τὴν τούτου ἔξοδον ἀκηκοώς, καὶ νῦν πρῶτον οἰηθεὶς τὸν ἀγῶνα ἔσεσθαι αὐτῷ 
πρὸς ἄνδρα πολεµιστὴν καὶ φέρειν εἰδότα γενναίως καὶ τακτικῶς τὰς πολέµου στροφάς, καὶ οὐχ, ὡς τὸ 
πρότερον, πρὸς ἀνδράρια ἐκτετµηµένα θαλαµευόµενα καὶ σκιατραφῆ (Skylitzes: 324.48-51; trans. 
308). 
1555 Cheynet (2006b): 16 n.53. 
1556 Bardas Skleros’ chief opponent in the capital was a eunuch, the parakoimomenos Basil Lekapenos, 
who feared Skleros’ control of the eastern forces to such an extent that he apparently demoted him and 
appointed the eunuch Peter as commander of the eastern forces instead (Skylitzes: 314-315).  This, 
Holmes argues, was at least the interpretation of events offered by Skylitzes’ pro-Skleros source, which 
attempted to justify the rebellion of its subject (Holmes 2005: 322-327).  Indication of the aristocratic 
loathing for eunuchs may also be found in the History of Leo the Deacon.  Having learned of Joseph 
Bringas’ attempts to have Nikephoros Phokas removed from command, an enraged John Tzimiskes 
vented his fury to his uncle: ‘[To think of] your labours and battles and prowess, while this is planned 
by an effeminate fellow, whose very sex is doubtful, an artificial woman who knows nothing except 
what goes on in the women’s quarters…For I think it is wrong, nay intolerable, for Roman generals to 
be led and to be dragged by the nose, hither and thither, like slaves, by a wretched eunuch from the 
wastes of Paphlagonia, who has insinuated himself into political power’ (Leo the Deacon: 39-40; trans. 
90).  While it is probable that these are the words of Leo rather than Tzimiskes, they nevertheless 
reflect an aristocratic mentality given the tone of Leo’s work.  For discussion of the poor portrayals of 
eunuchs in Leo’s History, see Markopoulos (2004a): 14-16.  Ringrose (2003: 129-131) suggests that 
the blacklisting of Basil Lekapenos could have much to do with general disdain for eunuchs in 
Byzantium.  On this point see also Tougher (1997b): 173-175.  For the controversial lives of Joseph 
Bringas and Basil Lekapenos in particular, see, respectively, Markopoulos (2004c); Brokkaar (1972).  
For further evidence of aristocratic hatred of powerful eunuchs, we may look to Nikephoros Bryennios, 
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Foreshadowing of Bardas Phokas’ combat skills may be observed as early as the 
account of his initial revolt against John Tzimiskes in 970, which Skylitzes probably 
also derived from the same pro-Skleros manifesto given the perspective afforded to 
this individual.  As Phokas fled to his fortress, a member of Skleros’ retinue, 
Constantine Charon, caught up with the rebel but met an unpleasant end in the form of 
Bardas’ mace.  The remainder of the pursuers, seeing Charon’s body, ‘were so 
amazed at the irresistible force of the blow that they all desisted from the chase, 
nobody daring to go any further’.1557  The same illustration of Phokas’ prowess is 
evident in Skylitzes’ account of Skleros’ subsequent revolt.  Skleros defeats Bardas 
Phokas in their first engagement at Pankaleia, though through no fault of Phokas’ 
generalship; indeed, Phokas is commended for conducting an organized, fighting 
retreat.  At this point one Constantine Gabras, a colleague of Skleros, attempted to 
seize Phokas, but was struck by Phokas’ mace and fell from his horse.1558  At Vasilika 
Therma, Bardas Phokas again accepted Skleros’ invitation to do battle, and was 
successful in ‘breaking down the ranks of the enemy with his iron mace and slaying 
thousands’, before his men turned to flight.1559  The presentation of Bardas Phokas as 
a formidable opponent made these initial victories of Skleros appear all the more 
impressive.  By the same token, there was no disgrace in losing to such an adversary 
in their duel at the Halys River.  The pro-Skleros source appears eager to impress 
                                                                                                                                            
who explains that his eponymous grandfather and great-uncle John made plans against the eunuch 
minister Nikephoritzes as they refused ‘to let a eunuch play with Roman generals’ (...µὴ ὑπ’ ἀνδρὸς 
ἐκτοµίου οὕτω τοὺς στρατηγοὺς Ῥωµαίων ἐµπαίζεσθαι: Bryennios: 217.16-19). 
1557 ...καὶ τῷ ἀνυποστάτῳ τοῦ πτώµατος ἐκπληττόµενοι πάντες ἵστων τὴν δίωξιν, µηδενὸς τολµῶντος 
προσωτέρω ἰέναι (Skylitzes: 293.53-294.84; trans. 280-281).  Cf. Leo the Deacon: 124-125. 
1558 Skylitzes: 325. 
1559 καὶ χρόνον µέν τινα ἀντέσχον οἱ περὶ τὸν Φωκᾶν, αὐτοῦ τούτου παριππεύοντος ἁπανταχοῦ καὶ τῇ 
σιδηραίᾳ κορύνῃ τὰς τῶν ἐναντίων ῥηγνύντος φάλαγγας καὶ µυρίον ἑργαζοµένου φόνον (ibid: 325.78-
82; trans. 308-309). 
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upon the reader that its subject had been defeated by a man his equal in military 
prowess. 
This appreciation of the enemy in many ways typifies ‘heroic historiography’.  With 
military ability an esteemed virtue, even adversaries from foreign cultures could be 
admired and given portraits beyond that of the stereotypical barbarian.  Leo the 
Deacon crafted a reasonably balanced image of Russian prince Sviatoslav, who, in 
spite of his insatiable greed and cruelty, warranted praise for his formidable reputation 
as a warrior.1560  Such a layered portrayal of a foreigner was hitherto largely unknown 
in Byzantine historiography, though we witness a similar admiration for the Norman 
rebel Roussel in the History of Attaleiates and for Bohemond of Taranto in the 
Alexiad of Anna Komnene, largely borne out of their martial prowess and 
ingenuity.1561  Intriguingly, Jonathan Shepard suggests that the manifesto of 
Katakalon Kekaumenos presented warlike Pecheneg and Arab leaders in a positive 
fashion.1562  This admiration is an inheritance of Homer, in whose eyes ‘the Trojans 
are as Greek and as heroic in deeds and values as their opponents in every respect’.1563  
While there was undoubtedly fierce rivalry among the military aristocracy, a common 
martial culture ensured a respect for achievements and personal prowess.   
 
 
                                                 
1560 Markopoulos (2004a): 11-12; Kazhdan (2006): 285-286, 328-329.  For Sviatoslav’s prowess in 
war, see Hanak (1995). 
1561 For Attaleiates’ admiration of Roussel, see Kazhdan (1984c): 66-67; Krallis (2006): 242-254.  
Roussel’s career is discussed by Bréhier (1911-1912); Lebeniotes (2004).  For Anna’s admiration of 
Bohemond, see Shepard (1988); Albu (2000).  For the general appreciation of western military prowess 
in eleventh-century Byzantium, see again Shepard (1993). 
1562 Shepard (forthcoming). 
1563 Finley (1978): 38. 
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Single Combat (Monomachia) in ‘Heroic Historiography’ 
The single combat between Bardas Skleros and Bardas Phokas represents an 
aristocratic ideal.  In a previous battle, Skleros did not use the devious tactics he 
employed against eunuch generals, but challenged Phokas to do battle, intimating an 
unwritten code of honour whereby like-minded and well-matched generals fought on 
even terms.1564  Michael Psellos’ account of the aforementioned duel is similar in this 
respect, as the two leaders ride out before the lines and engage in single combat ‘by 
common consent’.  The impetuous Skleros, however, ‘broke the rules of this kind of 
fighting’, striking Phokas on the head prematurely.  Phokas hit back and Skleros 
apparently turned away, shamed by his defeat and aware he was no match for his 
opponent.1565  This presentation of Skleros contradicts that of Skylitzes, underlining 
his pro-Skleros slant.  Psellos’ account may derive from anti-Skleros material and 
hold no greater credence, but nevertheless corroborates the idea of an aristocratic code 
of combat.   
One can distinguish between the two types of monomachy described by Psellos and 
Skylitzes.1566  While the former describes a formal duel, Skylitzes indicates that 
Phokas sought out Skleros in the midst of battle, with the ensuing tussle only then 
developing into an apparent battle-decider: ‘[The soldiers] preferred the matter to be 
                                                 
1564 ὁ Σκληρός...καλούµενον κατασκηνώσας, εἰς µάχην τὸν ὁµώνυµον ἐξεκαλεῖτο. ἀσπασίως δὲ καὶ 
τούτου δεξαµένου τὴν πρόκλησιν αὖθις ἑτέρα συνίσταται µάχη (Skylitzes: 325.74-77). 
1565 Ἐθάρρησαν γοῦν ποτε πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ οἱ τῶν ἀντικειµένων ἡγεµόνες ταγµάτων καὶ 
µονοµαχῆσαι ἐκ συνθήµατος εἵλοντο· καὶ µέντοιγε συνελάσαντες εἴς τι µεταίχµιον, εἶδόν τε ἀλλήλους 
καὶ ἐν συµβολαῖς εὐθὺς ἐγεγόνεισαν. καὶ πρῶτος γε ὁ τυραννεύων Σκληρὸς, οὐκ ἐπισχὼν ἑαυτὸν τῆς 
ὁρµῆς, ἀλλ’ εὐθὺς νόµους ἀγωνίας παραβεβηκὼς, ὁµοῦ τε ἀγχοῦ τῷ Φωκᾷ ἐγεγόνει καὶ παίει τοῦτον 
ὡς εἶχε κατὰ κεφαλῆς, δυναµώσας τὴν χεῖρα τῇ φορᾷ τῆς ὁρµῆς· καὶ ὁ πεπληγὼς πρὸς τὸ ἀδόκητον τῆς 
πληγῆς βραχύ τι τοῦ χαλινοῦ γεγονὼς ἀκρατὴς, αὖθις συνηθροίκει τοὺς λογισµοὺς, καὶ κατὰ ταὐτοῦ 
µέλους τὸν τιλήξαντα παίσας, τῆς πολεµικῆς ὁρµῆς ἔπαυσε καὶ φυγεῖν παρεσκεύασεν (Psellos, 
Chronographia: I, 6 [VIII]; trans. 31-32). 
1566 For the basic distinction see Pritchett (1985): 15-21. 
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decided by a contest between the commanders and, indeed thought that it would be a 
magnificent and astounding sight for the beholders, two men of courageous and 
valiant heart locked in single combat’.1567  The epic scenario described by Psellos last 
graced Byzantine historiography at the turn of the ninth century, when the Patriarch 
Nikephoros and Theophanes wrote of a contest between Heraclius and the Persian 
general Rhazates at the Battle of Nineveh, which took place in 627.1568  It is only in 
the ‘heroic historiography’ of the Middle Byzantine period that we again witness 
challenges to single combat in the field.1569  In 1211, the emperor of Nicaea, Theodore 
I Laskaris, reputedly slayed the sultan of Rum, Kaykhusraw, at the Battle of Antioch-
on-the-Maeander.1570  While nothing as extraordinary occurs in the preceding 
centuries, it was apparently not for the want of trying.  John Tzimiskes, concerned at 
the protracted siege of Dorostolon, was apparently frustrated in his attempts to bring 
Sviatoslav to a single contest which would decide the entire course of the conflict.1571  
More purposeful was Alexios Komnenos, who accepted the challenge of a brazen 
Cuman warrior and drove his sword through the nomad’s chest.1572   
Of somewhat lesser note are individual contests between regular soldiers.  At the 
siege of Neokaisareia in 1140, the Emperor John Komnenos’ homonymous nephew 
agreed to his uncle’s request to give his horse to a Latin knight, but only on the 
                                                 
1567 γὰρ δὴ καὶ ἐφαίνετο πάγκαλόν τι θέαµα καὶ κατάπληξιν τοῖς ὁρῶσιν ἐπάγον ἀνδρῶν δύο µονοµαχία 
ἐπ’ εὐτολµίᾳ καὶ ῥώµῃ ψυχῆς µέγα φρονούντων (Skylitzes: 326.2-4; trans. 309). 
1568 See below, 368-371.  The brief mounted contest between the eunuch Theodore Krateros and an 
Arab prisoner in the Hippodrome during the reign of Theophanes, described by Theophanes 
Continuatus (115-116), was more of a ceremonial occasion, an example no doubt of one of the many 
martial displays which graced the Hippodrome during this time. 
1569 This is not to say that single combats in battle did not occur in the preceding period.  Arab historian 
al-Tabari (XXIX: 220) describes a duel between Niketas, count of Opsikion, and Arab governor Yazid 
ibn Mazyad al-Shaybani in the late eighth century.  That Niketas lost probably ensured the encounter 
was ignored by Byzantine historians.   
1570 See below, 374-375. 
1571 Skylitzes: 307-308. 
1572 Anna Komnene: IX.4.7. 
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condition that the knight defeat him in single combat.1573  John Kinnamos’ record of 
the Byzantine expedition to Italy between 1154 and 1156 notes several instances of 
organized monomachy.1574  Choniates reports of an organized duel between a 
Byzantine and Armenian during John II Komnenos’ campaign in Cilicia in 1137-
1138.  The Byzantine soldier, Eustratios, withstood the violent attacks of the 
Armenian Constantine until he split the ‘Hectorian’ shield of his opponent.1575  As 
Choniates’ use of the term ‘Hectorian’ suggests, the inspiration for this sort of 
heroism, in both a literary and ideological sense, was Homer’s Iliad.1576 
The other type of single combat in the Iliad is the more spontaneous encounter, where 
one warrior challenges another to combat in the midst of battle – the sort of clash 
between Skleros and Phokas as described by Skylitzes.  Eric McGeer reminds us that 
such duels, while included to celebrate the exploits of notable warriors, are 
nevertheless ‘typical of the many individual combats that would break out in the 
general melee’.1577  One such incident may be found in Skylitzes’ account of the 
Battle of Hades, where one Randolf the Frank sought ‘somebody of rank’ to fight as 
the imperial army fled the field.  He called out Nikephoros Botaneiates, who agreed to 
the request, and the two contested a brief duel.1578  We have already discussed Manuel 
encountering the enemy commander Bakchinos during combat and engaging him in 
                                                 
1573 Niketas Choniates, Chronike Diegesis: 35-36. 
1574 Kinnamos: 159-160, 168.  See above, 133 nn. 682 & 683. 
1575 Niketas Choniates, Chronike Diegesis: 22-25. 
1576 For single combat in the Iliad, see Latacz (1977): 76-77, 118-139.  Frequently the arrogant Trojan 
proposes single combat, only for the humble Achaean to emerge victorious (Griffin 1983: 4-5; similar 
is true of the Roman Republic in relation to barbarians – see Oakley 1985: 407-408).  On the large 
shields used by Homeric warriors, an indication of their physical strength, see van Wees (1992): 17-22. 
1577 McGeer (1995a): 299. 
1578 Ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ µάχῃ φασίν, ὅτι τῶν περὶ τὸν βασιλέα τραπέντων Ῥανδοῦλφος ὁ Φράγγος ἐς µέσους 
περιπλανώµενος τούς τε φεύγοντας καὶ τοὺς διώκοντας ἐζήτει συµπλακῆναί τινι τῶν ὀνοµαστῶν. ἐπεὶ 
δὲ µάθοι, ὡς Νικηφόρος δίεισιν ὁ Βοτανειάτης, τοὺς ἄλλους καταλιπὼν ἀπῄει πρὸς ἐκεῖνον, πόρρωθεν 
κράζων καὶ µένειν παρεγγυώµενος, δηλῶν καὶ τοὔνοµα, ὅστις εἴη καὶ ἐφ’ ᾧ προσκαλεῖται· ὅπερ γνοὺς 
ὁ Βοτανειάτης ἵστησι τὸν δρόµον, καὶ ἐγγίσαντι τῷ Ῥανδούλφῳ προσµίγνυται (Skylitzes: 495.59-
496.69; trans. 461). 
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single combat.1579  The thought-world of the military aristocracy dictated that one 
could achieve great renown by besting an enemy of note in a fair fight. 
Conclusion - The Influence of Homeric epic 
The ‘heroic historiography’ of the Middle Byzantine period is marked by its obsession 
with heroes and heroism, an inheritance of Homeric epic.  Homer has been seen to 
‘zoom-in’ during his battle scenes, electing to follow the struggles of select 
individuals rather than choosing to describe the general scope of battle.1580  To some 
extent these contests serve as ‘highlights’ of the whole battle, though it is no 
coincidence that prominent persons command the author’s attention.1581  Little 
attention is paid to common men, those whom Odysseus considered to be ‘unwarlike, 
cowardly, and of no account in war or council’.1582  According to Hans van Wees, this 
emphasis was an ‘ideological projection’ of the values and beliefs of contemporary 
aristocrats, who claimed that their influence and power was reward for their 
outstanding contribution in battle.1583  A man’s arete (excellence) was judged by the 
prowess and courage he displayed on the field of battle, as well as his physical might; 
these all constituted key elements of his andreia (manliness).1584  As the Middle 
Byzantine elite valued the same heroic virtues, it is probable that the adoption of the 
                                                 
1579 See above, 242-246. 
1580 Pritchett (1985): 7. 
1581 For this tendency of Homer, and Homeric battle description in general, see Kirk (1968): esp. 111-
112; Latacz (1977): esp. 68-95; van Wees (1986): esp. 286; idem (1988): 3-7; idem (1994); idem 
(1995): esp. 166-167; Hellmann (2000): esp. 90-169; Albracht (2006): esp. 54-55. 
1582 δαιµόνι᾽ ἀτρέµας ἧσο καὶ ἄλλων µῦθον ἄκουε, 
       οἳ σέο φέρτεροί εἰσι, σὺ δ᾽ ἀπτόλεµος καὶ ἄναλκις 
       οὔτέ ποτ᾽ ἐν πολέµῳ ἐναρίθµιος οὔτ᾽ ἐνὶ βουλῇ (Homer, Iliad: 2.200-202). 
1583 van Wees (1995). 
1584 The secondary literature on Homeric manly virtues is extensive.  See Whitman (1965); Adkins 
(1960): 30-60; idem (1997); Long (1970); van Wees (1992): esp. 72, 138-152; Clarke (1995); idem 
(2004); Graziosi & Haubold (2003). 
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Homeric mode of battle description in Byzantine literature was a consequence of 
aristocratic preferences.   
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II. Noble Defeat and Warrior Pride in ‘Heroic Historiography’ 
The heroism of a particular individual is best seen when he is faced with 
overwhelming odds.  In the Iliad, Agamemnon observes that there is no glory in 
retreat,1585 while Hector considered a gallant death better than a life of shame.1586  
Heroic death and, conversely, the cowardice incurred by fleeing the field, was a well-
established topos in Classical Greek and Hellenistic literature.1587  Such a mentality is 
evident also in the ‘heroic historiography’ of the Middle Byzantine period. 
Death in Battle 
Byzantine aristocrats clearly saw merit in meeting one’s end in battle.  In the Synopsis 
Historion of Skylitzes, twice Bardas Phokas considers glorious death preferable to a 
life of ignominy and charges into the fray, on the latter occasion fulfilling his intended 
wish.1588  The wry Kekaumenos opines that a general should only fear shame, and not 
death, on behalf of the fatherland and the emperor.1589  The Emperor Leo VI 
encouraged generals ‘to show a bold front’ in the face of defeat,1590 warning against 
flight for practical reasons: ‘Know that it is more beneficial to take a stand in battle 
and to face danger bravely fighting in the ranks than to flee and be pursued’.1591  
                                                 
1585 φευγόντων δ᾽ οὔτ᾽ ἂρ κλέος ὄρνυται οὔτε τις ἀλκή (Homer, Iliad: 5.532). 
1586 Ibid: 22.90-114. 
1587 See Salazar (2000): 212-214. 
1588 βέλτιον εἶναι κρίνας τὸν εὐκλεῆ θάνατον τῆς ἀγεννοῦς καὶ ἐπονειδίστου ζωῆς... (Skylitzes: 326.90-
94); ὁ Φωκὰς τοῦ ζῆν ἀγεννῶς τὸ γενναίως ἀποθανεῖν εὐγενῶς προκρίνας... (ibid: 337.11-17). 
1589 καὶ µὴ φοβηθῇς τὸν θάνατον, ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος καὶ τοῦ βασιλέως τοῦτον µέλλων λαβεῖν. 
φοβήθητι δὲ µαλλον τὸ αἰσχρῶς καὶ ἐπιψόγως ζῆν. πλὴν µὴ ἐπιρρίπτῃς σεαυτὸν ἀσκόπως καὶ 
ἀβουλήτως εἰς κινδύνους· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν τὸ ψεκτόν (Kekaumenos: 148.19-22); στρατευθεὶς ἀνδρίζου 
εἰς πόλεµον, εἰ καὶ αποθανεῖν µέλλεις. µνήσθητι, ὅτι διὰ τοῦτο ἐστρατεύθης καὶ οὐδεὶς ἀθάνατος. 
φεῦγε δὲ ἀπὸ καπηλοπολέµου· τρωθεὶς γὰρ θανήσῃ καὶ µετὰ θάνατον ὄνειδος ἔσῃ (ibid: 226.18-22).  
Also ibid: 136.5-19 for further criticism of cowardice and fear. 
1590 δεῖ συµφερόντως τῶν κινδύνων κατατολµᾶν (Leo VI, Taktika: §XIV.19; trans. 301). 
1591 συµφέρον µᾶλλον γίνωσκε εἶναι, τὸ ἐν ταῖς µάχαις ἐνίστασθαι καὶ κινδυνεύειν ἀνδρείως τὴν 
παράταξιν µαχοµένην ἢ φυγόντας διώκεσθαι· ἐν γὰρ τῇ ἐνστάσει µᾶλλον τὴν σωτηρίαν ἐλπίζειν χρεόν, 
ἀλλὰ µὴ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς τὰ νῶτα διδόντας πιστεύειν τὸ σώζεσθαι (ibid: §XX.190; trans. 605). 
330 
Those who lost their lives by adhering to such principles were commended in 
literature.  Choniates draws attention to the brave ends met by John Kantakouzenos 
and Manuel’s brother-in-law Baldwin at the Battle of Myriokephalon.1592  The death 
of Stephen Kontostephanos at the siege of Kerkyra is highlighted by Kinnamos and 
the encomiasts Theodore Prodromos and ‘Manganeios Prodromos’.1593  Upon relating 
the noble sacrifice of the Cretan guardsman Anemas at the Battle of Dorostolon, both 
Leo the Deacon and Skylitzes laud his heroism,1594 suggesting that the common 
source employed by the pair drew considerable attention to the incident.1595  The same 
campaign narrative as utilized by Skylitzes appears to have presented the death of 
John Kourkouas, cousin of John Tzimiskes, as the noble sacrifice of a man attempting 
to thwart a Russian attack on a Byzantine siege engine.1596 
Brave Stands and Fighting Retreats 
Those who survived battle in ‘heroic historiography’ only left the field if captured or 
if the day was completely lost, so as not to lose face.  Van Wees has shown that even 
in Homer’s world, for all the rhetoric, retreat was permitted in truly hopeless 
situations.1597  Skylitzes’ account of the Battle of Diakene in 1049, almost certainly 
culled from a work favourable to Katakalon Kekaumenos, relates how the general 
stayed on the field until seized by the enemy.1598  Nikephoros Bryennios’ account of 
the Battle of Zompos, which probably derives from a personal history of John 
                                                 
1592 Niketas Choniates, Chronike Diegesis: 181, 185. 
1593 See above, 246-247. 
1594 Leo the Deacon: 153; Skylitzes: 308. 
1595 Paul Stephenson (2000: 52-53) proposes that the deeds of Anemas may even have been 
commemorated in contemporary bulletins and poems. 
1596 See above, 63-68. 
1597 van Wees (1996): 8-9, with examples.  Cf. Lendon (2005): 35-36, who argues that epic ‘does not 
decide’ if running away is unheroic or not. 
1598 Skylitzes: 468-469. 
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Doukas, depicts the kaisar Doukas remaining in the field until eventually captured 
along with his son, Andronikos, who had bravely attempted to aid his father.1599  
Emperors were similarly keen not to project an image of cowardice in the field.  
Michael Psellos praised Romanos IV Diogenes for battling bravely against the Turks 
at Manzikert until he was eventually surrounded and captured, a version of events 
corroborated by Michael Attaleiates and one which may have originated in a letter 
Romanos sent to the imperial court.1600  We have already discussed how official 
accounts of campaigns conducted by Manuel Komnenos and derivative encomia 
stressed Manuel’s resolve and heroism as he threw caution to the wind and risked his 
life for glory on the battlefield, enabling him to save some face after the defeat near 
Myriokephalon.1601 
The manner in which the Alexiad of Anna Komnene deals with heroism and 
cowardice is particularly insightful.  There are conventional moments of courage.  At 
the Battle of Kalyvrae, Nikephoros Bryennios the Elder stood heroically against the 
Turks along with his kinsmen until they were eventually forced to surrender.1602  
Eustathios Kamytzes gave little thought to death when set upon by Turks, fighting on 
until the impressed enemy compelled him to surrender.1603  The case of Alexios 
Komnenos is more complex.  While Anna is eager to show that her father was always 
                                                 
1599 Bryennios: 171-175. 
1600 See above, 87-88; below, 356-357. 
1601 See above, 237-259. 
1602 ἀλλ’ ὅ γε Βρυέννιος καίτοι πολλὰ βαρυνόµενος ὑπὸ τοῦ πολέµου καὶ σὺν βίᾳ ὠθούµενος ἐδείκνυ 
τὸ ἀνδρεῖον καὶ εὔψυχον ἀεὶ µὲν ἐπιστροφάδην τύπτων τὸν ἐπιόντα, ἀεὶ δὲ τὰ τῆς φυγῆς καλῶς καὶ 
ἀνδρείως διοικονοµούµενος· συνήραντο δὲ τούτῳ καὶ ὁ ἀδελφὸς ἐξ ἑκατέρου µέρους καὶ ὁ υἱὸς καὶ 
κατ’ ἐκεῖνο καιροῦ θαῦµα τοῖς πολεµίοις ἐδείχθησαν ἡρωικῶς ἀνταγωνισάµενοι (Anna Komnene: 
I.6.5-6). 
1603 ἔνθέν τοι καὶ µικρὸν ἀναποδίσας ἐπί τινα δρῦν ἑαυτὸν προσερείσας καὶ τὸν ἀκινάκην σπασάµενος 
τάς τε σῳζούσας ἀπολωλεκὼς ἐλπίδας, ὁπόσοι τούτῳ τῶν βαρβάρων συµπλακῆναι κατετόλµων, κατά 
γε κόρυθος καὶ ὤµων καὶ αὐτῶν δὴ τῶν χειρῶν παίων οὐκ ἐνεδίδου. ἐπὶ πολὺ γοῦν τοῦτον ἀντέχοντα 
ὁρῶντες οἱ βάρβαροι καὶ πολλοὺς κτείνοντα, πολλοὺς δὲ καὶ τιτρώσκοντα, ὑπεραγάµενοι τὴν τοῦ 
ἀνδρὸς τόλµαν καὶ τὸ σταθηρὸν αὐτοῦ θαυµάσαντες, τὴν σωτηρίαν αὐτοῦ διαταῦτα πραγµατεύσασθαι 
ἡβουλήθησαν (ibid: XIV.5.5-6). 
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the last to leave the field, she nevertheless stipulates that practical concerns compelled 
him to depart before capture or death.  Seeing his men breaking at Kalyvrae, Alexios 
gathered six of his guard and planned an assault on Nikephoros Bryennios; ‘if 
necessary they should be prepared to die’.  Alexios was dissuaded by a common 
soldier, who convinced him that the plan was imprudent.1604  Three years later, at the 
Battle of Dyrrachion, Alexios repelled Norman pursuers as he fled from the field.  In 
his final push Alexios charged one group and drove his spear right through the chest 
of Robert Guiscard’s second-in-command, making a bold break for freedom.1605  The 
next year, when fighting the Normans at Ioannina, Alexios ‘realized that he must look 
to his own safety, not to save his own life or because he was overwhelmed by 
fear…[but] in the hope that by avoiding danger and recovering his strength, he might 
resume the struggle with his Keltic adversaries more bravely another day’.  
Nevertheless, during flight he encountered a group of Normans and encouraged his 
men to join him in a ‘death-or-glory’ charge.1606  A subsequent battle against the 
Normans again resulted in defeat, but Alexios lingered in the field.  When down to his 
last few companions, ‘he judged it to be his duty no longer to expose himself to 
senseless risks – for when a man has no more strength to fight after a great deal of 
suffering, he would be a fool to thrust himself into obvious peril’.1607  Finally, at 
                                                 
1604 αίσθόµενος δὲ διαρραγεῖσαν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φάλαγγα καὶ ἤδη πολλαχοῦ σκεδασθεῖσαν τοὺς 
εὐψυχοτέρους (ἓξ δὲ ἦσαν οἱ σύµπαντες) συλλεξάµενος ἐβουλεύσατο σπασαµένους τὰ ξίφη, ἐπειδὰν 
ἐγγίσαιεν τῷ Βρυεννίῳ, κατ’ αὐτοῦ χωρεῖν ἀναισχύντως, κἂν δέοι κάκείνους αὐτῷ συναποθανεῖν. ἀλλ’ 
ἀπεῖρξε τοῦ τοιούτου βουλεύµατος Θεόδοτός τις στρατιώτης, ἀνὴρ τοὐµῷ πατρὶ παιδόθεν ὑπηρετήσας, 
ὡς ἄντικρυς παραβόλου τοῦ ἐγχειρήµατος ὄντος (ibid: I.5.5; trans. 19). 
1605 Ibid: IV.6-8. 
1606 ὡς δ’ εἰς µέρη πολλὰ τὰς φάλαγγας διασπασθείσας ἑώρα, δεῖν ἐλογίσατο καὶ αὐτὸς τὸ ἀσφαλὲς 
ἑαυτῷ περιποιήσασθαι οὐ σώσων ἑαυτὸν οὔθ’ ὑπὸ δειλίας συγχυθείς, ὡς τάχα ἄν τις εἴποι, ἀλλ’ εἴ που 
τὸν κίνδυνον διεκφυγὼν καὶ συλλεξάµενος ἑαυτὸν αὖθις γενναιότερον τοῖς µαχοµένοις Κελτοῖς 
ἀντικατασταίη...ἀναρρώσας γὰρ τοὺς σὺν αὐτῷ καὶ σφοδρὰν τὴν κατ’ αὐτῶν ἱππασίαν ὡς σήµερον 
τεθνηξόµενος ποιήσας ἢ κατὰ κράτος ἡττήσων κτείνει µὲν αὐτὸς παίσας ἕνα τῶν Κελτῶν, καὶ ὁπόσοι 
δὲ σὺν αὐτῷ Ἄρεως ἦσαν ὑπασπισταί, πολλοὺς τρώσαντες ἐξεδίωξαν (ibid: V.4.3-4; trans. 137). 
1607 ἐπεὶ τὸ ἅπαν ἐκρεῦσαν ἤδη στράτευµα ἐθέασατο καὶ ἑαυτὸν µετ’ ὁλίγων καταλειφθέντα, δέον 
ἐλογίσατο µὴ ἀλόγως ἀνθιστάµενος κινδυνεῦσαι. ἐπὰν γάρ τις πολλὰ µογήσας µὴ πρὸς ἰσχύος ἔχοι τοῖς 
333 
Dristra in 1087, Alexios stood ahead of his front line with just twenty men as his army 
crumbled before the Pechenegs.  As he was assailed by three of the enemy, his 
brother-in-law, the protostrator Michael Doukas, remonstrated with him.  ‘Why sir, 
are you trying to hold out here any longer?  Why lose your life, without a thought for 
your own safety?’  When Alexios retorted that it was better to die fighting bravely 
than find safety, Michael persisted:  ‘If you were just an ordinary soldier, those would 
be fine words; but when your death involves danger for everybody else, why not 
choose the better course?’  Recognizing that all hope had gone, Alexios heeded these 
words, yet he would not go with a wimper.  As at Dyrrachion, the emperor rode 
through the Pecheneg ranks and forcibly broke through their rear, fending off any 
pursuer who came too close.1608  This presentation accords with Anna’s general 
assessment of her father’s resilience in war towards the end of the Alexiad: ‘He would 
triumph when he fled, and when he was doing the chasing, he would conquer’.1609 
Conclusion 
Anna’s record of her father’s defeats all end similarly.  Alexios wishes to stand and 
fight, but his responsibilities as emperor and commander impel him to depart.  When 
he does leave the field, there is time for one last show of courage, emphasizing that he 
did not flee headlong but made fighting retreats.  That Anna Komnene persistently 
                                                                                                                                            
ἐχθροῖς ἀντικαθίστασθαι, µάταιος ἂν ἦ<ν> εἰς προῦπτον κίνδυνον ἑαυτὸν συνωθῶν...τὸ δὲ 
ἀναντίρρητον συνιεὶς τοῦ κινδύνου δέον ἔκρινεν ἑαυτὸν περισῶσαι, ὡς αὖθις δύνασθαι µάχεσθαι πρὸς 
τὸν καταγωνισάµενον καὶ ἀντίπαλος ἔσεσθαι καρτερώτατος καὶ µὴ τὸ πᾶν τῆς νίκης ἄρασθαι τὸν 
Βαϊοῦντον (ibid: V.4.7-8; trans. 138). 
1608 τὴν οὖν ἄµετρον φυγὴν τῶν ταγµάτων θεασάµενος ὁ πρωτοστράτωρ (αἱ φάλαγγες γὰρ ἤδη 
διεσπάσθησαν φευγόντων ἀκρατῶς) “ἱνατί”, φησί, “βασιλεῦ, τοῦ λοιποῦ ἐνταῦθα πειρᾶσαι 
ἐγκαρτερεῖν; ἱνατί τὴν ζωὴν προδίδως ἀφειδήσας παντάπασι τῆς ἑαυτοῦ σωτηρίας;” ο δὲ βέλτιον 
γενναίως µαχοµένους ἀποθανεῖν ἔφη ἢ ἀγεννές τι πεποιηκότας σωθῆναι. ὁ δὲ πρωτοστράτωρ· “εἰ µὲν 
τῶν κοινῶν εἷς τίς ὢν ταῦτ’ ἔλεγες, ἐπαίνου ἦς ἄξιος· εἰ δὲ ὁ σὸς θάνατος κοσµικὸν ἐπάγει τὸν 
κίνδυνον, ἱνατί µὴ τὸ βέλτιον αἱρῇ; εἰ γὰρ σωθείης, καὶ αὖθις πολεµήσων νικήσεις” (ibid: VII.3.8-12; 
trans. 194-195). 
1609 φεύγων ἐκράτει καὶ διώκων ἐνίκα (ibid: XV.3.3.37-38; trans. 438). 
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shows her father exhibiting bravery in defeat, and felt a need to offer reasons for him 
leaving the field, confirms that certain expectations of protagonists existed in ‘heroic 
historiography’.
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III. Blood, Wounds and Violence in ‘Heroic Historiography’ 
One way to show the commitment and durability of the subject was to specify wounds 
he suffered in combat.  Gore is a common feature of historiography of the Middle 
Byzantine period, a reflection of religious imperial symbolism, the influence of epic 
literature, and of aristocratic heroic values, which, in the tradition of Homer, 
considered there to be honour in injuries received and inflicted in battle. 
The Value of Suffering 
A striking aspect of the Katakalon Kekaumenos material in Skylitzes is the detail of 
the ‘mortal wounds’ he incurred at the Battle of Diakene in 1049:  ‘One had laid bare 
his skull…from the peak to the eyebrow, another on the collar had cut the neck at the 
root of the tongue, right through to the mouth; he had lost much blood’.1610  
Knowledge of these injuries indicates Kekaumenos’ contribution; indeed, it was 
among the aspects which led Jonathan Shepard to conclude that Skylitzes employed a 
biography of the general.1611  Kekaumenos endured great pain before his collapse, and 
he or his biographer were keen to illustrate this.  A warrior fainting from loss of blood 
was a topos of Hellenistic literature, and conveyed to the reader the severity of the 
wounds and the victim’s fortitude in sustaining them.1612  Such sentiments are seen 
also in a section of Nikephoros Bryennios’ Hyle Historias which probably derived 
from a source recounting the deeds of John Doukas.  In the account of the Battle of 
Zompos, it is said that Andronikos Doukas, despite being afflicted by mortal wounds, 
                                                 
1610 ἔκειτο γὰρ ἄφωνος διὰ τὸ καιρίας λαβεῖν πληγάς, µίαν µὲν κατὰ γυµνοῦ τοῦ κρανίου, πεσόντος τοῦ 
κράνους αὐτοῦ, διήκουσαν ἀπὸ κορυφῆς ἄχρι τῶν ὀφρύων, ἑτέραν δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ τραχήλου, ἔνθα περ ἡ 
γλῶσσα ἐρρίζωται, καὶ διατεµοῦσαν τὸν τράχηλου καὶ εἰς τὸ στόµα πεσοῦσαν, καὶ ἔξαιµος γενέσθαι 
(Skylitzes: 469.54-59; trans. 438). 
1611 Shepard (1992b). 
1612 Salazar (2000): 219. 
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endeavoured to rescue his father.1613  Receiving wounds whilst trying to save a 
companion or relative was a familiar scene in Greco-Roman literature.1614  In the 
Middle Byzantine period, as in past times, wounds and blood loss embellished a 
heroic display, and excused a soldier for giving up the fight.   
Being able to overlook one’s wounds and fight on was regarded as an equally 
impressive feat.  Prior to the Battle of Manzikert, Nikephoros Bryennios the Elder 
found himself surrounded by Turks, struck in the chest with a lance and pierced in the 
back by two arrows.  Yet the following day he reported to Romanos Diogenes 
‘without a thought for his wounds’.1615  Similar is the case of George Palaiologos: 
whilst fighting the Turks, he was struck in the head, and, though without a helmet, 
was ‘entirely unmoved by the blow’.1616  Anna Komnene notes that Palaiologos 
suffered severe wounds all over his body at the siege of Dyrrachion, the worst being 
an arrow which lodged near his temple.  Rather than retire, Palaiologos had the shaft 
removed, bandaged his head and threw himself back into the fray.1617  The efforts of 
these men did not go unnoticed.  Anna defends the decision of her father to appoint 
the ineffectual Aspietes the Armenian as stratopedarches of the east, citing an 
occasion where Aspietes’ proved his worth by killing a Norman attacker despite 
having a lance plunged through him.1618  Similarly, when John, nephew of Manuel 
                                                 
1613 ὁ δὲ καίτοι κατάστικτος τοῖς τραύµασιν ὤν - ἐβέβλητο γὰρ καιρίαις πληγαῖς -, περιῄει ζητῶν τὸν 
πατέρα… (Bryennios: 171-173). 
1614 Salazar (2000): 219-220. 
1615 ...ὁ δ’ ἀπῄει τῶν τραυµάτων καταφρονήσας (Bryennios: 111-113). 
1616 γενναίως δ’ ἀγωνιζόµενος, ἐπειδὴ τὴν κόρυθα ἀπεβάλλετο, πλήττεται βέλει κατὰ τὸ µέτωπον· 
ἀλογήσας δὲ τῆς πληγῆς παντάπασιν... (ibid: 309.10-12). 
1617 Anna Komnene: IV.4.4. 
1618 Ibid: XII.2.7. 
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Komnenos, was wounded in the eye during mock combat, the emperor promoted him 
to protovestiarios and made him protosebastos.1619   
There was merit in a military aristocrat emphasizing his sufferings, and the same was 
true also of emperors.  In accounts of the Battle of Nineveh, Heraclius’ lip is grazed, 
while an arrow is reported to have scraped his ankle.1620  George of Pisidia’s 
Expeditio Persica describes a heel wound which hindered Heraclius, demonstrating 
the extent of the emperor’s suffering on behalf of his empire and people.1621  The 
obvious model for this was Jesus Christ, whose graphic wounds were often a point of 
focus in Byzantine writing.1622  It was perceived that Christ, in turn, would favour 
those who fought and suffered in God’s name.1623  Around the year 900, there 
emerged an office on behalf of those who died in war and in captivity, which 
entreated Christ to look kindly on those ‘[who] displayed bravery to the point of 
death; they received wounds without mercy and maintained their courage even in 
captivity’.1624  This sentiment was felt throughout the Middle period.  A thirteenth-
                                                 
1619 Kinnamos: 126. 
1620 Theophanes: 318-319; Patriarch Nikephoros, Short History: §14. 
1621 George of Pisidia: Exp. Pers., §I.163-252.  For the significance of this incident, see Mary Whitby 
(1994): 204-205 & n.41; idem (1998): 255-257. 
1622 Hatzaki (2009): 66-85. 
1623 Relevant to this argument also are the tenth-century Byzantine flirtations with declaring soldiers 
who died in battle to be martyrs.  On this subject see Dagron (1983). 
1624 Συνέλθωµεν λαὸς τοῦ Χριστοῦ 
       καὶ µνήµην ἐκτελέσωµεν 
       τῶν θανέντων 
       ἐν πολέµοις ἀδελφῶν 
       ἡµῶν καὶ τεθνηκότων 
       δεσµοῖς ἐν ἀνυποίστοις· 
       ὑπὲρ τούτων δυσωπήσωµεν. 
       Ἠρίστευσαν µέχρι σφαγῆς 
       οἱ δοῦλοί σου, φιλάνθρωπε· 
       ἐδέξαντο 
       καὶ πληγὰς ἀνηλεῶς 
       δεσµοῖς ἐγκαρτεροῦντες· 
       γενέσθω ταῦτα τούτοις 
       εἰς ἱλασµὸν ψυχῶν, φιλάνθρωπε (Office for the War Dead: ll.7-19). 
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century oration of Niketas Choniates applies the term ‘stigmata’ to wounds suffered 
by the Emperor Theodore Laskaris in battle against the Turks.1625 
After Heraclius, there seems to have been no real conception of ‘glorious wounds’.  In 
811, the Emperor Staurikios died ignominiously from a spinal wound, after enduring 
months of pain.1626  In the Middle Byzantine period, one again sees emperors endure 
‘heroic’ wounds akin to those suffered by Heraclius.  Anna Komnene mentions that 
her father Alexios received a nick to the head at the Battle of Dyrrachion, but after the 
engagement ‘was not troubled in the slightest by the pain’, instead grieving deeply for 
those soldiers who had died.1627  At other times Anna shows her father giving more 
thought to wounds.  Whilst leaving the field at Dristra, Alexios was hit on the buttock 
by a spear, a blow which caused tremendous pain.1628  Injuries to lower parts of the 
body were common, or at least preferred among imperial propagandists.  We have 
seen that John II and Manuel I Komnenos’ soldiered on despite receiving arrows to 
the foot, earning praise in contemporary encomia for their endurance.1629 
 
 
                                                 
1625 ζητοῦµεν καὶ τοὺς ὑπὲρ ἡµῶν ἱδέσθαι σου µώλωπας καὶ χείλεσι τὰ στίγµατα περιπτύξασθαι, οὐχ 
ὅτι παρ’ ἡµῖν τις διστάζων καὶ δίδυµος τὴν γνώµην καὶ δύσπιστος, ἀλλ’ ὅτι καὶ Χριστὸς ἔχαιρε 
ψηλαφώµενος καὶ µαθητοῦ χερσὶ πολυπραγµονούµενος· ὥσπερ πρὸ µικροῦ τὴν τῆς ἱερᾶς σου κεφαλῆς 
ἐνοπτρισάµενοι κόρυθα τὰ τῆς σῆς ὑπὲρ ἡµῶν ἀγωνίας σύµβολα φέρουσαν µεθ’ ἡδονῆς 
ἐνηγκαλισάµεθα καὶ περιχαρῶς ἠσπασάµεθα (Niketas Choniates, Letters and Orations: 175.17-23). 
1626 Theophanes: 492-495. 
1627 µήθ’ ὑπὸ τῆς ἥττης µήθ’ ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων τοῦ µόθου κακῶν τὸν νοῦν συγχυθεὶς µήθ’ ὑπὸ τῆς κατὰ 
τὸ µέτωπον τοῦ τραύµατος ὀδύνης ὑποχαλάσας, κἂν τὰ ἐντὸς ὑπὸ τῆς λύπης τῶν ἐν τῇ µάχῃ 
πεπτωκότων καὶ µᾶλλον τῶν γενναίως ἀγωνισαµένων ἀνδρῶν ἐξεφλέγετο (Anna Komnene: IV.8.4.23-
27; trans. 127).  It is possibly this wound to which Alexios refers in the Mousai (II.80-81; trans. Jordan 
& Roueché), where the emperor relates that his ‘helmet was pierced by a Keltic spear’ (παρτυρεῖ γὰρ 
τὸ κράνος τρωθὲν δι’ αἰχµῆς Κελτικῆς).  
1628 Anna Komnene: VII.3.8-12. 
1629 See above, 221-225, 238-242. 
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Gore and Violence: Style and Significance 
The emphasis on wounds forms part of a wider interest in violence and gore in Middle 
Byzantine battle descriptions.1630  At the Battle of Arcadiopolis, Bardas Skleros was 
accosted by a large Russian, and struck him with such strength that he split his 
adversary in two.  Later in the same engagement, Bardas repeated the feat, slicing 
through helmet and breastplate.1631  At Preslav, Theodosios Mesonyktes sliced off the 
head of a Russian.1632  Anemas cut through the neck of a Russian commander at 
Dorostolon, severing his head and arm.1633  Alexios Komnenos cut off the arm of a 
Norman named Amiketas at the Battle of Dyrrachion.1634  These select examples 
provide a general image of the gory scenes frequently encountered in historiography 
of the period. 
Such violence was not unknown in descriptions of battle in Greek literature.1635  
Combat in the Iliad entails severed limbs, crushed skulls, and general bloodshed.1636  
Christine Salazar suggests that this technique served to make the narrative more 
intense;1637 indeed, the progymnasmata recommend that writers of an ekphrasis of a 
war divulge details about slaughter and deaths, specifically to heighten the sense of 
vividness.1638  Lucian had blasted historians who described ‘outrageous wounds and 
bizarre deaths’,1639 though such criticism did not dissuade writers from following 
Homer’s lead.  Walter Pohl considered ‘violent action [to be] one of the most 
                                                 
1630 See in general Birkenmeier (2002): 206-230. 
1631 Skylitzes: 290-291; Leo the Deacon: 110-111, who does not mention the initial act of butchery. 
1632 Leo the Deacon: 135-136. 
1633 Ibid: 149; Skylitzes: 304-305. 
1634 Anna Komnene: IV.6.8. 
1635 D’Huys (1987). 
1636 See in general Friedrich (2003) for the types of wounds suffered in the Iliad. 
1637 Salazar (2000): 129-130. 
1638 τὰς σφαγάς, τοὺς θανάτους (Pseudo-Hermogenes: X.4; Aelius Theon: 119). 
1639 τραύµατα συνέγραψε πάνυ ἀπίθανα καὶ θανάτους ἀλλοκότους (Lucian: §20; trans. 31). 
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common stylistic features’ in chronicles of Late Antiquity,1640 and this is particularly 
evident in the Gothic Wars of Procopius.  Walter Kaegi believes Procopius’ detailed 
descriptions of battle wounds were a consequence of his personal involvement in the 
siege of Rome of 536-537, though ponders if they might also be inspired by gory 
injuries mentioned by past writers.1641  Brent Shaw felt the realism shown in 
Procopius’ description of combat outside the walls of Rome to be ‘unusual’, not 
dependent on rhetorical devices or earlier historical writings like his other military 
set-pieces.1642  This is debatable, since Homer is an obvious influence, as Conor 
Campbell Whately has shown.  Contra Salazar, who proposed that Procopius’ 
‘wounds’ were chosen merely for their uniqueness,1643 Whately identified a striking 
feature of Procopius’ battle descriptions: while one blow is usually enough to kill the 
enemy,  Byzantine soldiers can sustain multiple hits, attesting to their greater 
endurance.1644  This is also the case in Middle Byzantine historiography, where, as we 
have seen, Roman heroes can endure many serious wounds and still stay in the field. 
Violence was not merely a stylistic aspect of battle description therefore.  While 
heroic death in battle was the ambition of any Homeric warrior, non-fatal wounds 
were an adequate alternative.1645  In the Iliad a hero’s wounds function as a badge of 
honour, showcasing his bravery and endurance.1646  Hector, Agamemnon and Achilles 
are all able to overlook their injuries and fight on.1647  A warrior drenched in blood 
                                                 
1640 Pohl (2006). 
1641 Kaegi (1990): 73-74. 
1642 Shaw (1999): 133. 
1643 Salazar (2000): 220. 
1644 Whately (2009): 256-261. 
1645 See in general Salazar (2000): 125-150; Neal (2006a). 
1646 Neal (2006b): 19-20. 
1647 Homer, Iliad: 7.263 (Hector); 11.264-266 (Agamemnon); 21.166-181 (Achilles). 
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had clear evidence of his martial prowess.1648  Salazar has shown that this ideology 
does not feature in Classical Greek historiography, reappearing only in historical 
writing of the Hellenistic period, inspired by Alexander the Great.1649  A Hellenistic 
culture of displaying one’s scars and wounds as evidence of martial valour 
emerged.1650  At Rome certain battle scars might even be shown publicly to advance 
one’s political career.1651  There is evidence to suggest that scars continued to be worn 
as a badge of honour in Middle Byzantium.  ‘Manganeios Prodromos’ encouraged 
John Kantakouzenos not to hide his mangled hand but exhibit it; his wounds are 
considered more valuable than any jewels, and said to cause envy among those less 
brave.1652  Leo the Deacon introduces the veteran strategos Nikephoros Pastilas by 
revealing that he ‘carried on his face and chest numerous scars of sword wounds 
inflicted in battle’.1653  That they were borne on Pastilas’ face and chest confirmed 
                                                 
1648 Neal (2006b): 29. 
1649 Salazar (2000): 184-208. 
1650 Ibid: 186-187, 216-217, with examples. 
1651 Bragg (2008); Salazar (2000): 217-218. 
1652 προτίθει σου τὰ πλήγµατα, τὰ τραύµατα µὴ κρύπτε· 
       ταῦτα πολυτιµότερα καὶ λίθων καὶ µαργάρων· 
       ταῦτα πολλοὶ ζηλώσουσι, κἂν οὐ µιµήσωνταί σε, 
       κἂν ἔστιν ἀπαράµιλλος ἡ πρᾶξις τῆς ἀνδρείας (Manganeios Prodromos: 49.208-211).  In a later 
poem, ‘Manganeios’ reveals that John gave no thought to the wound and continued fighting, thus 
demonstrating his endurance: ἀφαίρεσίν τε σπαθοτµήτου δακτύλου, ὥσπερ τὸ µηθὲν ὑπενεγκὼν 
εὐτόνως (ibid: 97.24-25).   
1653 Παστιλᾶς...ὃς γενναῖος ὢν πολλοὺς ἀνέτλη πολέµους· καὶ πλειστάκις µὲν ἥλω πρὸς τῶν Ἀγαρηνῶν, 
τοσαυτάκις δὲ ἐκεῖθεν διέδρα· καὶ πολλὰς οὐλὰς ἐκ τῶν κατὰ πόλεµον χαλκοτυπιῶν ἐπὶ τοῦ προσώπου 
καὶ τῶν στέρνων προὐβάλλετο (Leo the Deacon: 8.20-9.2; trans. 62).  In his Capture of Crete, 
Theodosios the Deacon refers to the veteran Nikephoros Pastilas possessing no fear of sword ‘cuts and 
thrusts’ in battle, since he had killed many and himself been injured before:  
       τούτοις στρατηγὸς ἦν ἀνὴρ ὁ τὸ ξίφος 
       ποθῶν ὑπὲρ σοῦ καὶ προτείνων εἰς µάχην 
       καὶ µὴ δεδοικὼς τὴν ‘τοµὴν’ τῶν ‘φασγάνων’, 
       ὁ καὶ πρὶν εἰς ἄπληστον ἐµπεσὼν γένος 
       θάρσει µεγίστῳ καὶ προθυµίᾳ ξένῃ 
       καὶ ‘δοὺς ἑαυτὸν’ εἰς σφαγὴν µονωτάτως 
       καὶ τοὺς ἀνίππους συνταράξας βαρβάρους (Theodosios the Deacon: ll.857-864). 
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him to be a heroic warrior in the Homeric tradition, since wounds on the back 
signified that one was prone to retreat.1654 
This ideology somewhat contradicts the growing fascination with the beauty and 
physical appearance of soldiers in Middle Byzantium.  Such idealized descriptions 
were problematic, however, since they risked undermining one’s masculinity.  
Consequently, soldiers are frequently depicted in contemporary literature as being 
unconcerned with their physical appearance.1655  A young Alexios Komnenos, fresh 
from the battlefield, refused offers to be cleaned and dressed in finer garments, 
claiming that physical appearance was a concern for women, not soldiers.1656  This 
image of Alexios, presented by Nikephoros Bryennios, corresponds closely with one 
of a tarnished warrior offered by Anna during her description of the Battle of 
Dyrrachion.  ‘He was dusty and bloodstained, bareheaded, with his bright red hair 
straggling in front of his eyes’.1657  Theodore Prodromos’ twelfth-century romance, 
Rodanthe and Dosiklis, likewise expresses a preference for military ability over looks.  
The hero Dosiklis maintains that bravery, martial prowess and a bloodstained sword 
constituted real male beauty, and thus made him worthy of Rodanthe.1658 
 
                                                 
1654 Salazar (2000): 130, 156-157; Neal (2006b): 26. 
1655 Hatzaki (2009): 118-135; Laiou (1992b):  94-96. 
1656 Bryennios: 151-155. 
1657 τῷ δὲ λύθρῳ τοῦ ἰδίου πεφοινιγµένος αἵµατος καὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν ἀπερικάλυπτον ἔχων καὶ τὴν 
πυρσὴν καὶ ἡλιῶσαν κόµην περιπλανωµένην ταῖς ὄψεσι καὶ διοχλοῦσαν αὐτόν (Anna Komnene: 
IV.6.8.81-84; trans. 123). 
1658 Ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ ἐµοὶ πρόσωπον ἠσβολωµένον, 
       οὐδὲ ξένη τις καὶ δυσέντευκτος πλάσις· 
       ἄλλως τε κάλλος ἀνδρικὸν σταθηρότης, 
       ἀλκὴ κραταιά, πρὸς µάχας εὐανδρία, 
       ἄτρεστος ἰσχύς, δεξιὰ θαρραλέα, 
       ἔπαλξις ἀπτόητος εἰς µάχης στόµα, 
       αἵµασιν ἐχθρῶν πορφυρωθείσα σπάθη, 
       ξίφος κορεσθὲν δυσµενεστέρου κρέως (Theodore Prodromos, Rodanthe and Dosiklis: ΙΙ.251-258). 
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Conclusion   
Physical prowess was a virtue greatly admired in Middle Byzantium.  Leo the Deacon 
frequently stresses the great size of Byzantine and Russian warriors,1659 while Anna 
Komnene describes the awe that the rebel Nikephoros Basilakes inspired in people on 
account of his physicality.1660  Detailing the wounds and damage a man inflicted in 
battle was an obvious way of demonstrating his power and martial prowess.1661  Thus 
Nikephoros Botaneiates, in his duel with Randolf, and Eustratios, battling the 
Armenian Constantine, allegedly split the shields of their opponent in two; this kind 
of feat placed these men on par with the heroes of Homeric epic.  It is presumably for 
this reason also that the more graphic wounds - severed limbs and split heads - are 
usually reserved for the enemy, just as they are for Trojans in the Iliad.1662  Slicing 
through helmets and piercing breastplates seems rather fanciful, but a measure of 
realism was perhaps required, since experienced soldiers among the audience would 
know how much damage a man could realistically inflict and sustain.1663  The notion 
of a mace blow crushing both helmet and head, for example, may not have been far 
removed from the truth.1664  Awareness of the damage wrought by an iron mace 
would have made the capacity of Bardas Skleros to survive such a blow from Bardas 
                                                 
1659 Byzantine warriors Nikephoros II Phokas, Constantine Skleros, Theodore Lalakon, and Bardas 
Phokas are all said to have had enormous bodies (Leo the Deacon: 37, 110, 144-145, 174-175).  
Several Russian champions are also said to have had huge frames (109-110, 144).  Kazhdan (2006: 
329) observed that Leo was one of the first Byzantine historians to make physical prowess a virtue. 
1660 ‘They do not see beyond to a man’s soul, nor do they regard his virtue, but stand in awe only of his 
physical excellence, his daring, his virility, his speed of running, his size, and these they judge to be 
worthy of the purple robe and the crown’ (Anna Komnene: I.7.2; trans. 24). 
1661 In a Homeric context, see van Wees (1996): 38-39.  For the unrealistic nature of the injuries 
described, see Friedrich (2003): 7-22. 
1662 Salazar (2000): 130; Neal (2006b): 26. 
1663 Salazar (2000): 146.  Cf. McGeer (1995a): 313. 
1664 See above, 143-144, with relevant references cited.  The expectation of someone surviving a direct 
blow to the head from an iron mace is perhaps best demonstrated by accounts of the Battle of Antioch-
on-the-Maeander, where the recovery of Theodore Laskaris from such a hit is seen as miraculous, and 
attributed to divine intervention.  See below, 374-375. 
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Phokas – which, according to Psellos, usually killed a man immediately1665 - all the 
more impressive.   
Skleros’ endurance is merely one of several ways in which wounds and violence 
could serve as rhetorical devices in Middle Byzantine literature.  Injuries sustained in 
battle were worth mentioning and exhibiting.  In an imperial context they enabled 
comparisons to Christ, an illustration of how the emperor had toiled on behalf of his 
people.  Less noted in modern scholarship is the importance of these wounds to one’s 
martial image, and the wearing of scars as an aristocratic badge of honour.  Drawing 
attention to wounds received and inflicted in war allowed for obvious parallels with 
great warriors of mythology and Antiquity, and were thus an indispensable aspect of 
‘heroic historiography’.
                                                 
1665 ὁ γάρ τοι πληγὴν παρ’ ἐκείνου δεξάµενος εὐθέως ἀφῄρητο τὴν ψυχήν (Psellos, Chronographia: I, 6 
[VIΙ]). 
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IV. Digenes Akrites, Frontier Songs and Aristocratic Ideals 
Digenes Akrites, an epic poem relating the life and deeds of an Arab-Byzantine border 
lord, was probably committed to writing in the twelfth century but originated in oral 
tales of the tenth-century eastern borderlands.1666  As a product of the military 
aristocracy, Digenes Akrites displays ideals and values which also appear in ‘heroic 
historiography’.  It is suggested here that this may not have been coincidental, with 
frontier ballads, influenced also by Homeric epic,1667  a plausible precursor to the 
promotional aristocratic literature of the tenth century. 
Aristocratic Heroic Values in Digenes Akrites 
Fundamental features of ‘heroic historiography’, including displays of andreia, single 
combat and violence, feature in both versions of Digenes Akrites.  Constantine, twin 
brother of Digenes’ mother, accepts the offer of single combat with the Arab emir 
(later Digenes’ father) for the release of his sister.  ‘They hacked at each other for 
many hours…And blood flowed over all that ground…They were covered with 
wounds but no one was giving way’.1668  The Escorial version has the emir feel great 
guilt over his eventual withdrawal:  ‘I have disgraced my army and my whole family. 
If only I had died today – I no longer wish to live’.1669  Conversely, the emir claims to 
have single-handedly routed an entire army in his youth.1670  His son, Digenes 
himself, followed his father’s lead in this respect.  Having taken his prospective wife 
                                                 
1666 For the historical akritai, see Huxley (1974); Ševčenko (1980); Haldon & Kennedy (1980); Dagron 
& Mihăescu (1986). 
1667 Beaton (1989): 44; Magdalino (1993b); E. Jeffreys (1998a); Bazzani (2007): 224. 
1668 ἀλλήλους ἐσυνέκοπτον ἐπὶ πολλὰς τὰς ὥρας 
       ...τὸ αἷµα δὲ κατέρρεε τὴν γῆν ἐκείνην ὅλην 
       ...ὁλόπληγοι γεγόνασι, µηδεὶς τροπὴν ποιῶν τε (Digenes Akrites: GI.113-197; trans. 13-15). 
1669 “’ντρόπιασα τὰ φουσάτα µου καὶ ὅλην µου τὴν γενέαν. 
          Σήµερον νὰ ἀπόθανα καὶ οὐ θέλω τὴν ζωήν µου” (ibid: E158-159; trans. 251). 
1670 Ibid: GIII.66-78. 
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from her family home, Digenes faced down thousands of her father’s retinue, urging 
them to turn back. ‘They were ashamed to be defeated by one man, and chose death 
rather than to be put to flight by him’.1671  This view was shared by Melimitzis, a 
notable warrior in the employ of the Amazon Maximou.  When exhorted by three 
bandits not to tackle Digenes alone, Melimitzis scoffed:  ‘I would be reproved for 
cowardice, for being afraid of one man; and I have no wish to carry on living if I am 
going to be called timid’.1672  While no match for Digenes, Melimitzis and the soldiers 
of Digenes’ father-in-law are to be perceived as honourable because they share his 
heroic ideals. 
Characterized by their inability to conform to heroic conventions, it is the frontier 
bandits – apelatai – who represent the real enemy of the piece.1673  At one point, 
Digenes’ prowess is doubted by three bandits – Philopappous, Ioannakis and 
Kinnamos – who challenge him to single combat.  Digenes urges all three to attack 
him at once, but they refuse.  ‘It is not our custom to come three against one, we who 
take pride, each of us, in repelling thousands…the three of us are shamed to fight 
against one man’.  So Philopappous attacked first, but when beaten, his comrades 
charge simultaneously, ‘not in the least ashamed despite their earlier boasts’.  
Kinnamos was unhorsed and pleaded with Digenes, who assured him that it was not in 
his custom to strike a man while he was down.1674  While Digenes’ enemies may 
                                                 
1671 Ἐκεῖνοι δὲ τὴν τοῦ ἑνὸς αἰσχυνόµενοι ἧτταν 
       τὸ θανεῖν ᾑρετίσαντο ἢ φυγεῖν ὑπ’ ἐκείνου (ibid: GIV.637-644; trans. 105). 
1672 “καταµεµφθῶ ὡς ἄνανδρος τὸν ἕνα δειλιάσας· 
         καὶ ζῆν σὐκέτι βούλοµαι, εἰ ἄτολµος ἀκούσω” (ibid: GVI.489-496; trans. 181). 
1673 As observed by Galatariotou (1987b): 44-51. 
1674 ἡµεῖς ἔθος οὐκ ἔχοµεν ἐλθεῖν οἱ τρεῖς εἰς ἕνα, 
       οἱ θαρροῦντες µετακινεῖν ὁ καθεὶς χιλιάδας 
       ...αἰσχυνόµεθα οἱ τρεῖς πολεµῆσαι εἰς ἕνα 
       ...καὶ τοῦτο θεασάµενοι οἱ ἕτεροι ὡς εἶχον 
       καβαλλάροι ἐπάνω µου ἤρχοντο παραχρῆµα 
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break the rules of combat, he maintains honour by not stooping to their level.  Of 
course, lone hero that he was,1675 Digenes had no interest in evening the odds.  ‘I have 
never been in the habit of performing valiant deeds with others’.1676  As in aristocratic 
promotional literature, honourable warriors in Digenes take pride in their martial 
prowess, feel shame in defeat, inflict and endure pain, and adhere to rules of combat. 
Two Heroes: Digenes Akrites and Manuel I Komnenos1677 
While Digenes Akrites exhibits historical elements, the eponymous hero is a 
superhuman creation who embodies the established aristocratic qualities of military 
might, independence and wealth.1678  Digenes Akrites was, most probably, written in 
the mid-twelfth century and reflective of ‘a milieu in which not only the aristocratic 
exploits and values of the hero but also his genealogy and the geography of his 
movements were of a direct contemporary interest’.1679  In a satirical poem of the mid-
twelfth century, the poet known as Ptochoprodromos referred to Manuel as Ἀκρίτης 
ἔτερος and τὸν νέον τὸν Ἀκρίτην, confirming that a version of the poem existed at 
that time.1680  Manuel’s reputation as a lothario, and, more pertinently, his courageous 
displays in battle permitted such comparisons, though it cannot be ruled out that his 
demeanour was inspired by Digenes Akrites.1681   
                                                                                                                                            
       µηδαµῶς αἰσχυνόµενοι, ὡς πρώην ἐκαυχῶντο (Digenes Akrites: GVI.192-269; trans. 165-167).  
Twice in the Escorial version Akrites tells Kinnamos to rise up, as he will not hit a man while he is 
down (E2179, E1287).   
1675 For the solitary existence of Digenes as a recurrent theme, see Magdalino (1989): 191-192; E. 
Jeffreys (2000): 197-198. 
1676 “Ποτέ µου οὐκ ἐσυνήθισα ἀνδραγαθεῖν µὲ ἄλλους” (Digenes Akrites: E1301; trans. 335). 
1677 See Appendix VI for further links. 
1678 Huxley (1974): 317-318. For these qualities, along with the importance of family and noble birth, 
see Magdalino (1989). 
1679 Magdalino (1993b): 10. 
1680 Ptochoprodromos: IV.189-191, 542-544. 
1681 Magdalino (1992): 203 n.45. 
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The martial culture at the imperial court may have intensified as a result of greater 
exposure to the chivalric ideals of western Europe.1682  Manuel remodelled elements 
of his army along western lines,1683 and he is also known to have participated in 
jousts.1684  Magdalino describes Manuel as ‘the westernizing Byzantine par 
excellence’, considering it ‘highly likely’ that Manuel aspired to the ideals of the 
westerners among his entourage.1685  There is some suggestion that the growing 
western tradition of compiling written versions of oral chansons de geste may have 
inspired the production of Digenes Akrites, though it is more plausible that several 
elements conspired to bring about the project.1686  The metre used in Digenes Akrites 
– the fifteen-syllable political verse – was more regularly employed among orators 
and writers during this period.1687  The Hellenistic romance, which experienced a 
sudden revival in the mid-twelfth century, shares a number of similarities with the 
content and tone of Digenes Akrites.1688  In addition to these literary elements, it is not 
implausible that Manuel himself inspired the production of Digenes Akrites.  
Elizabeth Jeffreys links the literary project to military operations on the eastern 
frontier c.1150.1689  It is proposed that these actions gave greater relevance to the 
popular stories of Digenes, and possibly stimulated a writer to turn the poem into a 
work of literature along the lines of the resurgent Hellenistic novels.1690  While this 
hypothesis is contestable, there can be no question that Manuel’s campaigns in the 
east were undertaken in ‘the spirit of Akrites’,1691 earning him comparisons with the 
                                                 
1682 E. Jeffreys (1980); idem (1984): 204-210; idem (1998a). 
1683 Lindner (1982). 
1684 Kinnamos: 47, 125; Niketas Choniates, Chronike Diegesis: 108-110.  See Jones & Maguire (2002). 
1685 Magdalino (1992): 203. 
1686 E. Jeffreys (1980); idem (1993): 33-37. 
1687 M. Jeffreys (1974); E. Jeffreys (2009). 
1688 See below, 351-352. 
1689 See also M. Jeffreys (1978). 
1690 E. Jeffreys (1993); idem (1998a): 452. 
1691 Ricks (1990): 7.  See also Beaton (1995): 84-85. 
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legendary borderer.  The appearance of the written Digenes epitomized the growing 
appreciation of martial valour under the Komnenian rulers. 
Songs of the Frontier, Aristocratic Promotional Literature and ‘Heroic 
Historiography’1692 
While Digenes Akrites was committed to writing in the mid-twelfth century, the poem 
almost certainly derived from oral tales disseminated on the frontier as early as the 
late ninth century.1693  It is argued that these tales were brought to Constantinople 
after the Battle of Manzikert, an element of the nostalgia for the disappearing martial 
culture of the frontier.1694  Very little however can be gauged of the oral tradition of 
frontier songs.  At the beginning of the tenth century, Bishop Arethas of Caesarea 
wrote of ‘the accursed Paphlagonians who compose songs about the feats of glorious 
men and who sing them for an obol from house to house’.1695  While we cannot know 
precisely who these ἀγύρτας were, or what their tales consisted of, it is plausible that 
the ἐνδόξων ἀνδρῶν in question were soldiers of recent memory.1696 
When frontier songs first appeared, the akritai themselves presented obvious 
candidates for subjects.1697  According to Jean-Claude Cheynet, ‘clear indications 
permit the affirmation that the remembrance of heroes was long-lasting’ in the oral 
                                                 
1692 Additional links between oral poetry and ‘heroic historiography’ are postulated in Appendix V. 
1693 Huxley (1974); E. & M. Jeffreys (1986): esp. 515-516; Beaton (1981a); idem (1981b); idem 
(1989): 43-51; idem (1993); Trombley (1998): 99.  See also above, 275-277. 
1694 Beaton (1996a). 
1695 Τοὺς ἀγείροντας λέγει ἤτοι ἀγύρτας, ὧν νῦν δεῖγµα οἱ κατάρατοι Παφλαγόνες ᾠδάς τινας 
συµπλάσαντες πάθη περιεχούσας ἐνδόξων ἀνδρῶν καὶ πρὸς ὀβολὸν ᾄδοντες καθ’ ἑκάστην οἰκίαν 
(Kougeas 1912-1913: 239).  We should not read too much into Arethas’ disdain for Paphlagonians – on 
this point see Magdalino (1998): esp. 141-143. 
1696 For discussion of Arethas’ comments, see Pertusi (1970): 502; Huxley (1974): 326-327; Ricks 
(1990): 8-9; Jouanno (1998): 103-104.  For the enduring culture of heroic songs in Byzantium, see 
Beck (1971): 99 n.10; E. & M. Jeffreys (1986): 508-509; E. Jeffreys (2011b): 470-471. 
1697 See in general Grégoire (1932); idem (1933d). 
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songs of ninth- and tenth-century Asia Minor.1698  We have discussed the prominence 
of the early Doukas family in these frontier ballads.1699  Henri Grégoire has suggested 
that members of the Argyros family may have inspired the tenth-century Lay of 
Armoures,1700 while Hans-Georg Beck links the Lay of Theophylact to the father of 
the Emperor Romanos I Lekapenos.1701  When Attaleiates writes of the deeds of the 
Phokades being ‘much talked of’ in his own day, it is not unthinkable that he is also 
referring to oral songs.1702  Indeed, Grégoire and Rosemary Morris have proposed the 
existence of a ‘Phokas cycle of songs’, inspired by the life of Nikephoros II 
Phokas.1703  With pro-Phokas literature emerging in the mid-tenth century, it is 
possible that frontier songs and aristocratic biography, both concerned in principle 
with the celebration of heroic deeds, were closely linked, with prose historiographical 
literature about famous soldiers a natural progression from oral verse compositions on 
the same subject.1704 
Conclusion 
Paul Magdalino observed the ‘common ground of epic’ which Digenes Akrites shared 
with the heroic biographies of Alexios I Komnenos by Nikephoros Bryennios and 
Anna Komnene.1705  Admittedly the poem is quite distinct from ‘heroic 
                                                 
1698 Cheynet (2006b): 9. 
1699 See above, 276-278. 
1700 Grégoire (1939): 241-245; Beck (1971): 52-57.  The idea is based on a Cypriot rendition of the 
song which features the name Azgoures.  For further discussion see Baud-Bovy (1938). 
1701 Beck (1971): 62-63. 
1702 See above, 270-271. 
1703 Grégoire (1962).  The thoughts of Morris remain unpublished – see Galatariotou (1993): 53 n.45.  
See also Adontz & Grégoire (1935) for suggestions of songs relating to other members of the Phokas 
clan. 
1704 Roderick Beaton’s suggestion (1986b) that Anna Komnene may have relied on an oral folk song 
for her account of the rebellion of Rhapsomates on Cyprus is relevant to this argument, strengthening 
the links between oral tales and historiography. 
1705 Magdalino (1993a): 431; idem (1993b): 3. 
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historiography’.  The relations between Digenes and numerous females put the poem 
in the realm of the classicizing romances of the mid-twelfth century, a rather sudden 
literary revival.1706  The poem has been described by Roderick Beaton as ‘proto-
romance’, an important precursor to the fully-fledged romances which followed soon 
after.1707  The original form of the poem, however, may have been quite different.  
Henri Grégoire considered it ‘by no means certain’ that the original Digenes was a 
‘perfect novel of the classical type’.1708  Beaton speculates that the exploits of Digenes 
Akrites may have originally been told in separate oral lays, with the Grottaferrata 
rendition possibly an attempt to create a coherent whole, incorporating elements from 
Hellenistic literary tradition.1709  The romance genre was among these.  Another was 
the biographical form which dominated many literary narratives of the period.1710  
David Ricks, a proponent of the idea that the Escorial represents a sequence of 
separate poems, observed that a ‘biographical tendency has crept into the interstices 
between poems by the time of [the Grottaferrata version]’.1711  Ulrich Moennig 
observes that this biographical element linked Digenes Akrites with Pseudo-
Callisthenes’ Life of Alexander, as well the Vita Basilii.1712  If this argument is correct, 
then two principal conclusions can be drawn.  Firstly, that Digenes Akrites in its 
written form may not provide an accurate reflection of its original oral mode, which 
perhaps veered more towards heroic epic than romance.  Therefore, frontier ballads 
                                                 
1706 Beaton (1986a); idem (1989); idem (1995); idem (1996b); MacAlister (1991); S. Alexiou (1993); 
Magdalino (1993a): 189; E. Jeffreys (1998b).  An interest in the romance genre is at least attested in the 
mid-eleventh century - in the will of Cappadocian aristocrat Eustathios Boilas, datable to 1059, a copy 
of the Hellenistic romance Achilles Tatius is recorded in his library inventory (Will of Eustathios 
Boilas: 24-25). 
1707 Beaton (1981a): 20-21; idem (1989): 44-48; idem (1993): 64-66; idem (1996b). 
1708 Grégoire (1940-1941): 92-93. 
1709 Beaton (1995): 83-85. 
1710 Athanasios Markopoulos (1989) argues that the author of the Grottaferrata Digenes Akrites utilized, 
in part, lost chronicles of the ninth to twelfth centuries, which, if true, might have had a significant 
bearing on its literary form. 
1711 Ricks (1989): 200. 
1712 Moennig (1993): esp. 115. 
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may have been more concerned with military deeds and thus served as a more obvious 
influence on writers of aristocratic promotional literature.  The second observation is 
that the process was reciprocal; as the oral songs may have influenced ‘heroic 
historiography’, the biographical principle perhaps shaped the literary form of ballads 
such as Digenes Akrites.
353 
V. The Great Conflict of ‘Heroic Historiography’: The Battlefield Role of the 
General 
Aristocratic notions of heroism dictated that a general partake in monomachy and risk 
his life on the battlefield.  Such recklessness however conflicts with the theoretical 
role of the general, which insisted that he distance himself from the fighting.  As the 
previous chapter has shown, the depiction of the general adhering to instructional 
handbooks and achieving victory through ingenious stratagems was another recurring 
feature of aristocratic promotional literature and ‘heroic historiography’ in general.  
Both styles of generalship appear to have been considered praiseworthy by the Middle 
Byzantine military aristocracy, but historians, conversant with military theory and 
perhaps lacking a true heroic mentality, favoured the more cautious approach.  We 
will see that the image of the emperor as warrior appears to have been particularly 
prominent in bulletins and panegyric.  The difficulty in reconciling the general as both 
commander and warrior in historiography had its roots in Homeric and Hellenistic 
attitudes towards war, and continued into the Early Byzantine period.  The renewed 
interest in military science and the heroic values of the emerging military aristocracy 
resulted in the reappearance of this ideological clash from the tenth century onwards.   
Theoretical Notions of Generalship in Byzantium 
Byzantine military theory encouraged the general to remain aloof from the action so 
that he could observe the course of the battle and react accordingly.1713  Leo VI the 
Wise, following the Strategikon of Maurice, had clear expectations of the commander: 
                                                 
1713 The general usually took up a position in the middle of the second line (Maurice, Strategikon: 
§§III.8.16; III.15.2-3; Sylloge Tacticorum: §46.17).  See also McGeer (1995a): 285. 
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Do not join in hand-to-hand fighting with the enemy; that is the role of the soldier, 
not of the general.  But you are to make all the proper arrangements and then 
station yourself in a suitable location from which you can observe the 
troops…You should see to their needs and take steps to call up your reserves…to 
go to the assistance of a unit in trouble.1714 
Leo later reiterates this crucial advice, this time in his own words: 
At the time of battle you must devote special attention to the men doing the 
fighting…rather than very rashly springing into action yourself and engaging in 
hand-to-hand combat when the situation is not critical.  It is better <for you> to 
refrain completely from close combat with the enemy, even if you could project 
the image of unlimited bravery.  By engaging in combat you will not benefit your 
army as much as you will harm it by dying, something not unexpected in close 
combat…Rather, in safety keenly observe and carry out your proper task.  It is 
then that the general is admired.1715 
Reliance on the commander, was, as Eric McGeer observes, ‘the Achilles’ heel of all 
medieval armies, with mere word of the general’s death a psychological blow which 
                                                 
1714 Καὶ µὴ συµπλέκεσθαι τοῖς πολεµίοις διὰ χειρός.  στρατιώτου γὰρ µᾶλλον ἢ στρατηγοῦ τοῦτό ἐστιν.  
ἀλλὰ ποιεῖν σε µὲν τὰ ἁρµόζοντα πάντα, ἐν ἐπιτηδείῳ δὲ ἵστασθαι τόπῳ, ὅθεν ὁρᾶν δύνασαι τούς τε 
ἀγωνιζοµένους καὶ τούς, ὡς εἰκός, ἀµελοῦντας, καὶ ἐπεύχεσθαι τὰ δέοντα καὶ σπουδάζειν διὰ τῶν ἐν 
ὑποβοηθείᾳ ὄντων συναίρεσθαι τῷ δεοµένῳ µέρει, τοῦτ’ ἔστιν διὰ τῶν πλαγιοφυλάκων καὶ 
νωτοφυλάκων (Leo VI, Taktika: §XIV.3; trans. 291).  Following Maurice, Strategikon: §§II.15; 
VII.B.1. 
1715 Σὲ δὲ χρὴ κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν τῆς µάχης προνοεῖν µᾶλλον τῶν µαχοµένων, καθώς σοι καὶ πρόσθεν 
ὑπεθέµεθα, ἢ τολµηρότερον ἄλλεσθαι καὶ ταῖς χερσὶ συµπλέκεσθαι, ὅταν µὴ ἀνάγκης ἐστὶ καιρός· 
µᾶλλον δὲ τὸ παντελῶς ἀπέχεσθαι διὰ χειρῶν τοῖς πολεµίοις συµπλέκεσθαι, καὶ ἂν ὑπέρβλητον 
ἀνδρείαν ἐπιδείξῃς. οὐ τοσοῦτον γὰρ ὠφελήσεις τὸ στράτευµα µαχόµενος, ὅσον ἀποθανὼν βλάψεις 
αὐτό, ὅπερ τοῖς συµπλεκοµένοις οὐκ ἀπροσδόκητόν ἐστιν... Μᾶλλον δὲ ἐν ἀσφαλείᾳ ὀξέως καὶ βλέπε 
καὶ πράττε τὰ δέοντα. τότε γὰρ µᾶλλον θαυµάζεται στρατηγός, ὅταν κατὰ τὸ ὀξὺ τῆς ἀνάγκης τὰ 
πρέποντα διοικήσῃ, ὅτε ἐν ἀδείᾳ ὢν τὰ εἰκότα προβουλεύσηται (Leo VI, Taktika: §XIV.99-100; trans. 
347).  Similar advice is found at ibid: §§XX.2; XX.153. 
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often led to collapse.1716  Byzantine generals were discouraged from risking their lives 
in battle, and yet the evidence suggests that they routinely ignored this caution. 
The Active Participation of the General in Historiography: Praise and Criticism 
There can be little doubt that commanders and emperors were actually prone to 
reckless displays in battle, primarily because historians of the period - even 
sympathetic ones – find difficulty in reconciling the prescribed responsibilities of a 
general with undisciplined bouts of boldness.  The sixth book of Theophanes 
Continuatus, written in the mid-tenth century, describes the fate of the patrikios Leo, 
commander of Adrianople c.921.  Though widely known as ‘Moroleon’ – foolish Leo 
– the author considers the name ‘Thymoleon’ – courageous Leo – to be more apt, 
noting that Leo had often exhibited bravery against the invading Bulgarians.1717  
When Skylitzes drew upon Theophanes Continuatus for his corresponding account, he 
elected to focus on the ‘foolish’ aspect, explaining that Leo earned the moniker ‘on 
account of his rash impetuosity in battle’.  In his ensuing narrative of the Bulgarian 
siege of Adrianople, Skylitzes substantiates his conclusion by stating that Leo would 
occasionally open the gates and charge the enemy.1718  While there is no obvious 
explanation as to why Skylitzes presents Leo in this way, the nicknames given by 
Theophanes Continuatus indicate that Leo’s bold conduct met with admiration and 
disapproval in equal measure.   
                                                 
1716 McGeer (1995a): 307-308.  Examples of such instances are compiled by Dennis (1997a): 174-175. 
1717 Τοῦ δὲ πατρικίου τοῦ οὕτως ἐπονοµαζοµένου Μωρολέοντος, ἢ µᾶλλον εἰπεῖν οἰκειότερον 
Θυµολέοντος...κρατίστου τὰ πολεµικὰ καὶ περιδεξίου τυγχάνοντος, ὃς πλείστας κατὰ Βουλγάρων 
ἀνδραγαθίας ἐπεδείξατο (Theophanes Continuatus: 404.18-405.10). 
1718 ...Λέων, ὃν διὰ τὴν ὀξύρροπον πρὸς τοὺς πολέµους ὁρµὴν καὶ Μωρολέοντα ἐκάλουν (Skylitzes: 
218.82-2; trans. 211).  For this observation, see Holmes (2005): 151. 
356 
Perhaps the most famous instance of a historian evaluating the conduct of a general is 
that of Michael Psellos judging the stand of the Emperor Romanos IV Diogenes at the 
Battle of Manzikert.  Having criticized Romanos for his ‘ignorance of generalship’ 
(ἀστρατήγητον),1719 Psellos, in recounting the moment when Romanos elected to 
remain in the field rather than flee, affords the emperor begrudging respect: 
Although I cannot applaud his subsequent behaviour, it is impossible for me to 
censure him…His action can be interpreted in two ways.  My own view represents 
the mean between these two extremes.  On the one hand, if you regard him as a 
hero, courting danger and fighting courageously, it is reasonable to praise him; on 
the other, when one reflects that a general, if he conforms to the accepted rules of 
strategy, must remain aloof from the battle-line, supervising the movements of his 
army and issuing the necessary orders to the men under his command, then 
Romanos’ conduct on this occasion would appear foolish in the extreme, for he 
exposed himself to danger without a thought of the consequences.  I myself am 
more inclined to praise than to blame him for what he did.1720 
Psellos’ criticism of Romanos’ knowledge of military science should not be 
considered accurate, nor indeed fair.  While Psellos professed to be a military expert, 
he possessed no practical experience and acquired his expertise entirely from military 
                                                 
1719 Psellos, Chronographia: II, 162 (XX); also II, 160 [XVI].  For Psellos’ criticism of Romanos, see 
De Vries - van der Velden (1997). 
1720 Τὸ δὲ µετὰ ταῦτα ἐπαινεῖν µὲν οὐκ ἔχω, ψέγειν δὲ οὐ δύναµαι, αὐτὸς τὸν ὅλον κίνδυνον δέχεται· 
τοῦτο δὲ µέσον ἐστὶν ἀντιρρήσεως· εἰ µὲν γὰρ ὡς φιλοκίνδυνον λογίσαιτό τις τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ ἀγωνιστὴν 
προθυµότατον, ἔχοι ἂν ἀφορµὰς πρὸς ἐγκώµιον· εἰ δ’ ὅτι, δέον κατὰ τὴν στρατηγικὴν ἀκρίβειαν πόρρω 
ἵστασθαι, πρωτοστράτηγον τυγχάνοντα τοῦ στρατεύµατος, καὶ τοῖς πλήθεσιν ἐπιτάττειν τὰ δέοντα, ὁ δὲ 
ἀλογίστως παρεκινδύνευε, πολλὰ ἂν ἐς αὐτὸν ἀποσκώψειεν· ἐγὼ δὲ µετὰ τῶν ἐπαινούντων, ἀλλ’ οὐ 
τῶν αἰτιωµένων εἰµί (Psellos, Chronographia: II, 162 [XXI]; trans. 355-356). 
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handbooks.1721  Perhaps Psellos was swayed in this instance by guilt over Romanos’ 
blinding and death, or by a tide of appreciation for Romanos’ bravery at court, evident 
in his historical portrayal by Psellos’ contemporary, Michael Attaleiates.1722  By the 
mid-twelfth century, Romanos Diogenes had become a figure of emulation for the 
warrior emperors of the Komnenian dynasty, worthy of mention in the same breath as 
a Nikephoros II Phokas.1723  There was no sense at this point that Romanos had shown 
himself to be a poor general by fighting on as those around him fled. 
We have seen that Anna Komnene depicted her father not shirking from the fight, but 
at the same time not staying in battle to the point of capture.  Anna, perhaps more than 
any other Middle Byzantine historian, displays a clear awareness of the 
responsibilities of the general on the battlefield.  Describing an engagement with the 
Cumans, Anna does not lavish praise on her father for his victory in single combat, 
but soberly opines: ‘On this occasion he showed himself more of a soldier than a 
general’.1724  Though Anna rarely criticizes her father, she implies that he was 
somewhat rash in his youth.  At Dyrrachion, Alexios neglected the cautious advice of 
the wise George Palaiologos and instead sided with his younger officers, who 
preferred to do battle with Robert Guiscard.1725  Prior to engaging the Pechenegs at 
Dristra, Palaiologos again counselled his brother-in-law towards a safer course of 
                                                 
1721 Psellos professes to being ‘thoroughly conversant with the science of military tactics’ (τὴν 
τατκτικὴν ἐπιστήµην ἠκριβωκότα), and bizarrely claimed to be superior to Romanos even in this 
respect (ibid: ΙΙ, 160 [XVI]; trans. 353).  Psellos’ worth to Romanos on the one campaign he did attend 
does appear to have been in his ability as a military engineer.  Writing in 1069 to Constantine, the 
nephew of former patriarch Michael Keroularios, Psellos bemoaned that he was currently assisting in 
the construction of siege engines for the emperor (Psellos, Letters: 470-473; see also Snipes 1981).  
This is consistent with Psellos’ statement in the aforementioned passage of the Chronographia about 
being skilled in building machines of war (ὅσα περὶ µηχανηµάτων κατασκευὰς). 
1722 See above, 89-93. 
1723 See above, 254 n.1274. 
1724 ...τὴν ἡµέραν στρατιώτην µᾶλλον ἢ στρατηγὸν ἑαυτὸν ἀποδείξας (Anna Komnene: X.4.7; trans. 
271). 
1725 Ibid: IV.5.3. 
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action, but was overlooked in favour of the urgings of impulsive youths.  According 
to Anna, ‘the emperor himself loved to take risks and was naturally inclined to 
provoke battle; he completely ignored the arguments for restraint’.1726  On both 
occasions the Byzantines suffered disastrous defeats, the implication being that these 
could have been avoided had Alexios heeded the wisdom of Palaiologos.  As Alexios 
matured, his outlook became more pragmatic; displays of personal valour in combat 
are absent after 1090, and in Bohemond’s invasion of 1105-1108 we witness Alexios 
shunning open battle and instead opting to force the Normans into submission via a 
policy of containment.1727  By the final book of the Alexiad, Anna is able to measure 
her father’s skills against her own expectations of a good general and soldier: 
The prime virtue of a general is the ability to win a victory without incurring 
danger…As far as I am concerned, it has always seemed best to devise some 
crafty strategic manoeuvre in the course of battle, if one’s own army cannot match 
the enemy’s strength…There is no one method of achieving victory, nor one form 
of it, but from ancient times up to the present, success has been won in different 
ways…In the case of my father, he sometimes overcame the enemy through his 
military powers, and sometimes by a quick-witted move…There were times when 
he had recourse to stratagem, at others he entered the battle in person…If ever 
there was a man who had an extraordinary love of danger, it was he; and when 
dangers continually arose, he faced them in different ways: by marching into them 
bareheaded and coming to close grips with the barbarians, or on occasions by 
                                                 
1726 ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς φιλοκινδυνότατος ὢν καὶ προαρπάζειν πεφυκὼς τὰς µάχας οὐδ’ εἰς νοῦν ὅλως τῶν 
ἀπειργόντων αὐτὸν τοὺς λόγους ἐβάλετο (ibid: VII.3.4-6; trans. 192). 
1727 See Birkenmeier (2002): 56-84; Theotokis (2010): 280-301.  Frankopan (1998: 96-163) argues that 
Alexios adopted containment tactics much earlier, in 1084. 
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pretending to avoid conflict and feigning terror.  It depended on the circumstances 
and the situation.1728 
Anna’s preference for the stratagem accords with the guiding principle of Byzantine 
military policy, and reflects her reading of military manuals.1729  While she prefers her 
father achieving victory by this method, she acknowledges that it was at times 
necessary for him to close ranks with the enemy.  The two styles – the general and the 
soldier – were not necessarily incompatible, but in the case of Alexios we witness a 
clear development in the Alexiad, as he evolves from fearless warrior to wise 
commander, a change which brought him greater success and closer to Anna’s idea of 
a good general. 
The same cannot be said of Manuel I Komnenos, who, as we have seen, cultivated a 
propagandist image of daring heroism.1730  Manuel’s boldness on the return march 
from Ikonion in 1146 did not meet the approval of Kinnamos, his generally admiring 
biographer:   
I dare not say whether on account of his repeated bold deeds against those 
barbarians he furnished them experience of his nobility and became well nigh 
                                                 
1728 πρώτη ἐστὶν ἀρετῶν ἢ στρατηγῶν σοφία κτᾶσθαι νίκην ἀκίνδυνον...ἐµοί δ’ ἄριστον νενόµισται καὶ 
τὸ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ µάχῃ µηχανᾶσθαί τι πανοῦργον καὶ στρατηγικόν, ὁπηνίκα µὴ ἀπόχρη τὸ στράτευµα πρὸς 
τὴν τῶν ἐναντίων ἰσχύν...ὡς οὐκ ἄρα µονότροπος ἡ νίκη οὐδὲ µονοειδής, ἀλλὰ διαφόροις κόποις πάλαι 
µέχρι τῆς δεῦρο κατορθουµένη, ὥστε τὴν µὲν νίκην µίαν εἶναι, τοὺς δὲ τρόπους...ὁ δέ γε ἐµὸς πατὴρ 
καὶ βασιλεὺς ὅπου µὲν ἀλκῇ τῶν ἐναντίων ἐκράτει, ὅπου δὲ καὶ περινοίᾳ τινὶ χρησάµενος, ἔστι δ’ οὗ 
κἀν ταῖς µάχαις αὐταῖς ὀξύ τι στοχασάµενος καὶ τολµήσας τὴν νικῶσαν εἶχεν εὐθύς.  ὅπου µὲν καὶ 
στρατηγικῷ µηχανήµατι συγχρησάµενος, ὅπου δὲ καὶ διὰ χειρῶν µαχόµενος, πολλὰ πολλάκις ἐξ 
ἀπροσδοκήτων ἐστήσατο τρόπαια.  ἦν µὲν γάρ, εἴπερ ἄλλός τις, καὶ φιλοκίνδυνος ὁ ἀνήρ, καὶ συνεχεῖς 
ἦν ὁρᾶν αὐτῷ τοὺς κινδύνους ἐγειροµένους, ἀλλὰ ποτὲ µὲν γυµνῇ τῇ κεφαλῇ πρὸς τούτους 
παραπεδύετο καὶ ὁµόσε τοῖς βαρβάροις ἐχώρει, ποτὲ δὲ καὶ ἐσχηµατίζετο ὑποκατακλίνεσθαι καὶ τὸν 
ὀρρωδοῦντα ὑπεκρίνετο, ὡς καιρὸς ἐδίδου καὶ τὰ πράγµατα ὑπηγόρευε (Anna Komnene: XV.3.2-3; 
trans. 437-438). 
1729 See Sullivan (2010a). 
1730 See above, 237-259. 
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unapproachable for them, or whether [it was] by Providence caring for him in 
ways which It understood.  I myself do not consider what he did among things 
worthy of commendation.1731  
There is a suggestion that Kinnamos was not alone in thinking this.  At the second 
siege of Kerkyra in 1149, Manuel allegedly wished to lead the assault himself, and 
had to be forcibly restrained by his generals and relatives.  Kinnamos notes that he 
had ‘heard some people impute the charge of rashness to [the emperor]; [Manuel] 
always nurtured a supreme audacity beyond [ordinary] courage’.1732  The historian 
does not count himself among these critics, but his earlier condemnation of Manuel’s 
bold conduct confirms that he shared their outlook.  Kinnamos had greater 
appreciation for Manuel’s more cunning actions, one of which occurred during the 
aforementioned expedition of 1146.  Manuel, seeing his army struggling against the 
Turks, ordered a soldier to remove his helmet and wave it around, falsely proclaiming 
that the sultan had been captured.  The conceit rallied the flagging spirits of his troops 
and led them to push back the enemy.  ‘Frequently thus a single clever plan succeeds 
over physical strength’, comments an approving Kinnamos.1733  In his appraisal of the 
abortive Italian expedition of John Doukas, which came to a head when Doukas 
elected to give battle against the Sicilians, Kinnamos provides a rare window into his 
opinions on warfare.  ‘There is a time when it is not shameful to flee, if the occasion 
                                                 
1731 ἐµοὶ δὲ ταῦτα διασκοπουµένῳ θαυµάζειν ἔπεισιν, ὅπως ἐν µέσῳ τηλικούτων γεγονότι κινδύνων 
οὐδὲ τετρῶσθαι γοῦν οὐδὲ βεβλῆσθαι ἐκείνης τῆς ἡµέρας συνέπεσεν αὐτῷ· εἴτε οὖν ἐκ τοῦ συχνὰ κατὰ 
τουτωνὶ τῶν βαρβάρων ἀνδραγαθίσασθαι πεῖραν τῆς αὐτοῦ παρασχόµενος σφίσι γινναιότητος 
ἀπρόσιτος µονονουχὶ τούτοις ἐγένετο, εἴτε καὶ τῆς προνοίας αὐτὸν περιεπούσης τρόποις οἷς αὕτη 
ἐπίσταται, λέγειν µὲν οὐ πάνυ θαρρῶ.  τό γε µὴν πεπραγµένον οὐκ ἐν ἐπαινετέοις αὐτὸς τίθεµαι 
(Kinnamos: 51.18-52.1; trans. 47-48). 
1732 ἤδη δέ τινων ἔγωγε καὶ θράσους αἰτίαν προστριβόντων ἤκουσα αὐτῷ· δαιµόνιον γὰρ ἀεί καὶ 
ἀνδρείας πρόσω ἔτρεφε λῆµα (ibid: 99.15-20; trans. 81, with amendments). 
1733 οὕτω πολλάκις ἓν βούλευµα συνετὸν ὑπὲρ µυριοπληθεῖς ὤνησε χεῖρας, καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἑνὸς ἀρετὴ 
πολλῶν ἀσπίδων δυνατωτέρα γίνεται (ibid: 45.2-13; trans. 43). 
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allows…where success would seem more by cunning than by force, risking 
everything is to be deprecated’.1734  It stands to reason therefore that Kinnamos did 
not always condone Manuel’s daring conduct, otherwise extolled in official bulletins 
and encomia.  Like Anna, he was fond of his subject, but this need not mean he had to 
share his military ideals. 
The Perfect General: The Presentation of Nikephoros II Phokas and John I Tzimiskes 
in the History of Leo the Deacon 
In contrast to Alexios and Manuel Komnenos, the historical record of the two great 
soldier emperors of the tenth century – Nikephoros II Phokas and John I Tzimiskes – 
suggests that these men rarely engaged in hand-to-hand combat.  References to their 
daring heroics in the History of Leo the Deacon are very general and abstract, 
seemingly drawn from panegyrical material.  Whilst describing the siege of Chandax, 
Leo briefly mentions Nikephoros once spearing an enemy champion in a nondescript 
battle.1735  A passage of general praise for Phokas insists that he led by example, and 
‘always used to fight in an extraordinary fashion in the van of the army’.1736  Leo adds 
that Phokas ‘was seen to be fearsome in exploits both in battle-line formation and in 
combat’.1737  This image does not accord with Nikephoros’ general presentation in 
Leo the Deacon’s narrative however.  Like his brother Leo Phokas, Nikephoros is 
characterized as a general who uses his cunning and knowledge of military science to 
                                                 
1734 φεύγειν τε γάρ ἐστιν ὅτε χρὴ µηδὲν αἰσχυνόµενον εἰ τοῦτο διδοίη καιρός, καὶ αὖ ἀνυπόστατα 
διώκειν, πρὸς τὴν χρείαν ἑκάτερον· ἔνθα τε ἐπινοίᾳ µᾶλλον ἢ χειρὶ κατορθοῦν φαίνοιτο, παραιτεῖσθαι 
τὸ τοῖς ὅλοις διακινδυνεύειν (ibid: 168.22-169.10; trans. 129-130). 
1735 Leo the Deacon: 10-11. 
1736 ...ἐκτόπως ἀεὶ ἀγωνιζόµενος πρὸ τῆς φάλαγγος, καὶ κίνδυνον τὸν ἐπιόντα ὑποδεχόµενος, καὶ 
κραταιῶς ἐκκρουόµενος (ibid: 29.22-30.2; trans. 82). 
1737 φοβερὸς ἀναδειχθεὶς ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τάξιν καὶ µάχας ἀνδραγαθήµασιν... (ibid: 44.3-7; trans. 94). 
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triumph over the enemy.1738  After seeing an initial assault on Chandax fail with heavy 
casualties, Nikephoros elected to weaken the city by starving it of supplies, enabling 
him to strengthen his siege equipment over the winter months.  Come the spring, he 
instructed sappers to undermine a section of the wall, allowing his troops to pour in 
and overwhelm the inhabitants.1739  Wearing down the besieged enemy through 
blockades and raids, and undermining sections of the fortification, were key principles 
extolled in Byzantine siege handbooks of the tenth century.1740  We witness Phokas 
employ similar tactics against Mopsuestia, Tarsos and Antioch.1741   
Similar is the portrayal of John Tzimiskes in historiography.  Leo the Deacon writes 
of Tzimiskes’ heroic tendencies in formulaic terms, in a passage Rosemary Morris 
believes may have derived from an imperial panegyric:1742  ‘He had a heroic [spirit], 
fearless and imperturbable, which displayed supernatural courage…he was not afraid 
of attacking single-handed an entire enemy contingent, and after killing large numbers 
he would return again with great speed unscathed to his close formation’.1743  Again, 
however, there are no extant accounts of Tzimiskes performing such feats in actual 
battle situations.  He is presented as a skilled and methodical general in the campaign 
he conducted against Sviatoslav in Bulgaria.  The secure siege camp which Tzimiskes 
erected outside Dorostolon accords with the guidance of contemporary military 
                                                 
1738 See Howard-Johnston (1972): 273-274 
1739 Leo the Deacon: 7-16, 24-27. 
1740 Heron of Byzantium, Parangelmata Poliorketika: §§13-14, with Sullivan (2000): 182-187; 
Nikephoros Ouranos, Taktika: §65.  See also McGeer (1995b); Sullivan (1997). 
1741 Leo the Deacon: 52-53 (Mopsuestia), 58-60 (Tarsos), 72-74, 81-82 (Antioch). 
1742 Morris (1994): 209. 
1743 ἡρωϊκὴ γὰρ αὐτῷ ἀνεκέκρατο, ἀδεής τε καὶ ἀκατάπληκτος, ἐν οὕτω βραχεῖ σώµατι ἀποδεδειγµένη 
τόλµαν ὑπερφυῆ. ἐς ὅλην γὰρ ἀντίπαλον φάλαγγα οὐκ ἀπεδειλία µόνος ὁρµᾷν, πλείστους τε 
κατακταίνων, ἀπτερώτῳ τάχει πρὸς τὸν οἰκεῖον αὖθις συνασπισµὸν διανέκαµπτε, κακῶν ἀπαθής (Leo 
the Deacon: 96.23-97.4; trans. 146). 
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manuals.1744  Prior to the campaign, he had dispatched bilingual spies dressed in 
‘Scythian’ clothing to the lands of the enemy, so that they could communicate enemy 
plans to the emperor.1745  Tzimiskes’ meticulous preparations ensured that the 
Byzantine expeditionary force was well-supplied by the fleet, bringing grain, fodder 
and arms along the Danube.1746 
Tzimiskes also adhered to standard precepts in battle situations.  A feigned retreat 
onto the wider plains of Dorostolon allowed for greater use of his effective heavy 
cavalry.1747  At both battles of Dorostolon, as well as that at Preslav, Tzimiskes made 
the bold decision to commit his elite troops to the fray when the enemy looked to be 
in the ascendancy.1748  He is portrayed as an active general, but never as a bloodthirsty 
warrior, as Anthony Kaldellis observes.1749  On many occasions, Tzimiskes shouts 
                                                 
1744 McGeer (1995a: 348-354) demonstrates that Tzimiskes’ siege camp at Dorostolon (described by 
Leo the Deacon: 142-143) corresponds to that outlined in Nikephoros Ouranos’ Taktika (§62.31-33) 
and other sources.  Similar camp defences are described by Yahya ibn Said in relation to Romanos III’s 
Syrian campaign of 1030 - see Canard (1961): esp. 305-306. Tzimiskes clearly took great care in this 
regard.  Leo (133) also reports that prior to advancing on Preslav, the emperor made camp on a secure 
hill with a river flowing past both sides, catering for defensive and living needs.  Coincidentally, this 
corresponds to the ideal site on which to build a city – De Re Strategika: §11.3-9.  The considerations 
were necessarily very similar. 
1745 Leo the Deacon: 108.  This practice parallels advice in the near-contemporary De Re Militari 
(§18.22-33), where it is recommended that spies be sent among the Bulgarians, Pechenegs and 
Russians to find out events in their lands prior to an imperial expedition.  For an eastern context, see 
the De Velitatione (§VII.2-3), which implores the general to send out merchants to make friends with 
border emirs, learn of the plans of the enemy and report back to the general.  The Byzantines were also 
conscious of spies infiltrating their own camps, taking measures against such tactics: see Nikephoros 
Ouranos, Taktika: §62.72-95; De Re Militari: §2.4-16.  The Vita Basilii (§68.8-11) describes the Arabs 
of Syria sending a spy who dressed as a Roman and spoke the ‘Roman’ language in order to gain 
intelligence with a major naval expedition pending.  
1746 Leo the Deacon: 126-127.  Skylitzes (295; trans. 281) notes similarly that Tzimiskes ‘gave careful 
attention to other preparations to ensure that the army did not go short of anything’.  For the impressive 
logistical arrangements which fuelled imperial expeditionary forces during this period, see in general 
Haldon (1997a). 
1747 Skylitzes: 306-307.  See Howard-Johnston (1972): 278-279. 
1748 McGeer (1995a: 318-319) notes that Tzimiskes’ decision to commit his elite reserves in these 
battles followed the advice of the Praecepta Militaria (§§II.28-37; II.63-66; IV.173-180). 
1749 Kaldellis (forthcoming).  That said, I see no reason to conclude, as Kaldellis does, that Tzimiskes 
never actually ‘fought’ in battle. Tzimiskes played a prominent role as a frontier commander during the 
second half of the 950s, and Arabic sources attest to him fighting during battle.  See Byzance et les 
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and rouses his men to further action, without getting directly involved.1750  At Preslav 
he dismounts to lead his troops, but does not appear to fight alongside them.1751  
Tzimiskes endeavours to bring liquids to his ailing troops at Dorostolon, but there is 
no mention of him getting his hands bloodied.1752  Near the conclusion of the second 
battle, Tzimiskes brandishes his spear and advances against the enemy, but cannot be 
seen to actively engage them in combat.1753  In this display Tzimiskes strikes a 
successful balance in his generalship, calling to mind Plutarch’s summation of 
Pyrrhus of Epirus:  
While actively participating in the fight and vigorously repelling his assailants, he 
did not become confused in his thinking nor lose his presence of mind, but 
directed the battle as if he were surveying it from a distance, rushing here and 
there and bringing aid to those who seemed overpowered.1754   
This is a suitable comparison when we consider below that the Middle Byzantine 
ideal of generalship was most akin to that of the Hellenistic era. 
Reckless and careless men typically court disaster in the History of Leo the Deacon, 
as is most evident with the indiscipline and demise of Nikephoros Pastilas at the siege 
                                                                                                                                            
Arabes: II.1, 362-364, as well as Canard (1951): 778-781, 793-796; Bikhazi (1981): 779-781; Howard-
Johnston (1983): 241-243; McGeer (2003): 123-134. 
1750 At the siege of Preslav twice (Leo the Deacon: 135, 137); and at the first Battle of Dorostolon (ibid: 
141; Skylitzes: 299, 300). 
1751 Skylitzes: 298. 
1752 Ibid: 306.  Nikephoros II Phokas’ Praecepta Militaria (§II.11-16; trans. 23) recommends that the 
commander deploy close to a source of water ‘lest he bring ruin on the army’.  At the Battle of 
Levounion in 1091, Alexios Komnenos is said to have ordered peasants to bring up water to his troops, 
toiling under the midday sun (Anna Komnene: VIII.5.8). 
1753 Leo the Deacon: 153. 
1754 µάλιστα δὲ ὅτι τὰς χεῖρας καὶ τὸ σῶµα παρέχων τῷ ἀγῶνι καὶ τοὺς καθ’ αὑτὸν ἀµυνόµενος 
ἐρρωµένως οὐ συνεχεῖτο τὸν λογισµὸν οὐδὲ τοῦ φρονεῖν ἐξέπιπτεν, ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ ἔξωθεν ἐφορῶν 
διεκυβέρνα τὸν πόλεµον, αὐτὸς µεταθέων ἑκασταχόσε καὶ παραβοηθῶν τοῖς ἐκβιάζεσθαι δοκοῦσιν 
(Plutarch, Pyrrhus: ΧVI.7-8; trans. 397). 
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of Chandax.  Prior to this episode, Nikephoros Phokas had instructed Pastilas to be 
‘vigilant and sober’, and thereafter criticized his negligence in a speech to his 
officers.1755  Leo constructed his account to emphasize two particular elements: the 
unerring wisdom of the commander, and the required qualities of the Roman soldier, 
which most certainly did not include a propensity towards indulgence and 
carelessness.1756  Nikephoros Phokas’ bastard nephew, Manuel, led a Sicilian 
expedition to ruin, principally because he was ‘a hot-headed and self-willed man, 
likely to yield to thoughtless impulse’.1757  John Tzimiskes’ cousin, John Kourkouas, 
rode out foolishly to meet a Russian force whilst drunk and was brutally slain.1758  
The Emperor Basil II’s Bulgarian campaign was fuelled by ‘greater anger than was 
proper or provident’, and ended in disaster due to logistical failings and 
negligence.1759  The Byzantine army, where successful, is marked by its superior 
discipline and order;1760 only when such basic principals are neglected do they come 
unstuck.  Leo the Deacon was firmly of the belief that intelligence, discipline, and the 
measured application of military theory were essential to a commander’s success.   
                                                 
1755 See above, 53-54.  Similar sentiments are expressed by Nikephoros later in the text, in an address to 
his troops upon being proclaimed emperor: ‘I advise all of you…not to turn to indolence and luxury, 
but to be vigilant and sober and ready to meet in a well-prepared manner whatever may occur’ (Leo the 
Deacon: 42.15-19; trans. 92-93). 
1756 Hoffmann (2007): 113-116. 
1757 ἄνδρα θερµουργὸν καὶ αὐθέκαστον, καὶ ἀπερισκέπτῳ φορᾷ εἴκοντα (Leo the Deacon: 66.2-5; trans. 
115-116). Skylitzes (267) similarly condemns Manuel’s generalship.  For discussion of the disastrous 
campaign, see Gay (1904): II, 290-291. 
1758 See above, 63-68. 
1759 τῷ τοι καὶ θερµότερον ἤπερ ἔδει µᾶλλον κινηθεὶς ἢ προµηθέστερον (Leo the Deacon: 171.6-7; 
trans. 213). 
1760 Examples at ibid: 8.5-6, 14.8-9, 15.17-18, 22.18, 24.16-17, 59.13-14, 109.14-15, 110.11-12, 133.6, 
140-141, 153.17.  Leo’s references to Phokas and Tzimiskes’ training of their troops should be seen as 
part of this – 16 (on Crete); 36 (in Cappadocia); 50-51 (of Phokas’ household); 111, 127 (Tzimiskes 
preparing for the Bulgarian campaign).  Nikephoros II Phokas famously chastising a soldier who 
dropped his shield on the march typifies the military code of Leo the Deacon’s History (57-58).  By 
contrast, the ‘rash and arrogant’ (θρασεῖς καὶ ἀγέρωχοί) men of Tarsos are scolded for being 
‘overconfident’ (θαῤῥαλεώτεροι τοῦ µετρίου) in pouring out of their strongly-fortified town to engage 
the Byzantines in pitched battle (58.20-59.2). 
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The General as Warrior and Commander in Greco-Roman Culture and 
Historiography 
The problem of counterbalancing reckless heroism with the principles of military 
theory was a perennial one in Greco-Roman literature and martial culture.  The 
tension is first evident in Classical Greece, where the new school of military theorists 
who advocated military trickery clashed with hoplites who viewed guile with 
contempt.1761  Both of these ideals stemmed from Homer: the ‘Odysseus’ mantra 
favouring cunning and prudence, and the ‘Achilles’ philosophy advocating physical 
force and open battle.1762  In the Hellenistic world, the tension is more pronounced, as 
rulers were judged by their martial prowess and commanders expected to fight in 
battle.1763  Homeric models compelled generals to fight and command in the field, but 
this was difficult to reconcile in reality.1764  In any case, historians of the period 
afforded greater attention to the individual deeds of the commander, reflecting a 
heightened interest in his personal performance in battle.1765  The cause of these 
developments was Alexander the Great, influenced in his bold behaviour by Homeric 
values;1766 his desire to best enemy leaders in combat reignited the general interest in 
Homeric-style monomachy.1767  Yet Hellenistic generals also wished to be good 
commanders, which meant following the cautious approach of contemporary military 
                                                 
1761 Lendon (2005): 78-90.  Wheeler (1991) observes that the hoplite general showed an occasional 
tendency to personally participate in combat, but never to the same degree as the Homeric warrior 
leader. 
1762 See Edwards (1985). 
1763 N. M. Austin (1986). 
1764 Lendon (2005): 143-152; Beston (2000). 
1765 Beston (2000). 
1766 See Lendon (2005): esp. 129-130, 357 n.31.  For the influence of Homer on Alexander and also on 
general Macedonian and Hellenistic values, see Cohen (1995); Alcock (1997). 
1767 Lendon (2005): 136-138.  Oakley (1985) shows that single combat reappears in Hellenistic 
narratives after all but vanishing during the Classical Greek period; see Wheeler (2007: 194-203) for 
single combat in Ancient Greek warfare.  For examples of single combat in Hellenistic literature, see 
Hornblower (1981): 194-196. 
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theory.1768  Polybius, though generally critical of commanders who endangered their 
lives in combat, could not hide his admiration for select individuals who embraced 
such risks, not least his beloved subject, Scipio Aemilianus.1769  Indeed, monomachy 
has been seen as a more prominent aspect of Roman military culture than that of the 
Hellenistic powers, as soldiers sought to demonstrate their virtus (martial courage).1770  
Once more, however, this heroic ethos clashed with the predilection for disciplina in 
military theory, a strain particularly evident in Julius Caesar’s Commentaries.1771  By 
the fourth century A.D., heroic leadership was common practice, with the daring 
exploits of Julian, striving to emulate Alexander and Scipio, symptomatic of the 
trend.1772   
Discipline and order return to the fold in the Early Byzantine period, as the Wars of 
Procopius demonstrate.  Conor Campbell Whately considers the Gothic Wars to 
represent the most Homeric part of Procopius’ history, with the Persian Wars 
otherwise more concerned with tactics and cohesion in battle.1773  Consequently, it is 
in the narrative of the conflict in Italy we find heroic displays and the most famous 
instance of single combat by challenge in the Wars.1774  Yet while andreia has a place, 
it is not something that Procopius favours in a general.  During one engagement with 
the Goths, Belisarius took it upon himself to rush the enemy, and would have been 
killed had his guard not intervened.  Procopius indicates he did not approve of his 
                                                 
1768 See Onasander: §§XXXII; XXXIII; Polyainos: 8.1.1, where the general is advised to refrain from 
fighting. 
1769 E.g., Polybius: XXXV.5.1-2.  See in general Eckstein (1995): 28-55. 
1770 Oakley (1985); Wiedemann (1996); Glück (1964). 
1771 Lendon (1999). 
1772 Idem (2005): 290-309.  Also above, 203-204. 
1773 Whately (2009): 162-160.  Whately later suggests (340) that this was a conscious decision of 
Procopius based on various similarities and connections with the Iliad. 
1774 For discussion see Whately (2009): 156-157, 162-169.  Lendon (2005: 385 n.32) considers some of 
these heroic displays to represent single combats, though Whately (2009: 162-165) classifies them 
more precisely. 
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master’s behaviour.  ‘Belisarius, though he was safe before, would no longer keep the 
general’s post, but began to fight in the front ranks like a soldier; and consequently 
the cause of the Romans was thrown into great danger’.1775  Since instances involving 
other generals carelessly entering the fray often result in death, Whately concludes 
that Procopius was not a proponent of this tactic, and listed such examples only to 
persuade his readers that such urgings were to be suppressed.1776  In the main, 
Belisarius adheres to military theory and the Odyssean model of generalship, setting 
him apart from his temperamental Gothic counterparts who tend to adopt the Achilles 
ethos.1777  In a speech to his fellow officers, Belisarius asserts that ‘stupid daring leads 
to destruction, but discreet hesitation is well adapted always to save those who adopt 
such a course’.1778  This is the overriding military philosophy which Procopius sought 
to convey.1779 
The campaigns of Heraclius against the Persians inspired heroic commemorative 
accounts at court, though one commentator seems to have opposed the officially-
propagated image of a warrior emperor.  We have mentioned the duel between 
Heraclius and the Persian general Rhazates, an incident first recorded in Byzantine 
literature c.800 but undoubtedly attributable to an earlier ‘panegyrical official 
                                                 
1775 τότε βελισάριος, καίπερ ἀσφαλὴς τὰ πρότερα ὢν, οὐκέτι τοῦ στρατηγοῦ τὴν τάξιν ἐφύλασσεν, ἀλλ’ 
ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις ἃτε στρατιώτης ἐµάχετο· καὶ ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ τὰ Ῥωµαίων πράγµατα ξυνέβη ἐς κίνδυνον 
πολὺν ἐκπεπτωκέναι, ἐπεὶ ξύµπασα ἡ τοῦ πολέµου ῥοπὴ ἐπ’ αὐτῷ ἔκειτο (Procopius, Wars: V.18.4-15; 
trans. 171). 
1776 Whately (2009): 294-297. 
1777 Ibid: 232-239, 297-308. 
1778 µὴ τοίνυν ἀλογίστῳ σπουδῇ χρώµενοι ἡµᾶς αὐτοὺς ἐσκυλευκότες φαινώµεθα, µηδὲ τῷ φιλονείκῳ 
τὰ Ῥωµαίων πράγµατα βλάψωµεν. τόλµα µὲν γὰρ ἀµαθὴς ἐς ὄλεθρον φέρει, µέλλησις δὲ σώφρων ἐς τὸ 
σώζειν ἀεὶ τοὺς αὐτῇ χρωµένους ἱκανῶς πέφυκεν (Procopius, Wars: II.19.10; trans. 421). 
1779 For similar conclusions see Kaegi (1990): esp. 67-68, 74-75, 83-84: ‘Procopius’ remarks about 
generalship and wars were not a turning-point in Byzantine military thought, but probably reinforced 
existing trends, as a reading of extant strategic and tactical treatises will confirm, in favour of caution 
and prudence, avoidance, whenever possible of risks of massed combat in battle, and a preference for 
delay and dissimulation’. 
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tradition’.1780  Evidence of this may be found in the mid-seventh century Frankish 
Chronicle of Fredegar, which includes a report of Heraclius’ single combat that can 
only have originated in tales disseminated by the imperial court.1781  According to this 
source, Heraclius requested the Persian ruler Khusro II fight him, only for Khusro to 
send one of his generals to fight in his place, a nameless ‘patrician’ who was 
beheaded by Heraclius.1782  The account of Theophanes is more succinct; it is said that 
Heraclius ‘met the commander of the Persians, and, by God’s might and the help of 
the Theotokos, threw him down’.1783  The Patriarch Nikephoros relates that Heraclius 
took up Rhazates’ open challenge to a duel, and rode forth against him.  Rhazates 
fired off two arrows which grazed the emperor, but was wounded by one of Heraclius’ 
bodyguards before the emperor himself speared the fallen Rhazates and cut off his 
                                                 
1780 Kaegi (2003): 167.  For discussion of the duel see also Trombley (2002): 246-247. 
1781 See above, 169-170.  In this account, Heraclius deceives his opponent, stating: ‘Since we have 
agreed to single combat, why are those other warriors following behind you?’  As the general turned 
his head, Heraclius quickly decapitated his opponent.  The episode is strikingly similar to the duel 
between the Athenian Melanthus and the Boeotian Xanthus, where Melanthus remarked: ‘You act 
unfairly to come two against one’, only to drive a spear through Xanthus when he turned his head to 
see who was behind him (Polyainos: 1.19; trans. I, 39).  The first extant recording of this legendary 
contest is found in the Scholia on Aristophanes’ Archanians, though it is its presence in the Strategika 
of Polyainos which is more interesting, given our discussion of Byzantine anecdotes of trickery being 
potentially modelled on tales from the strategemata.  The tale of Heraclius’ feat as presented here 
represents a rare fusion of heroism and trickery.  
1782 Egrediens cum exercito Aeraclius obuiam, legatis discurrentibus Aeraclius imperatorem Persarum 
nomine Cosdroe petit, ut hii duo imperatores singulare certamine coniungerent, suspensa procul 
uterque exercitus multitudinem; et cuius uicturia prestabatur ab Altissimo, imperium huius qui 
uincebatur et populum inlesum receperit.  Emperatur Persarum huius conuenentiae se egressurum ad 
prilio singulare certamen spondedit.  Aeraclius imperatur arma sumens, telam priliae et falange a suis 
postergum preparatam relinquens, singolare certamen ut nouos Dauit procedit ad bellum. Emperator 
Persarum Cosdroes patricium quidam ex suis quem fortissemum in prelio cernere potuerat huius 
conuenenciae ad instar pro se contra Aeraglio priliandum direxit.  Cumque uterque cum aequetis hy 
duo congressione priliae in inuicem propinquarint, Aeraglius ait ad patricium, quem emperatore 
Persarum Cosdroae stemabat, dixit: ‘Sic conuenerat, ut singulare certamen priliandum debuissimus 
confligere: quare postergum tuom alii secuntur?’ Patricius ille girans capud conspecere qui postergum 
eius uenerit, Aeraglius aecum calcaneum uehementer urguens, extrahens uxum capud patriciae 
Persarum truncauit. Cosdroes emperatur cum Persis deuictus et confusus, terga uertens a suis propries 
(The Fourth Book of the Chronicle of Fredegar: 52-53 trans.).  
1783 ὁ βασιλεὺς ἄρχοντι τῶν Περσῶν συνήντησεν· καὶ τῇ τοῦ θεοῦ δυνάµει καὶ τῇ βοηθείᾳ τῆς 
θεοτόκου τοῦτον κατέβαλεν (Theophanes: 318.16-23; trans. 449). 
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head.1784  The accounts differ somewhat, but the shared element of Heraclius slaying 
the Persian commander must have originated in contemporary bulletins and official 
panegyrical accounts.  Mention of Heraclius as a ‘second David’ in the Chronicle of 
Fredegar is particularly significant, as is the identification of his opponent as ‘another 
Goliath’ in the mid-eighth century Iberian Chronica Muzarabica.1785  Heraclius’ reign 
almost certainly saw the production of the David Plates, which famously depict the 
conflict between David and Goliath.  Steven Wander proposed that the plates were 
commissioned in the aftermath of Heraclius’ victory over Persia and commemorated 
in particular his personal combat with Rhazates.1786  This would represent one of the 
first notable instances of the Christianization of monomachy, the fusion of Biblical 
motifs with traditional epic heroic literature.1787  Furthermore, the conflict with Persia 
was one of the first Byzantine conflicts to be shrouded in overtones of ‘holy war’.1788  
Visual and literary depictions of Heraclius’ duel with Rhazates wished to draw 
                                                 
1784 Patriarch Nikephoros, Short History: §14. 
1785 Sed Eraclius exercitu adunato cum omni manu ferrea Persidam proficiscitur insequendo.  Tunc 
Cosdro tali certionatus nuntio cum cuncto Persarum collegio obuius extitit resistendo.  Denique ubi 
Eraclius cum Cosdro utrique frementes uno se applicant pago, hoc pari definiunt uerbo, ut ad singulare 
certamen electi ex utroque exercitu belligeri deueniant duo, ut in ipsos experiant presagando quicquid 
in eis prospexerint secernendo, et hoc sub diuo definiunt.  Quorum belliger<i>um animo uel consilio 
statuunt proprio, ut quidquid, ut diximus, prouentus fortune per eorum ostenderit gladios, hoc redundet 
in socios, qualiter ex ipsorum omnino tenerent auspicio ut regalia sine cunctatione uictori ilico 
mitterent uicissim colla sub iugo.  Sed Cosdro more Philistinorum auctior spurium quendam, tanquam 
alterum Goliam, educit in prelio.  Territi omnes Eraclii bellatores pedem subtrahunt retro.  Tunc 
Eraclius de Domini confidens auxilio super eum descendens uno hostem perimit iaculo (Corpus 
Scriptorum Muzarabicorum: I, 17). 
1786 Wander (1973); idem (1975).  For a similar view, see Spain Alexander (1977).  For alternative 
interpretations, see Mary Whitby (1994), 212-215, 218-219; and Trilling (1978), who favours an earlier 
dating.  Ruth Leader (2000: 407-415) finds problems with such historical readings of the David Plates. 
1787 For Biblical single combat see De Vaux (1972). 
1788 See above, 77-79. 
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parallels with the Biblical encounter between David and Goliath, at a time when the 
king of Israel emerged as a preferred model for Byzantine emperors.1789   
The image of Heraclius as a warrior king was not universally shared however.  For 
George of Pisidia, Heraclius was like David, but only in the sense that he too was a 
saviour of his people.1790  While there is a suggestion that some of the more action-
packed parts of George’s Heraclias are now lost,1791 it remains the case that the 
personal combat of Heraclius is played down by Theophanes, who is generally 
considered to have drawn upon an ‘official history’ of Heraclius’ campaign produced 
by George of Pisidia.  Mary Whitby has observed that this is the only notable 
individual feat of combat attributed to Heraclius, so perhaps we should not overstate 
the emphasis on Heraclius’ heroics in the works of George of Pisidia.1792  In contrast 
to lost contemporary bulletins, which propagated the notion that Heraclius was a 
heroic warrior ruler, George seems more concerned to show Heraclius as a general 
who commanded his men with skill and precision.1793  His poems attest to Heraclius’ 
preparations, as the emperor trained his troops through mock battles1794 and 
familiarized himself with military formations.1795  Walter Kaegi has argued that the 
Strategikon of Maurice was among the material consulted by propagandists working 
on official accounts of Heraclius’ wars, noting that stratagems and tactics employed 
                                                 
1789 For Davidic kingship as a model in Byzantium, see Dvornik (1966), II: 287-288.  Synkrisis with 
David intensified from the reign of Basil I – see Maguire (1983): 88-103; Magdalino (1987): 55-58; 
Kalavrezou (1989): 377-396; Brubaker (1999): 185-193. 
1790 Mary Whitby (1994): 212-215, 218-219.  In the Heraclias, Heraclius is likened to other Biblical 
figures also, including Noah, Moses and Daniel (Frendo 1986). 
1791 Pertusi (1961): 31; Wander (1975): 346. 
1792 Mary Whitby (1994): 204-205 & n.41.  Whitby concedes however that Heraclius’ personal feats 
may have received more prominence in George’s ‘official history’ of Heraclius’ campaigns. 
1793 For the cultivation of this image, see idem (1998): 257-258. 
1794 George of Pisidia: Exp. Pers., §II.38, 54, 56, 76-205; Theophanes: 303.  For discussion of this 
particular aspect of Heraclius’ training procedures, see Rance (2000): 223-238.  Rance argues that 
George developed this description as he had little else of dramatic note to discuss in relation to this 
campaign, in which Heraclius achieved relatively little. 
1795 George of Pisidia: Heraclias, §II.118-121, 134-142. 
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by Heraclius in the works of George of Pisidia and Theophanes echo precepts of the 
manual.1796  George was no soldier, so this was perhaps as much a result of his own 
reading as audience expectations.  Like many commentators, George favoured the 
established motif of the general as commander, but could not deny the heroic valour 
of his subject.
                                                 
1796 Kaegi (2003): 115-118, 129-130, 161-168. 
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Conclusion 
The Middle Byzantine perception of the role of the general did not differ substantially 
from that of the Early Byzantine period, though the origins of both lie in the 
Hellenistic vision of command, which perceived the commander as ‘arrayer, trickster 
and fighter, all at the same time’.1797  Anna Komnene’s summation of the qualities of 
her father and his rival Robert Guiscard corroborate this: ‘Both leaders were prepared 
for all eventualities, able to comprehend at a glance every detail, acquainted with all 
the ruses of war; each was thoroughly familiar with siege tactics, the laying of 
ambushes, fighting in line of battle; in hand-to-hand combat bold and valiant’.1798  
This expectation is attributable, in large part, to the consistency of Greco-Roman 
military theory, with Hellenistic commentators on warfare providing the basis for the 
Byzantine notion of the art of war.1799  The influence of Hellenistic culture during the 
Middle period further extended to historiography, and in this respect it is significant 
that problems in the presentation of the subject’s military abilities persisted.  Bravado, 
as in the Hellenistic era, was fuelled by a desire to emulate the heroic deeds of 
Homeric epic.  While some commanders risked their lives in battle, others, such as 
Nikephoros Phokas and John Tzimiskes, adhered more faithfully to the prescribed 
role of the general.   
The motif of the commander as an active participant in battle appears particularly 
prominent in official accounts circulated in the immediate aftermath of a campaign.  
Dimiter Angelov observed in relation to panegyrics of the Late period that the ideal 
                                                 
1797 Lendon (2005): 303-304. 
1798 ἦσαν γὰρ ἄµφω πάντα προϊδεῖν καὶ συνιδεῖν ἱκανοὶ καὶ πολεµικῶν τεχνασµάτων οὐδὲνος ἀδαεῖς, 
ἀλλὰ πάσαις µὲν τειχοµαχίαις, πάσαις δὲ λοχήσεσι καὶ ταῖς ἐκ παρατάξεως ἀγωνίαις ἐθάδες, τὰς δὲ διὰ 
χειρὸς πράξεις δραστικοὶ καὶ γενναῖοι καὶ ἐχθροὶ πάντων τῶν ὑπ’ οὐρανὸν ἡγεµόνων γνώµῃ καὶ 
ἀνδρείᾳ κατάλληλοι (Anna Komnene: V.1.3.33-37; trans. 129). 
1799 Dain (1967). 
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emperor was both a formidable warrior and an expert general, and such is true of 
earlier encomia.1800  The official line from the courts of Heraclius and later Manuel 
Komnenos, propagated by bulletins and panegyric, drew attention to the fighting 
prowess of the rulers by detailing single combats, underlining the significance 
attached to the image of the warrior emperor.  This is true also of the contemporary 
record of the victory won by Theodore Laskaris of Nicaea at the Battle of Antioch-on-
the-Maeander in 1211.  An oration Niketas Choniates composed to commemorate the 
occasion praises Laskaris’ generalship (στρατηγία),1801 but the most striking aspect of 
his account discusses the moment Theodore personally threw down his counterpart, 
Sultan Kaykhusraw of Rum.  Theodore was stricken but able to recover through the 
assistance of Christ and, once more grabbing his shield and arms, heroically attacked 
the mounted Kaykhusraw.  Striking the legs of the horse, Theodore then drove a lance 
through the sultan before removing Kaykhusraw’s head.1802  Like Heraclius and 
Manuel, Theodore is compared to David, who similarly slayed and decapitated his 
enemy in single combat.1803  The immediacy of the oration confirms that Laskaris’ 
heroics must have been advertised in bulletins issued by the court.  We know from a 
letter of the Latin emperor of Constantinople, Henry, that such victory proclamations 
were dispatched to former Byzantine lands, though he was only aware that the sultan 
had perished.1804  Michael Choniates, dwelling on the island of Keos, knew of 
Theodore’s triumph; in a congratulatory letter, Michael likened the emperor to 
                                                 
1800 Angelov (2007): 79, 82-83. 
1801 Niketas Choniates, Orations and Letters: 170.17-171.2.  For context and discussion, see van Dieten 
(1971): 161-162. 
1802 Ibid: 171.22-172.18. 
1803 ἠγωνίσατο καὶ ∆αυίδ, ἀλλὰ καθ’ ἑνὸς βαρβάρου τοῦ Γολιᾶθ, καὶ τούτῳ τὴν κεφαλὴν άφελόµενος 
ἐν µυριάσιν ἀνδρίσασθαι ταῖς χορευτρίαις νεάνισιν ᾔδετο... (ibid: 171.11-16). 
1804 ‘Qua de causa Lascarus acrior et elatior factus misit lit[te]ras ad omnes Grecorum provincias, 
continentes honorem et lucrum sue victorie...’ (Letter of Emperor Henry of Constantinople, January 
1212: ll.83-96). 
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Heraclius and Basil II, expressing amazement that ‘you slew the enemy by your own 
hand’ before removing the sultan’s head.1805  Even when George Akropolites 
composed his history in the third quarter of the thirteenth century, Laskaris’ feat 
remained well-known.  Akropolites discloses that the sultan struck the emperor with 
his mace, corroborating Niketas Choniates’ revelation that Laskaris had to be revived 
by some divine force.  Laskaris hacked at the horse’s legs, bringing down the sultan, 
at which point he was decapitated by an unknown hand.1806  Ruth Macrides suspects 
that the broad similarities in the accounts of Akropolites and Niketas can be attributed 
to Akropolites utilizing one of the aforementioned victory newsletters.1807   
When historians came to consult such official material, many found the presentation 
problematic.  Schooled in the theoretical conception of the commander, historians 
take issue with the rash conduct of their subject and favour instead wisdom and 
cunning generalship.  Yet just as emperors and aristocrats were torn between the 
ideals of skilled general and heroic warrior, historians admired personal valour and 
recognized its place in war.  Furthermore, they were obliged to include courageous 
displays in order to satisfy the interests of their audience and, in certain cases, to 
conform to the Homeric tone to which they aspired.  As Whately determined that the 
values inherent in the battle scenes of Procopius reflect those of the audience as well 
                                                 
1805 ὅθεν δοκῶ µοι καὶ χάριτας ὁµολογεῖν σοι τὴν ἁγίαν ἐκείνου ψυχὴν ὅτι πλείους τῶν τότε πεσόντων 
οὐ µόνον διὰ τῶν σῶν χειρῶν ἀντικατέστρωσας πολεµίους, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὴν τοῦ δυνάστου τὴν κεφαλὴν 
ἀπέκοψας (Michael Choniates: ep.179.18-30). 
1806 Akropolites: 14-17; trans. 131. 
1807 Macrides (2007): 36-38.  Michael Choniates, the near-contemporary Theodore Skutariotes (456) 
and the fourteenth-century historian Nikephoros Gregoras (I, 20-21), while largely similar to 
Akropolites in their accounts of the battle, add that Theodore beheaded Kaykhusraw and planted his 
head on a spear.  Alice Gardner (1912: 83 n.1) deemed the account of Akropolites preferable in this 
instance, though there is no discernible difficulty in reconciling them.  Given that Persian chronicler 
Ibn Bibi notes that the sultan spared Laskaris only to be killed by a Frank later in the engagement, 
Günter Prinzing (1973: 428) proposes that the death of the sultan may have been exploited to 
Theodore’s advantage in Byzantine propaganda.  See Savvides (1981): 91-122; idem (1996) for the 
various accounts of the battle and the political context.  
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as the author,1808 one can make a similar observation of the historiography of the 
Middle Byzantine period.  The depiction of the heroic warrior who takes pride in his 
wounds and does not retreat was a reflection of social trends as well as literary 
developments.  ‘Heroic historiography’ and Digenes Akrites were products of the 
traditions and values of the military aristocracy.  The process is succinctly described 
by John Haldon: 
Elements of the military value-system of the frontier were reproduced in a 
metropolitan cultural context.  For the values and the interest in warfare 
characteristic of the provincial military elite, with its emphasis on individual 
bravery and heroism, personal honour and skill, was reflected in the accounts of 
their deeds written by the historians of the tenth and eleventh 
centuries…Individual combats, struggles between two heroes, challenges to 
resolve battles on a duel, are all motifs which reflect not only the reality of the 
warfare of the period along with the values of those who lead the imperial armies 
and the social milieu they represented, but also the evolution of a new attitude to 
the representation of warfare in the literature of this period, generated by the 
demands of the Byzantine social establishment as well as the preferred self-image 
of the soldiers themselves.1809 
The texts which initiated this change in historiographical trends have not hitherto been 
considered.  The Vita Basilii, whilst describing campaigns undertaken by the Emperor 
Basil I, gives little thought to his personal military prowess, instead emphasizing more 
pacifist imperial virtues.  Alexander Kazhdan observed ‘a clear contrast’ between the 
portrayals of the protagonists in the Vita Basilii and the History of Leo the Deacon, 
                                                 
1808 Whately (2009): 341-343. 
1809 Haldon (1999): 244. 
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despite the texts being written only a few decades apart.1810  Furthermore, while the 
Vita Basilii presents a balanced appraisal of Basil’s deeds in war and peace, Leo’s 
History is dominated by military events.  How are we to explain this development?  
Kazhdan attributes the shift to Nikephoros II Phokas and the ideals he brought to the 
throne, though Jean Claude-Cheynet has correctly argued that the aristocratic 
consciousness of military glory was already established by the late ninth century.1811  
The lost biography of John Kourkouas pre-dated Leo’s History by at least thirty years, 
and while we may only speculate about its content, its eight books must have 
comprehensively covered Kourkouas’ military activities.  As a personal history of an 
aristocratic general, this may well have been the first work of its type.  Its influences 
and models would have included semi-secular hagiography, heroic tales of the akritai 
and Homeric epic.  The Vita Basilii may represent the first known work of secular 
biography in Byzantium, but the biography of Kourkouas appeared around the same 
time and, thus, the influence of the Vita Basilii cannot be assumed.   
To return to the question of what transpired between the Vita Basilii and the History 
of Leo the Deacon to effect the changes, I propose that the answer lies in the 
appearance of Manuel’s biography of Kourkouas, and other aristocratic promotional 
literature in the same vein, including the mooted Chronicle of the Phokades.  When 
writing his history, Leo the Deacon was able to consult appropriate models in the 
numerous aristocratic texts circulating near the end of the first millennium.  This 
chapter and the preceding one demonstrate that the probable content of the Phokas 
family chronicle and the encomiastic tales of Katakalon Kekaumenos, Bardas Skleros 
and John Doukas preserved in extant historical works contain many traits synonymous 
                                                 
1810 Kazhdan & Constable (1982): 110-111; Kazhdan (2006): 139. 
1811 Cheynet (2006b): 9. 
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with heroic literature – textbook generalship, cunning stratagems, respect for a rival, 
evidence of an aristocratic warrior code, monomachy, heroic deeds, and the 
importance attached to wounds.  The values of the military aristocracy first exhibited 
in their promotional literature inevitably pervaded historiography once representatives 
of the military officer class gained the throne.  By the second half of the tenth century, 
an interest in heroic narratives replete with Homeric-style combat and ingenious 
stratagems had been ignited, and it is suggested here that the emergence of aristocratic 
promotional literature marked the birth of the ‘heroic historiography’ which would 
generally characterize Byzantine historical writing in the following centuries.   
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CONCLUSION 
Battle scenes and war narratives were part of the Byzantine consciousness, a fixture of 
their education and reading.  Writing an ekphrasis of battle formed part of the 
rhetorical exercises of the progymnasmata, and associated handbooks encouraged 
writers to look to set-pieces described by Homer and Thucydides for inspiration.  
Reading of these, along with other major works of Antiquity, inevitably influenced 
how a historian approached the matter of writing about warfare.  By their very nature 
therefore descriptions of battle in historiography are derivative, though we should not 
dismiss them as formulaic because of this.  Mimesis might well involve the copying of 
descriptive passages verbatim, though this was typically done with enough care to 
avoid anachronisms.  The intertextual relationship could be more complex.  Historians 
could imitate a predecessor’s style of battle description, or adapt certain episodes to 
current circumstances.  We have shown that Leo the Deacon and John Kinnamos 
drew upon Procopius and Agathias in order to condemn particular individuals at the 
expense of their imperial subject.  Perhaps their utilization of older models was not as 
subtle or brilliant as Procopius’, but the templates employed satisfied their historical 
programme.   
Another set of texts which shaped expectations for war were the military handbooks 
known as taktika.  Reading of military manuals was the most appropriate means for a 
writer with no experience of war to familiarize themselves with the subject.  The 
notion becomes all the more compelling when a historian demonstrates considerable 
technical knowledge.  That most historians of the Middle period were versed in 
military theory is particularly evident in their conception of the role of the general in 
battle.  Though heroic displays were mentioned, even the most partisan of historians 
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were critical of such conduct, preferring their chief subject to command rather than 
risk his life fighting, a vision of generalship garnered from military theory.  
Widespread knowledge of the handbooks also offered writers a framework in which 
to present their subject, considering the textbook application of military principals to 
be the best method of demonstrating one’s ability as a commander. 
Historians without the benefit of autopsy – as was the case in most instances - were 
forced to consult oral and written sources detailing campaigns and battles.  The task of 
identifying these is complicated by the tradition of historians not naming their sources 
for specific events, as well as by their standard claims to have interviewed 
eyewitnesses, often a rhetorical device to gain greater credence and one which is not 
always validated by further study.  Following the initiative of other scholars, it is 
suggested that Middle Byzantine historians made greater use of written material than 
oral informants.  In the case of military affairs, this material can be divided into three 
groups.  The first category is comprised of items which disclose news about military 
events - correspondence and campaign bulletins.  The second category consists of 
‘official’ accounts – encomia and campaign narratives.  The final group is what I have 
termed ‘aristocratic promotional literature’: (auto)biographical compositions 
favourable to a particular general or family. 
The admonitions against Quellenforschung are valid, if somewhat stubborn and 
unrealistic.  Nevertheless, one cannot simply assert the use of a certain source without 
making an attempt to understand that type of material.  We possess only one obvious 
example of a campaign dispatch or bulletin, but there are references in historical 
works, letters, and exhortations which confirm the regular transmission of such items 
and give some indication as to style and content.  The close relationship between 
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domestic bulletins and letters sent abroad can also shed light on this type of 
information, and is especially important to consider given that copies of 
correspondence may have been preserved in the archives.  Indeed, it is imperative that 
we acknowledge the practicalities of the process, exploring why dispatches were 
stored in the archives, and how feasible access would have been for historians.  
Having undertaken this research, we can build a case for the encomiasts and historians 
of the reigns of John II and Manuel I Komnenos sharing bulletins as a common 
source, or at least following the same official line propagated by such documents. 
This line of investigation is also required for aristocratic promotional literature.  
References in texts and documents confirm the existence of such works, while 
Jonathan Shepard, Catherine Holmes and Leonora Neville have constructed 
convincing arguments for personal histories of key personalities of the tenth and 
eleventh centuries.  Previously considered in isolation, there is merit in studying 
aristocratic literature as a collective body, examining literary precedents and 
developments as well as other influences which led to their appearance in the mid-
tenth century.  These works should not be classified under a separate ‘biographical’ 
genre, but thought of as little different to surviving histories prominently structured 
around one or more persons. 
The historian is perhaps at risk of being forgotten amidst the discussion of underlying 
sources.  Writers do occasionally describe personal experiences in war, and study of 
Attaleiates’ narrative of the Manzikert campaign offers insight into how external 
factors might influence such an account, as well as the general limitations of the 
eyewitness in battle.  In respect of the written material they employed, historians 
could be expected to impart their own brand of rhetoric, embellishing accounts of 
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warfare with invented speeches, mimesis, and a variety of descriptive techniques.  
These additions are almost impossible to pinpoint without the original source.  We 
can, however, make more assured observations about how historians manipulated 
their material in accordance with their historical programme.  It is argued that John 
Kinnamos took a narrative of the disastrous Italian expedition of 1155-56 favourable 
to John Doukas and, through the use of literary devices, ensured the account 
ultimately undermined Doukas and supported the Emperor Manuel Komnenos.  By 
contrast, Niketas Choniates subverted the official image of Manuel in his account of 
the Battle of Myriokephalon, enabling him to make indirect criticism of the emperor.   
With a better understanding of written military sources, and the manner in which they 
were utilized by Middle Byzantine historians, we may begin to offer thoughts about 
content.  While it is not viable to reconstruct entire lost sources, one may still attempt 
to determine how these sources presented individual soldiers, in order to acquire a 
notion of the ideology of war they promoted.  Commanders might be presented as 
expert practitioners of military theory to demonstrate their brilliance, or perhaps even 
as ingenious masters of the ruse.  The two strands of generalship were both 
encouraged by the military handbooks, and the latter in particular owed much to the 
Byzantine tradition of reading collections of stratagems, brief anecdotes highlighting 
military cunning.  If ever we were to define a uniquely Byzantine style of war writing, 
it would be the ‘stratagem’ piece, a mode which seemingly developed through 
aristocratic promotional literature and which, as a consequence, features prominently 
in the second half of Skylitzes’ Synopsis Historion.   
The promotional literature of the military aristocracy inevitably exhibited their ideals.  
Reading of Homer and ancient literature, and the desire to emulate great soldiers, 
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inspired a warrior mentality unknown for centuries in Byzantium.  According to this 
martial culture, formidable enemies were to be admired, monomachy was the ultimate 
test of prowess, death in battle was a glorious end, and, failing that, wounds might be 
worn as a badge of honour.  This expectation of the aristocratic nobleman rested 
uneasily alongside that of the cunning and methodical general, an inheritance of the 
Achilles and Odysseus conflict of generalship styles which pervaded Hellenistic 
historiography.  The Middle Byzantine general, like his Hellenistic counterpart, was 
expected to be arrayer, trickster and warrior, all at once.  If the accounts of Bardas 
Skleros and Katakalon Kekaumenos fighting the enemy at close quarters in one battle 
and then outwitting him in another are any indication, then the promotional literature 
of the aristocracy did not see a conflict in presenting its subject in this fashion.  
Rather, it was historians who came to consult these works, lacking practical 
experience and perhaps the appropriate understanding of warrior ideology, who drew 
attention to the contradiction, often preferring the general not to engage in combat, in 
accordance with military theory. 
Prior to the second half of the tenth century, there had been little discernible interest 
in military skill and heroism in historiography since the time of Heraclius.  His duel 
with a Persian general was a feature of campaign accounts, and one has to wait until 
the twelfth century and the reign of Manuel Komnenos for a similar focus on heroic 
prowess in bulletins and derivative material.  Nevertheless, there are enough 
references in the History of Leo the Deacon and the Alexiad of Anna Komnene to 
suggest that Manuel was not the first emperor of the Middle period to be presented as 
a warrior in panegyric.  It is likely however that it was not Basil I; neither the Vita 
Basilii nor the encomium composed by Leo VI attribute great fighting qualities to this 
ruler.  The addition of military prowess as an imperial virtue with the accession of 
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Nikephoros II Phokas may account for this, but developments in historiography are 
more complex.  While the Vita Basilii continued the pattern of recent centuries in 
providing overviews of campaigns and battles, the History of Leo the Deacon, and 
historical works following it (Psellos’ Chronographia notwithstanding), describe 
engagements in detail reminiscent of Homeric epic.  The preponderance of heroic 
values was partly an inheritance of historiography from Antiquity, though the martial 
ideology was also very much a reflection of the mentality of the Middle Byzantine 
military aristocracy.  While many credit Leo the Deacon as the innovator of such 
‘heroic historiography’, it is argued here that it was aristocratic promotional literature, 
which appeared several decades before Leo’s History, that revived this mode of war 
writing and provided models for imperial historians also writing about heroic scions 
of great families.   
Kate McLoughlin considers ‘the study of war writing [to be] a source of enhanced 
literary insight’.1812  This is undoubtedly true in relation to Byzantine historiography, 
which followed a long Greco-Roman tradition of fixation with war.  Close 
examination of accounts of battle in these historical works can tell us much about the 
writer, including his or her reading and influences, their personal experiences, and the 
sources they may have employed.  The approach advocated by Ted Lendon and Conor 
Campbell Whately affirms that literary accounts of battle provide insight into general 
culture, as the descriptions reflect the social milieu in which they appeared.  Catherine 
Hanley’s observation that ‘the knight at war and the knight in [Old French] literature 
are inextricably linked’ may just as easily be applied to Byzantium, with the knight 
substituted for the aristocratic general.1813  The rise of the military class in the tenth 
                                                 
1812 McLaughlin (2009): 1. 
1813 Hanley (2003): 2. 
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century led to the creation of a body of literature which embodied their martial 
ideology; imperial historiography would soon follow suit. 
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Appendix I.  The Portrayal of Subordinates in the Alexiad: The Example of John 
Doukas 
The difficulties of accepting Anna’s statement about being informed by her uncles is 
highlighted by the portrayal of Alexios’ brother-in-law, the megas doux John 
Doukas.1  When Doukas joins another of Alexios’ relatives, Constantine Dalassenos, 
on a campaign against the Turkish emir Tzakhas, it is Dalassenos who is portrayed as 
the more vigorous and industrious commander, urging his superior Doukas to let him 
attack Tzakhas in spite of Doukas agreeing a ceasefire.  In the event, it is Dalassenos 
who Anna refers to as ὁ νικητὴς, not Doukas.2  Soon after in the Alexiad, Anna 
affords her father a considerable role in the capture of Mitylene on Lesbos.  She 
writes that Alexios grew tired and frustrated by Doukas’ inability to take the town.  
Having learned from a returning soldier that Doukas always attacked at dawn, Alexios 
gave orders for Doukas to wait until late afternoon to attack.  By following the 
emperor’s instructions, Doukas was eventually victorious.3  Thus Alexios, though not 
actively presiding over the siege, appears as the ultimate architect of the success. 
Anna refers to Doukas sending a full account of his campaigns against Crete and 
Cyprus,4 and Paul Gautier thought it apparent that Anna was working not from 
memory but rather written or oral sources rich in historical, topographical, and 
prosopographical details.5  Yet there is no indication that Anna consulted an account 
overseen by Doukas.  She is more concerned with the actions of the rebel 
Rhapsomates, with Anna noting that her judgments were based on ‘what I heard about 
                                                 
1 For the career of this individual see Frankopan (2002b). 
2 Anna Komnene: IX.1. 
3 Ibid: IX.1.4-6. 
4 τῷ αὐτοκράτορι τὰ συµπεσόντα ἅπαντα διὰ γραµµάτων δηλώσαντες (ibid: IX.2.3.79-80). 
5 Gautier (1977): 217. 
387 
him’.6  Again, Doukas is forced to share the billing with a colleague, Manuel 
Boutoumites, who creates a bigger impression through his daring capture of the 
rebel.7  Anna concludes her account thus: ‘As for Boutoumites, he returned to Doukas 
with Rhapsomates and the Immortals who had rebelled with him, and then made his 
way to Constantinople’.8  One would think that Boutoumites led the successful 
campaign, as Doukas is again marginalized. 
Anna’s ambiguous and muted descriptions of many of John Doukas’ campaigns is 
curious given that he was a close relative and undoubtedly one of Alexios’ most 
valued commanders between 1085 and 1100.  Demetrios Polemis observed that the 
Alexiad is ‘somewhat restrained’ in its treatment of Doukas, as Anna refrains from 
giving him full credit for his achievements, and rarely compliments him.  This 
judgment is borne out by close study of Anna’s narrative of Doukas’ military career.  
Furthermore, we are told little of his struggles with the Serbs whilst doux of 
Dyrrachion, suggesting that his involvement in other military actions may also have 
been overlooked;9 we cannot place him at all in the period from 1092 to 1097.  
Polemis proposes that Anna may have felt some resentment towards her uncle.  
Perhaps his career ended in the ignominy of rebellion,10 and Anna thought it unwise 
to mention given that it reflected rather poorly on her father.  This conclusion 
compares favourably with Peter Frankopan’s recent analysis of Anna’s portrayal of 
the kaisar Nikephoros Melissenos.  Frankopan determines that Anna deliberately 
played down Melissenos’ role in military successes as part of an effort to craft a 
                                                 
6 ὡς ἔγωγε περὶ τούτου ἤκουον (Anna Komnene: IX.2.2.52-56). 
7 Ibid: IX.2.3. 
8 ὁ µέντοι Βουτουµίτης ἀναλαβόµενος τὸν Ῥαψοµάτην καὶ τοὺς συναποστατήσαντας αὐτῷ Ἀθανάτους 
ἐπάνεισι πρὸς τὸν ∆ούκαν, καὶ οὕτως εἴσεισι πρὸς τὴν βασιλεύουσαν (ibid: IX.2.4.88-91; trans. 242). 
9 See Frankopan (2002b): 75-90 for Doukas’ activities during this period. 
10 As suggested by Polemis (1968): 69 & n.13. 
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negative portrait of this individual, perhaps because Melissenos rebelled against his 
close friend Alexios, something Anna may have found too damaging to disclose.11  In 
any case, it cannot be that sources on John Doukas’ military career were lacking;12 
Frankopan, presumably on the basis of Anna’s admission that she gained information 
from her uncles, even asserts that Doukas provided Anna ‘with a substantial amount 
of the material which appears in the Alexiad’.13  Perhaps Anna utilized material 
provided by Doukas, but manipulated the information accordingly. 
We cannot be certain if the minimal, negative or lukewarm portrayals of certain 
generals who served under Alexios are by Anna’s own design or a consequence of her 
material.  The successes of Gregory Taronites on the Black Sea coast in 1103, greatly 
extolled in Theophylact of Ohrid’s letters to the general but mentioned only fleetingly 
in the Alexiad, could well have been marginalized and distorted so as to simplify 
Anna’s depiction of the doux of Trebizond as a scheming rebel.14  By contrast, the 
sparse coverage of the campaigns of the domestikos of the west, Gregory Pakourianos, 
indicates that material was lacking, since Anna writes favourably of the general in the 
few instances he does feature.15  Such general discrepancies in Anna’s portrayals 
suggests that she cannot have had detailed biographies of these generals, and thus 
                                                 
11 Frankopan (2006): esp. 168-170, 183. 
12 In his own time, Doukas’ deeds were heralded and widely-known.  His Cretan expedition is 
mentioned in the Vita of Saint Meletios the Younger, written in 1141 (Nicholas of Methone, The Vita of 
St. Meletios: §27), while Theophylact of Ohrid sent a letter of congratulations to Doukas following the 
reconquest of the Aegean islands and the western seaboard of Asia Minor, wishing him further glory in 
his quest to reclaim Cyprus and Crete.  The letter includes little real information on the campaign, but it 
is apparent that news of his success spread quickly, and that Doukas’ contemporaries were in no real 
doubt as to who was the real architect of these victories (Theophylact of Ohrid: II, 153-155). For the 
historical context of the correspondence and discussion of Theophylact’s letters as a source for the 
Alexian ‘reconquest’, see Mullett (1997a): 234; idem (1997b): esp. 240-241.  For Doukas’ campaigns, 
see Ahrweiler (1966): 182-189; Gautier (1977); Frankopan (2004). 
13 Frankopan (2002a): 64-65. 
14 Theophylact of Ohrid: II, 415-417, 433, 473-475.  For discussion see Leroy-Molinghen (1936); 
Mullett (1992b): 239-243.  For the disgrace of the Taronites family as a consequence of the rebellion, 
see Frankopan (2007): 30. 
15 See Frankopan (1996).  Anna Komnene: VI.14.3-4. 
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lends support to the idea that she mainly utilized dispatches recording the events of 
particular campaigns. 
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Appendix II. Distortion and Dishonesty in Imperial Bulletins: The Example of 
Emperor Constantius II 
Our best evidence for the manipulation of events in military reports comes from the 
fourth-century, specifically the Res Gestae of Latin historian Ammianus Marcellinus.  
In a fascinating critique, Ammianus chastises the Emperor Constantius and his 
publicists for discrediting the achievements of the kaisar Julian and attributing false 
deeds to the emperor in public announcements.  Ammianus’ rant appears in the 
context of the aftermath of the Battle of Argentoratum in 357, where Julian defeated 
an Alemanni army led by King Chnodomar.  Rather than give praise to Julian, 
bulletins issued throughout the empire proclaimed that Constantius was chiefly 
responsible for the success.  The passage is worth quoting in full: 
On the successful outcome of these exploits…some of the courtiers in 
Constantius’ palace found fault with Julian, in order to please the emperor 
himself, or facetiously called him Victorinus, on the ground that, although he was 
modest in making reports whenever he led the army in battle, he often mentioned 
defeats of the Germans.  And between piling on empty praise, and pointing to 
what was clearly evident, they as usual puffed up the emperor, who was naturally 
conceited, by ascribing whatever was done anywhere in the world to his 
favourable auspices.  As a consequence, he was elated by the grandiloquence of 
his sycophants, and then and later in his published edicts he arrogantly lied about 
a great many matters, frequently writing that he alone (although he had not been 
present at the action) had both fought and conquered, and had raised up the 
suppliant kings of foreign nations.  If, for example, when he himself was then in 
Italy, one of his generals had fought bravely against the Persians, he would make 
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no mention of him in the course of a very long account, but would send out letters 
wreathed in laurel to the detriment of the provinces, indicating with odious self-
praise that he had fought in the front ranks.  In short, there are extant sayings filed 
among the public records of this emperor, in which ostentatious reports are given, 
of his boasting and exalting himself to the sky.  When this battle was fought near 
Argentoratum, although he was distant forty days’ march, in his description of the 
fight he falsely asserts that he arranged the order of battle, and stood among the 
standard-bearers, and drove the barbarians headlong, and that Chonodomarius was 
brought to him, saying nothing (Oh, shameful dignity!) of the glorious deeds of 
Julian, which he would have buried in oblivion, had not fame been unable to 
suppress his splendid exploits, however much many people would have obscured 
them.1 
While Ammianus Marcellinus was greatly fond of Julian, it is to be expected that non-
campaigning emperors might attempt to exploit the success of subordinates for their 
own benefit, largely to enhance their own prestige but perhaps also because of 
concern of appearing inadequate in the shadow of their leading generals.2  While there 
                                                 
1 His tot ac talibus prospero peractis eventu, in palatio Constanti quidam Iulianum culpantes, ut 
princeps ipse delectaretur, irrisive Victorinum ideo nominabant, quod verecunde referens quotiens 
imperaret, superatos indicabat saepe Germanos.  interque exaggerationem inanium laudum, 
ostentationemque aperte lucentium.  inflabant ex usu imperatorem. suopte ingenio nimium, quicquid 
per omnem terrae ambitum agebatur, felicibus eius auspieiis assignantes.  quocirca magniloquentia 
elatus adulatorum, tunc et deinde edictis propositis, arroganter satis multa mentiebatur, se solum (cum 
gestis non adfuisset) et dimicasse et vicisse et supplices reges gentium erexisse aliquotiens scribens, et 
si verbi gratia eo agente tunc in Italia, dux quidam egisset fortiter contra Persas, nulla eius mentione per 
textum longissimum facta, laureatas litteras ad provinciarum damna mittebat, se inter primores 
versatum cum odiosa sui iactatione significans. exstant denique eius dicta. in tabulariis principis 
publicis condita, in quibus ambitiose delata narrandi extollendique semet in caelum.  Ab Argentorato 
cum pugnaretur, mansione quadragesima disparatus, describens proelium aciem ordinasse, et stetisse 
inter signiferos, et barbaros fugasse praecipites, sibique oblatum falso indicat Chonodomarium (pro 
rerum indignitas) super Iuliani gloriosis actibus conticescens, quos sepelierat penitus, ni fama res 
maximas, vel obumbrantibus plurimis, silere nesciret (Ammianus Marcellinus: XVI.12.67-70; trans. I, 
301-303). 
2 Lee (2007): 38-39. 
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is little evidence confirming that emperors continued to assume credit (to the 
detriment of lesser commanders) in imperial bulletins of subsequent centuries, rulers 
such as Constantine VII Porphyrogenitos and Manuel I Komnenos are known to have 
participated in triumphs granted to subordinate generals,3 which might suggest that a 
parallel literary practice was at times adopted by imperial publicists.  In any case, the 
example of Constantius demonstrates that imperial victory bulletins could grossly 
distort the reality of events.
                                                 
3 For Constantine VII, see McCormick (1986): 165-166; Shepard (2001); Holmes (2012): 67-68.  For 
Manuel, see above, 139-147. 
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Appendix III. Dishonesty, Culpability and Praise in the Reports of Subordinates: 
The Example of the Battle of Callinicum, 531 
While Eustathios of Thessaloniki’s record of the dispatches sent by David Komnenos 
confirm that such documents were often driven by self-interest, without the reports or 
even an alternative historical account favourable to David we cannot know how the 
governor misled the Emperor Andronikos.  For insight into this practice, and indeed 
how military dispatches might influence the historical record, we must turn to the 
historiography of the earlier period; specifically, the official report of the Battle of 
Callinicum thought to underlie the narrative of sixth-century historian, John Malalas. 
There are a number of differences between Malalas’ write-up of the battle and that of 
his contemporary Procopius, with the conduct of the general Belisarius a particular 
point of divergence.  According to Procopius, Belisarius advised his troops that battle 
should be postponed, so that the festivities of Easter Sunday could be observed.  His 
men rejected however, and it is said that their weakness as a result of fasting was a 
key factor in the defeat.  This is not mentioned by Malalas, who portrays Belisarius as 
something of a peripheral figure.  In Procopius’ account, Belisarius dismounts and 
fights on foot until nightfall, at which point he escapes by boat.  Malalas, however, 
alleges that Belisarius fled much sooner, leaving the doukes Sunikas and Simmas to 
battle the enemy alone.  A contrast may also be seen in the portrayal of the Arab 
Arethas: while Procopius records that Arethas’ division easily crumbled and thus he 
suspected treachery, Malalas notes that Arethas was among the few Arabs to perform 
admirably.  Perhaps the most glaring discrepancy may be seen in the conclusion and 
aftermath of the battle.  Malalas paints a picture of Roman victory, with the Persians 
pursued for two miles and the Romans returning to the field the following day to 
despoil enemy corpses.  By Procopius’ account, the Romans were forced to retreat to 
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an island on the Euphrates, and were only able to recover their own dead once the 
enemy had looted the field and departed.1 
Procopius’ account is explained by his close links to Belisarius, who may have 
charged his personal secretary to write a report in which blame for the defeat was 
attributed to the overzealousness of his troops and the treachery of Arethas.2  The 
provenance of Malalas’ version of events is alluded to in his post-battle narrative.  
Here it is said that the magister officiorum Hermogenes, having learnt what happened, 
informed the Emperor Justinian via letter.  The emperor then dispatched to the east 
the former dux of Moesia, Constantiolus, ‘to find out the truth of the battle’.3  Having 
interviewed the regional exarchs and Hermogenes, he returned to Constantinople and 
reported his findings to the emperor, at which point Belisarius was relieved as 
magister militum per Orientem.4  The account of Malalas thus appears to present the 
official version of events, whereby Belisarius was deemed at fault; this outcome is 
indirectly confirmed by Procopius, who later notes that Belisarius was removed from 
eastern command.5  Malalas either consulted the report filed by Constantiolus6 or the 
letter of Hermogenes.7  The link to Hermogenes is strengthened by subsequent 
reference to ‘a report sent from Hermogenes’ (µήνυσις κατεπέµφθη παρὰ 
Ἑρµογένους) to the emperor about a smaller engagement at Nymphios, a document to 
                                                 
1 Procopius, Wars: I.18; John Malalas: 18.60.  For analysis of the battle, see Kawar (1957): 43-48, 55-
56; Greatrex (1998): 193-212. 
2 For an alternative view, see Whately (2008), who suggests that Procopius presents a balanced view of 
the general and of this battle in particular, the result of which Whately attributes to a failure on 
Belisarius’ part to control his men.  For analysis of the role of the Arabs in this battle, see Kawar 
(1957): 43-48, 55-56; Shahid (1995): 134-142.  Procopius similarly attempts to exonerate Belisarius for 
a defeat outside Rome in 537, as the general again reluctantly went to battle because of pressure from 
the populace and his troops (Wars: V.28.1-4). 
3 ...γνῶναι τὴν ἀλήθειαν τοῦ πολέµου (John Malalas: 18.60 [389.61-62]; trans. 271). 
4 Ibid: 18.60-18.61. 
5 Procopius, Wars: I.21.2. 
6 Contra Greatrex (1998): 195. 
7 Averil Cameron (1985): 145-147.  
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which Malalas may also have had access in some form.8  Elizabeth Jeffreys 
compellingly argues that Malalas attained official documents through the office of the 
comes Orientis in Antioch, where the historian was based, and where copies of 
official correspondence from eastern officials were stored.9  Malalas’ proposed use of 
an official report would account for the precise date (19th April, Holy Saturday), the 
large number of Roman personnel mentioned,10 the sizes of the Roman contingents,11 
and the brief, unliterary nature of the narrative12 - all salient features of document-
based information.13 
This official version of events was no less partisan than the account of Procopius.  
Malalas depicts Belisarius as a coward; other commanders fare better, in particular the 
doukes Sunikas and Simmas, who stand and fight the enemy.14  Similar is Malalas’ 
brief account of the Battle of Dara, wherein Belisarius, in contrast to Procopius’ 
account of the same engagement, is barely mentioned; again, however, Sunikas enjoys 
a heroic role, defeating a Persian noble in single combat.15  Returning to Callinicum, 
both accounts at least concur on the discord among the various Roman forces prior to 
                                                 
8 John Malalas: 18.65 (391.25-26); trans. 273.  Greatrex (1998: 195) suspects that Malalas had access 
to the entire document, though Elizabeth Jeffreys (1990) suggests that he may have only located a 
receipt of the item in the Antiochene archives, as his account of the battle is quite brief. 
9 E. Jeffreys (1990): 209-211.  For Malalas’ alleged use of items from the various archives of Antioch, 
see ibid: 200-216. 
10 Those mentioned include Hermogenes, Alamundaras, Arethas, Belisarius, Sunikas, Stephanus, 
Apskal, Simmas, Dorotheus, Mamantios, Andrazes, Namaan, Abros, and Stephanakios. 
11 Malalas breaks down the figures accordingly: 8000 under Belisarius, 5000 under Arethas, 4000 
under Sunikas, and another 4000 under Simmas.  The numbers themselves are consistent – 20,000 men 
for the Army of the East corresponds exactly with figures divulged by Procopius (Wars: I.18.5) - 
though they are also rounded and simplified. Whately (2009: 103) is perhaps right to suggest that they 
may be a product of authorial emphasis rather than official sources.  For discussion of army numbers at 
this time, see Treadgold (1995): 44-49, 59-64. 
12 Averil Cameron (1985): 145-146, where it is conceded that this style may equally be a consequence 
of the chronicle tradition within which Malalas was writing.  See also Whately (2009): 103-106. 
13 Howard-Johnston (2010): 300.  
14 Averil Cameron (1985): 145-147 notes that Malalas’ version is distorted to favour generals other 
than Belisarius. 
15 Procopius, Wars: I.13.12; John Malalas: 18.50. 
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the battle, with Belisarius angry at Sunikas for attacking the enemy without consulting 
his fellow generals.16  It seems therefore that Belisarius had many detractors among 
those involved in the campaign, and given that Constantiolus is only recorded as 
having seen Hermogenes and the other exarchs, it is possible that his fate was sealed 
by the testimonies stacked against him.17  We cannot rule out the possibility that 
Belisarius composed his own report – the version of events outlined in Procopius – 
which contradicted that of Hermogenes, who most probably based his testimony on 
the statements of Sunikas and Simmas; indeed, that Justinian ordered an inquiry into 
the battle suggests he received conflicting reports.  Given the efforts of Procopius to 
exculpate Belisarius, and the general’s subsequent dismissal, Kawar and Cameron 
deemed Malalas’ version to be more truthful,18 but Whately and Greatrex are less 
convinced, the latter noting that the reports of Hermogenes will ‘scarcely have been 
objective’.19  We may at least concur with Greatrex and say that Malalas’ optimistic 
conclusion of the battle and its aftermath appears highly improbable.  Evidently, this 
was a setback for the Romans, and Procopius’ sombre appraisal is more honest in this 
respect.20  Seemingly there is merit and fabrication in both accounts. 
After relating the flight of various elements of the Roman army, Malalas returns to the 
resilient Sunikas and Simmas; having stated that the pair ‘continued fighting with 
their army’ (ἐπέµειναν µαχόµενοι µετὰ τοῦ ἰδίου στρατοῦ), Malalas describes the 
arrival of the Roman forces at Callinicum, following a two-mile pursuit of the 
Persians.21  These events cannot be easily reconciled.  How the Roman army broke 
                                                 
16 John Malalas: 18.60. 
17 Greatrex (1998): 194-195. 
18 Kawar (1957): 43-48, 55-56; Averil Cameron (1985): 157-158. 
19 Greatrex (1998): 66-67; Whately (2009): 248-249. 
20 Greatrex (1998): 206. 
21 John Malalas: 18.60 (389.50-55); trans. 273. 
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the Persians and put them to flight is not explicitly stated, presumably because no 
such thing occurred.  Mention of the actions of Sunikas and Simmas does not enhance 
our understanding of the course of the battle, for there is no direct link between the 
outcome of their personal duels and troop morale, as we might find in other historical 
accounts.22  The sole purpose of this construction is to depict the doukes as heroic 
warriors, successfully battling Persians in single combat.  Hermogenes, seemingly 
informed by Sunikas and Simmas given the focus and detail, was clearly attempting to 
extricate the pair from blame.  Hermogenes’ preference for Sunikas is affirmed by 
Malalas’ brief account of the Battle of Dara, probably also culled from the magister 
officiorum’s notes: Sunikas again triumphs in single combat, and his is the only 
personal feat described.23   
If Malalas’ account of the Battle of Callinicum is considered to be largely 
representative of his original source, it can be concluded that Hermogenes drafted a 
concise report, and was concerned to put a positive slant on the outcome and extricate 
Sunikas and Simmas from blame.  The pair, Sunikas in particular, appear to have been 
Hermogenes’ key informants on the battle, and regardless of the truth, Belisarius’ 
dismissal following the subsequent investigation exposed his lack of friends among 
eastern command.  The historical record preserves Hermogenes’ report as well as, it 
would seem, Belisarius’ riposte.
                                                 
22 See, for example, Leo the Deacon’s account of the Battle of Arcadiopolis, where the death of a 
prominent Russian at the hands of Bardas Skleros demoralizes his followers and causes them to flee the 
battlefield (Leo the Deacon: 110-111).   
23 John Malalas: 18.50. 
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Appendix IV. Historical Accounts and the Formative Years of Emperors and 
Aristocrats 
Surviving sources disclose little of the education and training of prospective soldiers 
in Byzantium, and one suspects that even full biographies of soldiers touched only 
briefly on their subject’s upbringing.  Hagiography, a probable model for the 
biographical works of the tenth century, displays an inconsistency in this regard, with 
Béatrice Caseau-Chevallier observing that ‘the space allotted to the description of a 
saint’s childhood ranges from a few lines to a number of pages’.1  Hagiographers of 
Late Antiquity were known to pass over the childhood of their subject, seemingly 
considering it irrelevant, and begin from an age around fourteen.2  This tendency is 
frequently observed in secular literature.  Dimiter Angelov recognized that 
representations of imperial childhood in encomia and historiography of the Middle 
Byzantine period are idealized, with common motifs and themes running throughout.  
Particularly relevant here are the child’s education and his precocious maturity,3 both 
applicable also to the life of an aristocratic soldier.  Physical and military education 
were seen as an integral part of imperial childhood by the late eleventh century, 
though military training had long been mandatory in the upbringing of most princes 
and aristocratic children.4  Nikephoros Bryennios records the military training 
afforded to Alexios Komnenos’ father John and uncle Isaac when they were entrusted 
to the care of the Emperor Basil II as youths.5  In the 1080s Theophylact, archbishop 
of Ohrid, composed an oration to the young imperial heir, Constantine Doukas, then 
aged between ten and twelve.  Theophylact encouraged his subject to undergo 
                                                 
1 Caseau-Chevallier (2009): 162-165, esp. 162.  See also Abrahamse (1979); Kalogeras (2001). 
2 Caseau-Chevallier (2009): 130-138. 
3 Angelov (2009): esp. 105-111. 
4 For military training in Byzantium, see McGeer (1995a): 217-222. 
5 Bryennios: 75-77. 
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military training and learn from older soldiers, and praised Constantine for killing a 
ferocious beast during a hunting expedition.6  The twelfth-century panegyrics of 
Eustathios of Thessaloniki note that John II Komnenos educated his son Manuel in 
arms and tactics, just as Manuel later trained his eleven year-old son Alexios II.7  
Such details accord with traditional rules of imperial panegyric.8 
Demonstration of maturity at a young age in Middle Byzantine literature entailed a 
display of exceptional courage or an early involvement in military affairs.  After 
briefly documenting Basil’s education, the Vita Basilii skips ahead to the moment 
Basil ventured to Constantinople, to the time when he had ‘reached the age of 
adolescence and was about to turn to more manly pursuits’.9  The heroism of Digenes 
Akrites is first seen during a hunting expedition, wherein the twelve year-old Digenes 
is said to have wrestled bears before tackling a great lion.10  Manuel I Komnenos 
initially appears in the historical record as a twenty-two year-old performing 
heroically in the army of his father.11  Having related the education of John and Isaac 
Komnenos, Nikephoros Bryennios progresses to when the brothers were mature 
enough to enrol in the imperial bodyguard (the Hetaireia), as was customary for the 
sons of aristocratic noblemen.12  Nikephoros Bryennios also provides some snippets 
about the education and training of Alexios I Komnenos and his siblings, though the 
first time Alexios appears as an active character in the Hyle Historias is as a fourteen-
                                                 
6 Theophylact of Ohrid: I, 183, 207. 
7 Eustathios of Thessaloniki, Orations: 190, 285.  Michel Italikos (282-284) likewise records John’s 
training of Manuel in war. 
8 Menander Rhetor (Peri Epideiktikon: 371-372) encouraged encomiasts to describe the mental and 
physical education of the subject. 
9 Ἤδη δὲ αὐ<τοῦ> τὴν παιδικὴν παραλλάξαντος ἡλι<κί>αν καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν µειρακίων ἐλάσαντος καὶ 
τοῖς ἀνδρικωτέροις καιρὸν ἔχοντος προσβαίνειν ἐπιτηδεύµασιν (Vita Basilii: §7.1-3; trans. 29). 
10 Digenes Akrites: GIV; E739-791.  In other Byzantine romances, such as the Byzantine Iliad and the 
Achilleid, the hero likewise proves his manly worth in his early teens – see Jouanno (1996): 47-49. 
11 Kinnamos: 21; Niketas Choniates, Chronike Diegesis: 35. 
12 Bryennios: 77.  
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year-old eager to participate in an eastern expedition of Romanos IV Diogenes.13  
Anna Komnene, drawing on Bryennios for Alexios’ early career, does not elaborate 
on her father’s upbringing.  It may be concluded that emperors and aristocrats do not 
become active protagonists in historiography and epic literature until old enough to 
accomplish a manly deed or undertake a professional career, realistically between the 
ages of twelve and eighteen.   
It is impossible to reach a firm conclusion on this matter since we do not learn of the 
formative years of probable subjects of aristocratic literature subjects such as Bardas 
Skleros and Katakalon Kekaumenos.  Nevertheless, there is consistency in the 
depiction of aristocratic childhood in secular literature.  The narrative often jumps 
from birth to education and then on to adulthood, with little in between.  The typika of 
Michael VIII Palaiologos attest to a general method of describing soldierly childhood.  
In one, Michael briefly mentions his education and patronage under John III Doukas 
Vatatzes, stating: ‘from adolescence as soon as I was capable I was called to bear 
arms’.14  In another typikon, Michael goes further: 
From the beginning...we were raised in the imperial court so as to obtain a good 
education...But when we were well into our eighteenth year, as God furnished me 
with the strength…we were clothed with a tunic of scale armour, we placed an 
iron helmet on our head, and we bent our arm to hold a long spear, and we put a 
warrior’s shield over our shoulder.15 
                                                 
13 Ibid: 103-105. 
14 ἐγὼ δὲ ὡς εἰς µείρακας ἤδη πρώτως παρήγγελλον καὶ ὅπλα φέρειν ἦν ἱκανός (Typikon of Michael 
VIII Palaiologos for the Monastery of St Demetrios of the Palaiologoi-Kellibara in Constantinople: 
451; trans. 1243). 
15 ἐκ πρώτης γάρ, ὅ φασι, τριχος ταῖς βασιλείοις αὐλαῖς ἀνετράφηµεν παιδείας ἀγαθῆς χάριν, 
πράγµατος οὐκ εὐπορίστου, καὶ ἥκιστα χωρὶς ἰδρώτων καὶ συχνῶν καµάτων ληπτοῦ.  Ἤδη δὲ καὶ τὸν 
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In the case of aristocratic literature, it is questionable how much the reader needed to 
know beyond the education of the subject and the first manly deed which marked his 
entry into adulthood.  Caseau-Chevallier attributes the rather standardized childhood 
of a saint in hagiography to an ‘unwritten pact’ between the author and his audience, 
the expectation being that readers wished only to know the signs of holiness which 
prefigured the saint’s path to heaven.16  It may have been that a similar tendency 
prevailed in historical accounts detailing the lives of soldiers and warrior emperors, as 
readers were keen to learn of the heroism and accomplishments of the subject.
                                                                                                                                            
ὀκτωκαιδέκατον χρόνον ἐλαύνοντες Θεοῦ χορηγοῦντος τὸ δύνασθαι...περιεβαλόµεθα χιτῶνα 
φολιδωτόν, κράνος ἐκορυφωσάµεθα σιδηροῦν, δόρυ διηγκωνισάµεθα δολιχόν, καὶ ἀρεϊκὴν ἀσπίδα 
ἐπωµισάµεθα (Typikon of Michael VIII Palaiologos for the Monastery of the Archangel Michael on 
Mount Auxentios near Chalcedon: 790; trans. 1230-1231, with amendments). 
16 Caseau-Chevallier (2009): 129. 
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Appendix V. Repetition of Combat Scenes in Middle Byzantine Literature 
The suggested influence of oral tales on aristocratic literature and by extension ‘heroic 
historiography’ might explain the generic nature of many scenes of combat.  
Frequently in Middle Byzantine descriptions of battle limbs are sliced off, bodies 
severed in half, heads crushed, and torsos speared.  These may have been common 
enough sights on the battlefield, but one suspects that the historian is often drawing on 
stock descriptive elements to convey the carnage of battle.  Mimesis of phrases from 
classical works was one option available to writers.  Leo the Deacon, for example, 
twice lifts the phrase ‘lost much blood and was stricken by many arrows’ 
(ἔξαιµος…καὶ καταβελὴς) from Dionysius of Halicarnassus, once to describe the fate 
of Nikephoros Pastilas, and again to render the plight of Sviatoslav at Dorostolon.1  
More striking is the repetition of combat scenes and episodes.  Alexander Kazhdan’s 
observation that Leo the Deacon tended to repeat certain situations is true of his 
descriptions of combat.2  Thus Leo reports that Nikephoros Phokas once thrust a spear 
through the chest of an enemy champion with such force that it penetrated both sides 
of his breastplate, emerging from his back.3  Later in the narrative, Leo writes of a 
very similar deed performed by Peter stratopedarches when battling a ‘Scythian’.4  
Anna Komnene’s tendency to show her father conducting fighting retreats from the 
battlefield results in similar constructions at the battles of Dyrrachion and Dristra; 
                                                 
1 Dionysius of Halicarnassus: II.42.5, in relation to Mettius Curtius.  Leo the Deacon: 10.6-8, trans. 63, 
for Pastilas (ἔξαιµός τε καὶ καταβελὴς ἐγεγόνει); 155.6-8; trans. 198, for Sviatoslav (ἔξαιµος γεγονὼς 
καὶ καταβελὴς). 
2 Kazhdan (2006): 286. 
3 Leo the Deacon: 10-11. 
4 Ibid: 107-108. 
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during both Alexios reaches safety by heroically charging the remnant of the enemy 
line and unhorsing an opponent.5 
A complex case is presented by the recurrence of larger scenes, particularly those 
which derive from different sources.  Both Leo the Deacon and Skylitzes relate an 
episode where the rebel Bardas Phokas, fleeing to his fortress, was accosted and 
heckled by the gallant Constantine Charon.  After an exchange of opinions, Phokas 
cut down his bold pursuer and reached his destination.6  A very similar incident may 
be found in the Vita Basilii.  As the Paulician leader Chrysocheir fled, a Byzantine 
soldier named Poulades caught up with him, and a conversation ensued in which 
Poulades affirmed his intent to catch him.7  Poulades proved more successful than 
Charon in his objective, but the basic principle of the pursued being harassed by a 
bold chaser features in both accounts.  Strong parallels may also be seen in Skylitzes’ 
accounts of the battles of the river Acheloos (917) and the river Halys (989).  
Skylitzes provides two accounts of the encounter at the Acheloos River, which 
resulted in defeat for the Byzantines at the hands of the Bulgarians.  According to one 
version, the Byzantine commander, Leo Phokas, went to clean himself at the river, but 
his horse bolted, riding through the Byzantine ranks.  Thinking their commander 
dead, the men panicked and fled.8  Skylitzes’ account of the Battle of the river Halys 
unfolds similarly: having been injured in his duel with Bardas Phokas, Bardas Skleros 
was brought down to the water to treat his wounds, but his men fled when they saw 
his horse run through the lines without a rider, believing Skleros dead.9  These 
                                                 
5 See above, 331-334. 
6 Leo the Deacon: 124-125; Skylitzes: 293-294. 
7 Vita Basilii: §43; Skylitzes: 139-140. 
8 Skylitzes: 203-204. 
9 Ibid: 326-327. 
404 
examples demonstrate a tendency for scenes, constructs and descriptions to be 
recycled in Middle Byzantine accounts of battle. 
Literary borrowings undoubtedly contributed to this, with Homer an obvious model 
for gore and violence in combat.  Yet it is not implausible that the repetition of certain 
scenarios owes something to the technique of oral composition.  Bernard Fenik 
demonstrates that much of the Iliad’s battle narrative consists of an extensive, if 
limited, store of ‘typical’ or repeated details and sequences which the poet combined 
and altered for different effect.  It is thought that these stock elements derived from 
epic oral poetry, which relied on repetition and emphasis for greater understanding.10  
Fenik subsequently argued that a similar if less complex tradition underlined the 
construction of scenes in the Escorial Digenes Akrites.  He proposes that combat in 
this version of the poem, often thought to be closer to the original oral composition, 
possesses two main characteristics: the orderly scene-drawing seen generally in the 
narrative; and the various single battles which are built from a stock-pile of common 
details.  It is suggested that this style developed among the storytellers and poets of 
Asia Minor, just as it had in ancient Ionia and indeed across medieval Europe.11   
If one maintains that ‘heroic historiography’ was a logical progression from oral 
songs, it follows that some scenes of combat and descriptions of violence may also 
have derived from traditional oral tales.  While comparison with Digenes Akrites can 
take us only so far given that the Grottaferrata in particular may have been subject to a 
number of literary influences, the manner in which individual combat is described 
certainly echoes descriptions of ‘heroic historiography’.  In the Escorial Digenes, the 
titular hero frequently shows his prowess by killing both man and horse, in one 
                                                 
10 Fenik (1968): esp. 1-8, 11, 162-163. 
11 Idem (1991): 57-63. 
405 
instance driving a spear through both and in another striking a sword blow which split 
both horse and rider down the middle.12  Whilst fighting the Amazon Maximou, 
Digenes slices the head of her horse in half; in the Grottaferrata version, the head is 
hacked off at the neck, while another of Maximou’s horses is cut in half.13  In ‘heroic 
historiography’ soldiers are routinely cloven and speared, while horses tend to be an 
unfortunate casualty.14  Constantine Skleros sliced off the head of a Russian’s horse in 
the process of slaying its rider; Bardas Skleros cut another Russian in half.15  In his 
duel with Bardas Phokas, Skleros sliced off the right ear and bridle of his opponent’s 
horse.16  Accounts of the Battle of Antioch-on-the-Maeander record Theodore 
Laskaris striking at the hind or front legs of the horse of his enemy, Sultan 
Kaykhusraw of Rum.17  One particularly vivid encounter is described by Niketas 
Choniates.  In 1190, a huge German champion found himself surrounded by fifty 
Turkish soldiers.  One rode out to meet the German, who sliced off the horse’s two 
front legs with his great sword, before bringing his weapon down on the head of his 
opponent with such force that he cut the Turk in half and even cut through the back of 
his mount.18  Such an extraordinary feat would not be out of place in Digenes Akrites.   
                                                 
12 Digenes Akrites: E940-942, 962-965. 
13 Ibid: E1558-1559; GVI.584-589, 740-770. 
14 For horses being targeted in combat, see McGeer (1995a): 311-312.  The logic of such damage being 
inflicted is questionable when we consider an episode described by Theophanes.  At the Battle of 
Nineveh, Heraclius’ horse Dorkon was wounded in the thigh with a spear and received several blows to 
the face, but was unhurt on account of its sinew armour (Theophanes: 318-319).  Given the heavy 
armour of the kataphraktoi horsemen of the Middle Byzantine period, the idea of slicing through a 
horse seems rather implausible. 
15 Leo the Deacon: 110; Skylitzes: 290-291. 
16 Skylitzes: 326. 
17 Akropolites: 17.9-10 (hind legs – τοὺς ὀπισθίους πόδας); Nikephoros Gregoras: Ι, 21.1-2 (front legs 
– τοὺς ἐµπροσθίους πόδας).  The difference may hint at some fabrication concerning the encounter, 
based on stock scenes of combat.  Niketas Choniates (Letters and Orations: 172.7-8) suggests that the 
sultan’s horse was struck in the lower part of the legs (ἐς κνήµας). 
18 Niketas Choniates, Chronike Diegesis: 414-415. 
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It is suggested that oral compositions in the mould of Digenes Akrites, many praising 
the deeds of Byzantine generals, developed a number of typical combat scenes upon 
which the early promotional literature of the aristocracy drew, in turn influencing the 
battle descriptions of later proponents of ‘heroic historiography’ such as Leo the 
Deacon, Anna Komnene and Niketas Choniates.  Such a proposal is not entirely 
novel.  Roderick Beaton has suggested that Anna Komnene based her account of the 
revolt of one Rhapsomates on Cyprus not on a song actually commemorating this 
historical event, but rather a mythical tale on a similar subject, ‘to which the historical 
circumstances of Rhapsomates’ revolt had become…attached’.19  The suggestion 
therefore is that historians might have fashioned narrative episodes from elements of 
oral tales.  Admittedly, in the absence of a cluster of surviving frontier songs the idea 
remains hypothetical.  The probability of literary borrowing is high.  The matter is 
also complicated by lack of evidence for oral tradition in Byzantium, as well as the 
mutual influence of Homer on songs and ‘heroic historiography’.  The bards and poets 
of ninth- and tenth-century Anatolia drew upon Homeric epic for scenes of combat 
and violence, with biographers and historiographers following suit.  It is not 
unthinkable that the bards, working within the same culture of aristocratic hero-
worship, inspired the writers in this regard.
                                                 
19 Beaton (1986a): quote at 45. 
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Appendix VI. Digenes Akrites, Manuel I Komnenos and Visual Representation 
of Military Victory 
Another element linking Manuel Komnenos to Digenes Akrites is visual 
representation of heroism and victory.  The ceilings of Digenes’ palace dining 
chambers were decorated with golden mosaics recording the triumphs of great heroes.  
Among the scenes were Samson’s battle with the Philistines; David’s duel with 
Goliath; the exploits of Joshua; the wars of Achilles; the deeds of Odysseus, and the 
triumphs of Alexander the Great.1  Our best evidence for the prevalence of such 
scenes in aristocratic and royal households comes from the twelfth century.  The opus 
sectile floor of the south church of the Pantokrator monastery, constructed during the 
reign of John II Komnenos, featured the same four scenes from the life of Samson 
which adorned the palace of Digenes.2  Fragments suggest that another battle scene, 
possibly featuring Alexander the Great, also formed part of the decoration.3  Robert 
Ousterhout notes that such themes are typically associated more with Manuel 
Komnenos, principally because we are better informed on art from his reign.4  Here 
we observe Manuel earning a place alongside biblical and classical giants.  Kinnamos 
relates how the protostrator Alexios Axouch decorated his Constantinopolitan villa 
not with scenes of Manuel in hunting and war, as most officials were wont to do, but 
with murals of the campaigns of Sultan Kilij Arslan II.5  Other sources support 
Kinnamos’ claim that Manuel’s kin and other aristocrats adorned their homes with 
portraits of the emperor.  One Leo Sikountenos of Thessaloniki depicted Manuel 
                                                 
1 Digenes Akrites: GVII.59-101. 
2 Trilling (1989) suggests that scenes of Samson’s life may have been found on the floor of the Great 
Palace, and possibly influenced similar designs in Constantinople. 
3 Megaw (1963): 335-340; Ousterhout (2001): 147. 
4 Ousterhout (2001): 148. 
5 Kinnamos: 265-268. 
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alongside militaristic scenes of Joshua and Moses.6  The megas hetaireiarches George 
Palaiologos also decorated his monastery of the Theotokos with images of Manuel.  
The surviving description details the scenes depicted: 
[Manuel’s] countless feats are known throughout the earth’s orb, and a few of 
them have been represented here: how he set on fire the environs of Ikonion after 
forcing the entire Persian army to flee together with the chief satrap; how, while 
hunting unarmed, he chanced upon armed Saracens…and was wounded in the 
heel, yet turning round captured his assailant, but refrained from killing him; how, 
with a small army of Romans, he took countless captives when he joined battle 
with numerous attacking Ishmaelites and, all alone, put them to flight, not afraid 
of their swords, arrows and spears; next, how on setting forth to punish the 
insolent Dalmatians, he chanced upon the Paeonians, and showed his prowess in 
single combat by capturing the Zupan who came out against him with bared 
sword. 7 
                                                 
6 Cod. Marc. Gr. 524: fol. 22b, no. 61 (29-30); trans. Mango (1972): 225-226.  See also Magdalino & 
Nelson (1982): 135-137; Anne-Hunt (1984): 139. 
7 Πλὴν ἀλλὰ τὸν κράτιστον ἐν σκηπτροκράταις 
φρικτὸν Μανουὴλ βαρβάρων φυλαρχίαις 
ὡς δωρεῶν θάλασσαν ἐξυµνεῖ πλέον 
ἐιπεῖν δοτῆρα καὶ πνοῆς αὐτῆς κρίνων, 
οὗ µυρία τρόπαια γῆς ἔγνω κύκλος, 
ὦν βραχέων νῦν εἰκονίσθησαν τύποι· 
πῶς Ἰκονίου τὴν περίχωρον φλέγει 
πᾶν περσικὸν στράτευµα συνδραµὸν τότε 
τῷ σατραπάρχῃ συµφυγεῖν ἀναγκάσας· 
πῶς Ἀγαρηνοῖς ἐντυχὼν ὡπλισµένοις 
κυνηγετῶν ἄοπλος εἰσπίπτει µόνος 
βάλλων δὲ τοῦτον καὶ πρὸς ἄλλον ἐκκλίνων 
πτέρναν ἐπλήγη· πλὴν ἀναστρέψας φθάνει 
καὶ τὸν βαλόντα συλλαβὼν οὐ κτιννύει· 
πῶς δ’ ἀνάριθµον εἷλεν αἰχµαλωσίαν 
σὺν εὐαρίθµῳ στρατιᾷ τῶν Αὐσόνων· 
πολλοῖς ἐπιδραµοῦσιν Ἰσµαηλίταις 
συνεµβαλὼν ἔστρεψεν εἰς φυγὴν µόνος, 
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George was undoubtedly inspired by official records of Manuel’s campaigns, 
discussed in chapter three.  Whilst relating the return march from Ikonion in 1146, 
Kinnamos mentions an unarmed Manuel encountering Turks whilst hunting, being 
wounded in his heel, and yet still managing to capture his attacker.  ‘Manganeios 
Prodromos’ confirms the injury, and, like Kinnamos, draws attention to Manuel 
besting a Hungarian commander in single combat.  Lucy Anne-Hunt and Paul 
Magdalino propose that these images may have followed the gold mosaics depicting 
Manuel’s feats against ‘the barbarians’, which Choniates reveals lined the throne 
rooms of both the Blachernae and the Great Palace.8  The compiler of the dossier of 
synodal sessions held in 1166 confirms that a number of Manuel’s achievements were 
represented in rich mosaics in the throne room.9  Corroborative evidence is provided 
by Jewish traveller Benjamin of Tudela, whose itinerary records the representation of 
‘battles before [Manuel’s] day and his own combats’ on the walls of the Blachernae.10  
In 1172, Stefan Nemanja, ruler of Raska, beheld depictions of the recent campaign 
against him whilst visiting Constantinople, concurring with the version of events 
portrayed.  According to Eustathios of Thessaloniki, the cycle offered a remarkably 
lucid account: 
Here [Stephen was represented] leading his people to rebellion, elsewhere as a 
man-at-arms or a horseman, elsewhere placing his hand upon his sword, 
                                                                                                                                            
σπάθας, βέλη, δόρατα µὴ φρίξας τόσα· 
πῶς τοὺς παροινήσαντας αὗθις ∆αλµάτας 
ἐλθὼν κολάσαι Παίοσι προστυγχάνει· 
ἀνδραγαθεῖ µόνος δε συσχὼν ζουπάνον, 
γυµνῷ κατ’ ὄψιν ἀντεπελθόντα ξίφει (Cod. Marc. Gr. 524: fol. 108a-b, no. 224 [148-150]; trans. 
Mango 1972: 227-228). 
8 Niketas Choniates, Chronike Diegesis: 206.  For discussion see Magdalino (1978): 101-102; idem 
(1993a): 472-475; Anne-Hunt (1984): 140. 
9 Magdalino (1978): 106-107. 
10 Benjamin of Tudela: 21; trans. 13. 
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repeatedly ranging his army in the open, planting ambuscades, being defeated by 
your forces, filling the hard-trodden plain with his fugitives, and finally being 
enslaved.11   
Scenes of the emperor victorious in war were not new, and Manuel and his artists may 
have been inspired by such visuals in other parts of the Great Palace.12  According to 
Procopius, the ceiling of the Chalkê entrance was adorned with mosaics depicting 
battles and sieges from the Italian and African campaigns of Belisarius, who in turn is 
shown receiving rewards from Justinian.13  The entire ceiling of the building of the 
palace known as the Kainourgion was covered with golden mosaics depicting ‘the 
Herculean labours’ of Basil I: ‘his efforts on behalf of his subjects, his exertions in 
warlike struggles, and the victories granted to him by God’.14  Another section of the 
palace, the Kouboukleion, appears to have been decorated with murals showing the 
Emperor Alexios triumphing over his Norman, Pecheneg and Turkish enemies.15  In 
decorating the interiors of their homes to similar effect, provincial aristocrats may 
have drawn upon Arabic and Turkish influences, as demonstrated by Alexios Axouch 
and, it is suggested, the palace of Digenes Akrites.16  Many aristocrats also had an 
affinity with Armenia, where, in the early tenth century, King Gagik of Vaspurakan 
erected a palace and cathedral complex on the island of Aghthamar on Lake Van and 
                                                 
11 ὧδε µὲν ἐρεθίζοντα τὸ περὶ αὐτὸν ἔθνος εἰς ἐπανάστασιν, ἄλλοθι δὲ ὁπλίτην, ἱππότην, ἑτέρωθι δὲ τὴν 
χεῖρα ξίφους ἅψασθαι πλαγιάζοντα, πολλαχοῦ δὲ καὶ στρατὸν ἐξ ἐµφανοῦς τάττοντα καὶ λόχους 
καθίζοντα καὶ τέλος νικώµενον καὶ φυγῆς ἐµπιπλῶντα τήν τε πεδιάδα καὶ ὅση ἀπόκροτος καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶσι 
δουλούµενον (Eustathios of Thessaloniki, Orations: 217.86-218.24; trans. Mango 1972: 225). 
12 See Magdalino & Nelson (1982): 164. 
13 Procopius, De Aedificiis: I.X.15-16. 
14 ...προκαθήµενον ἔχων τὸν τοῦ ἔργου δηµιουργὸν ὑπὸ τῶν συναγωνιστῶν ὑποστρατήγων 
δορυφορούµενον, ὡς δῶρα προσαγόντων αὐτῷ τὰς ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ ἑαλωκυίας πόλεις. καὶ αὖθις ἄνωθεν ἐπὶ 
τῆς ὀροφῆς ἀνιστόρηται τὰ τοῦ βασιλέως Ἡράκλεια ἆθλα καὶ οἱ ὑπὲρ τοῦ ὑπηκόου πόνοι καὶ οἱ τῶν 
πολεµικῶν ἀγώνων ἱδρῶτες καὶ τὰ ἐκ θεοῦ νικητήρια (Vita Basilii: §89.17-24; trans. 291). 
15 Magdalino & Nelson (1982): 126-129. 
16 Anne-Hunt (1984): 142-145. 
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decorated the ceilings with triumphant scenes from the Old Testament.17  Lucy Anne-
Hunt suggests that the Anatolian refugees who moved to Constantinople following the 
Battle of Manzikert brought with them a melting pot of eastern styles of decoration, 
which, combined with the growing infatuation at court with chivalric romances and 
martial valour, led to a rise in artistic depictions of imperial military victory in the 
capital.18  It was the visual complement to the ‘heroic historiography’ of the period.19 
While there was a tradition of emperors emblazoning the ceilings of the palace with 
depictions of their wars and successes, that Manuel’s reign is the best documented 
period for official portraiture is unlikely to be a mere matter of source survival.  Paul 
Magdalino sees these mosaic cycles as part of Manuel’s attempts to propagate his 
military achievements, going hand-in-hand with court panegyric.20  Indeed, the 
rhetoric of one reinforced the other, with many of the scenes depicted precisely those 
extolled in bulletins and encomia.21  The murals of Digenes Akrites did not depict his 
own feats nor those of the emperor, but this can perhaps be attributed to modesty and 
the ambiguous portrayal of aristocratic-imperial relations.22  In Middle Byzantine 
visual propaganda, the emperor traditionally featured alongside the scenes presented 
in the murals of Digenes Akrites, reinforcing traditional strands of imperial authority 
and heroic ideology.23  Through such cycles, rulers might embellish their 
achievements and enhance their legitimacy.  Moreover, visual depiction of deeds 
                                                 
17 Thomas Artsruni: 354-358. For further discussion see Jones (1994).  For potential links between the 
palace and Digenes, see Bryer (1960), later revised in idem (1993): 94-94. 
18 Anne-Hunt (1984): 147. 
19 The practice continued into the Late period – George Pachymeres (I, 517) notes that Michael VIII 
Palaiologos’ victory over the Angevins in Albania in 1281 was immortalized on the walls of the palace, 
though plans to do the same for his earlier deeds were not fulfilled due to Michael’s death. 
20 Magdalino & Nelson (1982): 166-167. 
21 Magdalino (1993a): 473-474. 
22 See Anne Hunt (1984): 144-145. 
23 Grabar (1936): 93-97. 
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accomplished in war offered a memory more lasting and impressive than any written 
commemoration might offer.24
                                                 
24 For the practice of using visual media to commemorate victory in Late Antiquity, see Lee (2007): 42-
51. 
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